How turning the schlieffen plan into a deadly trap for the Germans?

All in the title. OTL the French knew everything about it ( thanks to a german officer who sold them the information) but Joffre dismissed it, preferring to rush into Alsace-Lorraine (Plan XVII) anyway. So ITTL, how the french can turn the german offensive into a disaster, or at least a meatgrinder with practically no gains? Any tactical or strategic thoughts?
 
It would be difficult as the Germans were tactically better than the French in 1914, the most obvious thing being the German use of indirect artillery at the Divisions and Corps level which the French had no equivalent. Their best bet would be to load up the 5th Army with the M1904TR 155mm howitzers they did have and advance into Belgium through open country and fight their encounter battles there. The Germans would still outflank them but would probably reach their culmination point much sooner.
 
so no " let them exhaust themselves in belgium" offering them a nice big hole where they would rush and then unleash some cannae doctrine?
 

Deleted member 1487

French tactical doctrine and abilities were so awful in 1914 that even when they had numerical superiority they generally got stomped anyway. Like the French 6th army first attacking the German 2nd army near Paris during the start of the Marne, they got smashed up by a single German reserve corps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_the_Marne#Western_flank
On 5 September, the Battle of the Ourcq commenced when the Sixth Army advanced eastwards from Paris. That morning it came into contact with cavalry patrols of the IV Reserve Corps of General Hans von Gronau, on the right flank of the 1st Army west of the Ourcq River. Seizing the initiative in the early afternoon, the two divisions of IV Reserve Corps attacked with field artillery and infantry into the gathering Sixth Army and pushed it back. Overnight, the IV Reserve Corps withdrew to a better position 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) east, while Von Kluck, alerted to the approach of the Allied forces, began to wheel his army to face west.
 
The reason the Germans fought in France rather than the other way around was because the advance though Belgium was in a lot of ways an administrative march, it was conducted against almost no opposition after the fall of Liege because the Belgian field army withdrew to Antwerp. This put the strongest German army deep on the French/British flank while the main strength of the French army was head-butting themselves to death on the frontier and in the Ardennes.

If the French conducted their own administrative march into Belgium with their 5th Army then their fighting retreat could have started earlier and ended earlier, but I have no doubt the Germans would push them back simply because they had more armies in the field and those armies were better prepared for war of 1914 due to their howitzers.
 
No doubt the german heavy artillery is an advantage but still, the german command was not the most brilliant (unlike 1870). If Joffre would only care to listen to generals like Lanzerac and castelnau (the latter was Joffre's deputy since 1911 and a talented strategist). Those men weren't without influence: they could convince joffre to adopt some defensive strategy, waiting for Alsace and concentrating everything they have in Northern France. hotchkiss 1914 and 75 mm would do the rest, no?
 

Deleted member 1487

No doubt the german heavy artillery is an advantage but still, the german command was not the most brilliant (unlike 1870). If Joffre would only care to listen to generals like Lanzerac and castelnau (the latter was Joffre's deputy since 1911 and a talented strategist). Those men weren't without influence: they could convince joffre to adopt some defensive strategy, waiting for Alsace and concentrating everything they have in Northern France. hotchkiss 1914 and 75 mm would do the rest, no?
Did they during the German offensives in 1918? They had a lot more MGs and 75s, along with heavier guns and a lot of Brits and Americans that were lacking in 1914, yet they were still smashed up badly until Germany ran out of manpower; in 1914 the balance of power is far more on Germany's side and there aren't enough French troops relative to the Germans to hold a line.
 
Did they during the German offensives in 1918? They had a lot more MGs and 75s, along with heavier guns and a lot of Brits and Americans that were lacking in 1914, yet they were still smashed up badly until Germany ran out of manpower; in 1914 the balance of power is far more on Germany's side and there aren't enough French troops relative to the Germans to hold a line.
if you keep 3 entire armies for alsace and lorraine ( all of them with active units), certainly. But what if they took these units against "schlieffen" armies? Leaving only fortress units in the East ( like the germans by the way). I don't mean to see the french army freeing all Belgium, i just wish to know if they can, with a proper strategy ( and not that garbage of Plan XVII), inflict some very heavy losses on german armies and avoiding the occupation of northern france, ensuring some balance between french/british manpower and the german one.
 

Deleted member 1487

if you keep 3 entire armies for alsace and lorraine ( all of them with active units), certainly. But what if they took these units against "schlieffen" armies? Leaving only fortress units in the East ( like the germans by the way). I don't mean to see the french army freeing all Belgium, i just wish to know if they can, with a proper strategy ( and not that garbage of Plan XVII), inflict some very heavy losses on german armies and avoiding the occupation of northern france, ensuring some balance between french/british manpower and the german one.
If you clean out French units from Alsace then the Germans attack with them and overrun the frontier and French forts, which puts France in a really bad situation, because their flank is turned. Forts can only stand with field army support. In the East the Germans cleaned out fort garrisons from non-threatened areas to use as field forces, while the threatened areas were reinforced with field units. Very different situation to what you are suggesting, as the 8th army held the only part of Germany threatened and it was the single biggest army Germany had given all the attached smaller units. The French could hold Belgium for a time, but only by giving up the German border. As it was the French had 5 armies, the Germans 7 in the West, and the Germans armies were mostly more powerful than their French counterparts due to the power of the reserve corps.
 
