How would be Stalin internal policy in a CP victory scenario?

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Here the scenario: Germany wins WWI, but the soviets still rise to the soviet union and Stalin still takes power, call it bordeline ASB if you want, but we got this situation

So, how would Stalin behave in such a situation? He do not have control of Ukraine to make the holomodor and sell grain to the west to industrialize the soviet union, he neither have the oil of baku and Russia lacks arable land, in such a scenario, how would he work to develop Russia using his sick ideology?
 

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If the Ottomans are the ones holding the Caucasus I can't imagine them holding it for very long or very effectively. Stalin could invade them to regain the oil at Baku, while the Volga provides a reasonable amount of arable land.
 
If the Ottomans are the ones holding the Caucasus I can't imagine them holding it for very long or very effectively. Stalin could invade them to regain the oil at Baku, while the Volga provides a reasonable amount of arable land.

Ok, here the composition of central powers:

Estonia and Latvia have been annexed into Germany and are being germanized as the united baltic duchy
Lithuania is independent with a German monarch, the same for Belarus and Georgia
Austria and Ukraine are under Habsburg monarchs
Azerbaijan and Armenia are ottoman puppets, with a ottoman vice roi in power

The thing is, if Stalin attacks the ottoman empire, he will also attack the entire central powers, and he is not in condition to fight them all
 
If the Ottomans are the ones holding the Caucasus I can't imagine them holding it for very long or very effectively. Stalin could invade them to regain the oil at Baku, while the Volga provides a reasonable amount of arable land.

This assumes that Germany--which, whatever they may think of their Ottoman allies, has an interest in keeping Russia as weak as possible--will let them get away with it. Remember we are talking here about a Germany which dominates all of east central Europe including Ukraine, which has presumably reduced France to impotence, and which can turn her forces against Russia without too much trouble. "We'd rather have the oil of Baku for ourselves and our allies, Mr. Stalin..."
 

Deleted member 97083

Well, there's oil in the Volga-Urals region as well as in Siberia, and plenty of coal all around European Russia, even without Baku. So these regions are probably built up.

Stalin was able to move Soviet industry to the eastern side of the Urals during WW2. So ITTL, the initial Soviet industrialization is developed in a more eastern region, along the Volga and also some east of the Urals.

If food shortages occur during industrialization, then Central Asia instead of Ukraine will likely take the brunt of the damage.

While Stalin pursues these aims, he seeks to make deals with the French and the British who are the only ones (except the US) who can really take down the Central Powers. So the Soviets try to make reconquest plans with the French and the British, although it'll take a while for any attempts to become feasible.

This assumes that Germany--which, whatever they may think of their Ottoman allies, has an interest in keeping Russia as weak as possible--will let them get away with it. Remember we are talking here about a Germany which dominates all of east central Europe including Ukraine, which has presumably reduced France to impotence, and which can turn her forces against Russia without too much trouble. "We'd rather have the oil of Baku for ourselves and our allies, Mr. Stalin..."
Well, Britain probably still controls the sea. Unless they had a communist revolution that dismantled most of the RN, but that would be rebuilt in short time.
 
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While Stalin pursues these aims, he seeks to make deals with the French and the British who are the only ones (except the US) who can really take down the Central Powers. So the Soviets try to make reconquest plans with the French and the British, although it'll take a while for any attempts to become feasible.

Don't forget that the French would be even weaker than in OTL, having lost the iron deposits of Briey and Longwy. The peace treaty will also no doubt limit their military, and the Germans IMO will not let these limits be violated as easily as the Western Allies let Germany's Versailles limits be violated. The US will probably be even more isolationist than in OTL, without a Hitler ruling Germany (I doubt very much that Hitler comes to power if Germany wins the war). The British will probably be even more inclined to appeasement than in OTL. In short, I don't see Bolshevik Russia having any effective allies against a far more powerful Germany.
 

