The difference was the American ships of the line, and frigates in ordinary was they were out of the water on slipways in a state of being ready for a final fit out and were being maintained.
No, they weren't.
The ships anchored off the navy yard piers are (left) U.S.S. Ohio, the yard’s receiving ship (for housing recruits and sailors transferring between vessels), and U.S.S. Wabash “in ordinary” (that is, out of commission and in storage). Anchored out in the harbor were several vessels “in ordinary.” A vessel in ordinary was out of service and in storage with a skeleton crew until recommissioned.
(Charlestown Navy Yard, by the US National Park Service
Indeed, there is plenty of evidence to show that US Navy ships decayed while in ordinary in this period:
it was the Ohio that arrested his attention; a superb 102-gun two-decker lying in ordinary, “a more splendid ship I never beheld.”... Though only seven years old, the Ohio was obviously falling rapidly into decay and De Roos was appalled at the apparent absence of reasonable care and attention that permitted so beautiful a vessel to remain undefended against the assaults of the weather.
(Commander F. Barley R.N.V.R., 'A Look at the U.S. Navy in 1826,' Royal United Services Institution Journal, vol. 106 no. 622 (1961) , p.221-228; note you could have told this from Wikipedia saying "She went into ordinary and in the ensuing years decayed badly.
Again, you could have saved yourself a lot of trouble if you'd actually read that 1843 Secretary of the [US] Navy report I linked you
what, almost a fortnight ago now?
A statement of the names of the vessels in ordinary or under repair at the several navy yards... Ships of the line Washington and Franklin - both require very extensive repairs. Frigate Hudson - unfit for sea service.
I guess we know why USS Washington was broken up in 1843 now, but I'll be interested to hear you explain how the American system of ordinary was so fantastic that it let a ship of the line rot to pieces.
Most of the British ships were in the water and spent years with no maintenance.
To link this quote to its fellow:
Your source is wrong
Source for the bolded bit, please. I find it implausible that the world's foremost naval power would have so little knowledge of ship maintenance as to let its reserve vessels rot away through neglect.
From my earlier post from Naval History Net
Instead, ships were laid up 'In Ordinary' for many years with no masts and rigging, no guns, and no maintenance crews...
They didn't want to spend the money to keep them up. That's why I said what they would have to do is count on the Post Ships, and new builds still on the slipways for reinforcements. Not so all powerful after all. Even the Royal Navy has limits.
In July 1783, Admiralty approved the appointment of 24 Masters from the half pay list to superintend the large numbers of ships that were laying in Ordinary after the War of American Independence. Eight of these were to reside at Chatham and Sheerness and each was to command a division of ships with a proportion of seamen on board each vessel; roughly 36 men to a ship of 100 guns and 26 to a ship of 74 guns. Ships that were fit for service kept their lower masts in, with bowsprits, yards and topmasts struck and covered over on board to preserve them from the weather. The ships were docked at intervals of not more than 3 years for the examination and repair of the under water parts...
Among the reforms made at the beginning of the 19th century was the splitting up of the Ordinary into divisions each under a Superintending Master responsible to the Master Attendant. The nucleus crew on board each ship was responsible for airing and ventilating the vessel and keeping it in good shape. In August 1803 Chatham Ordinary consisted of 20 ships in Chatham Reach, 10 in Bridge Reach, 8 at Cockam Wood, 13 at West Gillingham and 4 in Long Reach, with 56 boatswains, 53 gunners, 58 carpenters and 145 seamen dispersed among them. These 55 vessels were organised into six divisions each with a Superintending Master responsible to the Master Attendant...
A move to provide training for the officers and men of the Ordinary and to tighten up discipline took place in 1836 when Brune, 5th-rate, 38 guns, was put into commission as a guardship of the Ordinary. The Superintendent of the Yard was sent the establishment of officers and men for her; the Gunners, Boatswains, Carpenters and Cooks late belonging to the Ordinary at Chatham, were to be borne on a supernumerary list. The establishment was to include Petty Officers and men who volunteered from the Ordinary to enter for five years service. The Warrant Officers on the Supernumerary list were to be employed in charge of the ships of the Ordinary as well as Petty Officers and Seamen from those on the books of the Brune. The Carpenters were assigned a ship, but the others could be moved from one ship to another or recalled to Brune.
The Captain of the guardship was to have the care of the ships in Ordinary under the sanction of the Superintendent. In the absence of the latter he had charge of the Dockyard.
