How terrifying is it for well-armored elite cavalry to charge at infantry?

I used to be part of an English civil war recreation society and have portrayed a pike man in a pike muster.
Even when you know the cavalry are going to break left/right I can assure you it's bleeding terrifying and I wasn't the only one.
On the other hand, I would imagine the folks on horseback would be looking at that wall of pikes getting nearer and nearer with somewhat sweaty palms and a little concern about missing their mark to swing aside.

I think this discussion may also be getting a little led astray by the reality that very few commanders were blessed with ample supplies of well equipped well disciplined units balanced across heavy infantry, heavy cavalry, etc. and if they were, history tends to assume their success was a given.

It wasn’t at all unusual to have all the best-equipped well-trained warriors be nobles on horseback, which meant that if there was victory it was often theirs and they obviously made a song and dance about it. But that doesn’t mean that they were the best asset possible, just the best to hand.
Similarly, causing a hugely dramatic rout at marching pace is feasible but generally things unfold a little more sedately - if you want a dramatic insta-collapse of the enemy then putting the pony queens at a likely spot is a great approach. So there is a degree of selection bias when you go looking for famous victories.
 
Charging disciplined line of Infantry, who keep standing firm and determined, even after having their ranks thinned by arrows, however, is pretty much a suicidal situation.

Probably the key word is disciplined. At least in Europe the disciplined infantry in the post Roman times was a relatively rare animal. During the Early MA you can bring as an example the shield walls but in any specific case it was a question of how disciplined was this infantry. For example, at Hastings a big part of the Saxon formation was deceived by a fake Norman retreat (AFAIK, there are arguments if it was an intended maneuver or if they just managed to rally and counter attack). Judging by the fact that more or less the same scenario had been implemented by the Normans at the Battle of Dyrrhachium, the discipline of the Saxon/Varyangian troops was a known problem with as adequate solution (for the opponents).

At Falkirk scenario with a mix of the archers and cavalry also was a success because the static deep infantry formations were a good target and just staying forever was not leading anywhere. OTOH, at Bannockburn the advancing infantry formations defeated the knights and later usage of the infantry columns offensively became Swiss recipe for success.

In the later scenario, the heavy horse archers would just go back to get more arrows, or, if it wasn't possible. Formed behind dedicated heavy cavalry and support the wedge-charge from behind by adding their mass and ranks. At the very desperate situation, they will actually DISMOUNT, and charge the prepared infantry on foot, probably supporting their own infantry force in this regard.

Non-specialized Heavy Horse Archers charging prepared infantry from horseback is a suicide.

Why in all these scenarios you listed the cavalry is acting in a most moronic way limiting itself to the frontal attacks? Of course, in the case of the infantry columns "front" is more or less on each side but in the case of the phalanx-like formations (shield wall, Flemish infantry) this needed only if an opponent managed to take a position in which his flanks are protected. If it is caught outside such a position and "cavalry army" has a half-decent leadership and discipline, attack is happening on the flanks and infantry is a toast (as at Rosebeke).

An issue of the heavy horse archers, in the European context, limits situation to the Mongols and Ottomans. In the 1st case the opponent usually was not predominantly a cavalry and the Mongols used a wide variety of tactics of which the frontal attacks were not the most favorite option and in the 2nd, side with the archers was also a side with a better infantry than opponents had. Well, AFAIK, at Ankara the Janissary had been surrounded and then exterminated.
 
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Same in reverse. Many a time when you read about "famous infantry victories" people also omit the fact that the infantry was dug in, the ground was a nightmare, they outnumbered the cavalry by some mindboggling margin, and had supporting arms of their own.

Well, fair points most of them, yes.

I'd disagree as to the disparity in numbers. Yes, that counts, but it's something the cavalry general certainly knew well in advance. Cavalrymen are inordinately more expensive than infantrymen. If you choose a cavalry army, then it stands to reason that you accept the enemy infantry will outnumber you, and you have no problem with that. If one doesn't want to be outnumbered, then one uses cavalry as a small auxiliary arm.
 
Well, fair points most of them, yes.

