How Would An 1840s Anglo-American War Go?

For one thing, the Royal Navy was simply better -- bigger, more experienced -- than the US Navy.

For another, who says they'd have to attack from the seaward side at all? If the batteries would really cause a problem to ships, just disembark the troops a few miles down the coast, then march round and take the city from the landward side instead. It's not like the US had been investing in land defences during the period.

Trusting the reports of contemporary US officers is "British exceptionalism" now?
I don't think you understand the geography of New York. What landward side do you want to land on? Where do you want to land a large army on Long Island? Try to land in rowboats on Cony Island? Too close, probably has troops, with some cannon covering it. You can probably get shore with some loses and set up a base camp. Then in the next few days you can start the 5-mile march toward Fort Hamilton, the main defense position on the Long Island side of the Narrows. Fort Hamilton was actually designed to cover the landward side, with some guns facing the water, and Fort Lafyette on an offshore island being the main defense against ships in the Narrows. An American army on Long Island would have prepared defensive positions with heavy gun batteries to support them. That would be a tough nut to crack.

So, what other landward side do you want to try? Row ashore on the beaches of southern Staten Island, and start marching north toward the forts at the Narrows? The old forts of the Fort Richmond complex would form the base for the landward defense of the Staten Island side of the Narrows. Also, not easy to overcome. Either way even if you capture or bypass the land forts on the side you land Fort Lafyette still blocks the Narrows, along with the forts on the other side, and your still on the wrong side of New York Harbor with no boats to take you to Manhattan, or protect you from the fire of the forts, or warships in the inner harbor.
 
Americans are largely delusional in their thinking about Canadians willingness to fight them, seemingly unaware that if British North Americans had their way the empire and united states probably would of gone to war 2-3 more times than they did otl.
I guess the Canadians wanted to invade the U.S. to move south for the winter.
 
The USN was large enough that it would take a very large fleet to over awe it in home waters. The USN had a possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line
When people talk about your flagrant pro-US bias, this is basically exactly what they mean. We later have a long section explaining how bad for the Royal Navy it is to have ships in ordinary:

Nor was there any grouping of partially-manned ships at the home ports which could provide the means for a speedy mobilisation of the fleet. Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews. A considerable number of these ships had been launched and placed straight into Ordinary with ever being commissioned. The naval bases in the Medway, at Portsmouth, and at Plymouth were full of such vessels.

What state do you think the US Navy's "possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line" was in?
  • USS Independence - now a 54-gun frigate
  • USS Washington (90) - placed in ordinary at New York 1820, inactive until broken up 1843
  • USS Franklin (74) - in ordinary 1824 - 1838, receiving ship at Boston thereafter
  • USS Columbus (92) - flagship of Mediterranean and Brazil squadrons 1842 - 1844
  • USS Chippewa - laid down 1815, sold 1833
  • USS New Orleans (80) - laid down 1815 at Sackett's Harbour, New York, never completed)
  • USS Pennsylvania (130) - launched 1837, driven ashore 1838, in ordinary at Norfolk until 1842, receiving ship thereafter
  • USS Delaware (74) - In ordinary 1836-1841, flagship of Brazil and Mediterranean squadrons 1841 - 1844, in ordinary thereafter
  • USS Vermont (84) - laid down 1818, finished 1825, launched at Boston 1848
  • USS New Hampshire - laid down at Portsmouth, Maine 1819, finished 1825, launched 1864
  • USS Virginia - laid down 1822 at Boston, never launched
  • USS New York - laid down 1820; never launched; burnt on ways at Norfolk, 1861
  • USS Ohio (104) - receiving ship at Boston, 1841 - 1846
  • USS North Carolina (90) - receiving ship at New York, 1839 - 1866

Ships which have not yet touched the water; ships which have been roofed over as barracks for decades; ships which are on the verge of being broken up; ships which are already committed to Brazil and the Mediterranean; and a ship on Lake Ontario that you somehow need to get out. That's your "possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line".

the idea that they didn't know how to fight a fleet action would be dangerous assumption.
Would it? How many fleet actions involving ships-of-the-line has the US Navy fought in its history, let along in the thirty years prior to the outbreak of this war? Of the two sides, the more dangerous and less realistic assumption is the pro-American belief that fighting a fleet action with 9-10 ships of the line plus smaller supporting ships takes absolutely no practice whatsoever.

At the time the flagship of the North American & West Indies Station HMS Illustrious, and any other 74 would find itself out gunned, and probable out sailed by the USN ships of line.
Will they? I mean, you make a lot of references to there being c.2,000 guns stored at Norfolk for the US navy and that or its 1840s equivalent being available to shore up the US coastal defences, but equip 9-10 ships with 90-100 cannon each and you've gone through half that stockpile without equipping any frigates, sloops, or privateers. As for outsailed: approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have actually ever commanded a ship-of-the-line before?

The British can't sail with no less than 10 ships of the line at all times.
Trying as best I can to decipher your double negative, the British don't need every single squadron to have 10 ships of the line to have parity with the US. The US ships are scattered up and down the coast, and are going to take a long time to get into sailing order - let alone into fighting order. As such, the British need to add the following to their blockading squadrons:
  • 2 battleships at New York
  • 2 battleships at Norfolk
  • 4 battleships at Boston
  • 1 battleship at Portsmouth
  • 1 battleship in Brazil
  • 1 battleship in the Mediterranean
That's a total of 11 ships. Your figures from 1837 show that they have 22 first and second rate ships of the line in ordinary, and so could more than double these numbers without amending any of their existing dispositions (including the four second-rate 90-gun battleships already in the Mediterranean) or using any of the third-rate 74-gun ships that you said would be outgunned. And if you start questioning whether all the ships that are in ordinary would be available, I'll remind you that we're allocating two battleships of 90-guns plus against a ship that was broken up in 1843.
 
Last edited:
I don't think you understand the geography of New York.
I don't think you understand the geography of the US. There are multiple important cities on the coast or up navigable rivers; even if New York specifically is immune to landward attack (which I don't grant -- how many guns did all these forts have, exactly?) there are plenty of other targets for amphibious raids.
 
Just to set the stage for the folks interested in the idea of a blockade of the US coastlines in a notional 1843-1851 war...
Blockade 1843.jpg

I'm not great with naval blockades, let alone ones from ~180 years ago that never happened, but if folks want to talk blockades, let us start off with total distance needing coverage, seen above as some 3,000+ miles (this is just the East/Golf coasts, not Texas, the West coast, nor the Caribbean/St Lawrence/Great lakes), and then decide if there is any point in attempting talk of a close blockade at all.

In a close blockade, how close to the coastline do your ships need to be, in order to stop coastal trade/traffic? The cannons of they day have less than 1,760 yards range, right?

So how close do they need to be to the coastline? How far apart do they need to be from each other?

I know we cannot have the blockade having it's participating ships all within 1 mile of the coast, and 1 mile apart from each other, but what would such a blockade in the timeframe actually need? If we were to need the 1 mile distance for instance, then we would need a force of some 3,000 ships on constant station, and this would have to be augmented by ships needing to restock their fresh water and provisions, and making repairs from storm damage and regular wear and tear.

So a 1 mile distance, from shore and each other is wrong, but HOW WRONG is it?

If we want to allow for say a ten mile gap, then the number of ships needed just to be on station 24/7 would drop to a mere 300.
 
