How would a Rhineland war in 1936 play out?

The base of the scenario is: As we know Hitler was feeling very insecure of the reocupation of the Rhineland and even told the generals that if the french reacted the troops should return immediately to prevent a war because the german reindustrialization program was on it's beginning and the wehrmacht simple didn't had men or equipment yet to fight the french, even defensively. On this scenario for some pre 1936 PoD the French government decides to play the game of the nazis to use in their favour, they allow the nazis to reocuppy Rhineland, but as soon it seems that the dust is settled they deliver a immediate declaration of war and strike on the whole German border and also invite Poland for a alliance, promissing them Prussia and Silesia. What happens? How does the war plays? Do Poland accept the invite? How does the UK react for that?
 
Why and how exactly would the anti-war French government issue an immediate declaration of war without even regarding diplomacy as an option. I don't believe that any one political faction within France at that point had the power or prestige to order the invasion of Germany. France itself was gripped by a financial crisis and the next election was coming up, the political climate was simply too unstable for an invasion. Not to mention that the defeatist attitude that plagued interwar France made it seem to the government that a military victory was impossible without British support, the British meanwhile were carrying on with appeasement.
 
The internal political situation in France wasn't what you could describe as 'stable' in any way close enough to what would be required for a DoW to go over decently. The polarization levels were critical, communists, socialists, radicals, conservatives all hating each other, the military wasn't really funded for offensive warfare yet, there was little political or societal tolerance for casualties and Germany's new regime didn't look that problematic for many, many people there or elsewhere TBH.
 
Not to mention, the French Ultra-Conservatives were crying out "Better Hitler Than Blum!"

Blum being the leftist Prime Minister of France from 1936-1937. Funny how that works.

The French were also still very wary of war. The current generation still had massive, traumatic memories of WW1, of the battles of Somme, Marne, Verdun, and so on. The French Army almost practically crumbled in the mutiny of 1917, and was only saved by extreme measures and the arrival of fresh US troops and supplies. Very few people in France wanted a fight, and fewer still were willing to tolerate another scrap with Germany after what happened last time. Even almost 20 years after it, Verdun left deep scars on the French psyche. You'd need to convince the French against all that.

The British were similarly paralysed. While they suffered less than the French, they still had three quarters of a million deaths and god knows how many other casualties. The British public had pretty much lost its Imperial confidence and bravado as the sunny days of the Victorian era were soon forgotten in the trenches of Somme and Passchendaele and the bombing of London by zeppelins, a massive shock to the once-untouchable city.
 
The French Army almost practically crumbled in the mutiny of 1917
No, not at all. It was very willing to hold the line but a number of units protested against stupid assaults.

Now, the country in 1936? Definitely unwilling and materially unable to wage an offensive war properly due to the budgetary reductions, the delayed impact of the 1929 crisis and the mobilization system. Add to this the trauma of the war, the Never Again feeling combined with that political polarization and it's a non-starter.

Interestingly, one could go and check a bit the evolution of the French political and administrative structure during the interwar, which really became a lot more business-centric than both before and after, in a way a bit similar to Spain's administrative system and Belgium's old boys' system. Compared to what came after 1945 and the full rejuvenation of the administrative caste capable of organizing such an effort, it's a spectacular difference showing other issues that would be very hard to overcome by 1936 France.
 
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No, not at all. It was very willing to hold the line but a number of units protested against stupid assaults.

For the moment tit was, but can that last forever?

After all, the front line is well inside France, so just "holding the line" where it is amounts to accepting defeat. Once they start thinking they've lost, how long before death in a defensive battle comes to seem just as pointless as death in an attack?
 
.. their favour, they allow the nazis to reocuppy Rhineland, but as soon it seems that the dust is settled they deliver a immediate declaration of war and strike on the whole German border ...

A complicated and unnecessary way to do this. In 1923 France & Belgium had invoked clauses in the Treaty of Versailles and each sent a occupation force into the Ruhr region. No DoW was made. Although the ToV had been abrogated by the new nazi government it technically still existed. The French government did consider using this a justification for opposing the German infantry battalions headed west. Aside from internal political divisions the cabinet was told the Army was unprepared to do this. Gamelin, recently appointed, told the cabinet the peacetime organization of the French army prevent the mobilization of rapid response force. He painted a picture of the requirement for a 'full' mobilization of the ground forces, that the peace time training organization was not at all capable of any actual offensive combat operations & implied the mobilization of close one million reservists would be needed to field a army capable of chasing six infantry regiments out of the Rhineland. The government was for fairly obvious reasons unable to face this. Some subsequent historians have made a case Gamelin was dissembling in all this, or perhaps outright lying. I'll leave others to pick at that.

Externally France had little immediate support. Cooperation between Belgium and France on 'Germany Policy' had run aground several years earlier & France could no longer expect the same enthusiastic support that it had in 1923. Britains position was even worse than in 1924 & actual opposition might be expected at the start. Ditto for Italy, the US, and others. What Polands position might be in the immediate moment I cant say. The bottom line is the French government could not count on and international support at the very start of this, other than perhaps Poland.

