How would the lack of an American Revolution impact the French?

The American and French Revolutions shared many ideological traits, obviously-- both were rooted in Enlightenment notions, a belief that the people had the right to popular representation, etc. The United States was quite a trailblazer in this respect, because it proved that a country could thrive (or at least survive) without a king, and that the people had enough power to alter their government. The American accomplishment surprised many, and just as the ink was drying on the United States Constitution, France was barrelling down the road to revolution. In the beginning, before the heads started falling, the French Revolution largely imitated the American, with things like the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen being very Jeffersonian.

But here's my question for you all: what would the French Revolution look like without an American example to look to? Of course, modern liberalism (or at least its precursor) had been patented all over Europe, be it with British-style constitutionalism or Austrian "enlightened despotism". Without an example of a successful republic to look to, might the French revolutionaries be more moderate? (ie, 'sacre bleu! No one has abolished their monarchy since Roman times except Oliver Cromwell, and look what happened to him!) Perhaps the Revolution could end with Louis XVI simply becoming a British-style monarch, without anyone daring to say the "r-word". Conversely, things might end up being worse. If American-style liberals (Lafayette, most obviously) play less of a role, perhaps the Jacobins and similar radicals might take the reins harder, and pursue republicanism a la Cromwell, as opposed to a la Washington. And of course, what might become of that young, vertically challenged, artillery officer from Corsica?

Eighteenth-century political science is not my strong point: I would appreciate any suggestions. (@सार्थक (Sārthākā), I know this is your realm of expertise.....)

-Kaiser Wilhelm the Tenth
 
So there's two groups of effects that seem to stand out to me. The first is the direct impact on the financials of the ancien regime. It is very expensive to project military force across the Atlantic and that was the straw that broke the camel's back in terms of leading to bankruptcy. Having said that, the British and the French were having wars every 25 years or so regardless, so without the ARW I think another war would have done the same thing, perhaps developing out of the Falklands Crisis or the War of the Bavarian Succession. The other group of effects were the intellectual impacts and how they shaped political thinking among reformers in 18th Century Europe. To me, there are four ideas that matter: the public, nationhood, republicanism and the method of political reform.

Let's start with the concept of the public. Prior to the American Revolution, "the public" was something separate from "the people" in European thought. The public were the intelligent, well-read, well-mannered class of taste and distinction, who followed and discussed the affairs of state. They were usually aristocracy, gentry (in societies where that existed), or the emerging bourgeoise. These people effectively set the parameters of political debate. The people were the rest of the unwashed masses. In the emerging Enlightenment thought, these people were too driven by emotion and basic needs to be part of politics - they needed to be looked after, not listened to. It was the public that should decide what was best for them, because the views of the mob were dangerous. Obviously this distinction was driven by the extensive classism that had been inherited from medieval feudal society and re-emphasized by the nouveau riche, who were keen to show they were separate from their lessers by their education and their refinement. In American society, these distinctions were far less important (at least among white people). An aristocracy had not yet really developed and the bountiful opportunities of the place meant there wasn't a class of wretched poor white people to look down upon. In the US, the conceptions of the people and the public merged. This was advantageous for revolutionaries: those demanding change could both claim to be the public - educated enough to make their cases in respectable opinion - and to be the people - the aggrieved majority that policy should be set for. This approach was immediately adopted by would-be reformed among the Dutch and the French.

Related to this, but a bit different is the concept of nationhood. A nation was previously thought of a community of people that had bound themselves together to form a covenant, either with each other or with someone else (e.g. a King). With regards to political history, this usually meant a set of nobles who vehemently defended their ancient rights from royal power. So, for example, the Hungarian nation was merely the Hungarian nobles (of any language!) that had bound themselves together to constrain the King of Hungary, and participated in the election and institutions of Hungary, at a national or county level. An embryonic idea was that the nation was actually all people in a particular community. The American revolutionaries embraced this idea and made it the primary conception of "nation". Of course, their specific rights had never been formally declared, as was the case with nobles, but they insisted that they had inherent rights that should be respected. You can see why European thinkers embraced this concept.