Deleted member 97083

Don't forget that the French would be even weaker than in OTL, having lost the iron deposits of Briey and Longwy. The peace treaty will also no doubt limit their military, and the Germans IMO will not let these limits be violated as easily as the Western Allies let Germany's Versailles limits be violated. The US will probably be even more isolationist than in OTL, without a Hitler ruling Germany (I doubt very much that Hitler comes to power if Germany wins the war). The British will probably be even more inclined to appeasement than in OTL. In short, I don't see Bolshevik Russia having any effective allies against a far more powerful Germany.
True but Germany maintaining its military and rule over not only its eastern territories, but its inevitably floundering puppet states of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire will be very expensive and straining on the German state. Something like the Great Depression is still fairly likely to happen, and greatly upset the status quo.
 
To me the nationalism in Belarussia and Ukraine appear too weak to survive, I am not convinced the A-Hs can hold on to Ukraine and unless the Germans get serious about pursuing genuine independence for these countries they are all ripe for revolutions, Stalin will pursue a more cautious path but I feel unrelenting in its revanchist aim. Now I can see the 1923 Polish Soviet War butterflied and I think that unravels things a bit. Does Stalin still come to power or can Trotsky better hold sway in a world where the Germans remain a Monarchy and dreams of a German revolution pass? Unless outright victorious, the CP are likely in no shape to secure the East so the Soviets either pick it off early as we see in Ukraine or this is the flashpoint to the next war once the Soviets get on their feet. Realpolitik says the UK and France get cozy with the USSR but I can see them fumbling and then does Germany hold its nose to become the trade partner Russia needs? I think the board is open to any move. But I rather like German intrigue to let Stalin pick off the Ottoman gains to strengthen relations, the Ottomans will thus need even more German arms and pay in oil. Sadly the Germans do not seem that devious.
 
The premise is at least a little strange, since Germany wanted the Soviets to have Baku (this caused quite a stink between Berlin and Constantinople). And independent Belarus also wasn't a part of their treaties or serious plans.
The Soviet Union would be somewhat weaker, but not crippled.
 

Towelie

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Stalin likely would face war by 1925 in this scenario. And he would lose, badly. The Germans had absolutely no interest in allowing a state with those kinds of ideas to exist next door. Of course, I wonder if in this scenario, Germany still has a leftward shift around 1919. If they do, perhaps this whole thing could go very differently.
 
Stalin likely would face war by 1925 in this scenario. And he would lose, badly. The Germans had absolutely no interest in allowing a state with those kinds of ideas to exist next door. Of course, I wonder if in this scenario, Germany still has a leftward shift around 1919. If they do, perhaps this whole thing could go very differently.

The bavarian socialist republic still happens, but it is less succesfull than OTL
 
Stalin likely would face war by 1925 in this scenario. And he would lose, badly. The Germans had absolutely no interest in allowing a state with those kinds of ideas to exist next door. Of course, I wonder if in this scenario, Germany still has a leftward shift around 1919. If they do, perhaps this whole thing could go very differently.

The assumption might be that Germany shifts to support the Whites in the Civil War but I suspect Germany is too spent and still not sober enough to
My read of the voting on the eve of the war is that the Social Democrats are the emergent power and I see little to slow them, given they can gain support from Liberals, Zentrum and other disaffected interest groups they likely get governing power in the 1920s as they pull the system towards a stronger Constitutional Monarchy model.

That said I think Stalin would still push the Communists to dissent and he would see the SDP as enemy number one. Without the strictures of Versailles, Germany needs the USSR but is not bound to it, thus we see the benefits of mutual trade but not the desperation. An SDP led Germany here might be more aggressive towards the USSR and less accommodating. To date I presuppose it but that is hand waiving. I think the British remain cold to the USSR under Conservative led governments and warmer under others, the French likely warm up to the USSR, but the split in Entente unity fuels Stalin to see how he can isolate and play the Western powers off each other. The other issue is Asia and in particular China. If Japan grabs and holds territory in the East then Germany becomes a better prospect for relations. I think it stays a murky world of shifting relationships. War in the East or war in Asia, I think you have fuel for either or both, but here it might be Stalin openly the aggressor, something he should avoid.
 
My own opinion is that having won in the West, the Germans would promptly overthrow the Bolsheviks. To quote an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

***
"I disagree with you that Germany would not intervene [against the Bolsheviks
in the event of a French surrender]. Even *with* the
war still raging in the West, she came very close [to] intervening, and the
difference between Ludendorff (who wanted to liquidate the Bolsheviks
immediately) and the Foreign Office (which wanted to tolerate them
for now) concerned only the short run. Nobody in the German government
wanted the Bolsheviks to stay in power for long.

