How to Centralize and Industrialize China

I was wondering, how would one go about centralizing authority and industrializing China in the mid 19th century? What movements, groups, or characters in mid 19th century china pushed for such things, and what could they do to achieve it? What might a centralized China look like?
 

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China was “Centralized”

But not in the way you mean. Read James Clavell’s Shogun and Tai-Pan for more information. It would take a LONG time to properly answer your question, but it has to do with both geography and a inward looking culture.
 
When you think of Centralization and History you think of China. Industrialization the most common answer before the 19th century seems to be a successful Song Dynasty.
 
I was wondering, how would one go about centralizing authority and industrializing China in the mid 19th century? What movements, groups, or characters in mid 19th century china pushed for such things, and what could they do to achieve it? What might a centralized China look like?

I'm not totally sure what you're talking about, since the Qing government and their predecessors in general had a fairly high degree of centralization until the mid-19th century*. The regionalism that was characteristic of the late-19th and early-20th centuries was a product of dynastic decline. Perhaps the primary driver of this trend was the Taiping Rebellion, during which time substantial amounts of power were devolved to local officials to raise armies and put down the rebellion. As far as people advocating industrialization during the mid-19th century, it's not exactly what you're looking for, but you should research the self-strengthening movement. As Color-Copycat said, removing the Taiping Rebellion would be a good way to start (and it doesn't butterfly away the self-strengthening movement, which was largely in response to foreign incursions).

*In the sense of having a functioning centralized bureaucratic apparatus. Obviously, the vast size of the Chinese Empire (this phrase meant in a very general sense and inclusive of the Qing and the Yuan) militated towards a certain degree of decentralization simply due to the distance between the center and the periphery even at times of dynastic strength.

But not in the way you mean. Read James Clavell’s Shogun and Tai-Pan for more information. It would take a LONG time to properly answer your question, but it has to do with both geography and a inward looking culture.

This doesn't make any sense, since Shogun is about Japan and is set at the end of the sixteenth century. Tai-pan isn't terribly useful either; I haven't read it for a while, but it's largely about two feuding British trading houses or something. It's also a pretty dreadful novel.
 
George Macartney suddenly shouts, "Damnit, that is the last time you order me to bow and knock my head against the ground!" and pulls a pistol, thus starting a little war between Britain and China. The end result: China is seriously hurt and has to pay expensive reparations.

The Emperor who comes after Qianlong will hopefully have realized that the next time there is a war between Britain and China, China is definitely going to lose if they do not get their act together. If every European country has the war technology of Britain, then there is even the threat of China getting divided up between those nations into spheres of influence, and that would be bad. Last but not least, this opium epidemic needs to be taken even more seriously, and that means some drastic actions to get the domestic situation under control.
 
George Macartney suddenly shouts, "Damnit, that is the last time you order me to bow and knock my head against the ground!" and pulls a pistol, thus starting a little war between Britain and China. The end result: China is seriously hurt and has to pay expensive reparations

Did Britain have the same capacity to beat China in the 1790s that it did a few generations later? I would doubt it, but I can definately see the results of such a war leading to China pulling its head out of the ground a little regarding military technology.
 
A big problem for this is that the Qing Empire was ruled by a non-Chinese dynasty. The Manchu dynasty never had more than a small number of people to rule a much bigger number of Chinese and this is hardly the kind of reality to spur on/encourage reforms very much. Too, until the 1830s Qing China still stood ahead of the contemporary European empires so there's no real spur to this then.

It is possible that the Song Empire could have a medieval Industrial Revolution, though there are some significant and obvious differences between Medieval!China Industrial Revolution and Early Modern!Britain's. Namely that China was already at that point one of the largest and most densely populated societies of the time, and that if it jumps into the Industrial era, we're not talking 2 islands going out to expand their markets, we're talking a huge Empire in a period when Islam and Christianity were both in political decline........:eek::eek:
 
If you don't mind a point of departure located slightly more towards the latter half of the 19th century one idea I had was for the Empress Dowager Cixi to die a short while before Tongzhi Emperor. This leaves Ci'an as the sole surviving Empress Dowager so that when she makes the suggestion of Prince Gong's son Zaicheng becoming the new Emperor in keeping with Imperial tradition there's no-one to oppose it. Even if he's just an average ruler he can't do any worse than some of the ones from our timeline, and with his son on the throne the reforming Prince Gong becomes the most powerful person at court since Ci'an kept mostly to herself and he continues his support of the second phase of the self-strengthening movement. A continued and firmly supported reform movement backed by a steady government could do wonders, they were already bringing in western help like Sir Robert Hart or Prosper Giquel to help reform and run things.
 
