How would the Japanese have defended Normandy?

for those snickering few--did the question really go that far over your head? in other words, how would the Japanese prepare the defense of a probable/likely invasion beach on Honshu, within the time frame of 1943-6/44, based on all their experience up to that time.

they had better terrain for starters... there are several good works on this

"Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan" (really good for specifics of deployment and plans)
"Downfall: The end of the Japanese Empire" (a larger overall look)
"The Invasion of Japan: Alternateive to the Bomb" (again more of a general look)

I haven't read this one yet but it looks interesting
"Defense of Japan 1945"

my take is that there isn't a lot to choose from in terms of plans. The Japanese had their 2nd and 3rd rate units (In terms of equipment and training) manning fortress positions on the coast with their better trained and equipped 1st rate units held back in reserve. Which mirrors pretty closely the German deployment in Normandy, more so if the 12th SS and Panzer Lehr are moved up a little closer to the invasion area (as Rommel was pushing for). The Japanese, because of the relative smaller size of their potential invasion area had more depth and took advantage of that.

The Japanese had far less resources than the Germans at this point too, but if they had them, such as the large numbers of mines, they would definitely have used them similarly. The Japanese were weak in dealing with airborne attacks, but they really only saw 2 brigade sized airborne drops in the Pacific and a few in Burma unlike the major assaults in the European theater. German armored doctrine is obviously superior of course.

Both the Germans and Japanese depended on moving up their reserves and assumed they would suffer air attack. We know how well that worked in Normandy but we don't know how it would have worked in Japan. Again the terrain is the issue there
 

Towelie

Banned
The Japanese would suffer massively from the lack of armored formations capable of taking on American and British forces. German Armor was a major reason why Montgomery had such trouble in the area around Caen after the landing.

As far as beach defenses went, Japanese heavy and light machine guns were nowhere near as effective as German machinegun defenses by 1944, and tactically, that would create problems for them in attempting a waterline defense. However, after the Marshall Islands Campaign, the Japanese abandoned that concept and moved towards a cave defense with artillery zeroed across the front strategy. On Normandy, this would have been impossible, as there wasn't really anywhere to hide. A reserve army of varying levels of motorization would be used to counterattack, and that counterattack would be a disaster, as Japanese Armor would be cut to pieces and the infantry assault would not be able to hold up under constant air and naval bombardment (not even getting into the tactical deficiencies of Japanese Infantry by 1944, but this too would be a problem).

I would imagine Allied forces getting off the beaches quicker than OTL. Japanese artillery was not bad, but it was not effective in anti-tank roles nearly like German artillery, and as a result, it would be hard for the Japanese to stop Allied armour.

In the air, things would be about OTL. Japanese pilot quality in 1944 was a joke and the Zero no longer had the superiority it did in early 1942.

That being said, Japanese troops were not prone to large scale or small scale surrender in their conflicts with American troops. The kinds of morale collapses that afflicted German units of lower to mid quality in the immediate aftermath of Normandy would not be hitting the Japanese nearly as hard. Clearing out Cherbourg and other cities is going to be a real bitch of a time for the Allies. Paris might be razed. Patton's steamroll east would be bloodier as he would have to clear out town by town the remnants of the Japanese Army rather than imprisoning the willingly surrendering stragglers. Fortified positions might take longer to conquer.

Essentially, the Japanese would suffer grievous casualties and would be tactically and strategically overmatched in almost every engagement. That being said, there would be a higher price to pay for the Allies in taking fortified towns and a lower price to pay in duking it out on open ground.
 
Last edited:

nbcman

Donor
German TOE 1944
8a2ea8373e03ef96fba2e1afdd350aa0.png


Versus Japan (source):
hb-10.jpg


Overall, the Japanese divisions have about 50% more personnel but have much lighter weapons and less transport. The Japanese wouldn't do very well as they are undergunned and are weaker than a German static division.

Even if you give Japan the "strengthened" version of their triangular division, the division is still weaker in heavy weapons but has almost double the mouths to feed as compared to the German division:
hb-12.jpg
 
Last edited:
However, after the Marshall Islands Campaign, the Japanese abandoned that concept and moved towards a cave defense with artillery zeroed across the front strategy. On Normandy, this would have been impossible, as there wasn't really anywhere to hide. A reserve army of varying levels of motorization would be used to counterattack, and that counterattack would be a disaster, as Japanese Armor would be cut to pieces and the infantry assault would not be able to hold up under constant air and naval bombardment (not even getting into the tactical deficiencies of Japanese Infantry by 1944, but this too would be a problem).

Thats why I was using Lyete & Luzon as models. In the latter case Yamashita attempted to maneuver & engage the US 6th Army on the central plain, but was out maneuvered & out gunned by afar more mobile US field Army. Krugers campaign on Luzon is understudied, suffice to say Yamashita was hind footed throughout and was forced to use his back up plan. that is retreat to the forested hill country and concede the populated and productive regions to the US/Pillipino forces.

On Leyte the Japanese attempted to fight and maneuver from entrenched zones inland. This failed in the face of US firepower and maneuver. One of the advantages in maneuverability the US possessed was the effect of combined navy/army ops. That is the US was not wedded to single landings followed by a exclusively land campaign. On both Leyte & Luzon supporting landings, up to corps in size, were made to unhinge the Japanese defense.
 
Last edited:
Top