The third has been more discussed. Previously republics were something that existed at a small level. Preferably a city (there had been plenty of historical communes on this scale), but perhaps a handful of provinces could now do the same, if we look at the Swiss or Dutch examples. But just as Athenian democracy doesn't work beyond a certain scale, neither does a republic. History had shown that you need a powerful monarch to keep things together and ensure the country worked. Just look at what had happened to the Holy Roman Empire or the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth when the central King was too weak! There was a long history to this in medieval thought: the universe has one Heavenly Father, the Church should have one Pope, Christendom should have one Emperor. This was holy and proper. If you read Dante, there is a reason that Satan has three heads. Of course this conception had been increasingly broken down by facts on the ground for a couple of centuries by this point, but the attitude remained. Power centralized in one person is best. The United States proved otherwise: a republic could work on a continental scale.

Finally, we get to how political reform should be achieved. If you read the philosophes of the mid-18th Century, it is very clear they believe Enlightened governance can only be achieved at the giving of those currently in power. The idea of change coming via demands from below isn't even debated, because it wasn't seen as feasible in the age of centralized, absolutist monarchies. The public intellectuals going to coffee shops were equivalent to Chinese scholar-officials: there role is to persuade the powerful to rule better. Even in places like Holland, with a more distributed power system, the way to enact change was to win debates and votes in provincial and national assemblies, through the existing order. Again, America changed that. These ragtag colonists had demanded change and when they hadn't got their due, they had taken up arms against one of the most powerful Empires in the world - and won! Perhaps all these Kings and Emperors weren't as powerful as previously envisioned. Demands and, if they were not met, political violence, suddenly became a lot more popular. Especially among personality types more embracing of that sort of thing.

So now that we have considered these things, let's think how we could play it out in France. The first thing to point out is that the Dutch actually embraced all of this first. The Patriottentijd was a real change just over the border from France, which had to be put down by the Prussians but shaped a lot of thinking. The anti-Orangist party declared themselves the patriots, represented people of the Dutch nation, and moved from a "through the system" approach to forming militias and taking their rights back. They formed new assemblies, with broader suffrage, based on their natural rights, not historical liberties of the previous assemblies. With no American Revolution, I can't see this happening. Instead the Netherlands is likely to maintain political gridlock, with increasing cynicism and authoritarian creep.

So what about France itself? With no American or Dutch example, they are likely to have less drive to political violence. The first case in OTL in the revolutionary lead-up was the events before and during the Day of Tiles in Grenoble. A meeting of interested people decided to come together and decide to call the provincial assembly - notably, with double representation for the third estate, as was historical in Dauphine. That is unlikely to happen now. Rising bread prices and poor harvests are likely just to cause old fashion rioting, not posing as a provincial assembly.

It's probably likely that the General Estates would still get called a national level. The idea of this institution as the channel for reform had been around for a while, ever since the credibility of the parlements had been destroyed via their (temporary) abolition in the mid-century, even if they were brought back later. It's the natural place to go with the financial crisis hitting. But without the Dauphine example before them, I can't see the concept of double representation of the third estate entering the public consciousness. They will probably be called with single representation and be voting by class. However, that said, the Clergy was highly sympathetic to the Third Estate in our timeline, mainly because it was impoverished lower clergy that got elected as representatives. I suspect what will happen is that the events go off track from the King's demands as in our timeline. The Third Estate makes its demands and needs to work with the First Estate to get them through, probably trading off some favors for Catholic viewpoints, but then still needing the King's signature. It then becomes a negotiation between the King and the Estates over what rights they get for what extra taxation, probably with the nobility getting clobbered. At some point the King gets fed up and closes the thing down. There are some resisters, but nowhere near as many as our timeline. Most go back to their provinces, insisting they have achieved some major goals, and petitions start for another calling of the Estates. A minority of hotheads refuse to leave, but without public backing, the King's men arrest them and they get sent to the Bastille. The fail in the moment, but leave a heroic legacy for later would-be revolutionaries. The regime has enough funding from including the nobility in taxation to go on for now, but it is still horribly inefficient, and Britain's industrial acceleration increasingly leaves France behind...
 
So there's two groups of effects that seem to stand out to me. The first is the direct impact on the financials of the ancien regime. It is very expensive to project military force across the Atlantic and that was the straw that broke the camel's back in terms of leading to bankruptcy. Having said that, the British and the French were having wars every 25 years or so regardless, so without the ARW I think another war would have done the same thing, perhaps developing out of the Falklands Crisis or the War of the Bavarian Succession. The other group of effects were the intellectual impacts and how they shaped political thinking among reformers in 18th Century Europe. To me, there are four ideas that matter: the public, nationhood, republicanism and the method of political reform.