If you don't mind a point of departure located slightly more towards the latter half of the 19th century one idea I had was for the Empress Dowager Cixi to die a short while before Tongzhi Emperor. This leaves Ci'an as the sole surviving Empress Dowager so that when she makes the suggestion of Prince Gong's son Zaicheng becoming the new Emperor in keeping with Imperial tradition there's no-one to oppose it. Even if he's just an average ruler he can't do any worse than some of the ones from our timeline, and with his son on the throne the reforming Prince Gong becomes the most powerful person at court since Ci'an kept mostly to herself and he continues his support of the second phase of the self-strengthening movement. A continued and firmly supported reform movement backed by a steady government could do wonders, they were already bringing in western help like Sir Robert Hart or Prosper Giquel to help reform and run things.


That's the POD most often suggested; one which I agree with. I avoid Cixi rising to power altogether by having the taiping rebellion falter and having Prince Gong succeed his father as emperor.
 
I looked at Prince Gong inheriting the throne straight from his father the Daoguang Emperor, the main problem I found was that would mean he'd take the throne when he was 17 which might of been a little young to fully exert his authority. Well that and I didn't want to make it too easy for Imperial China in the timeline I was researching. :)

In either case you can't avoid the Taiping rebellion but a Prince Gong that inherits directly nine months before it starts would probably prosecute the putting down of it more efficiently so the main difference is going to be the upcoming First Sino-Japanese War. If it does happen as in our timeline, the Japanese might not be as confident facing a reformed China, it would be interesting to see how things played out. Even if China could only fight them to an honourable draw it would change things quite a bit.
 
The issue wasn't that China was not centralized. It was that China had been top dog for centuries and the Chinese were supremely confidant that everyone else was inferior. Very few felt they needed to change until it was demostrated again and again that the Europeans had better militaries and were an actual threat.

Machiavelli wrote in the Prince:

"It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had the actual experience of it.''

In other words, anyone who attempts to change China is going to run into all sorts of trouble. This isn't so much to do with any aspect of Chinese culture, but basic human nature. It is very rare in any country's history that someone can radically reform their society. Instead, reform comes only after repeated defeats that discredits the old regime, or comes only after a long period when the culture "digests" the once radical notions so that it becomes part of the culture.

The fact is that lots of people benefited from the way China did things. None of them are simply going to agree to changes that threaten that directly or indirectly. Strange and novel ideas naturally repel people as they seem to threaten the social order, and thus stability. When threatened by defeat, the first response of most societies is to think, "We were successful before, so why not now? It must be because we've deviated from the way our people used to do things. We must go back to the way our culture used to be and get rid of all these innovations that have crept in since then."

People tend to overstate the ability of despots to make changes in their society. Peter the Great did it, but that was an outlier. He encountered significant opposition, but succeeded because the earlier Russian Tsars had effectively destroyed any countervailing power. China, though, has lots of ways for people to thwart any reformer, including an emperor. There is the entire Mandarin bureaucracy based on the study of classic Chinese texts. The eunuchs of the Forbidden City. The commanders of the banner armies. All of them can sabotage reforms in many ways because the emperor simply can't know everything they are doing. Orders can be issued and simply ignored, or implemented in selective ways, or implemented in ways that discredit the ideas behind it. And it may not take much of such things for some kind of palace coup, which is very common in Chinese history, to remove the emperor and put someone else from the imperial family that is more amenable. Unless there is a broad based reform coaltion, any individual's reforms will likely be thwarted. And the earlier the time, the less likely such a broad coalition would exist.

As someone previously mentioned, the Manchu were not ethnic Han. They were outside invaders, and their only legitimacy was how much they followed Chinese ways. Too much innovation could cause them to be viewed as the troublemakers by the native Chinese.

So there are lots of obstacles.
 
Did Britain have the same capacity to beat China in the 1790s that it did a few generations later? I would doubt it, but I can definately see the results of such a war leading to China pulling its head out of the ground a little regarding military technology.

Probably not the same ability to impose the Unequal Treaties, but they can definitely "teach China a lesson" while their arch-enemy France is busy being enveloped by chaos.

Incidentally, this may also accelerate Japan's changes, as those were also partly motivated by seeing what happened by China.
 
