How would US-Japanese War play out differently if no Euro War?

Honestly, with no Vinson-Walsh act and with just US Versus Japan, I could see the US losing - not because they'd been defeated beyond the capability to resist, but because "don't worry, it's only a year and a half until we'll have a navy again!" is not the best PR.

In the aftermath of something like Pearl Harbor, though, that is hardly something that is going to kill morale. The US would be willing to wait for the deluge of ships while conducting campaigns along the lines of the OTL 1942 ones.

One should also consider other powers reactions. You already mentioned the British but without the Soviets being engaged in Europe, Japan is also going to have to constantly worry about her Manchurian frontier.
 

hipper

Banned
You seem to be assuming that the entire force will be made of CVEs, but just remember, you also have the Lexingtons, Yorktowns, Wasp, Langley and Ranger. This allows the Americans to have some flexibility with their operations, they can be used to provide air protection for battleships or transports without pulling major decks out of action, or they can ferry aircraft to distant bases, etc.

By the end of 1942 in OTL the US was down to Saratoga Enterprise and Ranger. And they never let Ranger into the Pacific. Now the Japanese were not in better shape, but it's hard to see the US invading New Britain with the Saratoga and a few CVE's

Waiting For 1944 might be the only Option.
 
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nbcman

Donor
By the end of 1942 in OTL the US was down to Saratogs, enterprise and Ranger. And they never let Ranger into the Pacific. Now the Japanese were not in better shape, but it's hard to see the US invading New Britain with the Saratoga and a few CVE's

Waiting For 1944 might be the only Option.

If it is a US vs Japan only war, Japan will be starved of oil before the end of 1942 because I can't see the British and the Dutch selling them oil when they are at war with the US. If Japan attacked the Dutch, French and British, the US would have the assistance of part of those nations fleets which would add at least 9 more carriers as possible opponents to the Japanese. Japan is at least as screwed as OTL regardless of what scenario you look at.
 
By the end of 1942 in OTL the US was down to Saratogs, enterprise and Ranger. And they never let Ranger into the Pacific. Now the Japanese were not in better shape, but it's hard to see the US invading New Britain with the Saratoga and a few CVE's

Waiting For 1944 might be the only Option.

No, there's always sending in USS Robin. And maybe a couple more like her.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
No, there's always sending in USS Robin. And maybe a couple more like her.
That would be frankly unlikely unless Britain was also fighting the Japanese. If they were, I've always held that the British can fill in the gap until the Essexes turn up.
If not, then the British lending the US half the flight decks of the RN would look extraordinarily suspicious.

If it is a US vs Japan only war, Japan will be starved of oil before the end of 1942 because I can't see the British and the Dutch selling them oil when they are at war with the US.
I can see the Dutch doing it - especially if the Japanese pay well. The Netherlands would be neutral, and neutrals can sell to either side.

By the end of 1942 in OTL the US was down to Saratogs, enterprise and Ranger. And they never let Ranger into the Pacific. Now the Japanese were not in better shape, but it's hard to see the US invading New Britain with the Saratoga and a few CVE's
And in OTL the Japanese had also had to divert attention into the Indian Ocean and securing the Malay Barrier. Without that draw on their resources they could potentially have a better 1942 in the Pacific. (Not guaranteed, of course, but it could swing things differently even if the multiply-contingent Midway of OTL still happens the same.)

And the other point about a fleet of CVEs is that they're a lot more vulnerable ship-for-ship. Not only are they much easier to catch in surface battles, but they're also less capable of taking damage even per ton and they're less able to operate heavy aircraft (try getting a 1941-2 US torpedo bomber off the deck of a carrier only able to make 15 knots... it'll be a lot harder than an equivalent carrier able to make 28.)


Basically, I think that without the RN in the mix and with no Vinson-Walsh Act the Japanese aren't going to be rolled back until about a year later than OTL - that is, they have the upper hand for some months longer and then building momentum takes some months after that.
 
Now, think carefully here. Without the demand for production for a war in Europe the burden on US industry will be a lot less. So, in the pre war preparation there will not be the same sort of stalling of production that occured in many sectors in 1941.

The balance would be made up of ships contracted from the global fleet, mostly those owned by US companies but flagged in Panama or other nations of convience. This was not uncommon. When Theodor Roosevelt sent the 'Great White Fleet' on its world tour its coal was carried in British flagged hulls contracted by the USN. The US had not built a fleet of coaliers.

So the consensus seems to be that without a war in Europe the resources are both more plentiful and more readily allocated to the Pacific, but would the USA go as full-tilt on spending? In other words, does the USA need to incur as much debt and build the same forces? I would argue the Navy gets much the same minus what was used in the Atlantic, the Army gets less Divisions, much less armor, a smaller air force but emphasis on long ranged aircraft and more arms to allies and China if there is a war.

