How would history have changed if HMSIndomitable had successfully joined Force Z?

[JasTysoe]

Indom's Hurrie squadron, 880 NAS, seems from what I can find to be probably at least average in experience and ability by FAA standards of the time. The star of the show would have been the famous Dickie Cork, but most of the rest of the squadron seem to have had some actual air fighting experience, such as taking part in Furious' raids on Petsamo.

During Operation Pedestal, the squadron claimed 8 kills for three losses; one of the losses, I think, was due to friendly AA fire. Hugh Popham also spread a Hurrie all over Victorious' deck when he and his section were delayed landing due to friendly fire and he landed on the closest carrier he could find, while she was still turning into the wind, with empty fuel tanks.

Pedestal had some very heavy attacks, with up to 43 Sm 79s in a single attack and cover from Reggiane 2000s, Me 110s and some 109s. Due to the loss of Eagle and the fact that Victorious mainly had Fulmars, 880 probably had the major share of the work although I can't find full details. Dickie Cork claimed four kills.

O'Hara notes that the Japanese naval attache of the time believed that Italian aircraft and crew were "sound" and their only real issue was lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force.

One of 880's lost aircraft went down to a 110, the squadron leader went down when disobeying his own ferocious warnings about stern-on attacks against bombers (in this case a bunch of He 111s) and I can't find the the other loss.

Some of Indomitable's crew were pretty confident with their fighter controllers, so it could be safe to assume that 880's aircraft would have done a good job, messed up some of the attacks, and downed maybe say 4-6 Japanese bombers. The Fulmars could have knocked down two or three.

However, would they have done a reversal of Midway and gone after the high level bombers and left the torpedo bombers to wreak havoc? We'll never know.

The other issue is that the PoW suffered a bit of a freak hit. If one of her engineer officers hadn't re-started the propeller shaft after it was smashed (which was, from what I recall, perfectly reasonable given what he knew) she may have done much better. So it would be reasonable to assume that particular hit, the first one if I recall correctly, would not have caused the enormously damaging chain of events that occurred IRL.

One other factor is that the time line seems to make it unlikely, as noted above, that Indomitable would have arrived on time anyway.

 

[JasTysoe]

Having said that, I do not blame the British anywhere near as much as I do CREDIT the Japanese for having run a brilliant, imaginative campaign that was as reckless as say the German invasion of Norway. Japanese planning was incredibly risky, and subject to quite capricious weather and sea conditions. Any clear reading of the campaign, and especially Force Z cannot help but emphasize the extreme streaks of luck the Japanese enjoyed at key times.

One wonders how much the luck the Japanese got in the early war contributed to the "Victorty Disease" they suffered from later? They are often criticised for over-complex plans but early on in the piece, that worked to their benefit. When complicated and imaginative plans worked as well as they did in the early war, it could explain why they kept on with them later - especially when they knew that they could not win a war of attrition.

We'll never know, but perhaps if the Force Z action hadn't gone so well for the Japanese (which is not to say it was all just luck) they would have been less daring later on, and therefore more successful in slowing down their defeat?

 

[HMSIndomitable_92]

The other issue is that the PoW suffered a bit of a freak hit. If one of her engineer officers hadn't re-started the propeller shaft after it was smashed (which was, from what I recall, perfectly reasonable given what he knew) she may have done much better. So it would be reasonable to assume that particular hit, the first one if I recall correctly, would not have caused the enormously damaging chain of events that occurred IRL.

I've never heard of this before.

The person who told me about the battle was that the damage the POW suffered at the time was so serious that the engineer turned off the engine without any report. wasn't it?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I've never heard of this before.

The person who told me about the battle was that the damage the POW suffered at the time was so serious that the engineer turned off the engine without any report. wasn't it?

The prop was initially stopped

However in one of those 'why did we design it like that?' moments that shaft drove dynamos that powered most of the AAA weapons and much of the rear internal lighting

So seeing that 6 of POWs 8 x 5.25 turrets had lost power someone turned it back on again making the damage much worse and resulting in increased flooding before it was turned off again.

The same issue impacted Ark Royal - loss of electrical power prevented pumps etc and impacted efforts to save her.

The best lessons are learned by the survivors

All RN ships had Aux power diesel generators installed during refits in 1942 and 1943 and I understand efforts made to allow cross over from other dynamos in case of failures etc

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Indom's Hurrie squadron, 880 NAS, seems from what I can find to be probably at least average in experience and ability by FAA standards of the time. The star of the show would have been the famous Dickie Cork, but most of the rest of the squadron seem to have had some actual air fighting experience, such as taking part in Furious' raids on Petsamo.