I'd disagree as to the disparity in numbers. Yes, that counts, but it's something the cavalry general certainly knew well in advance. Cavalrymen are inordinately more expensive than infantrymen. If you choose a cavalry army, then it stands to reason that you accept the enemy infantry will outnumber you, and you have no problem with that. If one doesn't want to be outnumbered, then one uses cavalry as a small auxiliary arm.

More often than not the “cavalry army” was associated with the cultures in which infantry was absent, usually due to the life style. In Europe the purely cavalry armies (putting aside those of the nomads who lived in Europe) were pretty much absent because there always were the foot soldiers. The question was their perceived vaLue for the field battles and even then, we are mostly relying upon the chronicles which, by the obvious reasons tended to glorify nobility (cavalry) at the expense of the lesser people.

Of course, during most of the MA the heavy armored cavalry was more efficient than an infantry due to the better equipment (and the fact that most often the foot soldiers had not been used in the big formations). Anyway, these “cavalry armies” had been mostly fighting another “cavalry armies” with infantry on both sides playing a minimal role on a battlefield (guarding the wagenburg, etc.). However, look at the speed with which the French knights started dismounting trying to copy the English “winning model” during the 100YW (the trait was still there as late as the battle of Monthlery).

OTOH, the purely infantry armies are seemingly associated mostly with the city militias, like Flemish. Even Swiss “career” usually had some cavalry (either the local nobility or the allies). Of course, in most of their famous battles they did have a numeric advantage but at Marigniano (which they lost) they tried to act offensively even with the lesser numbers against combination of the gendarmes, artillery and landsknechts.

In the XVIII - early XIX the infantry was not routinely digging in but it was more or less taken for granted that a well-disciplined infantry arranged in square (or column) would successfully resell an attack of the superior numbers of cavalry. Even putting aside Russian experiences in the Ottoman Wars staring from 1730s, judging by Clausewitz, cavalry attacks against the square formations were considered almost hopeless (his descriptions of Auerstedt, experience of his battalion after the battle and experience of Uvarov’s cavalry Corp at Borodino). This is echoed by the comments of Denis Davidov regarding campaign of 1812, Napoleon’s battles in Egypt, overadverised Murat’s cavalry attack at Eylau (the Russians had to stop their advance but the French just ride between the squares without breaking them).
 

Derek Pullem

Kicked
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Probably the key word is disciplined. At least in Europe the disciplined infantry in the post Roman times was a relatively rare animal. During the Early MA you can bring as an example the shield walls but in any specific case it was a question of how disciplined was this infantry. For example, at Hastings a big part of the Saxon formation was deceived by a fake Norman retreat (AFAIK, there are arguments if it was an intended maneuver or if they just managed to rally and counter attack). Judging by the fact that more or less the same scenario had been implemented by the Normans at the Battle of Dyrrhachium, the discipline of the Saxon/Varyangian troops was a known problem with as adequate solution (for the opponents).

I always liked the story from the filming of "Waterloo" with Rod Steiger et al - thousands of Russian conscripts used as extras in the filming were told that the cavalry were going to charge at their squares and go around them. Even so, quite a few squares broke and ran in the early takes even before the cavalry even got near to them
 
If the infantry form a good line and hold, cavalry can't just "smash" through them like in movies. The horses aren't crazy even if their riders are, they won't charge a solid line of spears/shields/pikes/etc. That's what "forming square" is about.

If the infantry panic at the sight of thousands of horsemen charging them, or they are stretched out and have gaps in their line for the horsemen to dart through and/or trample individual soldiers, or if they are already running from the field, they are screwed.

Horse archers are a different sort of cavalry as previously mentioned, doing hit-and-run ranged attacks rather than relying on a charge.
 
Cavalry charges are always frequently shown as terrifying in general history books, movies, TV, video games, and fantasy novels. Even accurate historical accounts mentions the ground having an earthquake and things moving in slow motion as you stand with your legs shaking but stuck still on the ground due to fear.

However I borrowed a book from the library today on Medieval Warfare, and on the Battle of Hasting it described the Norman Knights charges against the Anglo-Saxon shieldwall as something so terrifying that the Norman knights "displayed a most legendary courage very rarely seen in the early Medieval battlefield" and mentions several times how the Norman knights almost routed.

