Even then the problem we run into is that the government wasn't really in control. The military was, but even that's misleading since the army wasn't really even in control of itself. The higher ups had extremely limited control over their junior officers, and couldn't reign them in.
How to get the Japanese to win in the Pacific
- Thread starter Eternity
- Start date
Provoke the US into firing the first shots, then wear the US down. There was no way Japan was going to win after the outrage of Pearl Harbor and doubly so after Bataan. The US public was willing to pay whatever the price it took to crush Japan. Had Japan baited the US into shooting first, and preferably not carried out atrocities such as Bataan on US prisoners, the optimal strategy would be to try to wear the US down and basically turn the war into an early version of Vietnam.
Of course, it would still be a risky strategy given the massive US industrial advantage, but if Japan enrages the US public as it did, there's no averting disaster.
Of course, it would still be a risky strategy given the massive US industrial advantage, but if Japan enrages the US public as it did, there's no averting disaster.
Interesting read that.
Ok, sop ignoring the 'Wear the US Down' part, how do you provoke the US into firing the first shots?
I can't realistically believe they will be that silly, but they may be. 1940's politics are not my strong point.Ok, sop ignoring the 'Wear the US Down' part, how do you provoke the US into firing the first shots?
I think this is usually the argument for Japan to bypass the US and ignore the Philippines and conquer all of Southeast Asia in the meantime, and hope the US doesn't fortify their Pacific possessions anymore (as they were doing OTL) and hope that the Japanese can force the British and Dutch to sue for peace before the US gets involved.
Ignoring how Japan was already seen as a rapacious aggressor in the US, and that the US would likely be soon involved in the war in Europe... and if the British are fighting both the Germans and Japanese, once the US joins in against the one, they will be fighting against both as well.
Ok, sop ignoring the 'Wear the US Down' part, how do you provoke the US into firing the first shots?
The reason Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines in the first place was because it was certain the US was going to fire the first shots if it lunged for the Southern Resource Area, AKA the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. The whole Japanese goal was to make a grab for these oil-rich colonies while striking at the US before it could intervene. The US had already been steadily building pressure against Japan over it's empire-building adventures in Asia, and had imposed crippling sanctions, including an oil embargo. The US would have had a choice of letting Japan get all these oil-rich areas, effectively bypassing the US oil embargo and letting it's imperial adventures in Asia continue, or stepping in militarily.
nbcman
Donor
The problem is getting the 1940s era Japanese to change their approach to starting wars based on their previous experiences. The Japanese attacked the Russians before a DOW in 1904 and their policies in WW2 were bases on that experience-a sudden strike against an opponent and a decisive battle to force the opponent to concede. Following this strategy in 1941 will enrage the US and seal Japan’s fate.
EDIT: corrected typo on starting year of Russo-Japanese war.
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In talking about getting the Japanese to win in the Pacific, the overriding concern is that Japan is fundamentally not self-sufficient in production. Oil (1939 - 80% from US) is of course the obvious one, but steel (1938 - 75% US scrap), chemicals, machine tools, and minor minerals (vanadium, copper etc) were critical too. And this is just talking about dependence on US - we've not even gotten into whether Japan actually has the forex to pay for such imports. In 1936 alone, half of Japan's gold reserves were sent overseas to pay for imports, and boosting exports (cotton, specie) would require diverting resources from the military. Japanese leaders knew this and knew that (despite arguments, threats, and changes to the Planning Board) this meant that a long-term, attritional war against the rearming US (2nd Vinson Act, 1938) was not winnable.
The idea, in 1941 at least, was to bring on such a heavy strike in the Far East, coupled up with German success, that the US would be distracted and thus buy Japan some breathing room to set up a self-sufficient industrial system or pose itself as a bulwark against Soviet Communism. This strategy, as OTL showed, was doomed to failure, not least because Japan's industrial situation at that time was so poor (with prior US embargoes and lack of forex already causing major drops in production everywhere) that it was not possible for the country to replace losses not just in military units, but even in its shipping and logistics network which underwrote the whole structure of Japanese imperialism.
So changes have to start with the 1937 escalation in China, which began the cycle of increased Japanese spending, increased reliance on imports and American embargoes that ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. OTL, Tokyo in 1937 was interested in a stable regional environment in order to build up its industrial base in Manchukuo as a prelude to war with the Soviets in the mid-1940s, but when push came to shove it was neither able to stop the Kwantung Army nor was it willing to sacrifice its 'informal empire' in North China (at least not until it was too late). Ultimately, Tokyo would have to make the concessions instead of forcing China, because Chiang was being pressured by public opinion to take a strong stand against Japan.
Even more difficult, Tokyo would have to resist the urge to militarily move against the Soviet Union or the orphaned European colonies once WWII starts, both actions that would be taken very badly in the US as it would likely be seen as indirect aid to Germany. One could make a case for Tokyo sidling up to Germany since Germany (through the Soviets) was a key exporter of materials to Japan.