In a close blockade, how close to the coastline do your ships need to be, in order to stop coastal trade/traffic? ... If we were to need the 1 mile distance for instance, then we would need a force of some 3,000 ships on constant station

It would probably have been worth checking into this earlier, but in answer to your question: you put a big squadron outside all the important ports to stop things going in and out (perhaps splitting it into an inshore squadron of smaller ships that snaps up merchants and falls back before larger warships, and an offshore squadron of line-of-battle-ships that prevents the blockade being lifted), and then have a smaller number of cruising warships picking up anything outside. The same logic goes for the collection of customs revenue: does the US put a customs officer every mile around its coast, or does it put them in the major ports? That's why the Union navy only needs 600 ships to blockade the Confederate coastline of 3,000 miles; it's why the British at the end of 1814 have only 120 warships on the North America station. That's what happens in the Napoleonic Wars, what happens in the War of 1812, and what happens in the American Civil War.

For months, only the maritime centres of the Middle States were molested. The senior naval officer at Charleston, South Carolina, wrote on October 14, four months after war was declared, "Till to-day this coast has been clear of enemy's cruisers; now Charleston is blockaded by three brigs, two very large, and they have captured nine sail within three miles of the bar." The number was increased shortly; and two months later he expressed surprise that the inland navigation behind the sea islands had not been destroyed, in consequence of its defenceless state. In January, 1813, the mouth of the Chesapeake was watched by a ship of the line, two frigates, and a sloop; the commercial blockade not having been yet established. The hostile divisions still remained outside, and American vessels continued to go out and in with comparative facility, both there and at Charleston. A lively trade had sprung up with France by letters-of-marque; that is, by vessels whose primary object is commerce, and which therefore carry cargoes, but have also guns, and a commission from the Government to make prizes. Without such authorization capture is piracy. By February 12 conditions grow worse. The blockaders have entered the Chesapeake, the commercial blockade has been proclaimed, vessels under neutral flags, Spanish and Swedish, are being turned away, and two fine letter-of-marque schooners have been captured inside, one of them after a gallant struggle in which her captain was killed. Nautical misadventures of that kind became frequent. On April 3 three letters-of-marque and a privateer, which had entered the Rappahannock, were attacked at anchor by boats from Warren's fleet. The letters-of-marque, with smaller crews, offered little resistance to boarding; but the privateer, having near a hundred men, made a sharp resistance. The Americans lost six killed and ten wounded; the enemy, two killed and eleven wounded.

In like manner the lower Delaware was occupied by one or more ships of the line. Supported thus by a heavy squadron, hostile operations were pushed to the upper waters of both bays, and in various directions; the extensive water communications of the region offering great facilities for depredation. Dismay and incessant disquietude spread through all quarters of the waterside. Light cruisers make their way above Reedy Island, fifty miles from the Capes of the Delaware; coasting vessels are chased into the Severn River, over a hundred miles above Hampton Roads; and a detachment appears even at the mouth of the Patapsco, twelve miles from Baltimore. The destruction of bay craft, and interruption of water traffic, show their effects in the rise of marketing and fuel to double their usual prices. By May 1, all intercourse by water was stopped, and Philadelphia was also cut off from the lower Delaware. Both Philadelphia and Baltimore were now severed from the sea, and their commerce destroyed, not to revive till after the peace; while alarms, which the near future was to justify, were felt for the land road which connected the two cities. As this crossed the head waters of the Chesapeake, it was open to attack from ships, which was further invited by deposits of goods in transit at Elkton and Frenchtown. Fears for the safety of Norfolk were felt by Captain Stewart, senior naval officer there. "When the means and force of the enemy are considered, and the state of this place for defence, it presents but a gloomy prospect for security." Commodore Murray from Philadelphia reports serious apprehensions, consternation among the citizens, a situation daily more critical, and inadequate provision for resistance. There, as everywhere, the impotence of the General Government has to be supplemented by local subscription and local energy.

At the same time, both northward and southward of these two great estuaries, the approach of spring brought ever increasing enemies, big and little, vexing the coasting trade; upon which, then as now, depended largely the exchange of products between different sections of the country. What it meant at that day to be reduced to communication by land may be realized from a contemporary quotation: "Four wagons loaded with dry goods passed to-day through Georgetown, South Carolina, for Charleston, forty-six days from Philadelphia." Under the heading "New Carrying Trade" a Boston paper announces on April 28 the arrival of "a large number of teams from New Bedford with West India produce, and four Pennsylvania wagons, seventeen days from Philadelphia." "The enemy has commenced his depredations on the coasting trade of the Eastern States on a very extensive scale, by several ships and sloops-of-war, and five or six active privateers. The United States brig "Argus" cruises at the entrance of Long Island Sound for the protection of trade, latterly jeopardized;" a position from which she was soon driven by an overwhelming force. Hull, now commanding at Portsmouth, reports April 9, "several privateers on the Eastern coast, which have been successful in cutting coasters out of several harbors east." May 7: "A small force is indeed needed here; the enemy appear off the harbor nearly every day. A few days since, a little east of this, they burnt twelve coasters and chased several into this port." The town is defenceless. The Governor of Rhode Island laments to the Legislature "the critical and exposed situation of our fellow-citizens in Newport, who are frequently menaced by the ships and vessels about Point Judith"; mentioning beside, "the burning of vessels in Narragansett Bay, and the destruction of our coasting trade, which deprives us of the usual and very necessary supplies of bread stuffs from other States." The ship "Maddox," blockaded for two or three months in the Chesapeake, escaped in May, and reached Newport with five thousand barrels of flour. This is said to have reduced the price by $2.50 in Boston, where it was ranging at $17 to $18; while at Cadiz and Lisbon, thanks to British licenses and heavy stocking in anticipation of war, it stood at $12 to $13. The arrival at Machias of a captured British vessel, laden with wheat, was hailed "as a seasonable supply for the starving inhabitants of the eastward."

Ships returning from abroad necessarily had to pass through the cruisers which interrupted the coasting trade. "Many valuable vessels arrive, making at times hairbreadth escapes." The trade of Baltimore and Philadelphia is thrown back upon New York and Boston; but both of these, and the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound, have hostile squadrons before them. The letter-of-marque schooner "Ned" has transmitted an experience doubtless undergone by many. Bound to Baltimore, she arrived off the Chesapeake April 18, and was chased away; tried to get into the Delaware on the 19th, but was headed off; made for Sandy Hook, and was again chased. Finally, she tried the east end of the Sound, and there made her way through four or five ships of war, reaching New York April 24.


Likewise, for those saying the US is no longer dependent on naval commerce and will shrug off this blockade, I'd ask you why the US has an even higher proportion of its total merchant marine engaged in this coasting (internal naval) trade in the 1840s than it did in 1815 - up from 32% (435,066 of 1,368,127) to c.50% (1,190,898 of 2,417,002 in 1845).

The old forts of the Fort Richmond complex would form the base for the landward defense of the Staten Island side of the Narrows. Also, not easy to overcome.
even if New York specifically is immune to landward attack (which I don't grant -- how many guns did all these forts have, exactly?)
Always check the original documents.

Report of the Chief Engineer, Engineer Department, Washington, November 1 1842... Fortifications on Staten island, New York harbor... The water battery, very essential to the defence, is in ruins; and the fort on the hill, (Fort Tompkins,) indispensable to guard the defences from being turned in the rear, and rendered useless, is in the same condition... The officer of engineers who has made the repairs says: “The tract is open to the trespasses of the cattle of the neighborhood, and of the idlers who constantly resort there from the city of New York.”

Although in this case you could just have checked Wikipedia.

By 1835 Forts Richmond and Tompkins had deteriorated to the point that they were declared unfit for use, and the next year the federal government began a decade-long process of purchasing them.[3][5] In 1847 total reconstructions of both forts began

It doesn't really matter, though, does it? The United States can build earthen defences capable of resisting the British, no matter what the engineers said would actually be required before the war. But don't you dare suggest the British and Canadians might be able to build earthen defences capable of resisting the United States, even if the US leaves all its heavy artillery at home...
 