In addition the book has some battles during the fall of the Roman Empire and the years following it where the last of the Roman Equites and Patricians fought against impossible odds that would have "made brave men flee" as they made desperate attempts to fend off Germanic tribes using their cavalry or to hold onto far away territory. It mentions in Britannia how typical Roman cavalry would hesitate to charge even disorganized Celtic warbands wandering the countryside especially in forests and swamps and it took the Equites, the most elite of the Roman Army's horsemen and often coming from Rome's aristocracy, to be able to hunt down these disorganized local bandits.

And of course the book praises the Germanic horse warriors in its Rome sections especially after the final Sack of Rome where it was the horsewarriors of the Barbarians who would be the "hammer" of the Catholic Church as it was bringing stability into Europe during the Dark Ages. Especially the Frankish heavy cavalry who would become the basis of the Medieval Knight and the book mentions the Catholic Church's honoring the Frankish horse warriors as the "bravest" of the Church's military and who often took the most difficult and scariest tasks of guarding the Church's laymen throughout Europe.

I think some of the answer lies within the examples you cited. Meaning that you're talking about instances from several different eras. The level of experience, training, equipment and the horseflesh between each battle varied quite a bit. I think that some historians have made the mistake of lumping every century of cavalry warfare together in this monolithic mass and assuming that they can successfully draw conclusions from that.

While I hate to conflate modern warfare with that of the Middle Ages, I think the following analogy will work in this instance. To draw conclusions about medieval warfare based on say, the cavalry doctrine of the Roman Equites or how that arm was employed in Napoleon's day would be a bit like trying to examine Desert Storm through the lens of a WWI-era understanding of how tanks work. There's a lineage and some parallels to be sure, but the way a modern army uses an Abrams or a Challenger 2 is a bit different that how a Renault or Mark V would have been employed. And the capabilities are as different as night and day. A French Gens 'D Arme of the Compangnies 'D Ordannance during the Italian Wars looks very different and was far more dangerous than one of William of Normandy's Chevaliers for example. To continue the analogy, no two armies ever fight the same or the same way every time. The Russians and the US have very different ideas of what a tank should look like for example.

What I'm trying to say is that we need to examine these separate eras within their specific context, rather than making an assumption based off one specific era or battle and then applying it to the entire history of cavalry warfare. I believe that something similar occurred with John Keegan's work in regard to the Napoleonic Wars (and it was a conclusion largely based off the one battle out the entire series of wars as well). This conclusion was then propagated by other historians and in works of fiction by authors like Cornwall. However, we're talking about centuries of warfare and technical evolution in terms of equipment, training, tactics and horse breeding. In short, to present a piece of history that long and complicated is vastly overly simplistic. Warfare is more than just, "A will always triumph over B if A does C."

Now, I understand that an animal's basic nature can remain essentially unchanged. We do need to consider the kind of horse being used and its training/conditioning, though. Xenophon had different ideas about what made a good horse versus what a medieval knight would have ridden. A gelding ridden by a pistoleer in the 30 Years War was a far cry from the one ridden by a Gens 'D Arme in earlier times. A working horse in rural America is not the same kind of animal used in wars prior. In terms of its training, that is. A medieval war stallion, used in combat, was breed and trained from the time it was a foal for battle. Even today, stallions are still noted for being highly aggressive. Surviving illuminations and manuals show them being trained to do things like strike with alternating hooves, spin while kicking out, going up in the air and lashing out with all four legs at the same and to bite.

To go back to what I said about considering the specific type of cavalry within the context of its era and the technology available at the time, we need to consider a key factor. Medieval warfare encompasses almost a thousand years of history. A fully armored Gen 'D Arme on a fully armored horse from the Italian Wars looks quite a bit different than his ancestor from the time of say, Crecy. During the medieval period, siege warfare was the predominant form of combat. Battles were rarely fought and often avoided. Battles can be decisive at best (which means someone is always going to come off the worse for it and there's no guarantee it won't be your side) and a stalemate at worst. Sieges were usually the safer bet for a commander. So that means that there would have been quite a bit of action in terms of guerilla operations, raids, sabotage, foraging, reconnaissance and ambushes. All which are actions in which a heavily armed and highly trained mounted force can shine at the small unit level. The Medieval Man-At-Arm's ability to fight at the small and large unit level, his high amount of training, his ability to afford good equipment and his training to fight on horseback and on foot was what ultimately made him so valuable in war. It all boils down to his innate versatility, basically.

