How to avoid fall of Singapore and the after-effects

[Cryhavoc101]

The Japanese also had a spy with peerage working at the Admiralty, delivering information from the highest levels. He was never arrested, but was distanced from some of the information.

Lord Sempill?

Was anything ever proven beyond him having some Japanese Freinds in London that he might 'Gossiped' with before Hositilities?

From what I gather it was his freindship with the Japanese from before the war and his then finiancial problem's red flagging him as a security risk to MI5.

Its only modern historians with an ax to grind that seem to have 'joined certain dots' and claim that he was actually a spy.

 

[Just Leo]

Britain lost something like a 1000 pilots over Northern France in 1941 flying combat sweeps intended to attrite German Fighter strength and oblige the Germans to reinforce France from other regions (Russia and the Med etc) - which it failed to do.

I would far rather those Pilots were 'lost' fighting in North and East Africa and the Far East

And perhaps take some of their Spitfire's with them

Just 2 wings of Hurricanes (80+) and maybe some Spits and a Single Brigades worth of Armor (150 tanks) - hell a mix of AMC and Humber Armoured cars would have been a serious force multiplier - provided they were used properly.

I would also abandon Hong kong and any other non essential 'enclave' - and use those forces where it mattered.

The partially trained Canadian troops sent to Hong Kong were told they had surrendered while they were still fighting. They might have had a better chance in Singapore, but not much.

Those fighter pilots lost on rhubarbs might prefer not to be lost at all, including many experienced leaders. Maybe just leave Bader, and save Tuck. The Hurricane really wasn't up to the job, and the Spitfire pilots could attend seminars from Thatch and Chennault on tactics. The Spitfire wasn't a good offensive fighter either, and some of those slipper tanks would be handy. Those Vokes air filters under the nose reduced speed on tropicalized Spits, and made Hurricanes right lethargic. Too bad you can't have grass runways.

 

[Just Leo]

Lord Sempill?

Was anything ever proven beyond him having some Japanese Freinds in London that he might 'Gossiped' with before Hositilities?

From what I gather it was his freindship with the Japanese from before the war and his then finiancial problem's red flagging him as a security risk to MI5.

Its only modern historians with an ax to grind that seem to have 'joined certain dots' and claim that he was actually a spy.

If you know who informed the Japanese embassy of the details of the Placentia Bay conference, let us know. Before the war, he sold plans for the Iris flying boat, among other things. Only modern historians can grind their axes because information was withheld for decades. Lots of sensitive and embarrassing information is withheld for decades, but boring and tedious information is not withheld. How would it be, after the Rutland of Jutland fiasco, for the Americans to learn that Churchill and FDR's words were supplied to the Japanese directly from the Admiralty? And I loaned my axe to my daughter for camping, and I never got it back. Thanks for the reminder.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

You need more than just planes, you need infrastructure. I suggest reading this book - http://www.amazon.com/Fortnight-Inf...415719693&sr=8-1&keywords=fortnight+of+infamy

It's great but it is good and it does a nice job of pointing just underdeveloped Allied airbase infrastructure was in December 1941. They had airfields but a lot of those fields lacked revetments, parking aprons, proper anti-aircraft defenses, early warning radars, taxi ways, and all of the other things that separate an airfield from a proper air base.

Better infrastructure and raid warning (whether it is radar or some sort of coast watcher system) and the fighter squadrons whether they are equipped with Buffaloes, Hurricanes, or Spitfires will be able to take a pretty serious bite out of Japanese bomber formations.

WRT the comment about the Hurricane being outclassed by the Zero. The answer is no. The Hurricane, like the Wildcat, and like the P-40 when properly flown could match the Zero just fine and like the Wildcat and the P-40 it actually had some advantages over the Zero. The Hurricane could not match the Zero in a low speed turn but neither could anything else the Allies had - not the P-40, not the Wildcat, not even the vaunted Spitfire as British pilots deployed to Darwin discovered at some cost. Even the planes we supposedly mastered the Zero with like the Hellcat, the Corsair, and the P-38 could not match the Zero in a low speed turn. We just overpowered the damn thing.