Last edited:
When people talk about your flagrant pro-US bias, this is basically exactly what they mean. We later have a long section explaining how bad for the Royal Navy it is to have ships in ordinary:



What state do you think the US Navy's "possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line" was in?

  • USS Independence - now a 54-gun frigate
  • USS Washington (90) - placed in ordinary at New York 1820, inactive until broken up 1843
  • USS Franklin (74) - in ordinary 1824 - 1838, receiving ship at Boston thereafter
  • USS Columbus (92) - flagship of Mediterranean and Brazil squadrons 1842 - 1844
  • USS Chippewa - laid down 1815, sold 1833
  • USS New Orleans (80) - laid down 1815 at Sackett's Harbour, New York, never completed)
  • USS Pennsylvania (130) - launched 1837, driven ashore 1838, in ordinary at Norfolk until 1842, receiving ship thereafter
  • USS Delaware (74) - In ordinary 1836-1841, flagship of Brazil and Mediterranean squadrons 1841 - 1844, in ordinary thereafter
  • USS Vermont (84) - laid down 1818, finished 1825, launched at Boston 1848
  • USS New Hampshire - laid down at Portsmouth, Maine 1819, finished 1825, launched 1864
  • USS Virginia - laid down 1822 at Boston, never launched
  • USS New York - laid down 1820; never launched; burnt on ways at Norfolk, 1861
  • USS Ohio (104) - receiving ship at Boston, 1841 - 1846
  • USS North Carolina (90) - receiving ship at New York, 1839 - 1866
Ships which have not yet touched the water; ships which have been roofed over as barracks for decades; ships which are on the verge of being broken up; ships which are already committed to Brazil and the Mediterranean; and a ship on Lake Ontario that you somehow need to get out. That's your "possible fleet of 9-10 ships of the line".

Would it? How many fleet actions involving ships-of-the-line has the US Navy fought in its history, let along in the thirty years prior to the outbreak of this war? Of the two sides, the more dangerous and less realistic assumption is the pro-American belief that fighting a fleet action with 9-10 ships of the line plus smaller supporting ships takes absolutely no practice whatsoever.

Will they? I mean, you make a lot of references to there being c.2,000 guns stored at Norfolk for the US navy and that or its 1840s equivalent being available to shore up the US coastal defences, but equip 9-10 ships with 90-100 cannon each and you've gone through half that stockpile without equipping any frigates, sloops, or privateers. As for outsailed: approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have actually ever commanded a ship-of-the-line before?
The difference was the American ships of the line, and frigates in ordinary was they were out of the water on slipways in a state of being ready for a final fit out and were being maintained. Most of the British ships were in the water and spent years with no maintenance. A crew going over to a ship that spent a decade sitting in a river with no one taking care of it would find a hull with many rotted timbers, a leaking hull, and badly tarnished brass and rusted iron. There's a reason sailors spend their days holystoning decks, polishing brass, chipping rust, painting iron, recalking seams, and scraping the bottoms of ships when they go into ordinary.

The American ships need to be fitted out, most of the British ships would need to be rebuilt. The British would find most of these ships not worth the effort, and depend on the post ships, and new builds still on the slipways to reinforce the fleet. The American ships being used as receiving ships are in good shape because their being maintained and can go back into commission in short order.

Captains, and crews were rotated frequently, and a number of captains had commanded a ship of the line at one time or another. Where you get the idea the USN didn't have good seamanship, or the officers didn't study the great battles of the age of sail I have no idea. In 1814 at the battle of Lake Champlain Captain Macdonough anchored his fleet in a line like the French did at the Battle of Aboukir Bay. The British seeing this tried to do what Nelson did cut the line and attack the Americans from the shoreward side where they wouldn't be prepared to fight from.

Macdonough surprised them by learning several lessons from the French defeat. He anchored closer to shore, and had his ships set to spring on their cables to turn his ships any way they needed to. How could this green American captain who never fought in a fleet action outthink an experienced British captain, who had been in many actions? Surly the Americans couldn't know what they were doing in anything other than a single ship action. Granted the RN had more practical experience in a fleet action, but they'd only fought one in over the last 30 years.

As for the number of guns that need to be mounted only the ships on the slipways need to be fitted out, the others already have their guns. I never said there were 2,000 guns in Norfolk, I said in 1861 the Confederates found 1,195 heavy guns there. Ships in the Mediterranean would be recalled if there was time, and the squadron in the South Atlantic would receive orders to ether come home or operate out of neutral ports. Ships trapped in the Med would operate out of neutral ports, tying down British ships tying to blockade them.
Trying as best I can to decipher your double negative, the British don't need every single squadron to have 10 ships of the line to have parity with the US. The US ships are scattered up and down the coast, and are going to take a long time to get into sailing order - let alone into fighting order. As such, the British need to add the following to their blockading squadrons:
  • 2 battleships at New York
  • 2 battleships at Norfolk
  • 4 battleships at Boston
  • 1 battleship at Portsmouth
  • 1 battleship in Brazil
  • 1 battleship in the Mediterranean
That's a total of 11 ships. Your figures from 1837 show that they have 22 first and second rate ships of the line in ordinary, and so could more than double these numbers without amending any of their existing dispositions (including the four second-rate 90-gun battleships already in the Mediterranean) or using any of the third-rate 74-gun ships that you said would be outgunned. And if you start questioning whether all the ships that are in ordinary would be available, I'll remind you that we're allocating two battleships of 90-guns plus against a ship that was broken up in 1843.
Again, you don't understand the state of those Battleships in ordinary. Many of them are dismasted rotting hulks that will never see service again. Your fleet dispositions seem to be based on matching the American battle line ships one for one based on what ports you think they were placed in ordinary. First off, they may not be there when the RN ships arrive, because they don't want to be blockaded. Your other assumption is that in a battle of equal numbers the British will win. That's the same assumption they made in 1812 with American frigates and see how that worked out. The RN can't send most of its ships to the North American, and West Indies Station. They have too many other global commitments.

All of the American ships of the line carried more guns than rated, making all of them actually 2nd rate ships, and Pennsylvania a 1st rate. All of them outgun a British 74. The problems with several of the American battleline ships riding too low can be solved by replacing their upper deck intermediate 32 pounders with long 24's. You lose weight of broadside, but not any range, and now you know you can use the lower deck guns, and the ships will sail better.
 
The difference was the American ships of the line, and frigates in ordinary was they were out of the water on slipways in a state of being ready for a final fit out and were being maintained. Most of the British ships were in the water and spent years with no maintenance. A crew going over to a ship that spent a decade sitting in a river with no one taking care of it would find a hull with many rotted timbers, a leaking hull, and badly tarnished brass and rusted iron. There's a reason sailors spend their days holystoning decks, polishing brass, chipping rust, painting iron, recalking seams, and scraping the bottoms of ships when they go into ordinary.
Source for the bolded bit, please. I find it implausible that the world's foremost naval power would have so little knowledge of ship maintenance as to let its reserve vessels rot away through neglect.
 
Just to set the stage for the folks interested in the idea of a blockade of the US coastlines in a notional 1843-1851 war...
View attachment 820731
I'm not great with naval blockades, let alone ones from ~180 years ago that never happened, but if folks want to talk blockades, let us start off with total distance needing coverage, seen above as some 3,000+ miles (this is just the East/Golf coasts, not Texas, the West coast, nor the Caribbean/St Lawrence/Great lakes), and then decide if there is any point in attempting talk of a close blockade at all.

In a close blockade, how close to the coastline do your ships need to be, in order to stop coastal trade/traffic? The cannons of they day have less than 1,760 yards range, right?

So how close do they need to be to the coastline? How far apart do they need to be from each other?