During Operation Pedestal, the squadron claimed 8 kills for three losses; one of the losses, I think, was due to friendly AA fire. Hugh Popham also spread a Hurrie all over Victorious' deck when he and his section were delayed landing due to friendly fire and he landed on the closest carrier he could find, while she was still turning into the wind, with empty fuel tanks.

Pedestal had some very heavy attacks, with up to 43 Sm 79s in a single attack and cover from Reggiane 2000s, Me 110s and some 109s. Due to the loss of Eagle and the fact that Victorious mainly had Fulmars, 880 probably had the major share of the work although I can't find full details. Dickie Cork claimed four kills.

O'Hara notes that the Japanese naval attache of the time believed that Italian aircraft and crew were "sound" and their only real issue was lack of cooperation between the navy and the air force.

One of 880's lost aircraft went down to a 110, the squadron leader went down when disobeying his own ferocious warnings about stern-on attacks against bombers (in this case a bunch of He 111s) and I can't find the the other loss.

Some of Indomitable's crew were pretty confident with their fighter controllers, so it could be safe to assume that 880's aircraft would have done a good job, messed up some of the attacks, and downed maybe say 4-6 Japanese bombers. The Fulmars could have knocked down two or three.

However, would they have done a reversal of Midway and gone after the high level bombers and left the torpedo bombers to wreak havoc? We'll never know.

The other issue is that the PoW suffered a bit of a freak hit. If one of her engineer officers hadn't re-started the propeller shaft after it was smashed (which was, from what I recall, perfectly reasonable given what he knew) she may have done much better. So it would be reasonable to assume that particular hit, the first one if I recall correctly, would not have caused the enormously damaging chain of events that occurred IRL.

One other factor is that the time line seems to make it unlikely, as noted above, that Indomitable would have arrived on time anyway.

Dicks Sea Hurricane was a cannon armed variant (and he got most of his 'kills' in that one) and I understand that "Sea Hurricane Mk.Ic Z4642" was the only cannon armed Sea Hurricane in the whole battle.

He had to swap over to a machine gun armed plane during the convoy battle due to damage to his cannon armed one (which was thrown over board) although some sources claim it was repaired and retired later?

Not sure if Mk.1c Sea Hurricanes would have been available in Dec 41 if only the one had been available in Aug 42?

 

[ArtosStark]

Any questions/comments regarding the OTL sequence of events for 9 December 1941?

Coming in a little late but a few notes from my own understanding.

The decision to sortie was largely a result of a bombing raid on Singapore that would not go spectacularly well for the IJNAF 22nd Air Flotilla

The raid was a significant factor in Phillip’s decision to sortie, he considered his force safer at sea than in port. That assumption then fed the decision to use Force Z in an attempt to destroy Japanese landing forces.

It’s possible that this was the case, and I do remember seeing it stated somewhere. However, I understand that the sortie was due to the agreement among all major officers involved that it was unacceptable for the Navy to do nothing to aid the hard pressed army and Air Force. Philips appreciation was that given surprise and fighter cover it would be possible for Force Z to smash the landing forces. In light of the need to act, all officers agreed the risk of such a strike was acceptable. A determination that held, though with more reservation, when fighter cover was denied.

I don’t recall an inability to remain in port due to enemy bombers being mentioned though perhaps it was implicit rather than stated.

1700 – Photos reveal Force Z has left Singapore. RA Matsunaga orders a partial rearming of planned strike rearmed with torpedoes. Launch authorized as squadrons are ready.

As I understand it the submarine sighting report reached the 22nd Air Flotilla at 1600 while they were being bombed up for an attack on Singapore. They were ordered to rearm with torpedoes but this was only complete around 1800 by which time it was starting to get dark. However the danger to the landings was considered so great that a night attack was attempted. This failed to find Force Z but returned safely about midnight.

2352 – HMIJS I-58 unsuccessfully launches five torpedoes at HMS Repulse. The attack is not noted by Force Z.

Only other thing I would note here is that the report of landings at Kuantan came in around 2330.

The small air group on Indomitable will hardly form an impenetrable ASW zone. You're only talking about sighting a periscope. When I 58 fired torpedoes it was dark giving no chance to see the periscope. The Japanese have lots of aircraft for scouting out Force Z. You can't assume all the scout planes would be shootdown. The Sea Hurrican wasn't much faster than some of the Japanese scout planes.