Let's start with the concept of the public. Prior to the American Revolution, "the public" was something separate from "the people" in European thought. The public were the intelligent, well-read, well-mannered class of taste and distinction, who followed and discussed the affairs of state. They were usually aristocracy, gentry (in societies where that existed), or the emerging bourgeoise. These people effectively set the parameters of political debate. The people were the rest of the unwashed masses. In the emerging Enlightenment thought, these people were too driven by emotion and basic needs to be part of politics - they needed to be looked after, not listened to. It was the public that should decide what was best for them, because the views of the mob were dangerous. Obviously this distinction was driven by the extensive classism that had been inherited from medieval feudal society and re-emphasized by the nouveau riche, who were keen to show they were separate from their lessers by their education and their refinement. In American society, these distinctions were far less important (at least among white people). An aristocracy had not yet really developed and the bountiful opportunities of the place meant there wasn't a class of wretched poor white people to look down upon. In the US, the conceptions of the people and the public merged. This was advantageous for revolutionaries: those demanding change could both claim to be the public - educated enough to make their cases in respectable opinion - and to be the people - the aggrieved majority that policy should be set for. This approach was immediately adopted by would-be reformed among the Dutch and the French.

Related to this, but a bit different is the concept of nationhood. A nation was previously thought of a community of people that had bound themselves together to form a covenant, either with each other or with someone else (e.g. a King). With regards to political history, this usually meant a set of nobles who vehemently defended their ancient rights from royal power. So, for example, the Hungarian nation was merely the Hungarian nobles (of any language!) that had bound themselves together to constrain the King of Hungary, and participated in the election and institutions of Hungary, at a national or county level. An embryonic idea was that the nation was actually all people in a particular community. The American revolutionaries embraced this idea and made it the primary conception of "nation". Of course, their specific rights had never been formally declared, as was the case with nobles, but they insisted that they had inherent rights that should be respected. You can see why European thinkers embraced this concept.

The third has been more discussed. Previously republics were something that existed at a small level. Preferably a city (there had been plenty of historical communes on this scale), but perhaps a handful of provinces could now do the same, if we look at the Swiss or Dutch examples. But just as Athenian democracy doesn't work beyond a certain scale, neither does a republic. History had shown that you need a powerful monarch to keep things together and ensure the country worked. Just look at what had happened to the Holy Roman Empire or the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth when the central King was too weak! There was a long history to this in medieval thought: the universe has one Heavenly Father, the Church should have one Pope, Christendom should have one Emperor. This was holy and proper. If you read Dante, there is a reason that Satan has three heads. Of course this conception had been increasingly broken down by facts on the ground for a couple of centuries by this point, but the attitude remained. Power centralized in one person is best. The United States proved otherwise: a republic could work on a continental scale.

Finally, we get to how political reform should be achieved. If you read the philosophes of the mid-18th Century, it is very clear they believe Enlightened governance can only be achieved at the giving of those currently in power. The idea of change coming via demands from below isn't even debated, because it wasn't seen as feasible in the age of centralized, absolutist monarchies. The public intellectuals going to coffee shops were equivalent to Chinese scholar-officials: there role is to persuade the powerful to rule better. Even in places like Holland, with a more distributed power system, the way to enact change was to win debates and votes in provincial and national assemblies, through the existing order. Again, America changed that. These ragtag colonists had demanded change and when they hadn't got their due, they had taken up arms against one of the most powerful Empires in the world - and won! Perhaps all these Kings and Emperors weren't as powerful as previously envisioned. Demands and, if they were not met, political violence, suddenly became a lot more popular. Especially among personality types more embracing of that sort of thing.

So now that we have considered these things, let's think how we could play it out in France. The first thing to point out is that the Dutch actually embraced all of this first. The Patriottentijd was a real change just over the border from France, which had to be put down by the Prussians but shaped a lot of thinking. The anti-Orangist party declared themselves the patriots, represented people of the Dutch nation, and moved from a "through the system" approach to forming militias and taking their rights back. They formed new assemblies, with broader suffrage, based on their natural rights, not historical liberties of the previous assemblies. With no American Revolution, I can't see this happening. Instead the Netherlands is likely to maintain political gridlock, with increasing cynicism and authoritarian creep.