I know we cannot have the blockade having it's participating ships all within 1 mile of the coast, and 1 mile apart from each other, but what would such a blockade in the timeframe actually need? If we were to need the 1 mile distance for instance, then we would need a force of some 3,000 ships on constant station, and this would have to be augmented by ships needing to restock their fresh water and provisions, and making repairs from storm damage and regular wear and tear.

So a 1 mile distance, from shore and each other is wrong, but HOW WRONG is it?

If we want to allow for say a ten mile gap, then the number of ships needed just to be on station 24/7 would drop to a mere 300.
I'm sorry I don't understand your logic. You're arguing against yourself. A British blockade would depend on smaller handy ships like frigates, and sloops to patrol off the coast seeking ships going from port to port or chasing blockade runners. The British have to spread themselves along a 3,000-mile coast, not the Americans. That's predicated on the idea that all of the USN fleet is trapped in port unable to intervene, so the RN has a free run of it. That maybe a false assumption.

What major port do you want to attack? All of the major ports on the U.S. East, and Gulf coasts have barrier islands between them, and the ocean, and have shallow waters with only narrow channels leading into them. The Union Navy had to fight their way into the Sounds of North Carolina and needed army forces to secure the entrances. Do you want to sail into Hampton Roads under the guns of fortress Monroe? All of the big ships in the Battle of Hampton Roads in 1862, except the Monitor ran aground at one point or another during the course of the battle. Do you want to do that? Do you really want to try to work your way up a river to attack a city? How many ground troops are you bringing with you? It's not as simple as you seem to think.
 
Source for the bolded bit, please. I find it implausible that the world's foremost naval power would have so little knowledge of ship maintenance as to let its reserve vessels rot away through neglect.
From my earlier post from Naval History Net

Equally striking is the absence of a battle fleet in home waters. Normally the most obvious and significant indicator of naval power, there was no 'Channel Fleet or Channel Squadron'. Nor was there any grouping of partially-manned ships at the home ports which could provide the means for a speedy mobilisation of the fleet. Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews. A considerable number of these ships had been launched and placed straight into Ordinary with ever being commissioned. The naval bases in the Medway, at Portsmouth, and at Plymouth were full of such vessels. Only a few large ships were kept in harbour service commissions in each port to provide dignified flagships for the port admirals.

They didn't want to spend the money to keep them up. That's why I said what they would have to do is count on the Post Ships, and new builds still on the slipways for reinforcements. Not so all powerful after all. Even the Royal Navy has limits.
 
It would probably have been worth checking into this earlier, but in answer to your question: you put a big squadron outside all the important ports to stop things going in and out (perhaps splitting it into an inshore squadron of smaller ships that snaps up merchants and falls back before larger warships, and an offshore squadron of line-of-battle-ships that prevents the blockade being lifted), and then have a smaller number of cruising warships picking up anything outside. The same logic goes for the collection of customs revenue: does the US put a customs officer every mile around its coast, or does it put them in the major ports? That's why the Union navy only needs 600 ships to blockade the Confederate coastline of 3,000 miles; it's why the British at the end of 1814 have only 120 warships on the North America station. That's what happens in the Napoleonic Wars, what happens in the War of 1812, and what happens in the American Civil War.

For months, only the maritime centres of the Middle States were molested. The senior naval officer at Charleston, South Carolina, wrote on October 14, four months after war was declared, "Till to-day this coast has been clear of enemy's cruisers; now Charleston is blockaded by three brigs, two very large, and they have captured nine sail within three miles of the bar." The number was increased shortly; and two months later he expressed surprise that the inland navigation behind the sea islands had not been destroyed, in consequence of its defenceless state. In January, 1813, the mouth of the Chesapeake was watched by a ship of the line, two frigates, and a sloop; the commercial blockade not having been yet established. The hostile divisions still remained outside, and American vessels continued to go out and in with comparative facility, both there and at Charleston. A lively trade had sprung up with France by letters-of-marque; that is, by vessels whose primary object is commerce, and which therefore carry cargoes, but have also guns, and a commission from the Government to make prizes. Without such authorization capture is piracy. By February 12 conditions grow worse. The blockaders have entered the Chesapeake, the commercial blockade has been proclaimed, vessels under neutral flags, Spanish and Swedish, are being turned away, and two fine letter-of-marque schooners have been captured inside, one of them after a gallant struggle in which her captain was killed. Nautical misadventures of that kind became frequent. On April 3 three letters-of-marque and a privateer, which had entered the Rappahannock, were attacked at anchor by boats from Warren's fleet. The letters-of-marque, with smaller crews, offered little resistance to boarding; but the privateer, having near a hundred men, made a sharp resistance. The Americans lost six killed and ten wounded; the enemy, two killed and eleven wounded.

In like manner the lower Delaware was occupied by one or more ships of the line. Supported thus by a heavy squadron, hostile operations were pushed to the upper waters of both bays, and in various directions; the extensive water communications of the region offering great facilities for depredation. Dismay and incessant disquietude spread through all quarters of the waterside. Light cruisers make their way above Reedy Island, fifty miles from the Capes of the Delaware; coasting vessels are chased into the Severn River, over a hundred miles above Hampton Roads; and a detachment appears even at the mouth of the Patapsco, twelve miles from Baltimore. The destruction of bay craft, and interruption of water traffic, show their effects in the rise of marketing and fuel to double their usual prices. By May 1, all intercourse by water was stopped, and Philadelphia was also cut off from the lower Delaware. Both Philadelphia and Baltimore were now severed from the sea, and their commerce destroyed, not to revive till after the peace; while alarms, which the near future was to justify, were felt for the land road which connected the two cities. As this crossed the head waters of the Chesapeake, it was open to attack from ships, which was further invited by deposits of goods in transit at Elkton and Frenchtown. Fears for the safety of Norfolk were felt by Captain Stewart, senior naval officer there. "When the means and force of the enemy are considered, and the state of this place for defence, it presents but a gloomy prospect for security." Commodore Murray from Philadelphia reports serious apprehensions, consternation among the citizens, a situation daily more critical, and inadequate provision for resistance. There, as everywhere, the impotence of the General Government has to be supplemented by local subscription and local energy.

At the same time, both northward and southward of these two great estuaries, the approach of spring brought ever increasing enemies, big and little, vexing the coasting trade; upon which, then as now, depended largely the exchange of products between different sections of the country. What it meant at that day to be reduced to communication by land may be realized from a contemporary quotation: "Four wagons loaded with dry goods passed to-day through Georgetown, South Carolina, for Charleston, forty-six days from Philadelphia." Under the heading "New Carrying Trade" a Boston paper announces on April 28 the arrival of "a large number of teams from New Bedford with West India produce, and four Pennsylvania wagons, seventeen days from Philadelphia." "The enemy has commenced his depredations on the coasting trade of the Eastern States on a very extensive scale, by several ships and sloops-of-war, and five or six active privateers. The United States brig "Argus" cruises at the entrance of Long Island Sound for the protection of trade, latterly jeopardized;" a position from which she was soon driven by an overwhelming force. Hull, now commanding at Portsmouth, reports April 9, "several privateers on the Eastern coast, which have been successful in cutting coasters out of several harbors east." May 7: "A small force is indeed needed here; the enemy appear off the harbor nearly every day. A few days since, a little east of this, they burnt twelve coasters and chased several into this port." The town is defenceless. The Governor of Rhode Island laments to the Legislature "the critical and exposed situation of our fellow-citizens in Newport, who are frequently menaced by the ships and vessels about Point Judith"; mentioning beside, "the burning of vessels in Narragansett Bay, and the destruction of our coasting trade, which deprives us of the usual and very necessary supplies of bread stuffs from other States." The ship "Maddox," blockaded for two or three months in the Chesapeake, escaped in May, and reached Newport with five thousand barrels of flour. This is said to have reduced the price by $2.50 in Boston, where it was ranging at $17 to $18; while at Cadiz and Lisbon, thanks to British licenses and heavy stocking in anticipation of war, it stood at $12 to $13. The arrival at Machias of a captured British vessel, laden with wheat, was hailed "as a seasonable supply for the starving inhabitants of the eastward."