Another thing to consider is that when battles did occur, the intended purpose of the heavy cavalry was to go and sweep the other guy's cavalry off the field and then maneuver on the now exposed heavy infantry while their attention is taken up by friendly infantry. Basically, medieval commanders appreciated the value of combined-arms tactics and understood that each arm is supposed to complement the other and help mitigate their weaknesses and maximize their strengths. Just like any other era of warfare really.

I realize that was probably a very long-winded response, but I say all that provide a context for my answer to the core of your question. That being the idea of the cavalry against the infantry. The answer is that it largely depends. I hope that all I typed above illustrates how important tactics, doctrine, institutional knowledge, training, equipment, leadership, morale, technology and the actual horseflesh are when considering this. Another factor is that no intelligent commander, regardless of his branch, wants to charge home against the frontal defenses of an enemy if at all avoidable. Regardless of the army, the doctrine, type of unit or the era, the general consensus has always been that maneuvering around an enemy to hit their flank or rear is generally the safer approach. Units don't operate in a vacuum and you don't have to be that intelligent to figure out that supporting an attack with every possible enabler is usually the best option.

Now, there are examples from multiple eras when the cavalry was repulsed by the infantry and there are examples when the infantry was broken. In fact, the preferred tactic of Men-At-Arms against infantry was to charge, break their lances and then wheel away to go get more lances, change horses if need be and then return to charge again. One thing that I think people don't necessarily consider is that just because the cavalry charged home and slammed into the ranks of the enemy foot does not necessarily guarantee a victory in and of itself. Now, I realize that horse can generate a lot of impact. More so one from the Middle Ages with barding and its armored rider. However, the heavy infantryman (prior to the age of gunpowder warfare) was generally well-protected and had the press of the reinforcing ranks of his brethren to help him hold his spot in the ranks. Just because a formation ripples, flexes or gives in places does not mean that it is broken.

Two prime examples of this are Nancy in 1477 and Ravenna in 1512. The Burgundians charged home against the Swiss pikes and even the Swiss grudgingly admitted their admiration for the Burgundians' bravery and said that they manage to penetrate as far as the banners. Now both sides took heavy losses, but the Burgundian Men-At-Arms were defeated once their charge was finally stalled and the Burgundian leadership failed and their army was defeated. Ravenna is another example of where the French charged home against the pikes and actually punched through and then went on to defeat the Italian Men-At-Arms behind the pikes and then took up the Italians' discarded lances and charged the pikes again. Both sides displayed incredible determination and courage, but neither one was able to gain the upper hand until the pikes saw French-friendly reinforcements arriving on their rear and surrendered.

Moving on to the psychological aspect of such a clash …

Imagine if you will, it's the time of the Italian Wars that I've referenced so many times. This is the heyday of the heavy cavalryman, never has he been so well-armored or his prized horse so well protected. You're a Pikeman, marching with your triumphant brethren through the smoke and wreckage of earlier clashes. All the sudden the music changes and the officers begin to bellow new commands with that calm, but urgent tone of experienced men who know they're about to look Hell in the face again. As one, you and your fellow veteran pikemen march to a halt and hastily dress the line.

You ready your pike and scan your cramped surroundings, your view hampered by the armored bulk and the garish outfits of the soldiers around you.

Then you feel it before you hear it, that deep steady rumble that seems to emanate from the ground and up through your feet. You hear jubilant cries in the tongue of the accursed French and you see the grim expressions some of the older veterans and a few of them swear softly before being cursed back to silence by the officers. The faint sound of jingling harness, clinking steel plates and the hoofbeats of heavy horses draws nearer and you see them crest the small rise in the bloody field before you. Every of them one likes inhuman in their bright steel and fine cloth. Their horses are be-decked in steel plates and brightly-colored caparisons. They look something from the mind of some demented hellish painter. From their golden spurs, to their brightly enameled armor, to the rainbow of colors in the magnificent plumes atop their beaky-looking helms, they are a sight to behold. High trained and fully confident in their abilities to the point of arrogance, these are the epitome of mounted chivalry, the French King's mailed fist, his Gentlemen-at-Arms.

