How would YOU invade Greece as Italy?

It's a RN that is back filling the MN who were supposed to watch the Italians. All while the homeland is under threat of invasion.

yes. And, does that mean the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean took a fleet-in-being attitude? Hunkering down in their ports and waiting for better times? No.

Sure, although you need a crystal ball for Taranto from October 1940.

The point of mentioning an operation that took place a little later is to show what was the attitude of the Royal Navy in the Med. They did not wait and see. They actively resupplied Malta while looking for a fight with the Regia Marina, and challenged it time and again on its own turf, and eventually targeted it in Taranto. That gives you an idea of what happens to Italian destroyers who roam far from italy looking for Greek merchant ships.

GB is not ready to co-belligerent with Greece.

There is no co-belligerence involved. The Greek merchant ships try to stay as far from Italian bases as possible, the Italian cruisers go hunting for them, and unlukily they meet Royal Navy and RAF assets in those faraway corners of the Med, in international waters. The British sink the cruisers.

As to the British not being ready to be co-belligerents of Greece, the first RAF unit arrived on Greek soil in early Novemebr. Preliminary operations for the establishment of the Royal Navy base at Suda Bay began on October 29th!
 
As to the British not being ready to be co-belligerents of Greece, the first RAF unit arrived on Greek soil in early Novemebr. Preliminary operations for the establishment of the Royal Navy base at Suda Bay began on October 29th!
Yes but an Italian invasion from Albania was never going to reach Crete. Crete is a little distant and too big a target but Kefalonia is more suitable. An Italian sub had already sunk a Greek minelayer at Tinos in August 1940.
 
Firstly I would not be in the middle of changing from tri infantry brigade structure organization to bi infantry brigade structure organization

This change being made in the light of perhaps the wrong lessons being learned from Germanys invasion of Poland and the Western campaign resulted in more divisions but each one still needing a full allocation of staff officers (regardless of it being a 2 or 3 Brigade affair) - meaning a significant increase in staff officers.

These chaps could only come from one place - line units and would be the more experienced officers thus robbing line units of experienced officers.

OTL during the period 40-41 there were not enough experienced officers as it was and the number of staff officers was never fully realized meaning that the desire to have faster moving and more efficient 2 Brigade Divisions was never fully realized.

So perhaps the answer is having a smaller army - retaining the 3 Brigade structure - but ensuring that those divisions did have a full allocation off line officers and staff officers.

Secondly Mussolini believed 'erroneously' that the campaign would be decided politically, that is he did not expect the Greeks to be defeated by battle alone but expected the Greeks to come to terms and surrender the territory he had demanded after suffering early defeats.

A some what short military campaign.

However the Greek army defended far better than anyone could have predicted and the Albanian front stagnated into stalemate, with the Greeks making it quite clear that they were not going to be cowed by the Italians - indeed it is telling that when the Greek army did surrender they made it quite clear to the German commander Sepp Dietrich that they would not surrender to the Italians only the Germans.

So a longer campaign is required with the associated rotation of troops, replacement equipment and robust logistics with the intention to attrite the Greek army and defeat it by exhausting it of equipment ammo and supplies.

Thirdly It is telling that between the end of the Battle of France and the invasion of Greece Mussolini actually de-mobbed large portions of the army only to recall men to the colors a couple of months later and almost immediately throw them into battle.

So either don't do this or have a more limited de-mob (critical workers only etc) with the main core of each Regt / division remain with the colors and able to continue training and retain its cohesion before the campaign

Well that's my 3

If it would have made a difference is still however unlikely IMO - the Greeks had terrain, the knowledge that they were defending their home land and an almost joyous attitude that they were morally in the right allowed the morale of both leaders and soldiers to remain high almost to the end of the campaign when the Germans attacked.

Only a long campaign to sap them of their men, supplies ammo and equipment - but this achieved before the British could come to their aid (and conversely before the Germans came to theirs) would see them be more successful.
 

formion

Banned
As @Cryhavoc101 says.

A short campaign would be folly even better organized. The Greek General Staff had actually prepared for establishing a front in the backbone of the Pindus mountains (max elevation 2600 meters). The instructions given to the general of the reinforce 8th division at the border left him with a fair degree of independence but the main instruction was about a fighting retreat to the Arachthos river. Instead the local commander choose to fight close to the border and win the battle of Elaia-Kalamas. A better italian performance would result to a retreat to the mountain range and sqift pursuit would be difficult judging the primitive road network and automn rains.

So, a better italian military would just capture the province of Epirus and bash their heads against this
https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1...hUKEwizhf_n5sPlAhUFsaQKHU53BncQ4dUDCAc&uact=5

instead of this in OTL http://www.mariailiaki.gr/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Καλπάκι-Ιωαννίνων-13.jpg

If a long campaign is planned, Britain and Germany are bound to intervene.
 
As @Cryhavoc101 says.

A short campaign would be folly even better organized. The Greek General Staff had actually prepared for establishing a front in the backbone of the Pindus mountains (max elevation 2600 meters). The instructions given to the general of the reinforce 8th division at the border left him with a fair degree of independence but the main instruction was about a fighting retreat to the Arachthos river. Instead the local commander choose to fight close to the border and win the battle of Elaia-Kalamas. A better italian performance would result to a retreat to the mountain range and sqift pursuit would be difficult judging the primitive road network and automn rains.