Ships returning from abroad necessarily had to pass through the cruisers which interrupted the coasting trade. "Many valuable vessels arrive, making at times hairbreadth escapes." The trade of Baltimore and Philadelphia is thrown back upon New York and Boston; but both of these, and the eastern entrance of Long Island Sound, have hostile squadrons before them. The letter-of-marque schooner "Ned" has transmitted an experience doubtless undergone by many. Bound to Baltimore, she arrived off the Chesapeake April 18, and was chased away; tried to get into the Delaware on the 19th, but was headed off; made for Sandy Hook, and was again chased. Finally, she tried the east end of the Sound, and there made her way through four or five ships of war, reaching New York April 24.


Likewise, for those saying the US is no longer dependent on naval commerce and will shrug off this blockade, I'd ask you why the US has an even higher proportion of its total merchant marine engaged in this coasting (internal naval) trade in the 1840s than it did in 1815 - up from 32% (435,066 of 1,368,127) to c.50% (1,190,898 of 2,417,002 in 1845).


Always check the original documents.

Report of the Chief Engineer, Engineer Department, Washington, November 1 1842... Fortifications on Staten island, New York harbor... The water battery, very essential to the defence, is in ruins; and the fort on the hill, (Fort Tompkins,) indispensable to guard the defences from being turned in the rear, and rendered useless, is in the same condition... The officer of engineers who has made the repairs says: “The tract is open to the trespasses of the cattle of the neighborhood, and of the idlers who constantly resort there from the city of New York.”

Although in this case you could just have checked Wikipedia.

By 1835 Forts Richmond and Tompkins had deteriorated to the point that they were declared unfit for use, and the next year the federal government began a decade-long process of purchasing them.[3][5] In 1847 total reconstructions of both forts began

It doesn't really matter, though, does it? The United States can build earthen defences capable of resisting the British, no matter what the engineers said would actually be required before the war. But don't you dare suggest the British and Canadians might be able to build earthen defences capable of resisting the United States, even if the US leaves all its heavy artillery at home...
All your assumptions at sea are based on the false premise that the balance of forces will be the same in 1844 as they were in 1814. They won't be. The Americans have a bigger navy, and industrial base, and the Royal Navy is smaller. The idea that because they were still rated as the strongest navy in the world doesn't mean the can have overwhelming local superiority any place, or time that they want to. Like everyone else they have limits to their power, and higher priorities than bringing the U.S. to it's knees.

The defenses around Fort Tompkins were in decay, but the moats, and intrenchments would still be there, and given a few months more field works would be added to what was left. Just what do you think the Americans would do, give up? They'd take what they found in place fix what they could and improvise new field works. The outlines are already there. In 1814 the Americans built an earthen works system to defend Baltimore in a matter of a few weeks. It was so strong the British backed off from attacking it. I guess that was just another case of American exceptionalism.

Again, the reports to Congress and ignoring that Civil War experience showed those assumptions were wrong. Of course, the British/Canadians will build earthen work defenses at critical points, who said otherwise? Where do you get the idea that if the U.S. has to use most of its heavy guns for ships, and coastal defenses they won't have any heavy guns or mortars left to take to Canada? That makes no sense. The U.S. Army allocated heavy guns to coastal defenses, and others to field forces.
 
As for "dependent on food imports from the United States" I am extremely skeptical since they could afford to export wheat to Britain in the time period. I know they'd be reliant for certain crops and industrial products, but overall food imports? Never even heard of that.

I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that this statistic is actually caused by the arbitrage trade that was going on in the 1830's, before Peel repealed the British Corn Laws.

American grain was imported into Canada and consumed there, while Canadian grain was sent to Britain at reduced duty rates. Or at least that was the cover story; I suspect there was a good deal of American product simply rebranded as Canadian and sent on to Britain.

None of this affects the military argument here, but it's an interesting illustration of interdependence.
 
Equally striking is the absence of a battle fleet in home waters. Normally the most obvious and significant indicator of naval power, there was no 'Channel Fleet or Channel Squadron'. Nor was there any grouping of partially-manned ships at the home ports which could provide the means for a speedy mobilisation of the fleet. Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews. A considerable number of these ships had been launched and placed straight into Ordinary with ever being commissioned. The naval bases in the Medway, at Portsmouth, and at Plymouth were full of such vessels. Only a few large ships were kept in harbour service commissions in each port to provide dignified flagships for the port admirals.
None of that says anything about the laid-up ships being left in rivers to rot away.
 
I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that this statistic is actually caused by the arbitrage trade that was going on in the 1830's, before Peel repealed the British Corn Laws.

American grain was imported into Canada and consumed there, while Canadian grain was sent to Britain at reduced duty rates. Or at least that was the cover story; I suspect there was a good deal of American product simply rebranded as Canadian and sent on to Britain.

None of this affects the military argument here, but it's an interesting illustration of interdependence.
Yes, the interdependence on trade, and ties of cultural and language made any Anglo/American war a disastrous mistake. The American Revolution was caused by terrible colonial policies, and 1812 by the high-handed actions of the Orders in Council, and helping the Indians kill American settlers on the frontier. Yes, I know they teach you in Canadian, and British schools 1812 was caused by American aggressive designs against Canada. As if the Americans waited till the 20th year of Britian's war with France to stab them in the back while they were saving the world from the tyranny of Napolean. After 1815 everything could be settled by compromises. Each power stayed out of the others way.

The sensible thing to do while this 1843 War was going on was to be holding talks behind to scenes for restoring peace on the basis of a return to the prewar Status Quo. This war would be pretty pointless for both sides. A lot would be lost the longer it went on, and very little would be gained.
 
I'm sorry I don't understand your logic.
Fair enough.
You're arguing against yourself.
I don't understand?
A British blockade would depend on smaller handy ships like frigates, and sloops to patrol off the coast seeking ships going from port to port or chasing blockade runners. The British have to spread themselves along a 3,000-mile coast, not the Americans.
That is the point I'm trying to make, plus learn something along the way. In this thread we have seen far to many posts about what the RN can/will be doing in terms of blockade duty, bombarding coastal cities/ports/US shipyards. I'm asking questions so we can apply numbers of BRITISH ships needed to perform all their proposed actions, sorry if I caused confusion by the way I worded my post. When I said "we need" in this context, I'm speaking in the POV of the British/RN trying to impose a close blockade (which the RN never had a way to do on a 3,000 mile long coastline), on the other side of the Atlantic, while also trying to maintain a fleet in Europe to deter folks eying the British Empire, and wanting a piece of it, while the RN is off on the other side of the atlantic.

So, sorry for the confusion.
That's predicated on the idea that all of the USN fleet is trapped in port unable to intervene, so the RN has a free run of it. That maybe a false assumption.
No. All I'm trying to do is show that there will in fact be no "close blockade" of the entire US Coastline, where us evil Americans (all of whose ships must of course be trapped in ports, because reasons), to say nothing of how did an earlier poster put it.
The US versus Britain is always going to be slightly Lion vs. Whale but in this era that's especially true. At sea there effectively isn't going to be a war, the USN is a joke and the RN is absurdly dominant and has nothing to distract it. All overseas trade will end and the coast will be ravaged.
I don't think that...

