How terrifying is it for well-armored elite cavalry to charge at infantry?

Maybe. The source material isn't exactly clear.



You can be organized and have a light infantry force, of course. Regardless of how much of the rebellion was based on slaves or not, the Zanj mostly carried out guerrilla raids - which makes one think they had more light infantry than heavy infantry.



One might hypothesize that without the death or apparent death of the leader, the routs would not have occurred, and the charges would not have achieved much.



Huh, somebody who read the original post? Horse archers may also be well-armored, but their main weapon isn't the charge.

At Tours (732), heavy cavalry broke through heavy infantry, but this was well trained, disciplined and well equipped, and the cavalry did not push them into a rout - the smaller army, having no cavalry, won the day.

At Legnano (1176, just to pick something centuries later) the better trained German heavy cavalry easily defeated the Communal cavalry - and then was stymied all day long by a porcupine of heavy infantry, and lost the battle.

Not always, but often, when you read about a successful heavy cavalry charge, you'll have plenty of details about that, and then, some sort of footnote: oh, and the charge was prepared by light infantry/archers/horse archers peppering the enemy with missile weapons. And weakening and demoralizing them, of course. Adn the presence of heavy cavalry had forced them to bunch up, so as to become a perfect target for volley arrow fire. Combined arms, in other words, not just knights in shining armor.

1. I doubt anyone will say that heavy cavalry alone wins every battle per se, even if such may be possible in some scenario. So, the idea that, the army peppers the enemy with arrows prior to a cavalry charge that routs the enemy, is not an argument against the effectiveness of the heavy cavalry. All types of soldiers in pitched battles are tools to be used and utilized for the victory, we might say. But for a victory to be most assured, I would prefer to rely upon heavy cavalry in pitched battles than upon heavy infantry, light infantry or archers, if I had to rely upon any single grouping.

2. All military actions are primarily guerrilla raids and such-- or as we say logistical maneuvers. For instance in most military campaigns, much time is spent besieging towns, raiding villages, besieging cities, negotiating with locals, striking supply zones, etc etc etc... The Zanj had a, according to easily accessed materials on the topic, a rigid command structure to its military forces, with many different localized commanders, lieutenants, generals and marshals. Their plans, as al-Tabari noted, were to both rule the region of Iraq and to raid and pillage Abbasid held lands and strike at the sections that would most limit the Abbasid capability to wage war. This included attempts by the Zanj to cut supply lines to Baghdad from both the east and west, invasions of Arabia and Iran, campaigns in the north to devastate local countryside and using infiltration among its contacts in Karbala to cause mischief for the Abbasid caliphate among the already agitated Shi'a communities. The Zanj further, held their own wide supply lines, began taking taxes, implementing trade laws, protecting communities, minting coins and many other points. Do not continue this line that the Zanj were just some sort of Spartacus rebellion or some type of insurgency like its northern neighbor, the general Khawarij rebellion among the Kurds north of Samarra. Rather, they were creating a counter state-Imamate that under the genius of their leader, used a myriad of different classes and people: slaves, Shi'a radicals associated to the Shumaytiyya, freed criminals, bandits-robbers-pirates, bedouin who resented the Mihna and the Abbasid centralization attempts, Arab tribes who wished to make gains against other tribes in the region who were deprived of their lands (there was according to al-Tabari, an ongoing tribal warfare between different Arab tribes in the vicinity of Basra at the time of the Zanj rebellion, accoridng thus to al-Tabari and Ma'sudi, the Zanj leader infiltrated this conflict with some of his spies in 868 and began directing the conflict towards his gains and aligned heavily to factions that supported his rule), Khawarij revolutionary, generally dissatisfied peasantry and the leader's hardened partisans who formed his vanguard of varied military leaders, government officials and so forth. As I said earlier, one can derive this solely from the major works on the topic, which al-Tabari claimed to be a brief summary of the Zanj state and the Zanj war, while he mentioned a book written at his time that was focused solely upon this topic, that has been missing since 1258 (this book was written by one of the scholars who served the Zanj state and was captured by al-Muwaffaq in the 882 thrust and pledged his allegiance to the Abbasid state, thus he knew more intimately than anyone the situation of Zanj governance).

3. If deaths had not occurred. This is like saying, if the heavy cavalry was not present to perform such a critical strike, the battle would not have been won. It makes one wonder, no?
 
The thing is "Heavy" or should I say "Armored" Horse Archers are most often used in a manner that is closer to "Medium" or "All-rounder" cavalry. They are expected to deal casualties through shooting with their bows, hunting enemy skirmishers, and counter-charge lighter cavalry that strays too close.