I agree on I-58. But I believe they are referring to I-65 which spotted Force Z at around 1350 on 9 Dec and set off the air search.

@1330 – Walrus spots HMIJS I-65 and likely sinks her. RN ASW crews are trained against U-boats with a dive time of 17-25 seconds. HMIJS I-65 takes 56-59 seconds. In addition, the E7K (Alf) seaplane from HMIJS Kinu is not noticed by the submarine’s lookouts for about five minutes. I doubt they would notice a Walrus. Even if not sunk she is probably damaged. Even if undamaged, she will not see or report Force Z.

If sunk, then yes it seems Force Z slips by unnoticed. Though I believe standing protocol was for submarines to check in with the cruiser leading their flotilla at intervals. So their absence may get a response eventually.

If I-58 is not sunk, it seems likely that reports of attack by ASW aircraft will eventually make their way back to Japanese command. With a time gap and with I-65 not maintaining contact it is possible that it is either disbelieved or of limited benefit but it could start the ball rolling as well.

Either way, it is important to stress that Philips’ plan depended on surprise. So whatever I-65’s actual status, he has to be relatively confident that the Japanese are still unaware of Force Z’s approach.

@1530 – Recce spots HMIJS Kinu. Unless someone on the flag bridge remembers that up until the 1937 edition, “Jane’s Fighting Ships” published the disposition of the IJN, and that light cruisers were flagships of submarine squadrons, Phillips will wait until @1610 to allow a torpedo strike by Albacores. This will allow the strike to land before sunset, and he would be sure no possibility of hitting another target would exist.
@1700-1715 – HMIJS Kinu sunk by torpedo attack. Her report of attack by carrier-borne aircraft comes as a surprise by RA Matsunaga and VA Ozawa. RA Matsunaga orders aircraft rearmed. IJN submarine picket line is moved further east.

Here is where I am not sure. As mentioned the attack depended on surprise. Force Z detecting Kinu seems reasonable, but I suspect Philips would either turn back or (more likely) avoid the cruiser rather than alert the Japanese to his presence.

@2000 – G3M2 recce plane begins dropping flares over VA Ozawa’s flagship HMIJS Chokai and destroyer HMIJS Sagiri. Attack is averted at last minute, and air operations are cancelled until dawn 10 December 1941.
Flares are reported by HMS Electra and radar aboard HMS Kenya, HMNLS Jacob van Heemskerk, and once the destroyer has maneuvered to bring her Type 286M to bear, HMS Bedouin.
@2025-2100 – Using tactics exercised prewar, and used very effectively at Cape Matapan; destroyers HMS Intrepid and Electra to lose within searchlight range, while HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse and Kenya close to @6,000 yards before HMIJS Chokai and Sagiri are lit up and firing commences. Neither ship is able to either escape or launch torpedoes. HMS Prince of Wales suffers breakdowns in both her quadruple turrets. As with HMIJS Kinu, full contact report is made but IJN confusion over whether to countermand VA Ozawa’s orders postponing air operations until the next day results in no actions being taken. HMS Indomitable, Tenedos and HMAS Vampire are ordered 20 miles to the south for the duration of the battle

It’s possible if Philips has the spotting advantage (which if he has deployed radar equipped aircraft at night spotters he presumably would) but it also seems possible that the Japanese would not be taken quite as unawares at the Italians at Mataram (that action having an element of chance to it as well as skill). If so, even if the action is successful damage to Force Z would force a return to base, compromising the original mission of affecting the landings.

Which once again brings up whether Philips would risk an attack even if feasible. His goal is to hit the landings at Singora in a surprise attack at dawn on 10th Dec and be moving south by the time the Japanese could scramble a response. Based on the understood capabilities of dive and torpedo bombers he expected to face only level bombers on the return journey. Would he attempt to emulate Matapan if it jeopardizes surprise? Or would he avoid and try to move on with the original mission?

Related to all this I suppose is if Philips mission would remain the same. IOTL part of the reason that Philips went for a single surprise attack was because he knew he could not hope to significantly interdict Japanese supply lines without carrier support. Would a single carrier be enough to make him change his mind and try to maintain a more complete interruption? Personally I don’t think so, but arguably it is possible.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

It’s possible that this was the case, and I do remember seeing it stated somewhere. However, I understand that the sortie was due to the agreement among all major officers involved that it was unacceptable for the Navy to do nothing to aid the hard pressed army and Air Force. Philips appreciation was that given surprise and fighter cover it would be possible for Force Z to smash the landing forces. In light of the need to act, all officers agreed the risk of such a strike was acceptable. A determination that held, though with more reservation, when fighter cover was denied.