Cross border raids are likely, but British control of St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario make any offensives there difficult for America. America probably gains control of Lake Erie but it might be contested. The USN gets swept from the seas and America's overseas trade is shattered and choked off. Insurance rates rise in Britain from American privateers and raiders.
Control of the St. Lawrence how? There are points on the river where American guns can be emplaced on the US side, and hit the Canadian side, so how are the RN ships sailing upriver from the Atlantic Ocean past these narrows? The US isn't going to sink blockships and/or build floating obstructions, and then sink them in the Narrows, preventing quick and easy passage along the river? So how will the RN reach Lake Ontario?

The USN is going to be operating from US ports/naval bases, not swept from the seas, and while US trade will take a hit, it isn't ALL going away, as there will be no close blockade of the entire US coastline, because that is what I tried to demonstrate the impossibility of, with the first map.

On a side note, while I did get a good, informative post in reply, I'm still interested in learning what kind of a blockade this notional war is going to see, with specifics of what/where ships will be. I would ask that folks use Bing maps (or something better) to kind of piece things together with visual aids, so we can all easily see what is being proposed vs what the RN really had, and start checking off requirements from inventory, until we have a good idea of what is really possible.

Some other maps to illustrate other theaters for naval/river combat.
Kingston to Montreal.jpg

Shown above, is the St. Lawrence river, between Kingston and Montreal. Scale is used to show this location within the US/Canadian border. Next, we zoom in...
Brockville to Cornwall.jpg

Brockville to Cornwall is a close up view of a part of the above image, finally we zoom in to the Narrows, near Waddington...
The Narrows.jpg

My eyes are not what they once were, and it took many attempts to make this image, but eventually I got an image that can kinda do what I was wanting to do. AFAIK, the US 24 pounder had an effective range of 1,322 yards, and that comes out to be 3,966 feet, so what we see here is my best attempt to demonstrate, just in a single case, where the US can emplace guns within the United States, and where from notional batteries there, could deny access to ships attempting to run upriver to Lake Ontario, and no US invasion of Canadian territory is needed for this to be done.

So, unlike others have been posting, the RN will not be turning the Great Lakes into a British/Canadian pond, as it will have no access to even lake Ontario, let alone the other upper lakes. It is the USA, not Britain/Canada, that will dominate the Great Lakes, and this will allow the USA to land and support troops/disrupt enemy operations.

As I understand it, in the war of 1812, there were shipyards in Kingston that ensured Canadian control of Lake Ontario in that war, so in 1843 I would assume that these shipyards still exist, and this will make Lake Ontario an intriguing battlefield in this notional war.

***Like a fool, I apparently once again didn't manage the complicated task of bookmarking the range of the US 24 pounder (or if I did, I cannot find where I saved it too), so could anyone help out with that, and post a link?
 
I'm going to go out on a limb and guess that this statistic is actually caused by the arbitrage trade that was going on in the 1830's, before Peel repealed the British Corn Laws.

American grain was imported into Canada and consumed there, while Canadian grain was sent to Britain at reduced duty rates. Or at least that was the cover story; I suspect there was a good deal of American product simply rebranded as Canadian and sent on to Britain.

None of this affects the military argument here, but it's an interesting illustration of interdependence.
On that note, wasn't there some smuggling into/out of Bermuda back in the war of 1812? Or was that only in the ARW?
 
Last edited:
Fair enough.

I don't understand?

That is the point I'm trying to make, plus learn something along the way. In this thread we have seen far to many posts about what the RN can/will be doing in terms of blockade duty, bombarding coastal cities/ports/US shipyards. I'm asking questions so we can apply numbers of BRITISH ships needed to perform all their proposed actions, sorry if I caused confusion by the way I worded my post. When I said "we need" in this context, I'm speaking in the POV of the British/RN trying to impose a close blockade (which the RN never had a way to do on a 3,000 mile long coastline), on the other side of the Atlantic, while also trying to maintain a fleet in Europe to deter folks eying the British Empire, and wanting a piece of it, while the RN is off on the other side of the atlantic.

So, sorry for the confusion.

No. All I'm trying to do is show that there will in fact be no "close blockade" of the entire US Coastline, where us evil Americans (all of whose ships must of course be trapped in ports, because reasons), to say nothing of how did an earlier poster put it.

I don't think that...


Control of the St. Lawrence how? There are points on the river where American guns can be emplaced on the US side, and hit the Canadian side, so how are the RN ships sailing upriver from the Atlantic Ocean past these narrows? The US isn't going to sink blockships and/or build floating obstructions, and then sink them in the Narrows, preventing quick and easy passage along the river? So how will the RN reach Lake Ontario?

The USN is going to be operating from US ports/naval bases, not swept from the seas, and while US trade will take a hit, it isn't ALL going away, as there will be no close blockade of the entire US coastline, because that is what I tried to demonstrate the impossibility of, with the first map.

On a side note, while I did get a good, informative post in reply, I'm still interested in learning what kind of a blockade this notional war is going to see, with specifics of what/where ships will be. I would ask that folks use Bing maps (or something better) to kind of piece things together with visual aids, so we can all easily see what is being proposed vs what the RN really had, and start checking off requirements from inventory, until we have a good idea of what is really possible.

Some other maps to illustrate other theaters for naval/river combat.View attachment 820827
Shown above, is the St. Lawrence river, between Kingston and Montreal. Scale is used to show this location within the US/Canadian border. Next, we zoom in...View attachment 820830
Brockville to Cornwall is a close up view of a part of the above image, finally we zoom in to the Narrows, near Waddington...View attachment 820832
My eyes are not what they once were, and it took many attempts to make this image, but eventually I got an image that can kinda do what I was wanting to do. AFAIK, the US 24 pounder had an effective range of 1,322 yards, and that comes out to be 3,966 feet, so what we see here is my best attempt to demonstrate, just in a single case, where the US can emplace guns within the United States, and where from notional batteries there, could deny access to ships attempting to run upriver to Lake Ontario, and no US invasion of Canadian territory is needed for this to be done.

So, unlike others have been posting, the RN will not be turning the Great Lakes into a British/Canadian pond, as it will have no access to even lake Ontario, let alone the other upper lakes. It is the USA, not Britain/Canada, that will dominate the Great Lakes, and this will allow the USA to land and support troops/disrupt enemy operations.

As I understand it, in the war of 1812, there were shipyards in Kingston that ensured Canadian control of Lake Ontario in that war, so in 1843 I would assume that these shipyards still exist, and this will make Lake Ontario an intriguing battlefield in this notional war.

***Like a fool, I apparently once again didn't manage the complicated task of bookmarking the range of the US 24 pounder (or if I did, I cannot find where I saved it too), so could anyone help out with that, and post a link?
Sorry I was completely misunderstanding what you were saying. Please ignore my post.
 
Fair enough.

I don't understand?

That is the point I'm trying to make, plus learn something along the way. In this thread we have seen far to many posts about what the RN can/will be doing in terms of blockade duty, bombarding coastal cities/ports/US shipyards. I'm asking questions so we can apply numbers of BRITISH ships needed to perform all their proposed actions, sorry if I caused confusion by the way I worded my post. When I said "we need" in this context, I'm speaking in the POV of the British/RN trying to impose a close blockade (which the RN never had a way to do on a 3,000 mile long coastline), on the other side of the Atlantic, while also trying to maintain a fleet in Europe to deter folks eying the British Empire, and wanting a piece of it, while the RN is off on the other side of the atlantic.

So, sorry for the confusion.

No. All I'm trying to do is show that there will in fact be no "close blockade" of the entire US Coastline, where us evil Americans (all of whose ships must of course be trapped in ports, because reasons), to say nothing of how did an earlier poster put it.

I don't think that...


Control of the St. Lawrence how? There are points on the river where American guns can be emplaced on the US side, and hit the Canadian side, so how are the RN ships sailing upriver from the Atlantic Ocean past these narrows? The US isn't going to sink blockships and/or build floating obstructions, and then sink them in the Narrows, preventing quick and easy passage along the river? So how will the RN reach Lake Ontario?