Also keep in mind that a lot of times they were not flying against Zeroes, they were flying against Ki-27 Nates and Ki-43 Oscars.

It is also worth noting that the Dutch in the East Indies discovered that when they flew their Buffaloes with half loads of fuel and ammunition, the savings in weight allowed them to turn with both Zeroes and Oscars. Granted they were also flying the B-339 variants which did not have life rafts or arresting hooks or other "carrier" type gear so they were a little lighter to begin with.

They also seemed to lack a plan and any enthusiasm (I know thats not fair as some units fought well on the main land - just not enough of them).

The whole Criminal ineptitude of all the acts that resulted in the fall of Singapore makes me very cross - in fact I have only ever punched one book in my life and it happened to be on this very subject

Yes the populist view of the air campaign over Singapore is one of the 'Zero' running rings around the Buffelos and Hurricanes - while the truth is somewhat more mundane - with many Allied Aircraft caught and destroyed on the ground etc

Its as if the previous 2 years of war had not happened!

It would not have taken much to address the short comings of the 'landing strips' and establish an Air defense system capable of prividing some sort of early warning.

 

[Artaxerxes]

The other thing that they need to do is sort out the organisational mess the Malayan command was in. When Duff Cooper was made Resident Cabinet Minister for Far Eastern Affairs and chair of the Far East War Council with the aim of allowing for quick political and financial decisions to be made when there wasn't time to contact London Shenton Thomas the governor of the Straits Settlement refused to co-operate as he still saw the Colonial Office as running things and Brooke-Popham likewise refused and insisted on only reporting to the Chiefs of Staff. In Burma local officials apparently didn't like defensive works or preparations being carried out as it competed for labour and risked raising local wage levels. In an ideal world a new commander with the force of personality and backing to be able to face down the local interests would have been able to make things much more difficult for the Japanese, but for various reasons that was unfortunately unlikely.

Was coming here to post something like this, the Far East was a total shambles in terms of organisation.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

If you know who informed the Japanese embassy of the details of the Placentia Bay conference, let us know. Before the war, he sold plans for the Iris flying boat, among other things. Only modern historians can grind their axes because information was withheld for decades. Lots of sensitive and embarrassing information is withheld for decades, but boring and tedious information is not withheld. How would it be, after the Rutland of Jutland fiasco, for the Americans to learn that Churchill and FDR's words were supplied to the Japanese directly from the Admiralty? And I loaned my axe to my daughter for camping, and I never got it back. Thanks for the reminder.

Didn't the Atlantic charter become public knowledge a week or so after the event? So the BBC and Pathe News did it!

To be honest I don't know enough about it

Wasn't it his job to sell stuff to the Japs in the 20s and early 30s?

Bit like today where we 'discover' that millions of £s of military stuff is still being sold to the Evil Russians despite being told that we had stopped all that sort of thing months ago.

As for the Axe reminder - I feel like my work here is done in that regard.

 

[Sior]

http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/war/headline/church.html

WINSTON Churchill called the ignominious fall of Singapore to the Japanese the "worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history".
In the light of new research which concludes that the blame for one of the greatest debacles of World War II must rest squarely on the shoulders of Britain's wartime leader, these are indeed ironic utterances.

Contrary to what the history books traditionally purvey, the British military in Malaya and Singapore were not caught napping by the Japanese.
In fact, they had even drawn up a detailed battle plan, codenamed Matador, to stop the invaders who were expected to land along Thailand's eastern coastline at the Isthmus of Kra and in north-eastern Malaya.
This was based on several uncannily-accurate assessments of Japanese war intentions and movements in the region.
But, in a twist of fate that changed the destinies of millions of people, Operation Matador was never launched. It was stalled repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes, troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as the Middle East and Russia.
Yet the history books virtually absolved him for the humiliating defeat, pinning the blame instead on British military leaders, accusing them of being indecisive and unprepared for the Japanese attack.