To Snakes response: Your answer is definitely right. China of that time was pretty centralized for the time, especially for th e 1600s when the Qing dynasty came to power, but the Manchus had no interest in learning or reforming based on the fact that their system had worked pretty well for them up until the 1800s. The Japanese did reform both their government and opened their society to the west, but this was only after centuries of pressure and a civil war. Countries smaller or less centralized then Japan were taken directly over as colonies, and it seems like China was the only power that could withstand the internal and external pressures until the 1900s.

The only way for China to have massive change probably would be if the Taiping rebellion succeeded in surviving in southern China or possibly even overthrowing the Qing dynasty. But, whether the Taiping rebellion or another force in China could successfully reunite the nation would be very uncertain, and European powers would certainly try their best to exploit the situation.
 
The issue wasn't that China was not centralized. It was that China had been top dog for centuries and the Chinese were supremely confidant that everyone else was inferior. Very few felt they needed to change until it was demostrated again and again that the Europeans had better militaries and were an actual threat.

Machiavelli wrote in the Prince:

"It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had the actual experience of it.''

In other words, anyone who attempts to change China is going to run into all sorts of trouble. This isn't so much to do with any aspect of Chinese culture, but basic human nature. It is very rare in any country's history that someone can radically reform their society. Instead, reform comes only after repeated defeats that discredits the old regime, or comes only after a long period when the culture "digests" the once radical notions so that it becomes part of the culture.

The fact is that lots of people benefited from the way China did things. None of them are simply going to agree to changes that threaten that directly or indirectly. Strange and novel ideas naturally repel people as they seem to threaten the social order, and thus stability. When threatened by defeat, the first response of most societies is to think, "We were successful before, so why not now? It must be because we've deviated from the way our people used to do things. We must go back to the way our culture used to be and get rid of all these innovations that have crept in since then."

People tend to overstate the ability of despots to make changes in their society. Peter the Great did it, but that was an outlier. He encountered significant opposition, but succeeded because the earlier Russian Tsars had effectively destroyed any countervailing power. China, though, has lots of ways for people to thwart any reformer, including an emperor. There is the entire Mandarin bureaucracy based on the study of classic Chinese texts. The eunuchs of the Forbidden City. The commanders of the banner armies. All of them can sabotage reforms in many ways because the emperor simply can't know everything they are doing. Orders can be issued and simply ignored, or implemented in selective ways, or implemented in ways that discredit the ideas behind it. And it may not take much of such things for some kind of palace coup, which is very common in Chinese history, to remove the emperor and put someone else from the imperial family that is more amenable. Unless there is a broad based reform coaltion, any individual's reforms will likely be thwarted. And the earlier the time, the less likely such a broad coalition would exist.

As someone previously mentioned, the Manchu were not ethnic Han. They were outside invaders, and their only legitimacy was how much they followed Chinese ways. Too much innovation could cause them to be viewed as the troublemakers by the native Chinese.

So there are lots of obstacles.

Excellent post. Couldn't have said it better.
 
If we examine the two classical examples of successful reforms, Peter's reform of Russia and the Meiji reform of Japan, we can see more clearly why China's reforms failed.

In Russia Peter faced political rivarly from the Boyars, feudal Russian aristocrats who benefited from the status quo. Launching reforms allowed Peter to centralize power and use modernization to undermine the Boyars. Also Russia being Chrisitian and having geographic proximity and trade ties to Europe made the case for Westernization a conving one to Peter's supporters who stood to benefit from his reforms.

With Japan, political power was in the hands of the Shoguns who had maintained a closed country for two centuries. Rival factions stood to gain from overturning their rule in favor of a meek emperor who would permit his supporters to engage in profitable international trade as well as introduce foreign technologies and weapons that would allow them overcome their enemies. Furthermore, China recent defeat by the British made a convincing case that the outside world could not be kept out any longer.

In China the Emperor had absolute power. The Emperor already had central power and was the main beneficiary of the status quo. His only rival being potential peasant uprising from the subjugated Han majority who considered his dynasty a foreign one. The Manchu rulers' source of legitimacy comes from keeping China wealthy, safe, and traditional. Systemic reform came at too much risk and the Emperor unsurprisingly undertook the minimal possible reforms and only when they could not be avoided.
 
The Manchu rulers' source of legitimacy comes from keeping China wealthy, safe, and traditional. Systemic reform came at too much risk and the Emperor unsurprisingly undertook the minimal possible reforms and only when they could not be avoided.

So would it be safe to say that mistimed reforms would lead to peasant uprisings?
 
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