As I observed, that’s the key question: do the Soviets strike before or after Ichi-Go launches and if so, how long after it does so? How much did the Soviets know of it in the first place and how might it affect their plan?
How would the UK and the US react if the USSR crush Germany and by 1943, at the latest, they are in Berlin?
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BobTheBarbarian
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I don't know, but can try digging through some archives to find out. The Soviets regularly kept tabs on the disposition of Japanese military forces and their diplomatic traffic, and of course had sources from both the Chinese and Americans.
In any regard, the chronology for these events is kind of out of sync: if the Germans were somehow defeated in 1943, this would considerably predate the bomber threat from southern China that triggered the Ichi-Go offensive. Combined with a Japanese panic over being the last Axis power standing and the Allies still stuck in the Solomons and New Guinea, what you'd likely see would have been at least a re-appraisal of the northern frontier (Neutrality Pact notwithstanding) at a time when Japanese forces in the region were already more or less at an all-time peak. In the most extreme case, there might actually have been a pre-emptive invasion of the Maritime territory at a time when the correlation of forces (or at least, the correlation of what could immediately be brought to bear) was still relatively favorable for Japan, especially if the Japanese started detecting high-volume military traffic eastward along the TSRR.
From the Soviet perspective, this would be somewhat of a dilemma: preparations for an immediate attack might trigger a pre-emptive Japanese invasion, while a delayed invasion would only give them more time to prepare. The third option, which Carl brought up earlier, would be to do neither and simply wait a couple years until Japan was so weakened that US forces were threatening to invade the mainland, in which case events might proceed even more along the lines of OTL than thought.
There's a similar scenario written by @Bigby but the POD is Operation Valkyrie succeeds. Germany capitulates in late 1944. Due to the butterflies, the invasion of the Philippines is attempted earlier by two months but fails, so Formosa is chosen instead. The Americans do return to the Philippines in early 1945 and again due to the butterflies, the Battle of Manila is not as bloody as OTL. The "Flag Over Iwo Jima" iconic photo is taken above Manila City Hall for TTL.
Hehehe. Hi!
Though in my TL, the USSR has slightly less than otl. Only slightly. Czechoslovakia is neutral territory and Albania is Western aligned. Not exactly what the original author envisioned I imagine.
Kinda? Berlin goes down in November, at the earliest. That means the war in Europe probably ends a month or two later as Allied and Soviet armies close up at the Rhine or Weser or wherever. This is right around the same period that the construction of the bomber bases at Chengdu commenced, but those weren’t completed until June while Ichi-Go began in April. So if the bomber bases were the trigger for Ichi-Go, then it was their construction that were the trigger and that still is under way by the time the war in Europe wins.
Japanese Forces in the region were not at an all-time peak in the winter of ‘43/‘44. That would have been several years earlier. Given that Japanese strategic reappraisals constantly underestimated the Soviets, I don’t see them really coming up with anything that gives them the ability to withstand an attack by what in some ways would be an even more formidable Red Army compared to OTL.
That would be an incredibly bad move on the Japanese part. Whatever gains they might initially make would gut them and the massive flow of far superior Soviet reinforcements into the region would destroy them and roll them back into the Pacific.
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BobTheBarbarian
Banned
Who said anything about November? OP says Germany (somehow) surrenders in 1943 or before. In that case there is a large difference in both Allied capabilities and Japanese options.
In terms of organization, they were at their peak roughly from the summer of 1942 to the first half of 1943. And, if for whatever reason they decided on war, it would make sense to attack for a number of reasons - first, it would remove the threat to the Japanese rear from the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk-Blagoveshchensk direction, allowing for a shorter front, second, it cuts off any potential US aid and preempts any joint efforts at establishing bombers in Siberia, lastly, it wouldn't require any major changes to existing operational plans, since both the context and correlation of forces would be similar. Even if the Japanese took heavy losses in personnel, they had more than 4 million ready reservists at that time who could be called up quickly to replace them. The real cost would be in materiel - specifically ammunition and fuel. These things they had only a limited amount of.