The big guns of Singapore were not pointed the wrong way. They were installed primarily for the seaward defence of Singapore and to protect the naval base. The fact that there was no direct naval attack proved that they were completely successful in their mission and earned their keep.
Except for two giant guns of 15-inch calibre, they had all-round traverse and could - and did - fire landwards at Japanese targets in Johor and Singapore.

 

[Just Leo]

Wasn't it his job to sell stuff to the Japs in the 20s and early 30s?

Only until 1923 with a re-alignment of treaty obligations. He was supposed to sell them fish, but they wanted to know how to fish, and they learned from people like Herbert Smith, dis-employed by the Sopwith Company and unable to find another position. It was possibly Sempill who planted the seed of air attacks on ships in harbor.

 

[MattII]

There is also one major blunder the British never expected when defending Singapore; they expected a naval attack on the south. One of the things I remember from high school was that some of their most powerful guns were all trained to the sea or at least towards the south and southeast, expecting an attack from that direction. All in all, they never expected the Japanese to land on Malaya's northeastern coast, in northern Kelantan of all places! (it's the equivalent of Napoleon invading your nation through the absolute boonies).

Actually the guns were fully trainable north, but had next to no HE, making them effectively useless regardless.

But, in a twist of fate that changed the destinies of millions of people, Operation Matador was never launched. It was stalled repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes, troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as the Middle East and Russia.

This makes it a catch-22, the forces are needed elsewhere, but also in Malaya, and that's where the problem is, since they can't be in both places at once.

 

[Redhand]

I think that maybe abandoning Malaya other than a rapidly withdrawing delaying force kept there for political reasons and packing the defense in Singapore and entrenching facing Malaya might help. The Japanese could not attack from the sea due to the guns. The problem at this point is of course supplies, but stockpiling a ton of supply in Singapore for a year in advance, which simply means giving less to the Russians, could make Singapore a fortress that holds out for quite a while. The sea lanes are going to not be open, and other than submarines making drops and brave cargo planes making drops, they are going to need to stock up.

Yamashita could not overcome the British garrison if it was concentrated on the island and not taking morale and manpower losses after being thoroughly outmaneuvered in Malaya.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

http://ourstory.asia1.com.sg/war/headline/church.html

WINSTON Churchill called the ignominious fall of Singapore to the Japanese the "worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history".
In the light of new research which concludes that the blame for one of the greatest debacles of World War II must rest squarely on the shoulders of Britain's wartime leader, these are indeed ironic utterances.

Contrary to what the history books traditionally purvey, the British military in Malaya and Singapore were not caught napping by the Japanese.
In fact, they had even drawn up a detailed battle plan, codenamed Matador, to stop the invaders who were expected to land along Thailand's eastern coastline at the Isthmus of Kra and in north-eastern Malaya.
This was based on several uncannily-accurate assessments of Japanese war intentions and movements in the region.
But, in a twist of fate that changed the destinies of millions of people, Operation Matador was never launched. It was stalled repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes, troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as the Middle East and Russia.
Yet the history books virtually absolved him for the humiliating defeat, pinning the blame instead on British military leaders, accusing them of being indecisive and unprepared for the Japanese attack.

The big guns of Singapore were not pointed the wrong way. They were installed primarily for the seaward defence of Singapore and to protect the naval base. The fact that there was no direct naval attack proved that they were completely successful in their mission and earned their keep.
Except for two giant guns of 15-inch calibre, they had all-round traverse and could - and did - fire landwards at Japanese targets in Johor and Singapore.

Churchill loved to meddle in stuff and what suprises me is that he was allowed to get away with it for so long.