It's important not to underestimate the importance of the Battle of the Frontiers. While the planned advance through the Ardennes was a bad idea from start to finish, as was the whole concept of Elan for that matter, the other frontier froces played an important role. In this scenario they could be drawn down but not by too much or they won't be able to hold the Germans. Crown Prince Rupprecht was shouting for permission to attack from essentially the beginning of the campaign, and when he did get that permission he was successful enough to raise the dream of a Cannae-like double envelopment before the German general-staff. The retreat to the Marne was only possible by the armies on the frontier dying and bleeding to stop the German advance. The phrase used in The Guns of August was they " held shut the door to France". I think that describes the situation well.
 
Unfortunately good operations, which is what the Schlieffen plan and presumably the French advance into Belgium would be, cannot succeed with bad tactics and equipment or strategy. Given France isn't bringing reserve divisions into the front line for several weeks they will have to maintain 3 armies on the frontier, leaving 2 armies to go into Belgium. They will face 3 or 4 bigger, better equipped and more tactically proficient German armies that will be constantly threatening the junction or flank of the French armies.

Not that such an operation wouldn't be a better way to go, I think it would be, but it won't be a panacea that save northern France, it will only make things less bad.
 
the 8th army is relatively far north. the french east border is secured as long you hold a verdun, toul, lunéville line. Between sarrebourg and mulhouse, the germans had no troops for offensive. So troops, perhaps an army for holding the line. 4 armies at least for stopping the germans on a Longwy/ Mons line. No units wasted in Alsace/Lorraine, at least, no more than needed. If they managed to prepare some well entrenched position, could it not be doable?
Here is a map of schlieffen with the german armies and their objectives
 

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the 8th army is relatively far north. the french east border is secured as long you hold a verdun, toul, lunéville line. Between sarrebourg and mulhouse, the germans had no troops for offensive. So troops, perhaps an army for holding the line. 4 armies at least for stopping the germans on a Longwy/ Mons line. No units wasted in Alsace/Lorraine, at least, no more than needed. If they managed to prepare some well entrenched position, could it not be doable?
Here is a map of schlieffen with the german armies and their objectives

OK, the first thing you should be aware of is that what people including us call the Schlieffen plan has no resemblance to the majority of ideas and maps you see all over the web and in books. Schlieffen developed the whole right wing offensive in 1905 but Moltke only started making it into a plan, with units allocated, train timetables drawn up and the like from 1911 and it was adopted as the only German war plan from 1913. It's best to ignore the sorts of maps you can easily get hold of, they're wrong.

Secondly, apart from fighting in entrenched position the French were not the equal of the Germans when facing them in open battle, which is why Lanzerac's 5th Army kept being pushed back. Pitting 2 French Armies and the BEF and maybe the Belgian Army against the German right wing in Belgium would have been a better course of action than Plan 17 but the Germans will still push these forces back and most likely break them up, the Belgians will almost certainly retreat to Antwerp and the BEF will not retreat in lock-step with the French. There will be no battle of the Marne, but the decisive battle will occur in France, not Belgium and certainly not Germany, the Germans were simply too good in a 1 on 1 scenario for that to happen.

Not what you want to hear, no doubt, but there you have it.
 
OK, the first thing you should be aware of is that what people including us call the Schlieffen plan has no resemblance to the majority of ideas and maps you see all over the web and in books. Schlieffen developed the whole right wing offensive in 1905 but Moltke only started making it into a plan, with units allocated, train timetables drawn up and the like from 1911 and it was adopted as the only German war plan from 1913. It's best to ignore the sorts of maps you can easily get hold of, they're wrong.

Secondly, apart from fighting in entrenched position the French were not the equal of the Germans when facing them in open battle, which is why Lanzerac's 5th Army kept being pushed back. Pitting 2 French Armies and the BEF and maybe the Belgian Army against the German right wing in Belgium would have been a better course of action than Plan 17 but the Germans will still push these forces back and most likely break them up, the Belgians will almost certainly retreat to Antwerp and the BEF will not retreat in lock-step with the French. There will be no battle of the Marne, but the decisive battle will occur in France, not Belgium and certainly not Germany, the Germans were simply too good in a 1 on 1 scenario for that to happen.

Not what you want to hear, no doubt, but there you have it.
i see i'm dealing with a specialist:) Duly noted. And it was mere curiosity. How to change 1914 to change war without a meatgrinder wich last 4 years for a realistic Alternate WW1.
 
i see i'm dealing with a specialist:) Duly noted. And it was mere curiosity. How to change 1914 to change war without a meatgrinder wich last 4 years for a realistic Alternate WW1.

Not a WW1 specialist, just an enthusiast. If you want something special read this https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/a-bureaucratic-reorganisation-tl.393933/

Basically with the convergence of technologies and politics in 1914 you'll struggle to avoid a meatgrinder, about the best you can hope is some more dramatic territorial changes to accompany the meatgrinder. The battles of 1914 and 1918 were shockingly amazing casualty generators but with the big changes in ground won and lost they don't seem as bad as the 1915-17 battles.
 
Back in the 1970s & 80s I must have gamed this one out twenty+ times. Perhaps thirty. The usual result of the French player 'anticipating' the Schlieffen maneuver was a stalemate line maybe seventy kilometers north of OTL & a deeper penetration into eastern France. Sometimes the Brits could keep a corridor open to Antwerp, sometimes not.
 
so the front line would be somewhere just north of Guise and at best the "liberation" (or conquest) of the german lorraine so a front line right on the Vosges? Does this strategy, even if it would be costly (massing infantry and artillery do that...), avoid some horrible casualties like 20000 a day in August OTL? Not a wallies wank but a german limited victory with a bloody nose.
 
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