So what about France itself? With no American or Dutch example, they are likely to have less drive to political violence. The first case in OTL in the revolutionary lead-up was the events before and during the Day of Tiles in Grenoble. A meeting of interested people decided to come together and decide to call the provincial assembly - notably, with double representation for the third estate, as was historical in Dauphine. That is unlikely to happen now. Rising bread prices and poor harvests are likely just to cause old fashion rioting, not posing as a provincial assembly.

It's probably likely that the General Estates would still get called a national level. The idea of this institution as the channel for reform had been around for a while, ever since the credibility of the parlements had been destroyed via their (temporary) abolition in the mid-century, even if they were brought back later. It's the natural place to go with the financial crisis hitting. But without the Dauphine example before them, I can't see the concept of double representation of the third estate entering the public consciousness. They will probably be called with single representation and be voting by class. However, that said, the Clergy was highly sympathetic to the Third Estate in our timeline, mainly because it was impoverished lower clergy that got elected as representatives. I suspect what will happen is that the events go off track from the King's demands as in our timeline. The Third Estate makes its demands and needs to work with the First Estate to get them through, probably trading off some favors for Catholic viewpoints, but then still needing the King's signature. It then becomes a negotiation between the King and the Estates over what rights they get for what extra taxation, probably with the nobility getting clobbered. At some point the King gets fed up and closes the thing down. There are some resisters, but nowhere near as many as our timeline. Most go back to their provinces, insisting they have achieved some major goals, and petitions start for another calling of the Estates. A minority of hotheads refuse to leave, but without public backing, the King's men arrest them and they get sent to the Bastille. The fail in the moment, but leave a heroic legacy for later would-be revolutionaries. The regime has enough funding from including the nobility in taxation to go on for now, but it is still horribly inefficient, and Britain's industrial acceleration increasingly leaves France behind...
This is perfect. Thanks so much for the detailed reply-- you've given me a lot to work with.
Just a few things which jump out at me:

The first is the direct impact on the financials of the ancien regime. It is very expensive to project military force across the Atlantic and that was the straw that broke the camel's back in terms of leading to bankruptcy.
Yeah, this came to me about half an hour after I wrote up my OP. No ARW would kick the can of France's national debt down the road for a few years (Wikipedia says they spent 1.3 billion livres on the war), but the underlying structural problems are still there.
Having said that, the British and the French were having wars every 25 years or so regardless, so without the ARW I think another war would have done the same thing, perhaps developing out of the Falklands Crisis or the War of the Bavarian Succession.
This I completely agree with. Another round in the 1790s, perhaps with a shake-up of the Stately Quadrille, seems more than likely... and would use up that 1.3 billion livres not spent in America. If the French lose badly enough, that might set the ball of revolution rolling.....
In the US, the conceptions of the people and the public merged. This was advantageous for revolutionaries: those demanding change could both claim to be the public - educated enough to make their cases in respectable opinion - and to be the people - the aggrieved majority that policy should be set for. This approach was immediately adopted by would-be reformed among the Dutch and the French.
So without the American Revolution, the dividing line between civilised publicans and sweaty, unwashed masses remains even firmer than in OTL. This certainly makes sense. Impetus for change, then, would have to come from the "public" to be taken seriously. Similar to the distinction between "revolution from above" versus "revolution from below". As an example, Abbe Sieyes's idea that the Third Estate is "everything" would likely be diminished, or at the very least marginalised. No double representation for the Third either.
Related to this, but a bit different is the concept of nationhood. A nation was previously thought of a community of people that had bound themselves together to form a covenant, either with each other or with someone else (e.g. a King). With regards to political history, this usually meant a set of nobles who vehemently defended their ancient rights from royal power. So, for example, the Hungarian nation was merely the Hungarian nobles (of any language!) that had bound themselves together to constrain the King of Hungary, and participated in the election and institutions of Hungary, at a national or county level. An embryonic idea was that the nation was actually all people in a particular community. The American revolutionaries embraced this idea and made it the primary conception of "nation". Of course, their specific rights had never been formally declared, as was the case with nobles, but they insisted that they had inherent rights that should be respected. You can see why European thinkers embraced this concept.
Yep, this all makes good sense. As an aside, I don't know if you've read Pieter Judson's The Habsburg Empire: A New History, but he goes into many of the points which you described. He talks in considerable detail about how local officials and noblemen in eighteenth-century Austria took it upon themselves to suggest and/or implement reforms while remaining fiercely loyal to the monarch and institutions... because what else was there? The Habsburgs were Austria and vice versa. So it makes sense that whatever happens in France would follow this trajectory.
Finally, we get to how political reform should be achieved. If you read the philosophes of the mid-18th Century, it is very clear they believe Enlightened governance can only be achieved at the giving of those currently in power. The idea of change coming via demands from below isn't even debated, because it wasn't seen as feasible in the age of centralized, absolutist monarchies. The public intellectuals going to coffee shops were equivalent to Chinese scholar-officials: there role is to persuade the powerful to rule better. Even in places like Holland, with a more distributed power system, the way to enact change was to win debates and votes in provincial and national assemblies, through the existing order. Again, America changed that. These ragtag colonists had demanded change and when they hadn't got their due, they had taken up arms against one of the most powerful Empires in the world - and won! Perhaps all these Kings and Emperors weren't as powerful as previously envisioned. Demands and, if they were not met, political violence, suddenly became a lot more popular. Especially among personality types more embracing of that sort of thing.
And so, without the Americans setting a different precedent, I see Joseph II as the go-to model. Enlightened despotism, constrained by a British-style parliament elected from feudal nobles (so in the French case, the Second Estate). I like the comparison between Chinese scholars and intellectuals, by the way.