The Commander of the Brune was to reside in one of the ships and to carry on the duties performed before by the Commander of the Ordinary. The Master was to reside on the guardship and to be employed in looking after the moorings of the ships in Ordinary, to assist in transporting any ship which was to be moved, and the piloting of ships in and out of the harbour. The Surgeon, Chaplain and Purser were to reside in the guardship, and the Assistant Surgeon on the Commanders ship.
The Carpenters Mates were to be qualified shipwrights and were to assist in making good the defects and repairs of the ships in Ordinary, and if required, to work in the Yard. Besides the Petty Officers and seamen allotted for the charge of the various ships in Ordinary, there would remain a number on the guardship, to be trained by the Lieutenants, etc.
The officers of the Chatham Yacht and other Yard craft were to be appointed to the Brune: the Supernumerary List contained 39 gunners and boatswains, 23 carpenters and two cooks.
Three-deckers in Ordinary were to have a gunner, boatswain, carpenter and men to a total of eight; two-deckers, one gunner and one boatswain, carpenter and men to a total of seven. Every ship building or in dock under repair was to have a carpenter.
Did you really build this whole thing out of a single unfootnoted sentence on a website?
As for outsailed: approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have actually ever commanded a ship-of-the-line before?
Captains, and crews were rotated frequently, and a number of captains had commanded a ship of the line at one time or another.
That's not an answer to my question. Approximately how many captains in the United States Navy as of 1843 have ever actually commanded a ship-of-the-line before? You say captains and crews were rotated frequently: could we expect every one of the 9-10 ships of the line you propose to commission to be captained by someone who had commanded a ship-of-the-line within, say, the last twenty years?
Where you get the idea the USN didn't have good seamanship, or the officers didn't study the great battles of the age of sail I have no idea. In 1814 at the battle of Lake Champlain Captain Macdonough anchored his fleet in a line like the French did at the Battle of Aboukir Bay
I told you the US navy would struggle with seamanship in a high seas fleet action of ships-of-the-line, just as the blockaded French did, and you chose to prove me wrong by citing... a battle on a lake where the biggest ship mounts 36 guns and all the United States ships are anchored.
As for the number of guns that need to be mounted only the ships on the slipways need to be fitted out, the others already have their guns.
No, they don't.
Ships laid up in ordinary, are stript of all their rigging, which, with the stores, guns, &c. is taken on shore: in fact, every thing is taken out of them; and the men and officers are all paid off, except the boatswain, gunner, carpenter, and cook, (who always remain to take care of the ship,) and six ordinary seamen
(The Beauties of England and Wales, 1803
DISMANTLE is to unrig a ship, and take out all her guns, stores, &c., in readiness for being laid up in ordinary,
(The art of rigging, 1848
Find me a single contemporary or secondary source that shows that the US navy acted differently by keeping the guns in receiving ships or ships laid up in ordinary. Because I don't think you can:
The frigate Congress managed to slip out of Boston, only to return by the end of the year too damaged to repair. Her guns were stripped and she spent the rest of the war in ordinary.
(Center for International Maritime Security
); 'The United States Navy was small... Three of the five frigates were laid up in Ordinary - in reserve with all their masts, ordnance and stores removed' (Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812
Your fleet dispositions seem to be based on matching the American battle line ships one for one based on what ports you think they were placed in ordinary. First off, they may not be there when the RN ships arrive, because they don't want to be blockaded. Your other assumption is that in a battle of equal numbers the British will win... The RN can't send most of its ships to the North American, and West Indies Station. They have too many other global commitments.
Do they really seem to be any of these things?
That's a total of 11 ships. Your figures from 1837 show that they have 22 first and second rate ships of the line in ordinary, and so could more than double these numbers without amending any of their existing dispositions (including the four second-rate 90-gun battleships already in the Mediterranean) or using any of the third-rate 74-gun ships that you said would be outgunned.
Again, you don't understand the state of those Battleships in ordinary. Many of them are dismasted rotting hulks that will never see service again.
Sorry, are you talking about the US or the Royal Navy here? Let's compare the fates of the 22 first and second rate Royal Navy ships in ordinary in 1837 (which I suggested Britain could use in this war, and you are presumably calling "dismasted rotting hulks that will never see service again") with their equivalent US Navy ships of the line.