In retrospect we know there were many weak assumptions here & bad information with the Cabinet. Poor advice from Gamelin has been referred to. While Gamelin was correct in that the French army was configured for training operations and could not deploy a field army, a show of force by those training formations was not impossible. Gamelins negative advice was based on the implication the Germans would fight and a full on battle occur. Post 1945 we have learned Hitler had zero interest in making a fight of it. His directive was for the German soldiers to withdraw wherever confronted by foreign soldiers entering the Rhineland. In that context a few regiments of horse cavalry and armored car squadrons would have sufficed for the French.

For the international setting things were not the same as in 1923/24. The US had a entirely new government, which was hostile to Germanys new facist leadership. When Hitler announced in 1934 the cessation of reparations payments required by the ToV Roosevelt took this further disruption of the global banking system seriously. Not only was the cessation of US obligations under the 1929 Dawes Plan recognized, but the US government ceased any other support or encouragement of loans from the US banks to the German government & business. A outright banking embargo or other effective sanctions were out of the question then, but with the French taking effective action against the Rhineland occupation Roosevelt would have at least threatened the nazi government with financial sanctions. Mussolini was no friend of Germany at this point & Italian policy was still for a independent Austria. decisive French action may have over the longer haul brought the Italians around as well, at least diplomatically supporting the French counter action. Ditto for Belgium. The point here being nothing was set in stone, and the nazi government was starting to be seen as 'different' from the previous post 1918 German governments.
 
For the moment tit was, but can that last forever?

...

Well, the French soldiers did attack in 1918. Not every regiment mutinied, not every regiment showed low morale. Even in latter 1917 corps and armies under decent leadership responded to orders. The soldiery attacked when it was clear they were properly led, the plans were sensible. That the leadership at the top had changed and policies concerning food, pay, leave, family support, ect... changed as well.

The mutinies of 1917 went beyond the immediate concerns of the French infantry. Historians that have taken a broad look describe a general national feeling that the first three years of the war had been very badly managed. The French population in general was ready for and asking for a fundamental policy change.
 
After all, the front line is well inside France, so just "holding the line" where it is amounts to accepting defeat. Once they start thinking they've lost, how long before death in a defensive battle comes to seem just as pointless as death in an attack?
No, not really. By then, it clearly had become an industrial war, and a very large part of it was the Royal Navy starving Germany while the Entente worked on outproducing the Central Powers.
 
Not a myth. That the core guidance was withdrawal in the face of opposition stands. Delaying positions and plans to fight at selected positions were not set in stone. & those are dependent on Hitlers mercurial personality. Manic depressives are not known for their ability to stick firmly when difficulties show. Its just as easy for the nazis to have a few token shots fired, and make big propaganda out of a few corpses, than to have a larger fight & potentially lose control of the situation. Gobbels can spin a token defeat far better than a series of serious military defeats.

The problem is of course Gamelins unwillingness to consider how to get around the problem of French mobilization. Emmersons argument largely revolves around that, rather than any ability or intent of the nazi government to resist firm opposition in the Rhineland.

Defending the Ruhr as Emmerson mentions is a different matter, depending on if the French objective is simply to enforce keeping the Rhineland clear of the German Army, or something much larger. That requires a far larger political agenda for the French, (or perhaps incompetence). I don't know if the French government was considering anything goals beyond enforcing the soldier free zone west of the Rhine. Klien-Albrandt did not refer to it in his lectures on this, nor in his essay on the Rhineland crisis.
 
But let's assume the OP's original premise played out and France and Poland attacked and carved off large chucks of Germany. Depending on how far they went I think the UK wouldn't have tolerated it. Don't know how they would have responded exactly, but the UK's political strategy was to maintain Europe's existing states in a weaker condition then themselves. France absorbing 2/3's of Germany would have made for a fairly powerful nation with a huge uptick in industrial base, resources and population. (Let's just say for the sake of argument that the French could actually absorb the eastern half of Germany).

I think the UK would view this as a strategic threat.
 
But let's assume the OP's original premise played out and France and Poland attacked and carved off large chucks of Germany. Depending on how far they went I think the UK wouldn't have tolerated it. Don't know how they would have responded exactly, but the UK's political strategy was to maintain Europe's existing states in a weaker condition then themselves. France absorbing 2/3's of Germany would have made for a fairly powerful nation with a huge uptick in industrial base, resources and population. (Let's just say for the sake of argument that the French could actually absorb the eastern half of Germany).

I think the UK would view this as a strategic threat.

Absolutely. France would be THE strategic threat.
 
No, not really. By then, it clearly had become an industrial war, and a very large part of it was the Royal Navy starving Germany while the Entente worked on outproducing the Central Powers.

None of which is going to bring Germany down in any foreseeable future absent a decisive win on the battlefield. If the troops start to despair of ever getting that, then the war is lost.

But getting back to the OP, what exactly is the PoD for this? Once the French see the Maginot Line as their defensive position for any future war, they have no interest in the Rhineland, as they won't be defending it anyway. So unless you can somehow get the ML not to be adopted - - -
 
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