So to sum up, there would be far less emphasis on 'ordinary' people as agents of change; rather, the medieval system would, step by step, reform itself. It would be the monarch's job to revitalise France and fix the system; it would be on the First and Second Estates, primarily, to assist this with continued loyalty, suggestions and cooperation, and generally making the system work. I see liberal nobles playing a far more important role here, while unrest such as the Flour War would be looked down on as "the masses" acting like "children" and treated like a standard medieval revolt, detached from the process of reform from on high. (Of course, there's only so much a king can do to keep these two separate). This will hopefully keep reforms from escalating into revolutionary chaos... but the flip side is that the Bourbons can only sit on the boiling pot for so long. The longer they go without taking the Third Estate seriously, the more anger they'll build up directed at themselves and, I suppose, the worse it will be if the people end up doing the unthinkable and turning on their government.
So now that we have considered these things, let's think how we could play it out in France. The first thing to point out is that the Dutch actually embraced all of this first. The Patriottentijd was a real change just over the border from France, which had to be put down by the Prussians but shaped a lot of thinking. The anti-Orangist party declared themselves the patriots, represented people of the Dutch nation, and moved from a "through the system" approach to forming militias and taking their rights back. They formed new assemblies, with broader suffrage, based on their natural rights, not historical liberties of the previous assemblies. With no American Revolution, I can't see this happening. Instead the Netherlands is likely to maintain political gridlock, with increasing cynicism and authoritarian creep.

So what about France itself? With no American or Dutch example, they are likely to have less drive to political violence. The first case in OTL in the revolutionary lead-up was the events before and during the Day of Tiles in Grenoble. A meeting of interested people decided to come together and decide to call the provincial assembly - notably, with double representation for the third estate, as was historical in Dauphine. That is unlikely to happen now. Rising bread prices and poor harvests are likely just to cause old fashion rioting, not posing as a provincial assembly.
I know far less about Dutch politics of the era than French, so I'll need to look into that.

With regards to "natural rights", though, that concept had germinated long before the American Revolution. While Thomas Jefferson hadn't yet crossed the Rubicon and said that the people had the right to change their government in defence of "natural rights" (implying that they supersede the authority of kings), the idea that "perhaps there are certain things the government should not do! Perhaps the Creator gives us rights independent of the monarch!" was long established. So I think it would still be a factor here, albeit couched in different language.

