How would a Soviet invasion of the Japanese Home Islands go? Would it be doable?

Why were the Japanese so scared when the Soviets began invading then? As far as I am aware, a huge factor in making the Japanese surrender was the invasion of Manchuria. Which seems to indicate the Japanese were scared of the Soviets.

Seems strange for them to fear the Soviets so much if they actually had no capacity to invade Japan.

Japan's last hope for surviving the war would have been to exploit a falling out amongst the Allies over Europe and get the Soviets on their side to resist an American invasion. When the Soviets abrogated their nonaggression pact with the Japanese and invaded Manchuria that was the last nail in the coffin and the choice became either unconditional surrender or national suicide by resisting and suffering invasion and nuclear holocaust.

A combination of things. The USSR invading Manchuria basically destroyed their last card to play, the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria and meant that their plan, to use the Soviets as an intermediary to make peace with the WAllies through after they bled them out during Downfall. The USSR entering the war meant their plans where all for naught

Not to mention the Soviets entered the war after the IJN and their airforces were rendered impotent save for one last Kamikaze surge in the south, the Soviets could have probably invaded Hokkaido and Northern Honshu under those conditions with US help, and they really did not want the Soviets getting a piece of the home islands

Furthermore, for Japan the whole point of the war was to control China. Everything else was secondary and was done to that end, including the Pacific War against the USA.
The Japanese would be afraid of the Soviets because they were the only army that could directly take them off of the Asian mainland. Plus they'd loose Korea, which was part of their country.

The speed with which the Soviets overran Manchuria basically confirmed their deepest despairs, and so surrender became necessary.
 
The Soviets literally cannot land any significant number of troops in the first place. They can't even get far enough for the invasion to fail horribly.

That rather depends on what you'd consider "significant". Lend-lease and other stuff in Project Hulu on top of the more improvised landing craft gave the Soviets the capacity to move and supply around three divisions worth of forces, with a modest merchant marine capable of sustaining significantly more if a port is secured, and the distances they conducted some of these operations over were even further then a Vladivostok to Hokkaido operation might be. However, the alt-war the OP is positing would see minimal or no lend-lease through the Pacific, so that would obviously grossly deplete how much the Soviets could move. It's a rather moot point though: even with the level of amphib and MM assets they had in August 1945, a IJA undistracted by war with the Americans and with the transport infrastructure between the Home Islands still intact would undoubtedly be able to destroy any conceivable landing on the shoreline.

Furthermore, for Japan the whole point of the war was to control China. Everything else was secondary and was done to that end, including the Pacific War against the USA.
The Japanese would be afraid of the Soviets because they were the only army that could directly take them off of the Asian mainland. Plus they'd loose Korea, which was part of their country.

The speed with which the Soviets overran Manchuria basically confirmed their deepest despairs, and so surrender became necessary.

It's also worth recalling the rapidity with which the events occurred in tandem with the atomic bomb. The Imperial Japanese war council basically received confirmation from their own experts on nuclear physics who were sent out to Hiroshima that the city had indeed been atom bombed (as, for obvious reasons, they didn't take the Americans at their word), the news that the USSR had declared war, and the news that a second atomic bomb had been used (in that order) all in a single meeting on the morning of August 9th. There's one minister who starts off by saying that the Americans must only have one bomb, and then rather more nervously tries to dismiss the Soviet intervention as "inevitable" when that bit of news arrives, and upon hearing of the Nagasaki bomb he breaks and starts with frantic speculation that the US must have a thousand or so atomic bombs and that the Soviet attack might set off a communist uprising all in the space of just a few hours. So the shock of these individual events wind up amplified by their relative rapid proximity with each other.
 
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