I don’t recall an inability to remain in port due to enemy bombers being mentioned though perhaps it was implicit rather than stated.

Point well taken, and Phillips never left a clear record. Prior to the raid, Singapore was assumed to be beyond the range of IJNAF bombers. However, CAPT Tennant stated that after reports of Pearl Harbor reached Singapore, the consensus was that no harbor within range of IJNAF aircraft was safe. The rest is my personal analysis from various factors, including cancelling of off-loading ammunition and stores from HMS Electra before drydocking, and substitution of orders to prepare for sea immediately, Phillips signal to London for explicit instructions, etc. I would agree with you that Phillips would have sailed anyway, but the raid is the first event setting that decision making in motion.
I do note that bombing Force Z in Singapore was the intention of Matsunaga.

As I understand it the submarine sighting report reached the 22nd Air Flotilla at 1600 while they were being bombed up for an attack on Singapore. They were ordered to rearm with torpedoes but this was only complete around 1800 by which time it was starting to get dark. However the danger to the landings was considered so great that a night attack was attempted. This failed to find Force Z but returned safely about midnight.

The time of receipt of of Kin's message is documented at 1540. How long it took to get to Matsunaga is not known. The raid aircraft were being bombed up for was scheduled for the 10th. The near attack on HMIJS Chokai is well documented.

If I-58 is not sunk, it seems likely that reports of attack by ASW aircraft will eventually make their way back to Japanese command. With a time gap and with I-65 not maintaining contact it is possible that it is either disbelieved or of limited benefit but it could start the ball rolling as well.

I assume you mean IMIJS I-65. A Walrus could be either ship or shore-based, the submarine commander could not know.

Here is where I am not sure. As mentioned the attack depended on surprise. Force Z detecting Kinu seems reasonable, but I suspect Philips would either turn back or (more likely) avoid the cruiser rather than alert the Japanese to his presence.

HMIJS Kinu would make an excellent "tattle-tale", as were HMS Norfolk and Suffolk in the chase of KMS Bismarck, if she spotted Force Z. Phillips could try and avoid her. However removing the command ship of a Subron is a strong reason, and an early kill would do much for the morale of Force Z. A bird in the hand over two in the bush, and the attack would ensure Force Z would not return empty handed. Phillips then has darkness to disappear into.
Similar considerations would play into the attack on HMIJS Chokai .

Appreciate the response in all respects!

 

[Riain]

HMS Indomitable is limited by the number of aircraft she can accommodate. As of 8 December 1941, she was assigned nine Sea Hurricane of No 808 Sqn; ten Fulmar (11 crews) of No 800 Sqn (two were lost en-route to the West Indies, one crew rescued – I assume the same en-route to South Africa); 12 Albacore each from No 827 and 831 Sqn. This is a total 43 aircraft, her capacity was rated at 48.

The small and constantly shrinking with no chance of top up of RN CAGs in the first half of the war is a much overlooked problem.

IIRC the RN's experience from the Italian crisis in the mid 30s was that a carrier would lose something like 1/3 of it's CAG in operational mishaps in a month, without any combat. Added to this was the relatively low rate of FAA aircraft production and the very long supply routes between the FAA aircraft factories and RN operating areas the task to keep CAGs stocked to above a token level becomes almost impossible. We see this throughout the war, when the Ark Royal was sunk she was carrying her biggest CAG to date, 54 aircraft against a capacity of 60, and the carriers in the Med quickly went from their small CAGs to token CAGs within weeks of arrival in theatre.

By the time she arrived in theatre Indomitable would likely only have ~40 aircraft, which is what would have to take on 2 surface Task Forces, 1 with capital ship the other with heavy cruisers plus all the subs and aircraft.

 

[ArtosStark]

Point well taken, and Phillips never left a clear record. Prior to the raid, Singapore was assumed to be beyond the range of IJNAF bombers. However, CAPT Tennant stated that after reports of Pearl Harbor reached Singapore, the consensus was that no harbor within range of IJNAF aircraft was safe. The rest is my personal analysis from various factors, including cancelling of off-loading ammunition and stores from HMS Electra before drydocking, and substitution of orders to prepare for sea immediately, Phillips signal to London for explicit instructions, etc. I would agree with you that Phillips would have sailed anyway, but the raid is the first event setting that decision making in motion.I do note that bombing Force Z in Singapore was the intention of Matsunaga.