Less political violence in France would certainly be a good thing-- keeping the skeleton of the monarchy intact, at the very least, would prevent the Revolution from lasting a decade and building up a giant pyramid of severed heads. (Things like the Vendee war and subsequent mass execution of captured rebels would likely be butterflied)
It's probably likely that the General Estates would still get called a national level. The idea of this institution as the channel for reform had been around for a while, ever since the credibility of the parlements had been destroyed via their (temporary) abolition in the mid-century, even if they were brought back later. It's the natural place to go with the financial crisis hitting. But without the Dauphine example before them, I can't see the concept of double representation of the third estate entering the public consciousness. They will probably be called with single representation and be voting by class.
I agree with all of this.
Most go back to their provinces, insisting they have achieved some major goals, and petitions start for another calling of the Estates. A minority of hotheads refuse to leave, but without public backing, the King's men arrest them and they get sent to the Bastille. The fail in the moment, but leave a heroic legacy for later would-be revolutionaries. The regime has enough funding from including the nobility in taxation to go on for now, but it is still horribly inefficient, and Britain's industrial acceleration increasingly leaves France behind...
This can certainly serve as the basis for something quite interesting....

Thanks again for the response.
 
So without the American Revolution, the dividing line between civilised publicans and sweaty, unwashed masses remains even firmer than in OTL. This certainly makes sense. Impetus for change, then, would have to come from the "public" to be taken seriously. Similar to the distinction between "revolution from above" versus "revolution from below". As an example, Abbe Sieyes's idea that the Third Estate is "everything" would likely be diminished, or at the very least marginalised. No double representation for the Third either.
I think this is right, but the trends of literacy means the demands of the people will get powerful in time. It just needs a spark somewhere to show the way. Maybe Naples or Rome rather than Paris.
Yep, this all makes good sense. As an aside, I don't know if you've read Pieter Judson's The Habsburg Empire: A New History, but he goes into many of the points which you described. He talks in considerable detail about how local officials and noblemen in eighteenth-century Austria took it upon themselves to suggest and/or implement reforms while remaining fiercely loyal to the monarch and institutions... because what else was there? The Habsburgs were Austria and vice versa. So it makes sense that whatever happens in France would follow this trajectory.
Yep read it last year. Great book. It was where I got most of my understanding of the nation concept from.

And so, without the Americans setting a different precedent, I see Joseph II as the go-to model. Enlightened despotism, constrained by a British-style parliament elected from feudal nobles (so in the French case, the Second Estate). I like the comparison between Chinese scholars and intellectuals, by the way.
Here's where we diverge. A British style parliament is not going to happen in the 1790s from this sort of thing. Remember Britain needed a civil war, regicide, a military dictatorship, a restoration, a parliamentary revolution, and another foreign succession to get to their modern constitutional system. France will just be on the beginning of their journey. They are likely to have multiple false starts and retrenchment to monarchy and oligarchy.
So to sum up, there would be far less emphasis on 'ordinary' people as agents of change; rather, the medieval system would, step by step, reform itself. It would be the monarch's job to revitalise France and fix the system; it would be on the First and Second Estates, primarily, to assist this with continued loyalty, suggestions and cooperation, and generally making the system work. I see liberal nobles playing a far more important role here,

Liberal nobles are going to be a minority of the second estate and thus marginalized in their house of a tricameral system. In addition the Estates are unlikely to be in permanent sitting. Probably they will be called every 5-10 years depending on when the monarchy needs them.

while unrest such as the Flour War would be looked down on as "the masses" acting like "children" and treated like a standard medieval revolt, detached from the process of reform from on high. (Of course, there's only so much a king can do to keep these two separate). This will hopefully keep reforms from escalating into revolutionary chaos... but the flip side is that the Bourbons can only sit on the boiling pot for so long. The longer they go without taking the Third Estate seriously, the more anger they'll build up directed at themselves and, I suppose, the worse it will be if the people end up doing the unthinkable and turning on their government.
I agree with the concept but I think the Third Estate will get taken more seriously than the Second, the way the dynamics are setup.l for the 1789 Estates. Perhaps the Church will clamp down on the lower clergy standing for future elections. Then you could get a conservative clergy siding with the Nobility and the King.
Less political violence in France would certainly be a good thing-- keeping the skeleton of the monarchy intact, at the very least, would prevent the Revolution from lasting a decade and building up a giant pyramid of severed heads. (Things like the Vendee war and subsequent mass execution of captured rebels would likely be butterflied)

The monarchy will remain far more than a skeleton in this scenario. If their power is reduced so much, the monarchy will go to war all over it and then you get an OTL revolution scenario. Even the concept of "constitutional monarchy" would be too much I think. It will be the end of absolutism, but still a very powerful King, just with the necessity to negotiate with other constituencies to do some things. A bit like the English Kings in the early 1600s.
 