Just leo has mentioned the Canadians at Hong kong and I will add they along with the Rifle Brigade at Calais in 1940 as another example of mens lives and usefulness wasted for little or no perpose.

Just as he had ordered the forlon defence of Hong Kong Churchill ordered the Brigade to fight on in Calais when it could and should have been evacuated - the men represented the then best trained motorised brigade in the British Army. His reason at the time was to show the French that the British were capable of fighting to the last man etc.

People like Monty and AB Cunningham were quite happy to tell him to mind his own damn business when he tried to interfere with their commands.

Sadly this was not until post 41 (Thank that god's for Lord Gort having the moral courage to order the evacuation of the BEF when he did - Winston would have had them stay!)

As for resting squarely on his shoulders - Im sorry but no - partially yes but there was much more that the leaders on the ground could and should have done in 1941 as well as other allied political leaders.

Im not a fan of 'Churchillian Meddling'

 

[Riain]

....................Its as if the previous 2 years of war had not happened!............................

This is the unforgivable thing, after 2 years of being caught on the hop British senior officers and government officials should have been rabid about doing what they could to prepare, but in Malaya this did not happen.

 

[Driftless]

This is the unforgivable thing, after 2 years of being caught on the hop British senior officers and government officials should have been rabid about doing what they could to prepare, but in Malaya this did not happen.

There seems to be an "Emperors New Clothes" point of view for the British leadership in regard to Singapore. They had been told in detail of the deficiencies in advance (ironically in part by Arthur Pericival in a 1930's defense study), but with the demands of Europe and the Med, they willed themselves into believing that all would work out anyway.

 

[b0ned0me]

Defeat into Victory...

It's somewhat tangential, but Slim's excellent book on the Burma campaign will also give some insights into what went wrong in Malaya/Singapore. Basically the british were (rather badly) set up to fight a completely different kind of war and against a different kind of enemy. Consequently they lost the initiative immediately and found it nigh-on impossible to get it back since the Japanese would go for them at every opportunity and the terrain played more to Japanese strengths than British ones.
Slim ended up doing some seemingly crazy things like making units more mobile by taking away much of their motor transport (they were over-equipped for the pitiful road infrastructure available).

 

[Riain]

I've heard that before WW2 the British military presence was primarily Royal Garrison Artillery and Royal Engineers concentrated in the Straits Settlements (red). The 4 Federated Malay States (yellow) had the most British control but with the payoff of more development, the 5 unfederated Malay States had the least British control although had an Advisor who they had to listen to and the least development. The Governor of the Straights Settlements was the most important figure, he was the Commonwealth high commissioner to each of the Malay states and the defacto head of government of the Federated Malay States.

Efforts to train involved permission from the sultan of the affected Malay state, whether federated or not, however I think that with a strong Governor or Commander Far East these Sultans could be persuaded, especially in the FMS which the British had greater control.

 

[Barry Bull]

Just as he had ordered the forlon defence of Hong Kong Churchill ordered the Brigade to fight on in Calais when it could and should have been evacuated - the men represented the then best trained motorised brigade in the British Army. His reason at the time was to show the French that the British were capable of fighting to the last man etc.

To put the blame on Churchill along is not fair, given that the decision to defend HK was not his alone, but recommended by the Committee of Imperial Defence/Imperial General Staff once the availability of C Force is know, and actually agreed by the surviving command staff of the HK garrison after WWII.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

To put the blame on Churchill along is not fair, given that the decision to defend HK was not his alone, but recommended by the Committee of Imperial Defence/Imperial General Staff once the availability of C Force is know, and actually agreed by the surviving command staff of the HK garrison after WWII.

Either they should have sent sufficient forces to defend the place or not bothered at all.

Strategically HK offered nothing and was virtually impossible to defend once the mainland had been given up and given its location impossible to reinforce and supply once war started.

I understand that it was politically 'difficult' to accept the loss of a Colony but it was going to be lost any way - the only difference was 14,000 Commonwealth Soldiers from at least 4 countries went with it.

