If no WWI, I would bet on German being a lot more widespread in technological matters especially; basically a tossup between German and English, with whatever language is local enjoying partial translations from one or the other of these.
And I would think the empires would have broken up, to the extent they did OTL anyway--even now we have some overseas departments of France, Britain has Gibraltar and could easily have kept Malta, various Caribbean islands, etc. By and large though the empires are going down.
Really, you ought to like that better--it means way more language diversity after all! Why call a non-unified Europe "multipolar" when it is a handful of languages mainly in three big families (Romance, Germanic, Slavic) when you can have the hundreds more languages of Africa and Asia--and even a couple Native American ones as in Paraguay for instance?
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This is not the ASB forum, so one cannot simply stipulate that the Belle Epoque, as it looked in retrospect after the Great War to Eurocentric peoples, just soldiers on in fusty civilized stasis. There were reasons for a Great War and they are unlikely to hold in abeyance indefinitely. Meanwhile there were (and still are) reasons for disruptive phenomena like the Great Depression; I do believe one can butterfly the timing, and perhaps spread the intensity of that crash around, but a comparable net dip in global capitalist production, with associated political and social consequences, is just plain in the cards I think. The kind of social progress that leads to the breakdown of the several European centered imperial systems is also in the cards.
It is much easier to stipulate that the Central Powers could win the Great War than it is to suppose that the war can simply be averted indefinitely. It seems to me that despite its recent problems and perhaps total shipwreck, some kind of unified Europe is far more likely to be involved in high tech development of the kind that might support an Internet of some sort than that the several imperial powers manage to coexist in Europe and at the same time dominate separate colonial systems that fail to rebel and throw off the formal rule of Europe--if a European power is going to succeed in some combination of suppression of the discontent of the world's billions and coopting them, it seems more likely a unified European imperium would do that than several fragmented ones, particularly if they are maintaining their independence and not getting merged into a single union by patriotic resistance--which is to say, at bottom, threatening to be at each other's throats! Union might be the result of a rational federation, or the result of outright conquest, or intermediately the result of the hegemony of some pretty much forcing the others to "voluntarily" merge to some extent. But without such union, one way or another, it seems just a matter of time before the colonial peoples figure out how to manipulate the rivalries of their pretentious European masters to throw off formal rule.
Only, perhaps, to fall under informal rule. OTL the East/West divide formed by the Soviet Union and its attempts to secure its position while declaring hostility to the fundamental institutions of the rest of the developed world put the United States in the hegemonic position in the West, and under the rhetoric of political liberation the "imperatives" of anti-Communism gave Europe, the USA, and Japan the leverage to manipulate the nominally independent and free peoples of the Third World so as to position them as so many chess pieces in the east/west battle--the only recourse of the free but poor nations formerly subordinated as colonies to continuing to serve an essentially still colonial role being to side with the Eastern bloc, and then only rarely, under indigenous leadership, did a few of these nations manage to remove themselves from the global capitalism that subordinated them; this generally meant they were locked in poverty of one type, where collectively they were apparently worse off and certainly lacked liberal freedoms. But in the other nations that did not aggressively go Leninist, liberal freedoms were generally but weakly observed and only to the extent that individuals could get rich and therefore better connected with the global power system (and more trusted by it, having joined individually the ranks of the better-off global elites that First world citizens generally considered themselves to be in by right of birth, even if they were poor within these nations).
In fact the Internet of OTL emerged from a Cold War US defense program, the DARPAnet.
In fact I can't really picture the world simply proceeding from the premises of 1912 without some huge disruption or other; it might go on very different tracks than OTL but cannot reasonably proceed on the same tracks as then. If by some weird miracle it somehow managed to stumble forward along the lines you suggest...