So, a better italian military would just capture the province of Epirus and bash their heads against this
https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1GGRV___GR751GR751&biw=1366&bih=625&tbm=isch&sxsrf=ACYBGNR2uBEr_CExIpMNv2MGEMfhwPk3pA:1572432305447&sa=1&ei=sWm5XfPoGoXikgXO7pm4Bw&q=tzoumerka+mountains&oq=tzoumerka+mountains&gs_l=img.3..0i24.23906.25141..25380...0.0..0.148.737.8j2......0....1..gws-wiz-img.......0i7i30.SIjou7kpOfg&ved=0ahUKEwizhf_n5sPlAhUFsaQKHU53BncQ4dUDCAc&uact=5

instead of this in OTL http://www.mariailiaki.gr/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Καλπάκι-Ιωαννίνων-13.jpg

That's why I suggest naval landings. If the Italians secure Kerkira and maybe a few more islets not so far from italian bases, and then land at Igoumenitsa, the Greek defense inland is somewhat jeopardised. They can still line up along difficult ground, but the Italians might be threatening further landings further South, etc.
That still doesn't KO Greece before the British and German intervention, but is remarkably better than OTL.
 
Yes but an Italian invasion from Albania was never going to reach Crete.

Irrelevant. The reason why I mentioned the British making preparations in Suda Bay the day after the Italian invasion is that you claimed that the british weren't ready to be co-belligerents of the Greeks. Deploying military assets to the other country's territory is rather co-belligerent.
 

formion

Banned
That's why I suggest naval landings. If the Italians secure Kerkira and maybe a few more islets not so far from italian bases, and then land at Igoumenitsa, the Greek defense inland is somewhat jeopardised. They can still line up along difficult ground, but the Italians might be threatening further landings further South, etc.

Capturing Corfu in Day 1 would be perhaps the best option. However, Corfu can act only as a shield to Italy and not a springboard for new advances. Since the Greek General Staff was ready to concede all of Epirus, that means that landings down the coast up to Preveza would be irrelevant. Any landings further than that entail the danger of going straight to ABC's fleet. They would be way too dangerous. In such senario I see the British establishing a forward base in Lixouri Bay in Cephalonia to accomodate a few destroyers and submarines. After all, in WW1 before the Italian entry to the war, the Admiralty wanted to develop Cephalonia as a base against sorties of Austro-Hungarian Navy.
 
Did they not have sub units attached? ie only pure infantry?

Yes, each regiment (and they were called "regiments") had a company lining up 6 81mm mortars and a battery of 4 65mm infantry guns.

---

Now, naturally, had the reform been through, each division would have been short only one infantry battalion. In fact, each missing regiment was to be replaced by a Blackshirt legion, having two light infantry battalions (total 8 instead of 9; by "light" I mean the Blackshirt units would be anemic in terms of HIW support). But none other than the generals were dragging their feet on this, they did not want the Blackshirts in their divisions. And anyway the changeover was not completed.
 
Capturing Corfu in Day 1 would be perhaps the best option. However, Corfu can act only as a shield to Italy and not a springboard for new advances. Since the Greek General Staff was ready to concede all of Epirus, that means that landings down the coast up to Preveza would be irrelevant.

Well, no, if what we're talking about is just having Italy do a bit better than the abysmal OTL. Occupying, with limited losses, all of Epirus, and threatening the sea flank of Greece further South (regardless of the fact that further attempts there would indeed run into British naval assets) is way better than being in full retreat into Albania. Note I never ever claimed better strategy and/or logistics could completely defeat Greece before the bell.
 
Honestly, given the forces available, it cannot be done.

That said, there are ways to make things less worse.

Option 1. Scrap the planned landing on Corfu, use that division as a reserve for the Julia Div., whose limited early success was actually a curse in disguise. Thus, when the Greeks counterattack, the Julia is not expose, trapped and nearly wiped out, but instead holds its own and the front stabilizes. OTL, those forces were only redeployed too late to help, and didn't take Corfu anyway.

Option 2. Postpone the attack a couple of days to allow for good weather for the Corfu landings. Same outcome on the continent, but at least you've taken Corfu...

Option 3. Landing at Prevezza. Incredibly risky, which is why the generals talked Benny out of it. Unlike Igoumenitsa, you're not at risk of receiving incoming fire from 360 degrees.
 
Yes, each regiment (and they were called "regiments") had a company lining up 6 81mm mortars and a battery of 4 65mm infantry guns.

---

Now, naturally, had the reform been through, each division would have been short only one infantry battalion. In fact, each missing regiment was to be replaced by a Blackshirt legion, having two light infantry battalions (total 8 instead of 9; by "light" I mean the Blackshirt units would be anemic in terms of HIW support). But none other than the generals were dragging their feet on this, they did not want the Blackshirts in their divisions. And anyway the changeover was not completed.

I guess I was comparing it too a British commonwealth model with Engineer and other supporting arms intrinsic to the 'Brigade Group' which was usually 3 - anything from 2 - 5 Infantry Battalions with an allocation of the Division supporting arms.

And obviously in 'British' a Regiment refers to a Battalions Parent unit not an organizational unit - the British generally mixed Battalions from different Regiments into a given Brigade in order to prevent heavy losses in a given Brigade / division heavily impacting a single region of the UK as happened in WW1.

(Not always the 151st which formed part of the 50th TT Division for example was nearly always formed of 3 x Durham Light Infantry Battalions and the 133rd of the 44th (Home Counties) Division which was formed of 3 Royal Sussex Rgts.)

I take it that the unit would still have had only 2 Regimental HQs?
 
I
I take it that the unit would still have had only 2 Regimental HQs?

Well, of course the Legion would have its own HQ. Whether that had enough officers, men, equipment and vehicles to handle real C3, I don't know; possibly yes on paper and no in reality.
The upshot is that the signals company was the same unit (part of the engineer battalion of the division) that would have provided radios, telephones and personnel to three regular army regiment HQs in the 3-regiment division. It was a divisional, not regimental asset. It remains to be seen whether the divisional commander would allocate his precious radios to the Blackshirts.
 
Top