 

[yulzari]

At its simplest, the key task should have been to sink the Japanese transports at sea. Achieve this and the rest is irrelevant and can be attended to afterwards.

The Royal Navy, by the end of 1940, was clearly only able to mount operations against an enemy to the east of Malaya either with too little force, or too late if a fleet has to be assembled that is already acting in other theatres.

So you need aeroplanes that can sink or damage merchant shipping, aeroplanes that can temporarily dominate the skies over the shipping and trained pilots etc. who can fly the operations. Leave the naval vessels alone. They have no purpose without the troop transports.

You need continuous reconnaissance and Intelligence including human intelligence in the transport embarkation ports to attack as soon as the invaders come with range of attack under your fighter umbrella so it is your fighters effective range that will determine the timing, hence the need for forward airfields to be made available.

Given that the actuality of an attack was not clear until close to its launch and that Commonwealth forces were actively engaged in clearing Africa and the Middle East whilst garrisoning Britain against what was then felt to be a very real threat of invasion and then lending support to keep the Soviet union in the war, nothing modern is going to be released against another, less likely nor urgent Japanese threat.

What exists and could be made available is obsolete aeroplanes that could carry out the operations, albeit with major losses. Commonwealth aircrew training was flat out for existing operations elsewhere.

So, what I would suggest is that Churchill sends out a vigorous (if not necessarily likeable) overall commander with carte blanche to act as he sees fit within the resources available and back him up. A military CinC SE Asia to prod bottoms and raise alternate airfields, reserve groundcrew etc, reserve aircrew and an Observer Corps recruitd and trained locally. The aeroplanes existed, if not the ideal choices. Ones already used in tropical climates include Wellesleys, the Hart variants, Lysanders, Swordfish or Sharks and more Vildebeest/Vincents for example and Mohawks and Tomahawks to supplement all the Buffaloes (lightened with .303 guns) you can get. Even Gladiators would be better than nothing. Also proper air intelligence that draws on learned tactics from the war in China. Tactical trials between the modern monoplanes and Gladiators will also drive an understanding of how to deal with fighters of the Japanese style.

Of course, in parallel the Army needs to swap into intensive relevant training, especially in company to battalion level actions away from the principal roads to deal with any troops that do get landed. Out of the barracks and into the field. Proper Intelligence on Japanese tactics and weaknesses to be learned from the war in China.

Of course this means upsetting almost all the local establishment (hence the carte blanche powers) and accepting the generals burden of sending servicemen off to fight and die as the bombing/torpedoing aircrew mostly would.

Oh yes, and strip Hong Kong of all but a tripwire army force and pass the rest on to Malaya.

If successful stage 2 would be the defence of Malaya from Japanese forces in Java and Sumatra whilst India takes responsibility for Burma, which is a whole other thread in itself.

 

[Redbeard]

I we imagine we could rerun history from say December 1940 a number of times I think Singapore in most reruns would stay British. The OTL Japanese victory appears a single string of unlikely events. Possible but not likely.

The PoDs to change outcome are numerous:

1. Churchill must take a large part of the blame. He had literally scared the shit out Brooke-Popham, telling him to under no circumstances provoke hostilities with Japan. B-P had good intel. on Japanese movements before 7th of Dec, but didn't dare act on them. I do not suggest we remove Churchill, that's really incomprehensible, but putting Alan Brooke in command as CIGS some time before OTL (Dec 1941) will probably mean a much more sound British strategy. If anyone could filter Churchill's silly ideas it was Brooke.

2. Not many resources need to be diverted to the far east to make a difference and the military staff in early 1941 suggested a significant strengthening of Singapore/Malaya, incl. a tank regiment, but Churchill insisted on all focus on "taking the initiative" in Europe and especially the Med.