Honestly though I take pride in the technological leadership of the USA OTL, without the catastrophe dealt the Central Powers of OTL WWI, there is every reason to think Germany would lead in terms of advanced tech; Americans would be trailing behind them, licensing and rebranding--and Englishizing--largely German inventions. Every now and then it would go the other way, because the US market, although somewhat smaller than the huge Eastern European hegemony German Reich based firms would enjoy (because they would the be default suppliers for the Austro-Hungarian Empire) is richer in that the potential customers have more money. But the Americans will be behind in the institutional support that German firms get from well-funded universities. To a limited extent, a USA that never goes through the mill of two world wars will probably step up and develop some faint analog of the German central support for basic science and research--but faint and shadowy it will be. Where major German universities enjoyed the patronage of both the state on its several levels and the private corporations tied to aristocratic wealth, the parallel process in America was always weaker. OTL American academia, particularly in the physical sciences and engineering, enjoyed the benefits of a brain drain from old Europe, especially from Eastern Europe, in the wake of the disruption and chaos caused by losing the Great War and by the unsettled situation afterward, culminating in the rise of Hitler and other reactionary regimes there that drove dozens of top-rate minds across the ocean. At the same time the requirements of preparing for participation in WWI laid a lot of the groundwork for government-coordinated patronage of the sciences and engineering that US corporations benefited from. It is possible that the USA might conceivably have developed robust linkages between basic research and industry without the premise of two great wars to form organizations founded on government, if instead the "Robber Baron" era aka "Captains of Industry" had gone unchecked by American democracy; if the USA simply turned into a plutocracy that had no quarrel with that identification, the kinds of business organization that in fact lay at the basis of the USA being a growing industrial power on the same sort of scale as Germany might have served to support a comparable scientific establishment. But for good or for ill, Americans don't like trusts and monopolies and cartels. That doesn't mean we don't form them but we do enact laws and courts do uphold rulings that make it necessary for American cartels to disguise themselves. In those circumstances, the positive aspects of them, including the ability to invest in long-term development on the basis of private interests, fall by the wayside. We therefore need government institutions to do this for us. Given no premise to develop such institutions, I don't see Americans proceeding on a 1912 sort of mentality to do more than play catch-up behind the German-led scientific leadership of Europe. A certain amount of innovation would sprout first in America and make its way east instead, especially when the items involved serve a mass public, but on the whole the leadership would be in Germany.
Would a Germany leading the world in technology such as was cutting edge in the USA of OTL in the 1950s and '60s be motivated to develop any sort of Internet at all? The essence of the idea is to enable computers to exchange files with each other. it comes down to telecommunications. I'd think any such thing would emerge from the global telephone and telegraphic systems. As another poster pointed out, despite general German dominance in high tech, if we have the premise that somehow or other all the empires of 1912 are still standing and more or less functional in 2012, then surely it is the British, more than anyone else, who own most of the communications links and have the most territory to coordinate. On the other hand in a colonialist model of the world, much of the world does not require much in the way of intelligence; the "brains" are in the European political and commercial capitals, and in New York, maybe Tokyo too. If, while the social and political systems somehow stand still despite their manifest (in retrospect anyway) instability in the real 1912. somehow technology evolves so that computing power comparable to what we see in the world as a whole today is constructed and used, most of that will be in the North, most of that will be concentrated in elite corporate and governmental stations of great power--the situation would be a lot more like 1970 than 1990, with what dispersed computational power there is serving to run factory machinery or perhaps switch railroads or the like.
Instead of an Internet as such, I suppose there would be extremely high capacity trunk lines connecting a relative handful of mega-sites within each "empire" in Europe--lots of links between Ministries and the City of London, not so many to the factory towns up north; intense traffic between cartel HQs scattered in various German cities and universities there, connecting to Berlin for governmental coordination; the French might just have all their computing power to speak of all located in Paris! And then the telegraphic system would be enlarged to the extent necessary to send blocks of coded orders to the peripheral sub-command centers of political/commercial empire, and send back digested data in relatively simple form. The closest thing to an actual internet might indeed be in the USA, but I don't see it being a general public service, except to the limited extent that individual homes--perhaps middle class ones anyway, if not mass public--would have terminals allowing them essentially to send self-typed telegrams, perhaps with video and audio--basically videophones with type capability, and the ability to write virtual documents. I think the vast potential market of video gaming might go completely missed, as the penny might never drop that intensive computing power is something to play around with.
Note that if a "data wants to be free" culture were to somehow develop, personal computing be developed for both fun and profit, this would probably spell the downfall of the centralized colonial civilization if nothing else did before. The necessity of everything being coordinated by godlike ruling elites on a distant continent would cease to be obvious whereas the tools for both self-coordination and disruption of imperial rule would be falling into mass hands.