I don't see how it could have been much different. I doubt that Dewey would have acceded to the requests from Dougie for use of atomic weapons against Chinese targets.
Very interesting!Given that one of the causes behind the Korean war was Dean Acheson's failure to mention that South Korea was part of the defensive perimeter of the United States, and that Dean Acheson would likely not become the 51st US Secretary of State in the event of a Dewey victory in 1948, the Korean War might not happen in such a TL. With a firm US commitment to Syngman Rhee's government and defending South Korea, the invasion might not get the green light from Stalin. Blair makes this point in his book on the subject The Forgotten War. Assuming that Dewey's government would get caught with their pants down regarding Korea in the same way as Truman's, though plausible, is not the only possible outcome.
Depending on who Dewey picks for his cabinet and the policies he pursues the early portion of the Korean War could be vastly different. One possible option is that they take the prospect of defending South Korea more seriously than OTL but not seriously enough to dissuade a North Korean attack. This could result in heavier losses for the KPLA and a much earlier halting of their advance.
Given that one of the causes behind the Korean war was Dean Acheson's failure to mention that South Korea was part of the defensive perimeter of the United States ...
Plus the political backlash. I can see the Dems calling the Republicans weak by letting our troops being killed when we had weapons to end the war.Are you sure about this? Truman had served in the First World War and been the commander-in-chief at the end of World War 2, so he had military credentials that Dewey lacked. That lack of military/foreign policy experience might make Dewey less willing to stand up to a prominent general like MacArthur than Truman was. (Especially if Dewey also lost the popular vote and has a Democratic controlled Congress, since that means his political position will be weaker than Truman's was.)
But even more to the point, Dewey's leading foreign policy advisor and likely Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, and Dulles was not exactly hostile to the idea of the U.S. using nuclear weapons in Korea. Per John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy by Richard Immerman, Dulles at a NSC meeting held on February 11, 1953, supported granting General Clark's request to use tactical nuclear weapons on a concentration of Chinese troops in the Kaesong area. (The Truman Administration had been treating the Kaesong area as a sanctuary to help facilitate the armistice negotiations). And (also per the Immerman book) Dulles at a May 20, 1953 NSC meeting favored the idea of the U.S. using nuclear weapons on Chinese air bases in Manchuria as support for an offensive to push the armistice line from the 38th Parallel to the "waist" of Korea (the line from Sinanju to Hungnam.)
If Dulles was willing to use nuclear weapons just to improve the U.S. bargaining position in armistice negotiations, it seems like he would support General MacArthur's request to use nuclear weapons when it seems like the U.S. is on the brink of outright defeat in Korea. And if President Dewey's leading foreign policy advisor is telling him to use nuclear weapons it is very possible that a new president who has little foreign policy experience might very well follow Dulles and MacArthur's advice and authorize nuclear strikes.
Thanks for this information, David!For an argument that the importance of the "defensive perimeter" speech has been much overrated, see https://web.archive.org/web/2003040...ions/prologue/summer_2002_korean_myths_1.html
"To build political support for the Korean assistance package, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson delivered a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, offering an optimistic assessment of the ROK's future. Later, critics perpetrated the myth that Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the US 'defensive perimeter' gave the Kremlin a 'green light' to order an attack.13 Currently available declassified Soviet documents show, however, that Acheson's words had almost no effect on Communist planning for the invasion; only one even mentions the Press Club speech. In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at first thought that Acheson had placed South Korea *inside* the U.S. defensive perimeter.14...
"In January 1950, Stalin approved Kim's request to visit Moscow but, despite Acheson's speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. At that time, he also approved a major expansion of North Korea's military capabilities, but his purpose was more to ensure its survival than to promote aggressive expansion. When they met during April, Kim persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy, especially because of support from southern guerrillas and an expected popular uprising against Rhee. But Stalin still feared U.S. military intervention, advising Kim that he could stage an offensive only if China's Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim IL Sung traveled to Beijing to secure Chinese consent for the invasion. Significantly, Mao also expressed concerns about U.S. military intervention. But after Kim disingenuously explained that Stalin had approved his plans, Mao gave his reluctant consent for the offensive as well. Kim IL Sung knew that time was running out and manipulated his patrons into supporting his desperate bid for reunification before Rhee could beat him to the punch..."
In short, the "defensive perimeter" speech does not seem to have convinced either Stalin or Mao or Kim that there was no chance that the US would fight; rather, what happened was that Kim managed to persuade both Stalin and Mao that the North would win before the US could do anything about it.
is Dewey going to gut the military like Truman did?
Thanks for this information, David!
Anyway, I have a question--would Rhee's South Korea have actually attempted to unify Korea by force had North Korea not acted first? Indeed, couldn't the fear of Chinese and/or Soviet military intervention have caused South Korea to reject such a move (especially if the U.S. tells them to back off)?
OK; understood.Both Kim and Rhee wanted to unify Korea by force. But neither of them could do so without their superpower sponsors agreeing to it. Kim got that agreement; Rhee did not. OTOH, Rhee's bellicose statements were used by Kim in his talks with Stalin as evidence of Rhee's aggressive intentions--though whether either Kim or Stalin really believed Rhee would launch a war may be doubted.
is Dewey going to gut the military like Truman did?
For an argument that the importance of the "defensive perimeter" speech has been much overrated, see https://web.archive.org/web/2003040...ions/prologue/summer_2002_korean_myths_1.html
"To build political support for the Korean assistance package, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson delivered a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, offering an optimistic assessment of the ROK's future. Later, critics perpetrated the myth that Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the US 'defensive perimeter' gave the Kremlin a 'green light' to order an attack.13 Currently available declassified Soviet documents show, however, that Acheson's words had almost no effect on Communist planning for the invasion; only one even mentions the Press Club speech. In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at first thought that Acheson had placed South Korea *inside* the U.S. defensive perimeter.14...
"In January 1950, Stalin approved Kim's request to visit Moscow but, despite Acheson's speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. At that time, he also approved a major expansion of North Korea's military capabilities, but his purpose was more to ensure its survival than to promote aggressive expansion. When they met during April, Kim persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy, especially because of support from southern guerrillas and an expected popular uprising against Rhee. But Stalin still feared U.S. military intervention, advising Kim that he could stage an offensive only if China's Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim IL Sung traveled to Beijing to secure Chinese consent for the invasion. Significantly, Mao also expressed concerns about U.S. military intervention. But after Kim disingenuously explained that Stalin had approved his plans, Mao gave his reluctant consent for the offensive as well. Kim IL Sung knew that time was running out and manipulated his patrons into supporting his desperate bid for reunification before Rhee could beat him to the punch..."
In short, the "defensive perimeter" speech does not seem to have convinced either Stalin or Mao or Kim that there was no chance that the US would fight; rather, what happened was that Kim managed to persuade both Stalin and Mao that the North would win before the US could do anything about it.
Kiplinger Magazine in November 1948 did a pretty indepth article on what a Dewey presidency would look like, and they expected Dewey to substantially increase defense spending. (Possibly taking the defense budget from 14 billion up to as high as 20 billion.)
https://books.google.com/books?id=3wUEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA10#v=onepage&q=Defense&f=false
I'm skeptical that Dewey could get that big a defense spending increased passed pre-Korea (especially since it will likely require a tax hike to pay for it), but defense spending will almost certainly be considerably higher than it was under Truman.