Fair enough. The two views are not necessarily exclusive.

I assume you mean IMIJS I-65

I did. Apologies. Rookie mistake.

. A Walrus could be either ship or shore-based, the submarine commander could not know.

The Walrus was not deployed from land in this theatre as far as I know. Now it’s true the Japanese may not know that, but they also may.

HMIJS Kinu would make an excellent "tattle-tale", as were HMS Norfolk and Suffolk in the chase of KMS Bismarck, if she spotted Force Z. Phillips could try and avoid her. However removing the command ship of a Subron is a strong reason, and an early kill would do much for the morale of Force Z. A bird in the hand over two in the bush, and the attack would ensure Force Z would not return empty handed. Phillips then has darkness to disappear into.
Similar considerations would play into the attack on HMIJS Chokai .

The problem I see is that destroying the cruiser squadron does not materially help the Army or RAF in North Malaya. Which was the whole point of the sortie. All naval activity is ultimately in service of supporting the ground forces. In the Mediterranean this could be accomplished by obtaining command of the sea, which is furthered by the sinking of enemy ships, as at Matapan. In the South China Sea command of the sea is not possible in the near to medium term and thus the sinking of a cruiser squadron does little to affect the overall situation for the better.

Philips sortied to attack the landings, depending on surprise. I am not sure he would sacrifice surprise to attack a target that does not contribute toward his goal unless he is forced to.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

10 would be enough. Remember this is a maximum effort.

So about 2 fighters per group?

And reducing the search range as the A6m has only 66% of the range of a G4m

 

[Riain]

The problem I see is that destroying the cruiser squadron does not materially help the Army or RAF in North Malaya. Which was the whole point of the sortie. All naval activity is ultimately in service of supporting the ground forces. In the Mediterranean this could be accomplished by obtaining command of the sea, which is furthered by the sinking of enemy ships, as at Matapan. In the South China Sea command of the sea is not possible in the near to medium term and thus the sinking of a cruiser squadron does little to affect the overall situation for the better.

This is true in direct and immediate terms, but what about indirectly and in the longer term?

Of course in the broadest sense the IJN can't replace those cruisers, but what were the doing between Dec 10 and Feb 15? The Japanese landed more troops after the initial landing, including the tanks that were so handy for their campaign, would the loss of the heavy cruisers and subsequent reshuffling of escorts and covering forces impact that?

What about the invasion of Sumatra? The ABDA forces failed to intercept that convoy on the night of 14/15 Feb, the day Singapore surrendered. Would the loss of the heavy cruisers impact the Sumatra timetable, even for a day, as that will likely impact on Percival's decision making about surrender?

 

[Butchpfd]

This is true in direct and immediate terms, but what about indirectly and in the longer term?

Of course in the broadest sense the IJN can't replace those cruisers, but what were the doing between Dec 10 and Feb 15? The Japanese landed more troops after the initial landing, including the tanks that were so handy for their campaign, would the loss of the heavy cruisers and subsequent reshuffling of escorts and covering forces impact that?

What about the invasion of Sumatra? The ABDA forces failed to intercept that convoy on the night of 14/15 Feb, the day Singapore surrendered. Would the loss of the heavy cruisers impact the Sumatra timetable, even for a day, as that will likely impact on Percival's decision making about surrender?

Would the loss of those cruisers effect the force composition in Sunda Straight when Houston and Perth make their tragic run south allowing Huston and or Perth to escape?

 

[Eric C Johnson]

The problem I see is that destroying the cruiser squadron does not materially help the Army or RAF in North Malaya.

Forgive me, but I am not sure I understand that comment. I did not mean to imply that the IJN is losing a cruiser squadron. HMIJS Kinu is the flagship of IJN Submarine Squadron 4. Ironically, HMIJS I-65 is a part of SubRon 5. Single ships are sunk because Force Z has stumbled upon both groups.
The problem for Phillips is the IJN has saturated this part of the South China Sea with submarines and surface ships to successfully overcome the tactical limitations imposed by operating during Monsoon season. Phillips will run into some vessel, regardless of which route he takes. They are between him and Singora, and I believe he expects them to be there.
Phillips was also aggressive, a trait for which he's been roundly criticized. If forced to choose between options, I believe he would engage the enemy. He also had two years working fairly closely to Churchill. Phillips knows Churchill will forgive him if he is dead. Churchill will not forgive if Phillips avoids battle.... and then lives. Just ask ADM Dudley North.