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I'm doing a TL about that concept. Odds are, there will be no French Revolution. Of course, it's inevitable that the debt the French hold balloons upward by 1800 due to high spending and the Estates-General is called before then. Unlike OTL, though, I can see France slowly transitioning into a Constitutional Monarchy. With the Bourbons still in power, it probably preservers its alliance with Spain. And having no Napoleon is a very big concept to explore in and of itself.
 
I'm doing a TL about that concept. Odds are, there will be no French Revolution. Of course, it's inevitable that the debt the French hold balloons upward by 1800 due to high spending and the Estates-General is called before then. Unlike OTL, though, I can see France slowly transitioning into a Constitutional Monarchy. With the Bourbons still in power, it probably preservers its alliance with Spain. And having no Napoleon is a very big concept to explore in and of itself.
I'm considering doing something on the subject myself-- many of my ideas align with the above.
 
I'm doing a TL about that concept. Odds are, there will be no French Revolution. Of course, it's inevitable that the debt the French hold balloons upward by 1800 due to high spending and the Estates-General is called before then. Unlike OTL, though, I can see France slowly transitioning into a Constitutional Monarchy. With the Bourbons still in power, it probably preservers its alliance with Spain. And having no Napoleon is a very big concept to explore in and of itself.
France was well on its way to financial recovery when the ARW wrecked it.
 
Just please don't go down the "France seamlessly transitions to a constitutional monarchy route and suddenly performs as well as Britain" route. It's so ahistorical and cliched.
France really needs to encourage industry as well, since by 1830, a smaller percentage of France was industrialized than Britain. Not only that, but despite the Revolution, in the 1790s/1800s, people (British, Americans, whoever) were still sending to Paris for luxury goods.

So, while as pointed out in my "industrialized southern Italy" question, industry doesn't automatically equal prosperity, France's economic model was positively backwards. Then you got finance ministers who were idiots (Necker used to cook the books IIRC, Calonne an idiot, ISTR reading that Turgot was the only one who seemed to know what was going on, but even his model was outdated).
 
France really needs to encourage industry as well, since by 1830, a smaller percentage of France was industrialized than Britain. Not only that, but despite the Revolution, in the 1790s/1800s, people (British, Americans, whoever) were still sending to Paris for luxury goods.

So, while as pointed out in my "industrialized southern Italy" question, industry doesn't automatically equal prosperity, France's economic model was positively backwards. Then you got finance ministers who were idiots (Necker used to cook the books IIRC, Calonne an idiot, ISTR reading that Turgot was the only one who seemed to know what was going on, but even his model was outdated).

Also, most people don't have sufficient understanding of economics. Investing in a bit of industrial activity doesn't give you an industrial revolution. Otherwise the Chinese would have beaten the British to it by about seven centuries. You need a whole host of other things like widespread literacy, a scientific subculture, a sufficiently integrated end market (both from a legal and physical transport perspective), sufficiently mature capital markets, legal structures with the right incentives and protections (i.e. the concept of corporations), and faith among investors that their profits will be received (i.e. a constitutionally limited government). And even a super intelligent, economically savvy, reformist government cannot click its fingers and do these things. There are political vested interests at play. It will take them 50 years, best case.
 
I remember that I posted a thread asking a similar question a few years ago when I was starting to write my TL "Dreams of Liberty", which is about the US losing the ARW in mid-1777 without any French intervention. The conclusion that I reached after reading through comments in the thread is that something similar to the French Revolution, be it reform or full-out revolution, is borderline inevitable regardless of the outcome of the ARW due to debt accumulated by France during the Seven Years' War. Basically, the French economy was in ruins a decade before anyone was taking the idea of the Thirteen Colonies seceding seriously and no ARW doesn't magically eliminate the consequences of that. As for the impact of there being no ARW on the "revolution" and its outcome, it's impossible to say thanks to how many specific factors influenced the OTL outcome of the French Revolution, so I think anything from limited liberal reforms that keep the monarchy intact to the Jacobins seizing power and defeating the absolute monarchies of Europe is plausible enough with the right circumstances, but the most obvious impact that I can see is that Thomas Jefferson and Lafayette likely don't play as influential of a role in creating the Declaration of the Rights of Man as they did in OTL. That's not to say it's not impossible for them to not have a role (I can easily imagine Jefferson running off to Paris once the revolution breaks out and gaining traction with his ideas) and the fact that the American Revolution and the French Revolution were both products of the Age of Enlightenment as opposed to one being a product of the other means that you'll presumably see some common threads with OTL in any document based on the liberal ideas of the 18th Century, but it's more likely than not that whatever equivalent to the Declaration of the Rights of Man emerges, if any equivalent exists at all, will look very different from what we got in OTL if the US Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights don't exist for inspiration and Jefferson and Lafayette are largely out of the picture. Maybe the French base many of their new institutions and documents off of those of other republican governments in history instead of the US. In "Dreams of Liberty", for example, the new French regime takes substantial inspiration from the political structure and values of the Roman Republic.
 