3. Fighter sweeps over France were an incredibly costly way to use fighters and produced practically no effects - apart from losses. Just a reduced ambition will produce a large part of the fighters need for Malaya (appr. 500 fighters were estimated necessary for an effective defense). Others may come from reduced shipments to Russia (the Russians clam to this day they really didn't need them!) and not at least from reduced ambitions in the Med.

4. Churchill insisted on a number of offensive operations in the Med, which consumed huge resources in men and materiel, but in effect were practically futile. I do not say that the British should abandon The Med., but less ambitious goals for 1941 would have kept up the necessary pressure on the Axis but with a fraction of the British resources spent. Operation Crusader in late 1941 alone cost 800 tanks and 300 aircraft in losses, and imagine what the force sent to Greece in spring 1941 (6th Australian Div, 2nd NZ Div and 1st Armoured Bde) could have done in Malaya!? They achieved very little in Greece so it would have to be a lot more in Malaya. The British prewar had considered a force of appr. 55 battalions as sufficient for an effective defense of Malaya and Singapore, but had in OTL only about 35 of which about half were in two ill-trained Indian Divisions. The Greece force would bring the Malaya force up to planned strength and with well-trained troops.

5. Even with the OTL force a more competent utilization of the available intelligence on Japanese movements would have given the defence plan (Operation Matador) a fair chance. Not necessarily in smashing defeat of the Japanese in N. Malaya/S.Thailand, but a “heroic” defence with significant losses for the Japanese will in itself have tremendous influence on the following events in Malaya. With the “Greece force” or similar in place in Malaya the Japanese will have a very hard time. Trained CW troops actually fared quite well vs. Japanese in Malaya, but were too few in OTL.

6. Slightly more competent British leadership would have been significant. On top of all the other examples in this thread: The guns of Singapore (incl. 4 15”) had no problems firing on inland targets, but the local leadership had ordered no HE shells! AP shells for naval targets are practically useless vs. land targets. The engineer officer of Singapore had made comprehensive plans for the defence of Singapore itself, but was forbidden to carry them out as “that may worry the civilian population!”

7. The Japanese siege force of Singapore has very little artillery and no heavy. The garrison digging in and biting back has a fair chance of success in the critical first months of 1942.

8. Singapore has a plausible potential to become “the Stalingrad of the Far East”, but anyway my time is running out now…

Regards

Redbeard

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I we imagine we could rerun history from say December 1940 a number of times I think Singapore in most reruns would stay British. The OTL Japanese victory appears a single string of unlikely events. Possible but not likely.

The PoDs to change outcome are numerous:

1. Churchill must take a large part of the blame. He had literally scared the shit out Brooke-Popham, telling him to under no circumstances provoke hostilities with Japan. B-P had good intel. on Japanese movements before 7th of Dec, but didn't dare act on them. I do not suggest we remove Churchill, that's really incomprehensible, but putting Alan Brooke in command as CIGS some time before OTL (Dec 1941) will probably mean a much more sound British strategy. If anyone could filter Churchill's silly ideas it was Brooke.

2. Not many resources need to be diverted to the far east to make a difference and the military staff in early 1941 suggested a significant strengthening of Singapore/Malaya, incl. a tank regiment, but Churchill insisted on all focus on "taking the initiative" in Europe and especially the Med.

3. Fighter sweeps over France were an incredibly costly way to use fighters and produced practically no effects - apart from losses. Just a reduced ambition will produce a large part of the fighters need for Malaya (appr. 500 fighters were estimated necessary for an effective defense). Others may come from reduced shipments to Russia (the Russians clam to this day they really didn't need them!) and not at least from reduced ambitions in the Med.