That isn't to say that Tokyo can't make life difficult for the Allies, however. An overtly-peaceful Japan with a stronger industrial base will be able to make 'reasonable demands' of French Indochina, Malaya and the DEI that would be hard(er) to resist. OTL, this was what Japan hoped to achieve; but in both cases their demands were essentially waved off as the China War made Japan's hostile intentions clear. A hostile posture towards the Soviet Union might also prevent the transfer of units to Germany. All the while, Japan continues to develop its industry and lessen/diversify dependence on imports, if not on oil then at least in other raw materials and industrial goods.
Even if this strategy doesn't save Germany, it places Japan in a very strong position to dominate the postwar space in China and SE Asia. Being militarist alone is not a reason for the US to crusade against Japan, as Franco's survival showed; indeed, it's not even clear that the anti-colonial US would actually take all that much offense to Japan sponsoring its own independence movements against the British, French and Dutch postwar. The strength of Japan's economy and its 'success story' allure to the peoples of Asia (this includes China) would almost ensure the establishment of an 'informal/commercial empire' across the region, with Japan now becoming a mini-US in the supply of industrial goods to Asia.
I realize this is not a Pacific War, but in terms of achieving what Japan intended to achieve through its doomed Pacific War (self-sufficiency and space for itself in Asia), this pretty much covers it.
The idea, in 1941 at least, was to bring on such a heavy strike in the Far East, coupled up with German success, that the US would be distracted and thus buy Japan some breathing room to set up a self-sufficient industrial system or pose itself as a bulwark against Soviet Communism. This strategy, as OTL showed, was doomed to failure, not least because Japan's industrial situation at that time was so poor (with prior US embargoes and lack of forex already causing major drops in production everywhere) that it was not possible for the country to replace losses not just in military units, but even in its shipping and logistics network which underwrote the whole structure of Japanese imperialism.
So changes have to start with the 1937 escalation in China, which began the cycle of increased Japanese spending, increased reliance on imports and American embargoes that ultimately led to Pearl Harbor. OTL, Tokyo in 1937 was interested in a stable regional environment in order to build up its industrial base in Manchukuo as a prelude to war with the Soviets in the mid-1940s, but when push came to shove it was neither able to stop the Kwantung Army nor was it willing to sacrifice its 'informal empire' in North China (at least not until it was too late). Ultimately, Tokyo would have to make the concessions instead of forcing China, because Chiang was being pressured by public opinion to take a strong stand against Japan.
Even more difficult, Tokyo would have to resist the urge to militarily move against the Soviet Union or the orphaned European colonies once WWII starts, both actions that would be taken very badly in the US as it would likely be seen as indirect aid to Germany. One could make a case for Tokyo sidling up to Germany since Germany (through the Soviets) was a key exporter of materials to Japan.
That isn't to say that Tokyo can't make life difficult for the Allies, however. An overtly-peaceful Japan with a stronger industrial base will be able to make 'reasonable demands' of French Indochina, Malaya and the DEI that would be hard(er) to resist. OTL, this was what Japan hoped to achieve; but in both cases their demands were essentially waved off as the China War made Japan's hostile intentions clear. A hostile posture towards the Soviet Union might also prevent the transfer of units to Germany. All the while, Japan continues to develop its industry and lessen/diversify dependence on imports, if not on oil then at least in other raw materials and industrial goods.
Even if this strategy doesn't save Germany, it places Japan in a very strong position to dominate the postwar space in China and SE Asia. Being militarist alone is not a reason for the US to crusade against Japan, as Franco's survival showed; indeed, it's not even clear that the anti-colonial US would actually take all that much offense to Japan sponsoring its own independence movements against the British, French and Dutch postwar. The strength of Japan's economy and its 'success story' allure to the peoples of Asia (this includes China) would almost ensure the establishment of an 'informal/commercial empire' across the region, with Japan now becoming a mini-US in the supply of industrial goods to Asia.
I realize this is not a Pacific War, but in terms of achieving what Japan intended to achieve through its doomed Pacific War (self-sufficiency and space for itself in Asia), this pretty much covers it.
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An easy way of doing this is that the Japanese had a treaty with Holland over oil from the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch would have agreed to allow Japan to send supervisors to enforce the agreement. If this was done then despite the US embargo the oil would flow to Japan.
An expansion into China or advance in the South would guarantee the US entry into the war.
How to get the Japanese to win in the Pacific? Like the old joke: Don't start from here!
this gets to the heart of it: Resources. Where does Japan get the oil, coal, rubber and ores needed to build the weapons to beat the USA?
this gets to the heart of it: Resources. Where does Japan get the oil, coal, rubber and ores needed to build the weapons to beat the USA?
So much of the global rubber supply was coming from Indochina that the threat of it being cut off was enough to force development of synthetic rubber technologies in the US and other Allied countries. No joke - some argue this was one of the key reasons for the deterioration of diplomatic conditions in the Pacific prior to Pearl Harbor.
Fun fact: silly putty arose from a failed attempt at making synthetic rubber; specifically tires if memory serves.
Other fun fact: Had Knute Rockne not become a football coach his work might have permitted viable synthetic rubber 5-15 years ahead of OTL
Hmm. Fascist US(after the great depression) and we get a GE/US vs GB/RU/JP war after pearl harbor.