The USN is going to be operating from US ports/naval bases, not swept from the seas, and while US trade will take a hit, it isn't ALL going away, as there will be no close blockade of the entire US coastline, because that is what I tried to demonstrate the impossibility of, with the first map.

On a side note, while I did get a good, informative post in reply, I'm still interested in learning what kind of a blockade this notional war is going to see, with specifics of what/where ships will be. I would ask that folks use Bing maps (or something better) to kind of piece things together with visual aids, so we can all easily see what is being proposed vs what the RN really had, and start checking off requirements from inventory, until we have a good idea of what is really possible.

Some other maps to illustrate other theaters for naval/river combat.View attachment 820827
Shown above, is the St. Lawrence river, between Kingston and Montreal. Scale is used to show this location within the US/Canadian border. Next, we zoom in...View attachment 820830
Brockville to Cornwall is a close up view of a part of the above image, finally we zoom in to the Narrows, near Waddington...View attachment 820832
My eyes are not what they once were, and it took many attempts to make this image, but eventually I got an image that can kinda do what I was wanting to do. AFAIK, the US 24 pounder had an effective range of 1,322 yards, and that comes out to be 3,966 feet, so what we see here is my best attempt to demonstrate, just in a single case, where the US can emplace guns within the United States, and where from notional batteries there, could deny access to ships attempting to run upriver to Lake Ontario, and no US invasion of Canadian territory is needed for this to be done.

So, unlike others have been posting, the RN will not be turning the Great Lakes into a British/Canadian pond, as it will have no access to even lake Ontario, let alone the other upper lakes. It is the USA, not Britain/Canada, that will dominate the Great Lakes, and this will allow the USA to land and support troops/disrupt enemy operations.

As I understand it, in the war of 1812, there were shipyards in Kingston that ensured Canadian control of Lake Ontario in that war, so in 1843 I would assume that these shipyards still exist, and this will make Lake Ontario an intriguing battlefield in this notional war.

***Like a fool, I apparently once again didn't manage the complicated task of bookmarking the range of the US 24 pounder (or if I did, I cannot find where I saved it too), so could anyone help out with that, and post a link?
Wiki post says the 24 pounder had an effective range of 1,322 yards, or 3,966 ft. As you say it would be able to cover the river, as would the American 12 pounders set up on Ogden Island in the middle of the river.
 
The difference was the American ships of the line, and frigates in ordinary was they were out of the water on slipways in a state of being ready for a final fit out and were being maintained.
No, they weren't.

The ships anchored off the navy yard piers are (left) U.S.S. Ohio, the yard’s receiving ship (for housing recruits and sailors transferring between vessels), and U.S.S. Wabash “in ordinary” (that is, out of commission and in storage). Anchored out in the harbor were several vessels “in ordinary.” A vessel in ordinary was out of service and in storage with a skeleton crew until recommissioned. (Charlestown Navy Yard, by the US National Park Service)

Indeed, there is plenty of evidence to show that US Navy ships decayed while in ordinary in this period:

it was the Ohio that arrested his attention; a superb 102-gun two-decker lying in ordinary, “a more splendid ship I never beheld.”... Though only seven years old, the Ohio was obviously falling rapidly into decay and De Roos was appalled at the apparent absence of reasonable care and attention that permitted so beautiful a vessel to remain undefended against the assaults of the weather. (Commander F. Barley R.N.V.R., 'A Look at the U.S. Navy in 1826,' Royal United Services Institution Journal, vol. 106 no. 622 (1961) , p.221-228; note you could have told this from Wikipedia saying "She went into ordinary and in the ensuing years decayed badly.")

Again, you could have saved yourself a lot of trouble if you'd actually read that 1843 Secretary of the [US] Navy report I linked you what, almost a fortnight ago now?
A statement of the names of the vessels in ordinary or under repair at the several navy yards... Ships of the line Washington and Franklin - both require very extensive repairs. Frigate Hudson - unfit for sea service.

I guess we know why USS Washington was broken up in 1843 now, but I'll be interested to hear you explain how the American system of ordinary was so fantastic that it let a ship of the line rot to pieces.

Most of the British ships were in the water and spent years with no maintenance.
To link this quote to its fellow:

Source for the bolded bit, please. I find it implausible that the world's foremost naval power would have so little knowledge of ship maintenance as to let its reserve vessels rot away through neglect.
From my earlier post from Naval History Net

Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews...

They didn't want to spend the money to keep them up. That's why I said what they would have to do is count on the Post Ships, and new builds still on the slipways for reinforcements. Not so all powerful after all. Even the Royal Navy has limits.
Your source is wrong.

In July 1783, Admiralty approved the appointment of 24 Masters from the half pay list to superintend the large numbers of ships that were laying in Ordinary after the War of American Independence. Eight of these were to reside at Chatham and Sheerness and each was to command a division of ships with a proportion of seamen on board each vessel; roughly 36 men to a ship of 100 guns and 26 to a ship of 74 guns. Ships that were fit for service kept their lower masts in, with bowsprits, yards and topmasts struck and covered over on board to preserve them from the weather. The ships were docked at intervals of not more than 3 years for the examination and repair of the under water parts...

Among the reforms made at the beginning of the 19th century was the splitting up of the Ordinary into divisions each under a Superintending Master responsible to the Master Attendant. The nucleus crew on board each ship was responsible for airing and ventilating the vessel and keeping it in good shape. In August 1803 Chatham Ordinary consisted of 20 ships in Chatham Reach, 10 in Bridge Reach, 8 at Cockam Wood, 13 at West Gillingham and 4 in Long Reach, with 56 boatswains, 53 gunners, 58 carpenters and 145 seamen dispersed among them. These 55 vessels were organised into six divisions each with a Superintending Master responsible to the Master Attendant...

A move to provide training for the officers and men of the Ordinary and to tighten up discipline took place in 1836 when Brune, 5th-rate, 38 guns, was put into commission as a guardship of the Ordinary. The Superintendent of the Yard was sent the establishment of officers and men for her; the Gunners, Boatswains, Carpenters and Cooks late belonging to the Ordinary at Chatham, were to be borne on a supernumerary list. The establishment was to include Petty Officers and men who volunteered from the Ordinary to enter for five years service. The Warrant Officers on the Supernumerary list were to be employed in charge of the ships of the Ordinary as well as Petty Officers and Seamen from those on the books of the Brune. The Carpenters were assigned a ship, but the others could be moved from one ship to another or recalled to Brune.

The Captain of the guardship was to have the care of the ships in Ordinary under the sanction of the Superintendent. In the absence of the latter he had charge of the Dockyard.
The Commander of the Brune was to reside in one of the ships and to carry on the duties performed before by the Commander of the Ordinary. The Master was to reside on the guardship and to be employed in looking after the moorings of the ships in Ordinary, to assist in transporting any ship which was to be moved, and the piloting of ships in and out of the harbour. The Surgeon, Chaplain and Purser were to reside in the guardship, and the Assistant Surgeon on the Commanders ship.
The Carpenters Mates were to be qualified shipwrights and were to assist in making good the defects and repairs of the ships in Ordinary, and if required, to work in the Yard. Besides the Petty Officers and seamen allotted for the charge of the various ships in Ordinary, there would remain a number on the guardship, to be trained by the Lieutenants, etc.
The officers of the Chatham Yacht and other Yard craft were to be appointed to the Brune: the Supernumerary List contained 39 gunners and boatswains, 23 carpenters and two cooks.
Three-deckers in Ordinary were to have a gunner, boatswain, carpenter and men to a total of eight; two-deckers, one gunner and one boatswain, carpenter and men to a total of seven. Every ship building or in dock under repair was to have a carpenter.