 

[ArtosStark]

Forgive me, but I am not sure I understand that comment. I did not mean to imply that the IJN is losing a cruiser squadron. HMIJS Kinu is the flagship of IJN Submarine Squadron 4. Ironically, HMIJS I-65 is a part of SubRon 5. Single ships are sunk because Force Z has stumbled upon both groups.

I was referring to this:

2025-2100 – Using tactics exercised prewar, and used very effectively at Cape Matapan; destroyers HMS Intrepid and Electra to lose within searchlight range, while HMS Prince of Wales, Repulse and Kenya close to @6,000 yards before HMIJS Chokai and Sagiri are lit up and firing commences. Neither ship is able to either escape or launch torpedoes.

I suppose “squadron” might be a bit generous a descriptor for two cruisers.

The problem for Phillips is the IJN has saturated this part of the South China Sea with submarines and surface ships to successfully overcome the tactical limitations imposed by operating during Monsoon season. Phillips will run into some vessel, regardless of which route he takes. They are between him and Singora, and I believe he expects them to be there.

Philips plan involved only facing a response from the Japanese after attacking the landings at dawn on the 10th. That seems to imply he believed he could avoid detection until reaching Singora. What’s more, the fact that IOTL the two groups missed each other from 15 miles away, and the fact that ITTL they would be using Matapan type tactics to get to within point blank range before firing, implies that avoidance to continue the mission is possible.

Phillips was also aggressive, a trait for which he's been roundly criticized. If forced to choose between options, I believe he would engage the enemy. He also had two years working fairly closely to Churchill. Phillips knows Churchill will forgive him if he is dead. Churchill will not forgive if Phillips avoids battle.... and then lives. Just ask ADM Dudley North.

True, but IOTL Philips made the determination that he could only succeed if he could maintain surprise. And he turned around when it was clear he had been spotted. I don’t doubt that Philips would be willing to attack if he felt he could not slip by. But it seems like he would have to assume that this would alert the Japanese, and end any chance of a successful surprise attack. Which would seem to defeat the purpose of his mission.

 

[Butchpfd]

Phillips, knew he did not have enough destroyers, he had convinced Tommy Hart to lend him a division of 4 destroyers, who were, on 8 December at Balikaipan, Borneo. The destroyers were limited to a speed of 15 kts, the max of their tender USS Black Hawk which would have put them at Singapore on the 12th. It would have take another 12 to 24 hours after arrival to be ready for operations. That entailing refueling , exchanging signals, seeing if the early USN tbs would work with RN commo, exchange signal codes. Also the USN 4 pipers did not have sonar, only hydrophones 1 depth charge rack, and 4 K guns per vessel, AAA was 1 or 2 x 3"/23 cal AA guns, and 4 TO 8 .50 CAL AA MG, and some Lewis guns.
Ironically, this weak AAA could have been helpful against torpedo bombers.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

I suppose “squadron” might be a bit generous a descriptor for two cruisers.

HMIJS Sagiri is a "Fubuki" class destroyer.

 

[Logan2879]

Very interesting this thread...

 

[Eric C Johnson]

True, but IOTL Philips made the determination that he could only succeed if he could maintain surprise. And he turned around when it was clear he had been spotted. I don’t doubt that Philips would be willing to attack if he felt he could not slip by. But it seems like he would have to assume that this would alert the Japanese, and end any chance of a successful surprise attack. Which would seem to defeat the purpose of his mission.

The purpose of this thread is to determine what effective changes are likely with HMS Indomitable and appropriate escorts are attached to the OTL Force Z.
In the OTL, after knowing he was spotted at @1700, and shadowed for an hour and a half afterwards, Phillips remained on course until 2255 when he signaled he was abandoning the mission. He did this for purposes of deception. It did not work.
With air reconnaissance from HMS Indomitable finding, and her air group sinking a cruiser and a submarine in the afternoon of the ninth, I doubt Phillips still believes surprise is possible. As in the OTL, he deliberately remains a threat in the hopes of disrupting Japanese operations, buying time. The choices then are to withdraw, or attack on the tenth with no expectation of surprise. HMIJS Chokai happens to be in the way of these two decisions. The decision to sink her and her consort is an easy one.

 

[HMSIndomitable_92]

Hmm... So what's the conclusion?

 

[Logan2879]

Hmm... So what's the conclusion?

It depends of the buttleflies...