4. Churchill insisted on a number of offensive operations in the Med, which consumed huge resources in men and materiel, but in effect were practically futile. I do not say that the British should abandon The Med., but less ambitious goals for 1941 would have kept up the necessary pressure on the Axis but with a fraction of the British resources spent. Operation Crusader in late 1941 alone cost 800 tanks and 300 aircraft in losses, and imagine what the force sent to Greece in spring 1941 (6th Australian Div, 2nd NZ Div and 1st Armoured Bde) could have done in Malaya!? They achieved very little in Greece so it would have to be a lot more in Malaya. The British prewar had considered a force of appr. 55 battalions as sufficient for an effective defense of Malaya and Singapore, but had in OTL only about 35 of which about half were in two ill-trained Indian Divisions. The Greece force would bring the Malaya force up to planned strength and with well-trained troops.

5. Even with the OTL force a more competent utilization of the available intelligence on Japanese movements would have given the defence plan (Operation Matador) a fair chance. Not necessarily in smashing defeat of the Japanese in N. Malaya/S.Thailand, but a “heroic” defence with significant losses for the Japanese will in itself have tremendous influence on the following events in Malaya. With the “Greece force” or similar in place in Malaya the Japanese will have a very hard time. Trained CW troops actually fared quite well vs. Japanese in Malaya, but were too few in OTL.

6. Slightly more competent British leadership would have been significant. On top of all the other examples in this thread: The guns of Singapore (incl. 4 15”) had no problems firing on inland targets, but the local leadership had ordered no HE shells! AP shells for naval targets are practically useless vs. land targets. The engineer officer of Singapore had made comprehensive plans for the defence of Singapore itself, but was forbidden to carry them out as “that may worry the civilian population!”

7. The Japanese siege force of Singapore has very little artillery and no heavy. The garrison digging in and biting back has a fair chance of success in the critical first months of 1942.

8. Singapore has a plausible potential to become “the Stalingrad of the Far East”, but anyway my time is running out now…

Regards

Redbeard

1: Yep
2: if the Aussies and Perhaps the Kiwi's were diverted here instead of being squandered in the Med + a Brigade of Tanks (150 odd Valentines) - that should make a massive difference
3: Rhubarbs wind me up - and the RAF still had more than enough pilots and Planes for the UK when they would have made a massive difference in the Med, Africa and the Far East.
4: Again yep - 3 or 4 Reg Divisions from Wavells lot + a Brigade of tanks and modern armored cars (Damilers / AEC ) - and I think the place is sorted.
5: In OTL Brit intel couldn't understand how the Japanese hadn't run out of supplies - when in fact they had effectively run out of supplies. If the Commenwealth had continued resisting then the Japs effectively break. With more troops and formations this becomes more likely to happen.
6: I am not convinced that Lt Gen Arther Percival is the problem here. From what I have read about him he performed all his previous roles very well and had been a very good commander - I think its obvious that he had a breakdown and his staff should have replaced him. Frankly I dont think any of the Allied commanders could have done better with what he had! More and better units + Resources and Percival would be remembered differently today.
7: Yeah they had out stripped their supplies and where effectivly a light infantry force. I reccall that the British even knew where the Japanese commander had made his HQ - in a Sultans Palace but he knew the British would not shell it...and so it proved...Madness!
8: Oh no - in this ATL its Stalingrad that becomes the "Singapore of Russia"


So a more "Selfish" Empire with a more robust almost "Zero Tolerance" attitude towards the Japanese Empire?

That would work

So more defensive in North Africa while East Africa and Vichi French are Dealt with and additional units / Wings shifted to the Far East when it becomes apparent that the Japs are going to attack.

Malta, Africa and Far East reinforced with fighters from the UK that not needed for the defence of the UK and no useless Rhubarbs over France.

Want to destroy Axis Aircraft? - Destroy them in the Med where it will make a difference!

And yes all 3 Theatres could be reinforced at the expense of equipment sent to Russia - The British Empire should look after its own first (I appreciate that by equipping the Russians to fight the Germans this would also be achieved at a remove - but given how resource starved some of the British Commonwealth theatres where at the time I would rather those supplies and equipment went to those Imperial troops first)