The sun flashes off their fine plate and the rich fabric of the cloth over their armor. What catches your attention, though, are the gleaming points of the eighteen-foot lances that every single one of them holds. It looks as though a small forest, with streaming pennants, has uprooted and is surging towards you. You feel your hands tighten on the grip of your weapon and your heart begins to beat so fast it feels like it's about to explode through your chest in a shower of blood. You send a silent prayer up to the Lord as the rattle of the harquebusiers' weapons echoes around the formation as they present their guns and await the command to fire. Your own officers soon pass the command to make ready and you lower your pike without conscious thought, bracing it just like your Father taught you.

The sound of music and barked commands is drowned out in the roar of Harquebus fire and a thick grey fog of biting smoke soon rises between you the oncoming cavalry. The ground now to seems to shake beneath your feet like something from the Old Testament.

Then … the French emerge from the cloying smoke in a single wave of steel and horses. As one they touch gilded spurs to their horses' sides. As one these arrogant warriors lower their lances and they break into a headlong gallop with clods of wet earth flying up from beneath their steeds' iron-shod hooves. You know, you know full well that fleeing will just mean your death. But even so, the animal part of your brain is gibbering with terror and wants only to run. You force yourself to focus and hope your training will carry you through … and that the men next to you will do their damn job.

The entire world turns into a blur of screams, a shower of splintered wood and the surging clash of steel. It sounds like the whole world is drowning in a tide of blood, screams, broken blades, the sound of steel on steel and the godawful dying screams of man and beast.

Ultimately, I hope that what I provided can show that it largely depends on the situation and the era. History has shown us examples where cavalry broke the enemy infantry, where the infantry held off the enemy horse and instances where the cavalry charged home and dealt out heavy casualties to the enemy but didn't break them. I hope that my post shows just how complicated the study of warfare can be and the situation as not as simplistic and monolithic as it's often presented to be. I'd also like to apologize for this mini-novel I just wrote you.
 
Unless fighting with ranged weapons, the strength of a cavalryman is his momentum. Let's say you charge at an infantry regiment (an unprepared or distracted one, because charging at a compact square of spears is a death sentence). At the start, yes you're unstoppable, you're going to trample and smack enemies on the way in. But then, unless they break and run immediately, you only have a few seconds to get out, or else you'll find yourself being a large and big target entirely surrounded by pissed soldiers potentially wielding polearms. Doubly difficult if you're slowed down by heavy armor and/or injuries received earlier.

MOSTLY wielding polearms through most of history. Spears if nothing else. Polearms were the main battle weapon through most of history.

 
Battle of Alexandria aka Battle of Canope 21st March 1801. French cavalry broke through the British line and and formed up behind the 28th Regiment of Foot (South Gloucestershire Regt). With the men still heavily engaged to their front, the order was given for the rear rank to turn about, and standing thus in two ranks back to back, the regiment successfully held the line. We are talking here about well disciplined and trained infantry.

The French order of battle at the beginning of the campaign was as follows:
7th regiment of hussars - 630 men
22nd regiment of chasseurs on horseback - 280 men
3rd regiment of dragons - 390 men
14th regiment of dragons - 640 men
15th regiment of dragons - 230 men
18th regiment of dragons - 330 men
20th regiment of dragons - 530 men

Unknowns:
How many cavalrymen and horses were remaining for this battle
How many broke through the British lines
Heavy or light cavalry
Condition of the horses and men
Morale of the men

One source reports that during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars French cavalry were largely mounted on geldings, British cavalry were largely mounted on mares and stallions. Resulting in the horses of the two sides having differing physiological profiles. The British horses being more aggressive or maybe it was the French horses that wore more submissive (if that's the correct word).
 
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If the infantry form a good line and hold, cavalry can't just "smash" through them like in movies. The horses aren't crazy even if their riders are, they won't charge a solid line of spears/shields/pikes/etc. That's what "forming square" is about.
Yes they can. Horses are herd animals; if their leaders, the riders are good and give their horses no physical signs of fear, the horses will go where the herd leaders tell them. People take the horse's supposed unwillingness as received wisdom, but there's a lot of contrary evidence. Even in periods where pikemen were the dominant infantry type, pike squares were often defeated by cavalry; six ranks at least were considered necessary to withstand a charge, and there were still instances where disciplined infantry like Swiss pikemen held their ground, but cavalry rode right through them. Infantry squares depend on firepower to repulse cavalry. In rainy conditions, musketeers were easy prey for horsemen.
 