Japan could never defeat the Soviet Union (much less the Soviet Union, USA, Britain, and China together) in a protracted war. But removing one dangerous flank would at least reduce the possibility of an all-axes surprise offensive at the moment of Stalin's choosing, and allow them to hold on to the industrial potential of Manchuria for longer. With total defeat at the hands of the US not particularly close, a bloody fight in northeast Asia with some Soviet territory under occupation would be a stronger bargaining position than purely defensive battle. It should be remembered that both the conciliatory diplomatic approach and passive military strategy adopted OTL vis a vis the USSR were direct consequences of the Kwantung Army's weakness and the impending US invasion, but in this case none of that applies.
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The OP doesn’t say when in 1943, and realistically I, not anyone else on here, see Berlin falling before November. So late-43 at the earliest.
So not in terms of actual combat strength.
Context and correlation of forces being in the Soviets favor, it’s fanciful to suppose that a Japanese attack in ATL-1943 would actually achieve any of that. The Japanese strategic planning may say otherwise, but everyone knows the poor track record of Japanese strategic planning in WW2...
Unless you are proposing said reservists are tossed to their forces with no training, in which case they are pretty much useless, they’ll never actually reach the Japanese units before the Soviet counteroffensive destroys them.
It very much applies. The Kwangtung Army had already been drawing down since late-41 and with victory in Europe on sight for the Soviets so much earlier, Stalin would also have begun the slower paced build-up of Soviet Forces in the Far East that OTL began in November 1944 that much earlier (probably in early-43). Hell, just the fact of a less damaging German attack would leave the Soviets with greater material and manpower reserves would mean the Far Eastern Front would find itself stronger than OTL basically by default, as less men and equipment have to be withdrawn from it and more could be allocated too it as part of the standard dispatch of replacements. The Japanese would find the Kwangtung Army very much the weaker force, just like it did OTL.
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BobTheBarbarian
Banned
I think any POD where the Nazis are overrun by this time is borderline ASB anyway. If you want to talk about 1944 we can do that, but the scenario will be different (and a lot less interesting).
Yes, it was their peak in terms of actual combat strength. After the initial success in the Pacific Theater most tank and medium artillery units temporarily sent to support the Southern Army were returned to the Kwantung Army, while the 4th Division returned to mainland Japan. In total more than 30 ground units from the southern theater were redeployed to Manchuria during the summer of 1942. At the same time, the large number of army HQs then directly subordinate to Kwantung Headquarters were placed under the intermediate command of two Area Armies. To partially compensate for the loss of the 51st Division in September 1941, the Kwantung Army created the 71st Division out of the Hunchun Garrison Unit and a rifle regiment from China, which together with a BGU became the nucleus of a new corps-level formation, the 2nd Army. At the end of June 1942, reorganizations proceeded further with the consolidation of most tank forces into the "Kikogun," or "Armored Army." At this point the Japanese actually had more tank regiments in Manchuria than they did in 1941, both due to new arrivals and recategorization of existing elements.
The net effect of all this was, compared to summer 1941, to increase the number of corps from 6 to 8, the number of divisions from 14 to 16, and the number of brigades from 1 to 2, while garrison units decreased from 24 to 23. Air strength remained the same at 19 Air Regiments, though the number of Air Group HQs increased to 2. Personnel strength was still well over 700,000 men, excluding puppet troops and forces in Korea. Despite the larger number of units, command and control was made easier by the addition of the Area Armies, which were commanded by Generals Yamashita (eastern forces) and Anami (western and northern forces).
The composition of the Soviet forces in the Far East hardly changed at all from the end of 1941 to 1944, and it would take months to increase the number of combat units to conduct offensive operations OTL. Even the argument that in the event of an earlier victory against Germany force levels would be higher is iffy because most transfers OTL happened in 1941 anyway. In many ways, they would still be facing the same problems in 1943 as they would in 1941.
The Japanese replacement system wasn't like that. They had "skeleton" (depot) divisions in Japan that were constantly training reserve units for activation by IGHQ; this was how they were able to raise so many divisions so quickly in 1944-45. They could and did send entire units (regiments, brigades, etc) as "replacement groups," fully equipped and ready for action, to the various active theaters, where they could either be plugged in to an existing formation or sent as standalone forces. The US spent a good amount of time studying this system, and one of their publications (I will have to search for the one in question) actually said it was the best in the world for carrying out a rapid mobilization.
Couldn't the US help the Brits in Burma as long as they haven't started their island hopping campaign yet. What effect would that have?