Also, most people don't have sufficient understanding of economics. Investing in a bit of industrial activity doesn't give you an industrial revolution. Otherwise the Chinese would have beaten the British to it by about seven centuries. You need a whole host of other things like widespread literacy, a scientific subculture, a sufficiently integrated end market (both from a legal and physical transport perspective), sufficiently mature capital markets, legal structures with the right incentives and protections (i.e. the concept of corporations), and faith among investors that their profits will be received (i.e. a constitutionally limited government). And even a super intelligent, economically savvy, reformist government cannot click its fingers and do these things. There are political vested interests at play. It will take them 50 years, best case.
This is actually huge. Economics isn't something I'm well-versed in so I appreciate any and all pointers. If we look at OTL's United States, they had the nucleus of a modern industrial economy well before the Civil War (instrumental to victory in that conflict). They had all of the factors you mentioned: a developed political and intellectual culture, plus a large population and open space to develop, with resources. That last one is, IMO, rather unique to the USA by this point in history (and something which I doubt British America would be able to enjoy), but all the others can be developed in a reformed France. Perhaps it's significant that in OTL, major French industrialisation only really picked up during the July Monarchy, when France was at its most liberal (and, of course, a new generation had grown up without getting mowed down in an endless war-- a cheap source of labour!)

Certainly, just reforming the Bourbon state so that it resembles Joseph II's "enlightened despotism" more than Saint Louis IX's regime will take time, and depending on when Louis XVI dies sans guillotine, might well be a project for his successor. If that's the precursor for serious industrialisation... the timescale might not be too different from OTL.
I remember that I posted a thread asking a similar question a few years ago when I was starting to write my TL "Dreams of Liberty", which is about the US losing the ARW in mid-1777 without any French intervention. The conclusion that I reached after reading through comments in the thread is that something similar to the French Revolution, be it reform or full-out revolution, is borderline inevitable regardless of the outcome of the ARW due to debt accumulated by France during the Seven Years' War. Basically, the French economy was in ruins a decade before anyone was taking the idea of the Thirteen Colonies seceding seriously and no ARW doesn't magically eliminate the consequences of that. As for the impact of there being no ARW on the "revolution" and its outcome, it's impossible to say thanks to how many specific factors influenced the OTL outcome of the French Revolution, so I think anything from limited liberal reforms that keep the monarchy intact to the Jacobins seizing power and defeating the absolute monarchies of Europe is plausible enough with the right circumstances, but the most obvious impact that I can see is that Thomas Jefferson and Lafayette likely don't play as influential of a role in creating the Declaration of the Rights of Man as they did in OTL. That's not to say it's not impossible for them to not have a role (I can easily imagine Jefferson running off to Paris once the revolution breaks out and gaining traction with his ideas) and the fact that the American Revolution and the French Revolution were both products of the Age of Enlightenment as opposed to one being a product of the other means that you'll presumably see some common threads with OTL in any document based on the liberal ideas of the 18th Century, but it's more likely than not that whatever equivalent to the Declaration of the Rights of Man emerges, if any equivalent exists at all, will look very different from what we got in OTL if the US Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights don't exist for inspiration and Jefferson and Lafayette are largely out of the picture. Maybe the French base many of their new institutions and documents off of those of other republican governments in history instead of the US. In "Dreams of Liberty", for example, the new French regime takes substantial inspiration from the political structure and values of the Roman Republic.
These are actually really good points so thank you.

I agree with all of this, matter of fact.
 
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