You raise valid points. I'd also point out that that was wartime rhetoric, and that TR was nothing if not practical. He had the credentials--street credibility, if you will--to arm-twist other negotiators to his views. They would have known they were dealing with a man who brokered peace once before and has the Nobel Prize to prove it.
How would president Charles Hughes handle the aftermath of WWI?
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You raise valid points. I'd also point out that that was wartime rhetoric, and that TR was nothing if not practical. He had the credentials--street credibility, if you will--to arm-twist other negotiators to his views. They would have known they were dealing with a man who brokered peace once before and has the Nobel Prize to prove it.
I doubt that Hughes or Root would fight against the Racial Equality Proposal to the degree of Wilson, especially with the importance of the black vote to the Republican Party of the time. The proposal received a majority of the votes on the committee (11 for vs 8 against), but Wilson was the chairman and refused to allow it to pass without a unanimous vote. If Root/Hughes supports the measure, that means that Japan probably ends up moving closer to the US during the 1920s. The butterflies here have a decent chance of moving Japan from the Axis to the Allies come WW2 (which will almost certainly still happen), likely replaced by a Germany-Nationalist China alliance. If it butterflies further Japanese militarism against China, then it could also mean a Nationalist victory in the Chinese civil war.
The treaty could not have been ratified in the Senate with the proposal. The opposition in the South and the West would be enough to kill it. (Even though it would actually have little effect on the South--it had to do with treatment of foreign nationals--just the words "racial equality" would doom it there; and of course anti-Japanese feeling was very intense in the West.)
I have no doubt the treaty wouldn't get ratified, but Japan was watching the negotiations very closely. Having both Britain and the US opposed to the measure was a major factor in the alienation of Japan, and the degree to which Wilson moved to oppose it severely damaged US-Japanese relations. Hughes/Root support would probably lead to a US-Japan alliance when the UK-Japan expires in 1923, but even Hughes/Root not opposing to the same extent as Wilson would mean there's some possibility of US-Japan rapprochement during the early 1920s. Wilson really pulled out all the stops to prevent it from making it into the treaty, and anything short of that means the proposal makes it in.
There is also the 'Adriatic question', Wilson had a pretty strong anti-italian stance in the negotiations as saw Rome as an imperialist power and supported the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, starting a process that saw the italian delegation leaving Versailles and humiliating returning later. Hughes maybe can be more diplomatic and so an agreement is reached, sure it will make both side unhappy but can be something they can live with it
I just don’t feel that it’s that hardwired in, yes, even given the punitive and resentful aspects of the Treaty of Versailles, and yes, even given the Great Depression.
And certainly not that the small dopesville Nazi party will maneuver itself to a position of power, or be the least crummy choice for German President Paul von Hindenburg.
Doesn't have to be Hitler but virtually certain to be a dictatorship of some kind. Democracy was a feeble bloom in interwar Europe, and the's no reason for Germany to be an exxception to the general pattern.
And the dictatorship is certain to want rearmament, and revision of the ToV. So either the victors have to give in peacefully (ie successful appeasement) or they have to fight.
If they were smart and patient they wouldn't be Spartacists; they'd be Majority Socialists.
Deleted member 94680
I imagine the American position would be far stronger and historically more well regarded if the 14 Points had simply been avoided.
Hughes could do pretty much everything Wilson did and look far better if he didn’t publicise the 14 Points beforehand.
The real “what if” of an ATL POTUS would be if he could drag the US into the Mandate system and greater post-War involvement...
Hughes could do pretty much everything Wilson did and look far better if he didn’t publicise the 14 Points beforehand.
The real “what if” of an ATL POTUS would be if he could drag the US into the Mandate system and greater post-War involvement...
Wilson is the real punching bag of this forum, isn't it. In fact, I'm pretty sure a lot of people unironically think Harding 1916 would be a better outcome than Wilson 1916. Harding might have tried, but his mistress was blackmailing him at the time
Deleted member 94680
Probably something to do with him being a pretty shitty individual and fairly poor President. It's my personal opinion that the 14 Points were a terrible idea, made public for no particular reason and for no effect, only serving to make the WAllies look foolish down the line when realpolitik meant they weren't implemented evenly.
I don't know enough about Harding, but I'm sure pretty much any of the main players could have done a better job than Wilson in 1916-20.
They both go together, in a way.
It's likely the Army will be larger and more prepared than OTL, and doing it without Conscription at first.
In 1915, the Army had 106k and 108k men in 1916. From the National Defence Act passed in Summer 1916, the Army was authorized for 175k men, 375 aircraft and increasing the size of the National Guard to 450k, plus Federal funding for drills, up from 5 days a year to 48 days
Wilson's SecWar Garrison resigned over this: he wanted more, to double the size of the Army, and do more with the Guard, immediately.
He was replaced with Newton Baker, who opposed the whole idea of Preparedness that Garrison was an advocate for. Baker was a pacifist.
Baker admitted that he didn't know anything on what the Secretary of War was to do.
He had been a Lawyer and the Mayor of Cleveland.
A more prepared Army means the AEF would have their own gear, rather than getting it from the French and British, as well as being available for use on the Western Front sooner. Having a SecWar who knew anything about the Army would be a vast improvement, like say, TR
That improved, earlier AEF voids Ludendorff's plan for the 1918 Spring offensive, to strike before the AEF was in place in numbers.
This changes the end of the War completely, with the Germans huddled in their Trenches as Germany fell apart behind them
1917 they will get instead the Allies trying to bounce their withdrawal the Hindenburg Line, rather than Haig's cautious OTL advance, and with AEF assistance, the Nivelle Offensive may not turn out so disastrously for the French
That withdrawal started in Feb 1917, far too soon for US intervention to make any difference.
Conceivably,, though, the AEF might have arrived fast enough to forestall Michael. If this leads the Germans to seek peace with their frnt still unbroken and essentially immobile, they may get a more lenient armistice and peace.