HMS Caledonia - launched 1808, last active service 1851 (Mediterranean)
HMS Nelson - launched 1814, converted to screw 1860, transferred to Australia 1867
HMS Neptune - launched 1832, Baltic flagship 1856, converted to screw 1859, last service 1862 (Mediterranean)
HMS Prince Regent - launched 1823, Baltic 1856, converted to screw but never fitted for sea 1861
HMS St Vincent - launched 1815, last active service 1849 (Western squadron)
HMS Camperdown - launched 1820, last service 1843 (flagship at Sheerness)
HMS Hibernia - launched 1804, last active service 1849 (Mediterranean)
HMS Impregnable - launched 1810, last active service 1843 (Mediterranean)
HMS San Josef - launched 1797, gunnery training ship 1839
HMS Ocean - launched 1805, harbour service only.
HMS Temeraire - launched 1798, broken up 1838
HMS Victory - launched 1765, harbour service only
HMS Calcutta - launched 1831, last active service 1859 (East Indies and China)
HMS Cambridge - launched 1815, last active service 1843 (Mediterranean)
HMS Clarence - launched 1827, no active service
HMS Formidable - launched 1825, last active service 1845 (Mediterranean)
HMS Ganges - launched 1821, last active service 1857 (Pacific)
HMS Monarch - launched 1832, last active service 1858 (Pacific)
HMS Powerful - launched 1826, last active service 1854 (Mediterranean)
HMS Thunderer - launched 1831, last active service 1843 (Cape of Good Hope)
HMS Vengeance - launched 1824, last active service 1855 (Mediterranean)
USS Washington - launched 1814, in ordinary 1820-1843, broken up 1843
USS Franklin -launched 1815, in ordinary 1824 - 1838, receiving ship at Boston thereafter, broken up 1842
USS Columbus - launched 1819, Mexican-American War to 1848, in ordinary 1848 - 1861, sunk.
USS Pennsylvania - launched 1837, in ordinary 1837-1842, receiving ship thereafter, sunk 1861
USS Delaware - launched 1820, , flagship of Brazil and Mediterranean squadrons 1841 - 1844, in ordinary thereafter; burned 1861
USS Vermont - laid down 1818, finished 1825, launched at Boston 1848, in ordinary until 1861, receiving ship 1862-1901
USS New Hampshire - laid down at Portsmouth, Maine 1819, finished 1825, launched as storeship 1864, out of service 1921
USS Virginia - laid down 1822 at Boston, never launched; broken up on stocks 1874
USS New York - laid down 1820; never launched; burnt on ways at Norfolk, 1861
USS Ohio - launched 1820; Pacific, 1849; In ordinary, Boston, 1850; receiving ship, 1851 - 1875; in ordinary, 1875 - 1883, sold, 1883
USS North Carolina - launched 1820; Pacific 1839; receiving ship at New York, 1839 - 1866; sold 1867.
Which of those groups saw more service?
All of the American ships of the line carried more guns than rated, making all of them actually 2nd rate ships, and Pennsylvania a 1st rate. All of them outgun a British 74.
Oh boy, it's a good job you did your research so that you weren't comparing the rated number of guns a Royal Navy 74 with the actual number of guns and carronades on a US Navy warship. Because if you were doing this, and the Royal Navy also happened to carry more guns than they were rated for, such as the Vengeur-class (40 ships, 1809-1822) and Black Prince-class (4 ships, 1812 - 1815) carrying 28 32pdrs, 28 18pdrs, 6 12pdrs, 12 32pdr carronades and 6 18pdr carronades for a total of 80 guns, then the entire premise of your argument would be completely wrong. Even before you factor in that I only proposed to use first and second rate ships of the line on the blockade.
The defenses around Fort Tompkins were in decay, but the moats, and intrenchments would still be there, and given a few months more field works would be added to what was left. Just what do you think the Americans would do, give up?
You see, what we have here is an unfalsifiable belief. You tell us "The old forts of the Fort Richmond complex would form the base for the landward defense of the Staten Island side of the Narrows" and they were "not easy to overcome." We point out that those forts were not just decaying but literally in ruins, incapable of keeping out either a cow or a tramp, and you say "well it doesn't matter, the Americans would just fight harder and win anyway".
Where do you get the idea that if the U.S. has to use most of its heavy guns for ships, and coastal defenses they won't have any heavy guns or mortars left to take to Canada? That makes no sense
Yes, the US is going to need a lot of heavy guns to invade Canada. So tell this guy:
The main impact of the RN will be on forcing the US to divert troops and equipment (especially cannon) from the Canadian front to guarding ports
Forts, and coastal batteries mount heavy guns. An army going into Canada will have mostly field guns no bigger than 12 pounders.