How would the Japanese have resisted a American/Soviet invasion?

The distance from Vladivostok to Hokkaido is about 415 nm - and this is not necessarily the distance to a landing beach, just the closest point. The waters between Vladivostok and Hokkaido, especially in winter, are pretty rough. The range from Vladivostok is at the very max for an IL-2, the Yak-9 can get there and have some loiter time. This means any air support for landings will be limited at best. The Russians have never done a major amphibious assault of the size that would be needed, and certainly not over this sort of distance. IMHO at best the Soviets would have to wait until spring of 1946, doing it over this distance with these numbers. Pulling this off with no experience for the Soviets would be quite a feat. The USA worked for a long time to get the equipment, the doctrine, and training to pull off these sorts of amphibious assaults.

Assuming the Soviets could get enough of the equipment - landing craft, transports, etc - and practiced a lot, they could give it a shot. Minimal air support, minimal naval gunfire (they had no major ships in the Pacific or anywhere for that matter) they Soviets will have a very bad time of it. Absent naval gunfire and proper air support any Japanese defenses that are dug in, and they will be, will be there waiting. By spring 1946, if things are still going on the Japanese on Hokkaido will expect the Russians to come and will do their best to make it expensive.

If the Soviets are willing to pay the price and they have some luck, yes they can take Hokkaido. Given the logistical issues in getting what they need for the navy, training troops and sailors in amphibious warfare, the water conditions in that area in the winter...doing it before spring 1946 would result in failure.
 

trurle

Banned
My forecast based on prior engagements and reserves of hardware Japanese had:
1) 50,000 KIA US soldiers in the day of invasion to Kyushu
2) 300,000-700,000 KIA the cost for US to secure Kyushu
3) 300,000-1,500,000 US and Soviet corpses is the cost of full campaign up to Imperial Hill.

Duration of campaign can be anywhere from 9 to 30 months, with Japanese dead in range 2,000,000-14,000,000

Basically, the longer fight continues the larger the uncertainty. I can even image the degeneration of Japanese campaign into proxy war between Soviet and US. More violent version of Korean War or Chinese Civil War. The harder Japan would fight, the larger would be Japanese losses. Approximately the same forecast lead to IOTL Japanese surrender. Chances to protect parts of Japanese independence existed, but why to try if surrender terms (basically becoming a satellite state of US and giving up only minor islands) were much more advantageous?

Also, Soviet invasion to Hokkaido is highly unlikely. Yalta treaties clearly defined four core Japanese islands as non-annexable post-war, and Stalin was interested in clear demarcation rather then confrontation with Allies at the moment. See what happened (or more exactly, NOT happened) in Greece post-WWII.
 
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Have any of you read The Red's Decisive Darkness timeline? That may answer the question (to be fair, the most extreme elements of Imperial Japan had purged the (relative) moderates after said moderates tried to surrender).
 
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trurle

Banned
Have any of you read The Red's Decisive Darkness timeline? That may answer the question (to be fair, the most extreme elements of Imperial Japan had purged the (relative) moderates after said moderates tried to surrender).
Yes, and found the bloodthirstiness assumptions on all sides too elevated. "Decisive Darkness" would require not a single POD, but rather a continuous purge of moderates in Japan, US and Soviet Union. Also, heavy fighting was reported even in areas IOTL Japanese deemed non-strategical and therefore only lightly defended.
 
Yes, and found the bloodthirstiness assumptions on all sides too elevated. "Decisive Darkness" would require not a single POD, but rather a continuous purge of moderates in Japan, US and Soviet Union. Also, heavy fighting was reported even in areas IOTL Japanese deemed non-strategical and therefore only lightly defended.

There were actually two purges of "moderates" in DD, first of the 'Peace' faction in the wake of Anami's coup and subsequently if anyone who wasn't utterly committed to the last stand after the failure of Doihara's counter-coup. I'm not sure about the "heavy fighting" in lightly defended areas though. I tried to stay fairly loyal to Allied and Japanese plans which the exception of butterflies.
 

trurle

Banned
There were actually two purges of "moderates" in DD, first of the 'Peace' faction in the wake of Anami's coup and subsequently if anyone who wasn't utterly committed to the last stand after the failure of Doihara's counter-coup. I'm not sure about the "heavy fighting" in lightly defended areas though. I tried to stay fairly loyal to Allied and Japanese plans which the exception of butterflies.
For me, most striking imbalance was the Aomori battle. IOTL, it was assigned the troops roughly equivalent to Okinawa only, spread on much longer perimeter. See map.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Last_batch_of_Imperial_Japanese_Army_Divisions
 

trurle

Banned
The Japanese were scraping the bottom of the battle at that stage of the TL, somewhat compunded by the fact city had been nuked shortly before the Soviets invaded.
What`s why i am saying "bloodthirsty". The battle for Aomori had no point at all. After the Tsugaru Strait coastal fortresses were disabled, Japanese in North Honshu had the entire left flank (at Sea of Japan) wide opened for both US and Soviet invasion. Counter-attacks to north were worse than useless because it caused only dilution of already dispersed Japanese forces, and re-captured territories were impossible to hold without heavy artillery in coastal defences. Well, i doubt even infamous Renya Mutaguchi would be so idiotic. Realistically, at that stage of war dominant mode of operation of Japanese officers would resemble man-saving actions of Gyosaku Morozumi, purges or not.
 