If the infantry form a good line and hold, cavalry can't just "smash" through them like in movies. The horses aren't crazy even if their riders are, they won't charge a solid line of spears/shields/pikes/etc. That's what "forming square" is about.

If the infantry panic at the sight of thousands of horsemen charging them, or they are stretched out and have gaps in their line for the horsemen to dart through and/or trample individual soldiers, or if they are already running from the field, they are screwed.

Well, fortunately or unfortunately, the principle did not work for the Swedes at Kircholm and few other battles: the Poles did break formations of their pikemen. Eventual solution was to increase firepower of their formation: under intensive fire the hussars quite often could not be even assembled for the attack.

In more modern time when the infantry pikes had been long gone the effective method was, quite often, to hold a fire until the last moment. As Clausewitz described his own encounter after Auerstedt, by the time cavalry closed to something like 30 meters (IIRC) it slowed down to a step and already started turning around. After Prussian salvo the rest of it rode away even if the true casualties were minimal: it was not the horses but the cavalrymen who decided that the risk was too great. His later experience on the other side of the equation was similar: at Borodino Russian cavalry corps of Uvarov (in which Clausewitz served) did not risk to attack the French battalion in a good position. Clausewitz remarked that this would require a younger and more dashing commander trying to build his reputation rather than an older general trying not to damage reputation he already had. Somehow, he forgot to mention opinion of the horses on that subject. :)
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BTW, simultaneous attack by the thousands of the cavalrymen assembled in one place was a rather rare event even during the late MA: usually, they were broken into the smaller units attacking on the different parts of the front.
 
One comment about sieges. Until relatively recently in the military history of the world an army NOT on the move was an army living in its own filth, literally. Only by leaving this behind on almost a daily basis did premodern armies manage to avoid crippling levels of casualties from disease. This is in a permissive environment, not counting encampments in marshes and swamps where disease vectors swarmed. While a fortress or walled town might be overcrowded compared to normal during a siege, compared to the encampment outside the walls the sanitary arrangements were well in hand - after all any castle or town had some sort of waste system. Yes, with overcrowding this system could be and eventually was overwhelmed, but until that happened things were better (not anywhere near good by modern standards) then in the besieging army. There are innumerable acco8nts of the disease problems in besieging armies occurring prior to the disease outbreaks in the town/castle. It did not always go this way, but it was something that was more common than not and always a concern of the besiegers.

One must never forget that it was usual up until the last 150 years or so for >80% of casualties to be from disease not enemy action of any sort. The Roman Army was a notable exception to this, the explanation is somewhat complex but it was NOT because they had the germ theory of disease.
 
Yes they can. Horses are herd animals; if their leaders, the riders are good and give their horses no physical signs of fear, the horses will go where the herd leaders tell them. People take the horse's supposed unwillingness as received wisdom, but there's a lot of contrary evidence. Even in periods where pikemen were the dominant infantry type, pike squares were often defeated by cavalry; six ranks at least were considered necessary to withstand a charge, and there were still instances where disciplined infantry like Swiss pikemen held their ground, but cavalry rode right through them. Infantry squares depend on firepower to repulse cavalry. In rainy conditions, musketeers were easy prey for horsemen.

If there is a lot of contrary evidence, maybe you could mention a few cases by name.

Maybe you'll find that the cavalry did ride through the infantry - in the sense that the cavalry rode through the gaps between infantry squares.

Or you'll find that the cavalry did ride into formed infantry - save that missile or fire weapons had first rained down on the infantry formation, weakening it numerically, thinning its packed ranks, and lowering its morale.

As to musketeers in the rain, sure, not being able to fire a salvo at the charging cavalry is a bad thing - not just from the practical POV but also as to the musketeers' morale. So maybe the real reason for the cavalry success wasn't that they weren't shot at, nor that they were able to convince their horses to gallop into a living wall, but that the musketeers, not being able to do their thing, were already pretty inclined to flee.
 