I don't think the British would want a major American effort in Burma. Where the Americans went they tended to take over. The Burma campaign was all about protecting India, the crown jewel of the empire. Why stop the Japanese only to let the Americans begin to dominate and control?
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
It would also mean that, barring a major shakeup of the agreed command structure, the US forces would be subordinate to a British commander.
With some lucky breaks, I can see the Soviets overrunning the Nazis by December 1943 (Berlin specifically as early as November). Any earlier is ASB and thus not fit for this forum, but that still is within the parameters of the OP and leads to the conclusion of a 1944 (and not a 1943) assault against Japan regardless.
We're talking about 1943, not 1942. By that point, not only had units begun to redeploy out of the Kwangtun Army from September 1942 onward, those units which remained were steadily weakened: the December reduction of infantry divisions TO&Es for example cut the number of men per battalion from 1,273 to 745 men. On the flipside, Japanese estimates of the Soviets show chronic underestimation: at the end of 1942 they ascribed them with less than half the number of tanks (~1,000 instead of ~2,500), 30% the number of aircraft (another ~1,000 instead of ~3,300), and about 57% the number of men (~750,000 instead of the nearly 1.3 million). Given such underestimations, it's no wonder the Japanese had such unrealistic expectations for their offensive action plans. This poor intelligence picture also indicates poorly for their ability to detect the movement of Soviet forces as you have previously claimed, as does their historic failure to detect all the Soviet preparations in 1945 OTL, and again in 1939 during the Battle of Khalkin-Ghol.
Given that Soviet stockpiling and transfers to the Far East for the purposes of August Storm specifically began as early as November 1944, and went unnoticed by the Japanese, it is rather clear the Soviets would have those months. Applied to IATL, that would see the Soviets begin such activity in May/June 1943.
It is not iffy at all and this claim ignores that transfers that occurred were made up for by retransfers, the consolidation of new units, and the rotation of personnel. The claim that the Soviets in the Far East would be facing the same problems in 1943 as they would in 1941 is blatantly false even OTL, much less IATL when the Soviets would begin transfers and stockpiling in the Far East that much earlier: unlike in 1941, the Soviets would have a plethora of modern material, logistics, experienced manpower, and experienced command cadre.
The divisions Japan raised in 1944/45, mostly for static defense in the home island, are a far cry from what can be described as "fully-equipped and ready for action", especially not when said action is maneuver warfare on the Manchurian plains.
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
In that case, any offensive options are probably off the table for Japan. Technically their contingencies contained an offensive component until well into 1944, but by that time the window for aggressive actions would have been vanishingly small and in direct conflict with priorities elsewhere.
The first wholesale movement of divisions started in early 1944 with the 29th Division sent to Guam and the 14th Division to Palau. There was some leakage prior to that, especially in aircraft, and although Ness points out that since December 1942 there was a decision to slowly reduce back to peacetime strength it's unclear how much of that actually happened prior to fall 1943. At the Tokyo Trial the prosecution cited Japanese figures claiming 700,000 men, 900 tanks, and 900 planes in Manchuria during 1942, excluding the Korea Army, troops in Inner Mongolia, or 150,000 reservists in Manchukuo (p. 48,194). IIRC General Tanaka gave figures of 600,000 men and 900 tanks for the end of 1943 - Coox on p. 1059 of "Nomonhan" gives 600,000 men and 250 combat aircraft. After that though, there were huge losses in both men and equipment - strength at the end of 1944 was 460,000 men and 120 planes.
As for Japanese intelligence, I suspect that at least some of the discrepancy is caused by different measures of accounting, i.e, that the Japanese (and American) military intelligence services only counted operable tanks and planes directly assigned to combat units as part of their TO&E, without including reserve or inoperables. This is supported by the fact that the Japanese were more or less accurate in the number of divisions the Soviets had east of Lake Baikal at that time - 25 give or take, including 23 Rifle Divisions. There's also that, based on their analysis of rail traffic, they concluded in April 1945 that come June Soviet forces east of Lake Baikal would total 1.6 million men, 4,500 tanks, and 6,500 aircraft, which compares favorably with the real numbers. [JSOM vol. XIII p. 112] From the manuscript dealing with Khalkhin Gol, it seems they were also able to accurately assess the Soviet combat strength (to which I can also add estimates of US air, naval and land forces quoted in "Reports of General MacArthur"). The decisive factor in both cases was operational surprise rather than lack of skill at bean-counting.