And aside from essential specialist ships the fleet train leans more on merchant hulls then, correct? We buy the shiny weapons but not the prosaic stuff to field them fully until war comes and we scramble? And if the window of crisis closes we are left with a rather potent set of fists and a weaker set of feet.

Now if war does not come to pass by 1944 I suppose FDR declines to run or is defeated and we get a Republican, either an interventionist or isolationist, then perhaps another build up of tensions as Japan struggles on in China or is war inevitable in the 1940 to 1945 period? It appears that Japan was a risk taker but without a war in Europe they do not gamble on war, yet there is a lot pushing Japan to take the plunge.
 
So the consensus seems to be that without a war in Europe the resources are both more plentiful and more readily allocated to the Pacific, but would the USA go as full-tilt on spending? In other words, does the USA need to incur as much debt and build the same forces? I would argue the Navy gets much the same minus what was used in the Atlantic, the Army gets less Divisions, much less armor, a smaller air force but emphasis on long ranged aircraft and more arms to allies and China if there is a war.

And aside from essential specialist ships the fleet train leans more on merchant hulls then, correct? We buy the shiny weapons but not the prosaic stuff to field them fully until war comes and we scramble? And if the window of crisis closes we are left with a rather potent set of fists and a weaker set of feet.

...

I'd agree with every bit of the first paragraph. The validity of the second paragraph depends on how throughly the fleet train was planned prewar. War Plan Orange was the most throughly examined and tested of the US war plans from 1907 through 1940. Only Plan Black had a similar real test, in 1917-18. WP Orange seems to have been the prize of the Navy for over twenty years. So much of WP Orange was reflected or reproduced in the central Pacific campaign. Perhaps the specialty ships and other peculiarities of the fleet train were as well?
 
I'd agree with every bit of the first paragraph. The validity of the second paragraph depends on how throughly the fleet train was planned prewar. War Plan Orange was the most throughly examined and tested of the US war plans from 1907 through 1940. Only Plan Black had a similar real test, in 1917-18. WP Orange seems to have been the prize of the Navy for over twenty years. So much of WP Orange was reflected or reproduced in the central Pacific campaign. Perhaps the specialty ships and other peculiarities of the fleet train were as well?

My observation is that the United States often gives short shrift to the supporting stuff, but I will have to delve deeper into the plan as you suggest, I suspect the Navy had a good idea of what it wanted, whether funds get allocated is the question mark. But then a fleet oiler can be adapted from a merchant tanker, and so on, not the best, but doable in the pinch. I have read the account by Commodore Clapp regarding the Falklands and his observations on the shipping he took to war, it is a job well done but you can see the frustration at not having the specialist shipping or other pieces that you know should have been funded but got cut before the moment hindsight crystalized.
 
By the end of 1942 in OTL the US was down to Saratoga Enterprise and Ranger. And they never let Ranger into the Pacific. Now the Japanese were not in better shape, but it's hard to see the US invading New Britain with the Saratoga and a few CVE's

Waiting For 1944 might be the only Option.

Why would the US wait until 1944? The S Carolina class BB were authorized in 1936, BB55 laid down Oct 1937 and launched 1941. The S Dakota class authorized 1938 , BB 57 laid down July 1939 & launched June 1941 . The first three Essex class CV were authorized in the 1938 Naval Expansion Act, component construction started in 1939 & keels laid in 1941. CV9 was launched in July 1942, CV11 The original three were all operational in 1943. The decision to build the original Essex class, & the S Carolina & S Dakota classes of BB, came in the 1930s with the end of the naval restriction treaties and the Japanese naval construction programs. Those & related construction programs came long before anyone in the US admitted there might be a war in Europe, or accepted the US would be involved

The decision to initiate the central Pacific offensive was made in mid 1943 & the first major offensive operation Op Galvanic in the Gilbert islands executed Nov 1943. Preparations for Op Galvanic started slowly due to the need to withdraw the combat units & a portion of the support units from combat ops in the S Pacific. There are arguments the Gilbert Islands offensive could have been initiated several months sooner had the 1943 S Pacific offensives been reduced or not undertaken. ie: Essex class carriers were in ops in the Pacific from the summer of 1943.

Bottom line here is the USN was executing offensive ops, first in the S Pacific & the in the central Pacific in 1943 with a carrier fleet no larger than what existed in the summer of 1942. The BB fleet was more powerfull by mid 1943. -Second, those ships were authorized and under construction long before the Pacific war became inevitable
 

Thomas1195

Banned
If there was no European war by 1941, meaning that German fought Czech war and lost. In this case, the German economy would have gone down to the toilet. They would have to cut back rearmament, and refocus on export to repay debt and deficit, which would be only effective if the Allies did not impose embargo afterward.
 
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