Did you really build this whole thing out of a single unfootnoted sentence on a website?

As for outsailed: approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have actually ever commanded a ship-of-the-line before?
Captains, and crews were rotated frequently, and a number of captains had commanded a ship of the line at one time or another.
That's not an answer to my question. Approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have ever actually commanded a ship-of-the-line before? You say captains and crews were rotated frequently: could we expect every one of the 9-10 ships of the line you propose to commission to be captained by someone who had commanded a ship-of-the-line within, say, the last twenty years?

Where you get the idea the USN didn't have good seamanship, or the officers didn't study the great battles of the age of sail I have no idea. In 1814 at the battle of Lake Champlain Captain Macdonough anchored his fleet in a line like the French did at the Battle of Aboukir Bay
I told you the US navy would struggle with seamanship in a high seas fleet action of ships-of-the-line, just as the blockaded French did, and you chose to prove me wrong by citing... a battle on a lake where the biggest ship mounts 36 guns and all the United States ships are anchored.

As for the number of guns that need to be mounted only the ships on the slipways need to be fitted out, the others already have their guns.
No, they don't.
Ships laid up in ordinary, are stript of all their rigging, which, with the stores, guns, &c. is taken on shore: in fact, every thing is taken out of them; and the men and officers are all paid off, except the boatswain, gunner, carpenter, and cook, (who always remain to take care of the ship,) and six ordinary seamen (The Beauties of England and Wales, 1803)

DISMANTLE is to unrig a ship, and take out all her guns, stores, &c., in readiness for being laid up in ordinary, (The art of rigging, 1848)

Find me a single contemporary or secondary source that shows that the US navy acted differently by keeping the guns in receiving ships or ships laid up in ordinary. Because I don't think you can:

The frigate Congress managed to slip out of Boston, only to return by the end of the year too damaged to repair. Her guns were stripped and she spent the rest of the war in ordinary. (Center for International Maritime Security); 'The United States Navy was small... Three of the five frigates were laid up in Ordinary - in reserve with all their masts, ordnance and stores removed' (Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812)

Your fleet dispositions seem to be based on matching the American battle line ships one for one based on what ports you think they were placed in ordinary. First off, they may not be there when the RN ships arrive, because they don't want to be blockaded. Your other assumption is that in a battle of equal numbers the British will win... The RN can't send most of its ships to the North American, and West Indies Station. They have too many other global commitments.
Do they really seem to be any of these things?

That's a total of 11 ships. Your figures from 1837 show that they have 22 first and second rate ships of the line in ordinary, and so could more than double these numbers without amending any of their existing dispositions (including the four second-rate 90-gun battleships already in the Mediterranean) or using any of the third-rate 74-gun ships that you said would be outgunned.

Again, you don't understand the state of those Battleships in ordinary. Many of them are dismasted rotting hulks that will never see service again.
Sorry, are you talking about the US or the Royal Navy here? Let's compare the fates of the 22 first and second rate Royal Navy ships in ordinary in 1837 (which I suggested Britain could use in this war, and you are presumably calling "dismasted rotting hulks that will never see service again") with their equivalent US Navy ships of the line.

HMS Caledonia - launched 1808, last active service 1851 (Mediterranean)
HMS Nelson - launched 1814, converted to screw 1860, transferred to Australia 1867
HMS Neptune - launched 1832, Baltic flagship 1856, converted to screw 1859, last service 1862 (Mediterranean)
HMS Prince Regent - launched 1823, Baltic 1856, converted to screw but never fitted for sea 1861
HMS St Vincent - launched 1815, last active service 1849 (Western squadron)
HMS Camperdown - launched 1820, last service 1843 (flagship at Sheerness)
HMS Hibernia - launched 1804, last active service 1849 (Mediterranean)
HMS Impregnable - launched 1810, last active service 1843 (Mediterranean)
HMS San Josef - launched 1797, gunnery training ship 1839
HMS Ocean - launched 1805, harbour service only.
HMS Temeraire - launched 1798, broken up 1838
HMS Victory - launched 1765, harbour service only

HMS Calcutta - launched 1831, last active service 1859 (East Indies and China)
HMS Cambridge - launched 1815, last active service 1843 (Mediterranean)
HMS Clarence - launched 1827, no active service
HMS Formidable - launched 1825, last active service 1845 (Mediterranean)
HMS Ganges - launched 1821, last active service 1857 (Pacific)
HMS Monarch - launched 1832, last active service 1858 (Pacific)
HMS Powerful - launched 1826, last active service 1854 (Mediterranean)
HMS Thunderer - launched 1831, last active service 1843 (Cape of Good Hope)
HMS Vengeance - launched 1824, last active service 1855 (Mediterranean)

USS Washington - launched 1814, in ordinary 1820-1843, broken up 1843
USS Franklin -launched 1815, in ordinary 1824 - 1838, receiving ship at Boston thereafter, broken up 1842
USS Columbus - launched 1819, Mexican-American War to 1848, in ordinary 1848 - 1861, sunk.
USS Pennsylvania - launched 1837, in ordinary 1837-1842, receiving ship thereafter, sunk 1861
USS Delaware - launched 1820, , flagship of Brazil and Mediterranean squadrons 1841 - 1844, in ordinary thereafter; burned 1861
USS Vermont - laid down 1818, finished 1825, launched at Boston 1848, in ordinary until 1861, receiving ship 1862-1901
USS New Hampshire - laid down at Portsmouth, Maine 1819, finished 1825, launched as storeship 1864, out of service 1921
USS Virginia - laid down 1822 at Boston, never launched; broken up on stocks 1874
USS New York - laid down 1820; never launched; burnt on ways at Norfolk, 1861
USS Ohio - launched 1820; Pacific, 1849; In ordinary, Boston, 1850; receiving ship, 1851 - 1875; in ordinary, 1875 - 1883, sold, 1883
USS North Carolina - launched 1820; Pacific 1839; receiving ship at New York, 1839 - 1866; sold 1867.

Which of those groups saw more service?

All of the American ships of the line carried more guns than rated, making all of them actually 2nd rate ships, and Pennsylvania a 1st rate. All of them outgun a British 74.
Oh boy, it's a good job you did your research so that you weren't comparing the rated number of guns a Royal Navy 74 with the actual number of guns and carronades on a US Navy warship. Because if you were doing this, and the Royal Navy also happened to carry more guns than they were rated for, such as the Vengeur-class (40 ships, 1809-1822) and Black Prince-class (4 ships, 1812 - 1815) carrying 28 32pdrs, 28 18pdrs, 6 12pdrs, 12 32pdr carronades and 6 18pdr carronades for a total of 80 guns, then the entire premise of your argument would be completely wrong. Even before you factor in that I only proposed to use first and second rate ships of the line on the blockade.

The defenses around Fort Tompkins were in decay, but the moats, and intrenchments would still be there, and given a few months more field works would be added to what was left. Just what do you think the Americans would do, give up?
You see, what we have here is an unfalsifiable belief. You tell us "The old forts of the Fort Richmond complex would form the base for the landward defense of the Staten Island side of the Narrows" and they were "not easy to overcome." We point out that those forts were not just decaying but literally in ruins, incapable of keeping out either a cow or a tramp, and you say "well it doesn't matter, the Americans would just fight harder and win anyway".

Where do you get the idea that if the U.S. has to use most of its heavy guns for ships, and coastal defenses they won't have any heavy guns or mortars left to take to Canada? That makes no sense
Yes, the US is going to need a lot of heavy guns to invade Canada. So tell this guy:

The main impact of the RN will be on forcing the US to divert troops and equipment (especially cannon) from the Canadian front to guarding ports
Forts, and coastal batteries mount heavy guns. An army going into Canada will have mostly field guns no bigger than 12 pounders.
 
Last edited:
Top