Huertgen is bypassed

Got to thinking about this today, watching video's of the battle, reading up on it. Let us suppose that instead of attacking directly into the forest, nothing more than holding forces are left in place, and the main effort is shifted to either side of it. How well would this strategy work, and how does it affect the outcome of the war?
 
I'm sure there was a reason for the campaign - to prevent the Germans from flooding land thought vital to the subsequent advance - or to get them to flood it prematurely?
 
Need to look at this battle in context of all the attacks going on during the Autum and winter. I don't have references at hand, but vaguely recall this battle was connected to the capture of the Achen transportation hub.
 

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I'm sure there was a reason for the campaign - to prevent the Germans from flooding land thought vital to the subsequent advance - or to get them to flood it prematurely?
That was the case, they were trying to gain control of the Rur Dam to prevent it being used to flood lowlands and prevent an invasion into Germany.
 
Heres two maps. First is a modern map of the Aachen area. Note the Hurtgen Forrest to the SE of Aachen. Advancing into the forrest flanks Aachen. Securing the forrest keeps enemy artillery and flanking attacks off a future advance out of Aachen along the major roads to the NE.

Aachen copy.jpg


Next is a map of the Hurtgen Forrest. This shows the front for 2 November when the battle in question nominally started. Note however over half the forested region, to the SW, had already been capture in the preceding weeks. Also that this is where the fortified West Wall had been breeched. Finally note how this front line of 2 Nov flanks Aachen to the NW.

I still have a lot of questions, but can see some logic in the attack. It may be the intent was to flank the relatively well defended West Wall to the south out of the terrain shown on the Hurtgen Forrest map. A longer view might be securing the entire Hurtgen Forrest out flanks the Aachen area. That may not hold up with more information, but on the surface both look logical. Many sources cite observers who described the 1st Army staff variously as 'worn out, pedantic, unimaginative, hostile. The 1st Army commander was also described as tired & unenergetic during these autum months. Col Dickenson the 1st Army G2 rejected assistance from the OSS, directing the OSS liaison team to leave his area. Devers, Patch, Patton, Simpson, and Bradly all made use of the OSS, integrating the liaison teams into their G2 operations, and utilizing OSS missions in their sectors. If Col Dickensons G2 was as dysfunctional as all this & other evidence suggests to German defense in the Hurtgen may have been a surprise. Col Dickenson was certainly surprised five weeks later by the Ardennes offensive.

Hurtgen Forrest copy.jpg


One other point. Bradley at least twice, once in Tunisia, and once in Sicily, broke a German defense line swiftly by making the primary attack of his II Corps through rugged uplands, which were in each case less well defended. It may be when he saw the plans for this offensive forwarded from 1st Army he saw it as what he might have done, & not considered a stronger German defense.
 
One other point. Bradley at least twice, once in Tunisia, and once in Sicily, broke a German defense line swiftly by making the primary attack of his II Corps through rugged uplands, which were in each case less well defended. It may be when he saw the plans for this offensive forwarded from 1st Army he saw it as what he might have done, & not considered a stronger German defense.

Well, from what I've read the German forces that defended Huertgen were far from impressive. Accounts seem to indicate that the initial defenders were made up of a mix of burnt-out survivors from the Falaise Gap and recently conscripted Luftwaffe ground personnel... so we're not exactly talking panzergrenadiers from the Wehrmacht's heyday here. If he was aware of it, perhaps that helped inspire a degree of underestimation as to the difficulty of the task on Bradley's part.

That was the case, they were trying to gain control of the Rur Dam to prevent it being used to flood lowlands and prevent an invasion into Germany.

If that was the case, they went about it the wrong way. When the dams were taken, it wasn't via the Huertgen Forest in October and November, but by the Monschau Corridor further to the south in the first half of December.
 
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Well, from what I've read the German forces that defended Huertgen were far from impressive. Accounts seem to indicate that the initial defenders were made up of a mix of burnt-out survivors from the Falaise Gap and recently conscripted Luftwaffe ground personnel... so we're not exactly talking panzergrenadiers from the Wehrmacht's heyday here. If he was aware of it, perhaps that helped inspire a degree of underestimation as to the difficulty of the task on Bradley's part. ...

There certainly was a underestimation, tho the problem lay primarily in 1st Army HQ - G2. What they seem to have missed is the extensive preparation. Entrenchments, dense minefields, clearing underbrush from fields of fire, extensive planning of artillery fires. The third rate units had spent 3-4 weeks turning their sector into a hasty fortification.

One observer criticized Col Dickenson for over reliance on ULTRA for tactical intelligence. This matches claims he was dismissing intel passed up from the corps G2.
 
From my readings, the problem was that the Allies never thought of the Huertgen as more than an annoyance, an enemy stronghold on the flank of their real advances. Initially the Allies were not thinking about the Roer dams at all, they just wanted the Germans out of there so 1st Army could resume its advance without worry. So they never committed enough troops to get the job done, just sending in a single division at a time. The Germans, on the other hand, were very worried about the dams and were convinced that is what the Allies were after, so they were willing to commit reserves to stop each attack. If the Allies had been willing to just ignore the Huertgen and advance past it to the north and south, eventually the Germans would have had to pull out without a fight.
 
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