"Richard Pipes (in *The Russian Revolution*) suggested that June 28, 1918
was one of the most historic days of modern times. The Kaiser had before
him two memoranda, one with the Foreign Office viewpoint, the other with
the military's. The Kaiser had a tendency to agree with the first arguments
an adviser presented to him, if they seemed at all plausible--
and in this case he happened to read the Foreign Office memo first. He
ordered that the Germans were to undertake no military operations in
Russia, that the Soviet government be informed that it could safely
withdraw troops from Petrograd and deploy them against the Czechs, and
finally 'without foreclosing future opportunities' that support be
extended to the Soviet government as the only party that suppported the
Brest Treaty. The immediate effect was to allow Trotsky to transfer
Latvian regiments--which at this time were virtually the *only* pro-
Bolshevik units capable of combat--from the western border to the Ural-
Volga front to fight the Czechs. (That a small army of Czechs had been
able to overthrow Soviet power in vast areas of Siberia is itself
indicative of the Bolsheviks' extreme military weakness at this time.)
Only this saved the Bolshevik regime in the East from total collapse.

"Even with the war going on in the West, it would have taken the Germans
no effort to seize Petrograd and only a bit more to occupy Moscow, both
cities being virtually undefended. Then they could have set up a puppet
government like Skoropadski's in Ukraine.

"Ah, you say, but what about popular resistance to the occupiers? Well,
in August 1918 a Bolshevik-organized revolt against the Germans in
Ukraine was a complete failure. In Poltava province, where the Bolsheviks
had counted on scores of thousands of peasants to take up arms, only one
hundred obeyed their call; in most other regions, there was no response
at all.

"In short, overthrowing the Bolsheviks would have been quite easy for the
Germans--and remember that even the Kaiser in deciding to temporarily
support the Bolsheviks added the significant qualification 'without
foreclosing future opportunities.' Surely the surrender of France would
present such an opportunity."

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/qSAUM1-eguw/zudQj2x2P2gJ
 
Would the civilian leadership accept another offensive in the east? The war is over, the Empire stands victorious, and everyone is exhausted. I can't see, barring a rather ASB Spartacus uprising the fear of Bolshevism being enough to make prompt German intervention a thing. If anything, they may want to do something later (1919-20) but by then it may be too late.
 
If anything, they may want to do something later (1919-20) but by then it may be too late.

Also, Stalin takes power in 1925, so the german economy already had been reconverted into a civilian economy again, they will not want to gear up for another war so soon as they need to recover from WWI and consolidate their gains in eastern europe
 
Would the civilian leadership accept another offensive in the east? The war is over, the Empire stands victorious, and everyone is exhausted. I can't see, barring a rather ASB Spartacus uprising the fear of Bolshevism being enough to make prompt German intervention a thing. If anything, they may want to do something later (1919-20) but by then it may be too late.

Obviously, much would depend on when and how Germany won the war, but if it was by the summer of 1918, overthrowing the Bolsheviks would not require any real effort at that point, even for an "exhausted" Germany. The Czechs were able to do it in Siberia, and the Left SR's *almost* managed to do it in Moscow, and neither of them was exactly a formidable military force. And remember that Ukraine would still be a client state under Skoropadski, and that Petrograd is a very short distance from German-controlled Estonia...
 
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Obviously, much would depend on when and how Germany own the war, but if it was by the summer of 1918, overthrowing the Bolsheviks would not require any real effort at that point, even for an "exhausted" Germany. The Czechs were able to do it in Siberia, and the Left SR's *almost* managed to do it in Moscow, and neither of them was exactly a formidable military force. And remember that Ukraine would still be a client state under Skoropadski, and that Petrograd is a very short distance from German-controlled Estonia...


And would they need to remain for any length of time?

What they really wanted in Russia was not so much a particular government (though preferably non-Bolshevik) as a power vacuum. Wouldn't a White regime - tainted by owing its accession to a foreign invader, be a pretty weak one, having to cope with left wing revolts and maybe local warlords, something a bit like Kuomintang China - be a pretty good approximation to this?
 
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