trurle

Banned
A Soviet Hokkaido might have become like North Korea.
A bit of resemblance, but not that powerful. North Korea had approximate economic parity with South Korea for decades until social ineptness took its toll. On the other hand, Hokkaido is less than 4% of Japanese GDP. Actually it was the reason the Hokkaido was so lightly defended in the IOTL end of WWII. The utility/area ratio was the worst of all the Japan.
 
What`s why i am saying "bloodthirsty". The battle for Aomori had no point at all. After the Tsugaru Strait coastal fortresses were disabled, Japanese in North Honshu had the entire left flank (at Sea of Japan) wide opened for both US and Soviet invasion. Counter-attacks to north were worse than useless because it caused only dilution of already dispersed Japanese forces, and re-captured territories were impossible to hold without heavy artillery in coastal defences. Well, i doubt even infamous Renya Mutaguchi would be so idiotic. Realistically, at that stage of war dominant mode of operation of Japanese officers would resemble man-saving actions of Gyosaku Morozumi, purges or not.

The Soviets had reached their limit in regards to shipping so attacked via airborne assault, the Japanese counter-attack was mainly based on Japanese stragglers rallying around the self-proclaimed regent rather than any central command. At that point in the story there was little coherent command structure left.

There is artistic license in DD and I've never denied that but things do have a logical flow within the TL's events.
 
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trurle

Banned
The Soviets had reached their limit in regards to shopping g so attacked via airborne assault, the Japanese counter-attack was mainly based on Japanese stragglers rallying around the self-proclaimed regent rather than any central command. At that point in the story there was little coherent command structure left.

There is artistic license in DD and I've never denied that but things do have a logical flow within the TL's events.
Yes, i know your "Decisive Darkness" timeline is largely self-consistent. It just..makes the plain old zombie myths to look like kindergarten fairy tales in comparison. If Tolkien would write in same style, his work would be called "Chronicles of foreign intervention of Mordor Civil War".:(
 
Absent naval gunfire and proper air support any Japanese defenses that are dug in, and they will be, will be there waiting. By spring 1946, if things are still going on the Japanese on Hokkaido will expect the Russians to come and will do their best to make it expensive.

Wasn't Hokkaido barely defended in the Japanese plans though? I have a memory that distance and the weather would be the greatest impediments to the Soviets.

Also, Soviet invasion to Hokkaido is highly unlikely. Yalta treaties clearly defined four core Japanese islands as non-annexable post-war, and Stalin was interested in clear demarcation rather then confrontation with Allies at the moment. See what happened (or more exactly, NOT happened) in Greece post-WWII.

Wasn't the same true of the remains of Germany? Or Korea? Both still ended up divided.

Though I do think Stalin wouldn't authorize an invasion of Hokkaido unless the US asked for it (and the US might, if Kyushu and Honshu are bruising enough). If such an operation would upset the US, the Soviets would definitely be losing more than they could gain by even trying.

fasquardon
 

trurle

Banned
Wasn't Hokkaido barely defended in the Japanese plans though? I have a memory that distance and the weather would be the greatest impediments to the Soviets.



Wasn't the same true of the remains of Germany? Or Korea? Both still ended up divided.

Though I do think Stalin wouldn't authorize an invasion of Hokkaido unless the US asked for it (and the US might, if Kyushu and Honshu are bruising enough). If such an operation would upset the US, the Soviets would definitely be losing more than they could gain by even trying.

fasquardon
Hokkaido was nearly undefended too. It was irrelevant for Japanese war plans. Entire island was manned by 7th and 42nd infantry divisions, plus 101st independent mixed brigade in southern fortifications.

About Korea and Germany core - these were slated for occupation but not for annexation. Agreed annexation zones - Sakhalin, Kuril Islands, or Keningsberg (Kaliningrad) were truly annexed by Soviet Union.
 
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The location and disposition of troops and fortifications OTL were for August, 1945 in Hokkaido. If the war continues in to 1946 the Japanese, who while perhaps "unhinged" by western standards are not stupid, will realize the threat to Hokkaido is from the USSR. Whatever forces are there would be repositioned so as to resist an attack from the USSR. I don't know enough about the topography of Hokkaido to say what beaches and air drop zones would be most likely. Of course any ports facing Russia would be targets for the Soviets since their ability to sustain and expand any holdings on Hokkaido will depend on getting a port - their across the beach capabilities are minimal.