If there is a lot of contrary evidence, maybe you could mention a few cases by name.

Maybe you'll find that the cavalry did ride through the infantry - in the sense that the cavalry rode through the gaps between infantry squares.

Or you'll find that the cavalry did ride into formed infantry - save that missile or fire weapons had first rained down on the infantry formation, weakening it numerically, thinning its packed ranks, and lowering its morale.

As to musketeers in the rain, sure, not being able to fire a salvo at the charging cavalry is a bad thing - not just from the practical POV but also as to the musketeers' morale. So maybe the real reason for the cavalry success wasn't that they weren't shot at, nor that they were able to convince their horses to gallop into a living wall, but that the musketeers, not being able to do their thing, were already pretty inclined to flee.

I hope you realize you're simply assuming the truth of a popular factoid, rather than coming to a conclusion after studying a wide variety of evidence. Unless you have direct working knowledge of horses and are qualified to asses their psychology, I would encourage you to draw your conclusions from the evidence, rather than impose an interpretation on them.

At the battle of Gaugamela, the heavy infantry bodyguard of Darius stood their ground against Alexander's Companions; a melee ensued in which many were struck in the face by Macedonian lances, clearly indicating that the horses had charged into the thick of their formation and that they continued to fight.

At the battle of Lake Trasimene, Livy notes that the Gallic horseman who killed the Roman consul spurred his horse through the thickest press of the Roman infantry to strike their leader with his lance.

During the wars of the Byzantines, their cataphracts made it their habit to charge directly into the center of enemy pikemen, formed in a wedge and advancing at the trot.

At the battle of Dreaux in the French Wars of Religion, a square of Swiss pikemen stood their ground against the French men at arms, who rode through their formation and out the back; the Swiss had remained in place, and later reformed without loss of ground. Contemporary sources record riders training their horses to knock over armored dummies and trample them on the ground; since many ranks were considered necessary to withstand the impetus of the charge, it's clear that pike and shot armies expected a physical crash.

During the siege of Trichinopoli during the conquest of India, a company of Company infantry in square repulsed several Maratha charges with well directed fire, but were totally overrun when hit with a 'one-two' punch, with a second line of horsemen following on the heels of the first wave.

At the battle of Salamanca, a battalion of the 45th regiment of foot was broken by a French cavalry charge; their dragoons rode back and forth through the infantry, throwing them into utmost confusion, sabering and trampling many of them before friendly cavalry rescued the infantry.

Prussian cavalry at Lutzen routed a regiment in square of Bonet's division fighting under the eye of Napoleon himself. During the retreat into Silesia, Prussian cavalry smashed more steady squares in a combat at Haynau, riding over six battalions of French infantry. In the fighting at Mockern during the Battle of Leipzig, the Prussian cavalry broke several French squares; following Yorck's exhortations, the Lithuanian Dragoons of the Reserve Cavalry charged into the Marine Guard, riding into the thickest press of the enemy while French prisoners picked up muskets to shoot into their backs and enemy artillery poured fire into their flank.

Louis E. Nolan wrote a book on cavalry tactics, and included in it three pages of examples of steady infantry squares being broken. At the Pyramids, many individual Mamelukes were able to charge into the French squares and out the back; the horses were perfectly willing. Napoleon's XIII Legion, Davout's III Corps with its iron discipline, saw a battalion in square smashed utterly by Prussian dragoons; they had received a volley at 15 paces, but carried through the charge and overthrew them. In a combat at Garcia Hernandez, King's German Legion dragoons rode over three squares of French infantry.

At the battle of Omdurman, a squadron of lancers crashed directly into solid infantry, memorably recorded by Winston Churchill.

If cavalry can't do anything against infantry in square because the horses won't charge, why would being unable to fire hurt the morale of musketeers? If they could ward off cavalry simply by standing close together, they could carry butter knives into battle and be just as safe against horsemen. No, the deft employment of firepower was essential to defeating a cavalry charge, as was widely known in Europe at the time; steady square formations weren't enough, and accounts of infantry defenses against cavalry typically focus on their effective use of fire. It's not about solid formations scaring off horses, it's about riders losing their nerve from effective fire.
 
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