(Possibly another piece of info is that despite the number of tanks and assault guns in the composition of the various Soviet forces in August 1945 frequently being given as 5,556, the number reported on hand on August 5 was 6,980. A counterpoint would be that, adding Cherevko's figure of 2,119 tanks and SPGs sent east from May to August '45 to the IVMV total of 2,338 in-theater on May 9 - IVMV being the source material for c. 2,000 tanks and AFVs in the Far East at the lowest point - gives only 4,457. Either way something seems up, and this question alone may be worth asking Art on AHF.)
I don't have much data on personnel rotation to the Far East from the West. I do know that 344k were sent East to West during the war, and that most equipment transfers happened in 1941. I suppose the reverse could have happened, at least from a manpower standpoint, but regardless there was a pronounced decline in combat ability from early 1941 to 1942 onward, which is reflected in the Soviet operational plans.
At that time it was more a problem of equipment and supplies. The system was unable to produce all "first rate" divisions at that point because the war economy simply failed to provide the materiel needed to fully capitalize on available manpower. Before that though, especially in preparations for the Philippines, Mariana Islands, and Okinawa campaigns there were many such "short notice" deployments and the units in question handled themselves well.
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From what I recall about Burma, the things the Brits really needed were:
- Enough time to get their heads around an extremely skill-dependent form of warfare in almost total absence of logistical infrastructure
- Lots of air transport, since moving stuff any other way was misery
Sending US troops to a theatre that explicitly neutralises their advantages in logistics and supply doesn’t seem productive, especially since they will also need to learn all the same lessons the Brits had struggled with.
That was why I said major effort by the U.S. If the U.S. becomes the dominant power there would be pressure to change the command structure to reflect it.
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Divert transport from the Hump!!! That was sacrilege! The Hump supplies were critical to keeping China in the war. Yes a lot of it was wasted/lost/stolen, but the effort was needed to keep the Chinese engaged.
Also with a major American effort you get the massive logistic tail they brought with them. And depending on when they came in might mean they would learn the lessons as fast and as soon as the British did.
My understanding is that while the amount flown over the hump was impressive, the bulk of it went to support the US bomber effort (pointless) and the Chinese leg of the transport effort itself. The amount that went to support the Chinese war effort seems to have been pretty insignificant in the grand scheme of things. The Chinese were engaged because of a million Japanese troops stomping around in their homeland, not because of US efforts.
The ”massive logistical tail” seems like it would be pretty pointless in the Burma context. The British had everything they needed in the way of supply other than a method of getting it to the battlefront. Slim had to restructure the British army by reducing the allocated amount of motor transport, heavy equipment, supplies etc just so it was capable of moving around. Where the terrain allowed they did use tanks etc but generally everything had to be humped around by coolies in a very 19th century way, which was vastly inefficient. What they needed was air transport, which (when the US could occasionally be persuaded to release it) transformed their operations.
Other than supply airlift, what is the US going to do, ship more stuff to add to to the existing piles in India? Send more porters to add to the limitless numbers the British had available in India? Spend a decade or more paving the jungle-covered hills and ravines which OTL are still fairly impassable 70 years after the war ended?
Actually the 20th Bomber command was pretty self sufficient and hauled its own supplies. Yes it took a lot but at the time it was planned and started it was the only way to get strategic bombers within range of Japanese Home Island targets. Once the Marianas were operational 20th Bomber was moved there to operate alongside 21st Bomber. The general hump effort was very large and wasteful but it was seen as a cost of keeping China in the war.
Well the U.S. used pack animals in several instances when needed. I remember reading a study that showed that the average size of Italian pack animals increased after the American Missouri & Kentucky mules were brought over to support the mountain campaign in WWII.
Also the Reason the U.S. converted to full motorization instead of using animals was because it actually reduced the logistical tail. The amount of feed and fodder needed for pack animals was a greater logistic load than the POL needed for motorization. Also using animals reduces the range of your support forces. During the era of general animal transport 40 miles was considered the distance you could support regular operations from your supply base. Go beyond that and it required more supplies to keep the logistic train operating. Light raiding type forces can go further but for regular 'line units' that was about it.
In Burma the British main effort was pretty much 'down the coast' where they could be supported with logistic bases supplied from the sea (actually very much like the campaign in North Africa).