The points I think are relevant are: a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido is unlikely almost impossible until early spring 1946 for a lot of reasons; the Japanese will see this risk and position fortifications and personnel to resist this attack; Soviet success is likely but not guaranteed and is likely to be quite expensive. OTL the soviet invasion of the Kuriles nearly failed, so this does not augur well for an invasion of Hokkaido.

As far as what Stalin "agreed" to in terms of annexation/occupation...really?? It took the equivalent of a crowbar to pry Stalin out of northern Iran, and almost as much to get the Soviets out of Austria which was a joint occupation. Stalin was not going to leave a single square inch of territory where the Red Army was without making sure a "friendly" government was left behind unless he had no choice (see N. Iran and Austria). Remember that Stalin agreed to free elections in Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc - how well did that work.
 

trurle

Banned
The location and disposition of troops and fortifications OTL were for August, 1945 in Hokkaido. If the war continues in to 1946 the Japanese, who while perhaps "unhinged" by western standards are not stupid, will realize the threat to Hokkaido is from the USSR. Whatever forces are there would be repositioned so as to resist an attack from the USSR. I don't know enough about the topography of Hokkaido to say what beaches and air drop zones would be most likely. Of course any ports facing Russia would be targets for the Soviets since their ability to sustain and expand any holdings on Hokkaido will depend on getting a port - their across the beach capabilities are minimal.

The points I think are relevant are: a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido is unlikely almost impossible until early spring 1946 for a lot of reasons; the Japanese will see this risk and position fortifications and personnel to resist this attack; Soviet success is likely but not guaranteed and is likely to be quite expensive. OTL the soviet invasion of the Kuriles nearly failed, so this does not augur well for an invasion of Hokkaido.

As far as what Stalin "agreed" to in terms of annexation/occupation...really?? It took the equivalent of a crowbar to pry Stalin out of northern Iran, and almost as much to get the Soviets out of Austria which was a joint occupation. Stalin was not going to leave a single square inch of territory where the Red Army was without making sure a "friendly" government was left behind unless he had no choice (see N. Iran and Austria). Remember that Stalin agreed to free elections in Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc - how well did that work.
The Japanese documents related to troops formation and movement in the last stage of WWII does not support the idea the Japanese intended to resolutely defend Hokkaido. Since April 1945, all Hokkaido-related movements were withdrawal of troops and spreading of ones who remained. Also, Japanese have started a large-scale removal of rails on railroad since May 1945, although this was not unique for Hokkaido. The trend did not reverse after Soviet Invasion 9 August 1945, although it may be just not enough time for orders to pass.

As about place for Soviet landings, most viable areas are on South-East - from Kushiro to Hakodate. Sea ice will force the delay of landings elsewhere.
 

trurle

Banned
In Decisive Darkness, the Soviets invaded Hokkaidp on August 24, 1945 at Rumoi.
Not the worst possible location for landing. At least it had a seaport and railroad connection. By the way, the OTL naval battle has happened near Rumoi port 20 August 1945 too. 2 Soviet subs sunk 2 Japanese transports with evacuees and damaged a auxiliary gunboat, with one submarine severely damaged by gunboat. Damaged Soviet sub sank with all hands 3 days later off Southern Sakhalin (or at least that location is reported in Russian Navy registry).

https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/三船殉難事件

Speculations exist what these submarines were the part of scouting force for the impeding amphibious operation on Rumoi, but no official confirmation is available.
 
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The Soviets would have certainly benefitted by waiting. Japanese plans were to withdraw the two existing divisions for use in defending Kyushu during the autumn of '45. A local division was to be raised to replace them, but since this would be formed from the local militia the quality of training and equipment would obviously be quite poor.

Hokkaido was nearly undefended too. It was irrelevant for Japanese war plans. Entire island was manned by 7th and 42nd infantry divisions, plus 101st independent mixed brigade in southern fortifications.

Point of order: there was an additional brigades worth of static IJN personnel dedicated to manning the coastal forts on the northern shore of Hokkaido. These don't appear in most accounts of home island defenses, as those rely on IJA records.
 

trurle

Banned
Point of order: there was an additional brigades worth of static IJN personnel dedicated to manning the coastal forts on the northern shore of Hokkaido. These don't appear in most accounts of home island defenses, as those rely on IJA records.
Yes, i know. The same situation was in Okinawa. Even local researchers has difficulty accessing the disposition of IJN forces because these did not report to local authorities. I suspect about brigade-force of IJN was in Hokkaido by the end of WWII, extrapolating from Chishima IJN garrisons which were reported fighting.
 
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