They could, and did employed to charge enemy formations from time to time. However, this would be done either in very advantageous moment, or in desperate situation. Most Commanders aren't that keen to waste what is basically their most experienced, best equipped archers on close combat, mind you. Sure, there are exceptions like Grivpanvars of the Parthians, whose charge broke Roman ranks at Carrhae,, but those are rather few.

Maybe this is what I got from playing too much Broken Crescent and Europa Barbarorum though.

But said cavalry were used to charge infantry after having showered them with arrows and prepared themselves fro the charge. Even non-steppe powers performed this, such as the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the reign of Ashurbanipal, whose cavalry would fire arrows prior to the engagement but upon orders, would don a long lance and charge the enemy. In the battle between Urartu and Assyria during the reign of Sargon II, the Assyrian lancers charged the Urartu line before said infantry could prepare themselves, mainly because Urartu was preparing to defend against a transfer of arrows and did not imagine a cavalry force to be so aggressive.

Scythian cavalry for instance, also had heavily armored cataphract-like units which fired composite bows prior to their main thrust into the enemy. This is reasonable for a steppe army whose entire force will be upon horseback and the armor is used to distinguish the more experienced, distinguished and noble warriors among their force.
 

Dolan

Banned
But said cavalry were used to charge infantry after having showered them with arrows and prepared themselves fro the charge.
I already said the charge would be used only in very advantageous moment, or in total desperation.

Charging obviously frightened, almost broken part of enemy infantry is the very example of very advantageous moment. The infantry in that situation only need to be charged to break them off, and thus it would be worth it.

Charging disciplined line of Infantry, who keep standing firm and determined, even after having their ranks thinned by arrows, however, is pretty much a suicidal situation.

In the later scenario, the heavy horse archers would just go back to get more arrows, or, if it wasn't possible. Formed behind dedicated heavy cavalry and support the wedge-charge from behind by adding their mass and ranks. At the very desperate situation, they will actually DISMOUNT, and charge the prepared infantry on foot, probably supporting their own infantry force in this regard.

Non-specialized Heavy Horse Archers charging prepared infantry from horseback is a suicide.
 
I already said the charge would be used only in very advantageous moment, or in total desperation.

Charging obviously frightened, almost broken part of enemy infantry is the very example of very advantageous moment. The infantry in that situation only need to be charged to break them off, and thus it would be worth it.

Charging disciplined line of Infantry, who keep standing firm and determined, even after having their ranks thinned by arrows, however, is pretty much a suicidal situation.

In the later scenario, the heavy horse archers would just go back to get more arrows, or, if it wasn't possible. Formed behind dedicated heavy cavalry and support the wedge-charge from behind by adding their mass and ranks. At the very desperate situation, they will actually DISMOUNT, and charge the prepared infantry on foot, probably supporting their own infantry force in this regard.

Non-specialized Heavy Horse Archers charging prepared infantry from horseback is a suicide.

From what we learn at Anzen, the Byzantine infantry was advancing and had pushed back the Abbasid infantry before the cavalry heavily armored and with bow, mace and lance intervened, charging and then pulling out and firing arrows. This stopped the Byzantine army in its march and saved the smaller Abbasid army. The subsequent assault caused the Byzantine army to go into disarray, which would not have been possible otherwise. In short, for Byzantium, such a use of cavalry was foolish, but to the steppe oriented al-Afshin from the fringes of the Caliphate, was far more aggressive with his cavalry than even what the Byzantines had been accustomed to from the Bulgars are the Abbasids. It reminds us of the Sassanid or Arsacid era usage of heavy cavalry and it inflicted a massive defeat upon the Iconoclast emperors and brought about ruin for the second largest city in the empire, Amorium.

Mind you, my position is not that the heavy cavalry cannot be countered or so forth, but that we should not be so hasty to assume that armies of the past had no issue with heavy cavalry charges and that these are just Hollywood imaginations. We also should not glorify the role of disciplined infantry, if it was the case that these forms of disciplined and heavily armored infantry were so effective long-term, then we would see the Islamic states and others using hoplites and massive polarms. Rather, these hoplites were certainly countered by heavy cavalry and faster infantry that can out manuever them in a situation of combined arms. Regardless, I am not so dogmatic either, hoplites could have even been effective in the Middle Ages, if the planning, logistics and strategy was auspicious. Just like small local militia can be fantastic if the planning and logistics favor their sort of warfare.
 
Then you will need to propose better examples.

The Zanj "army" was a servile uprising. We have no reliable friendly source detailing them, but I doubt they were well trained, well equipped heavy infantry. And you yourself note they were effective as long as they remained in the marshlands of southern Iraq, that is terrain very unsuitable for cavalry.

In the other two cases you mention, one might point out that success was achieved but not without the help of horse archers, that is, not heavy cavalry relying on impact. And, anyway, in both cases, the losing army panicked on the (real or not) loss of their leader.


In the Western Europe the heavy cavalry also was routinely crushing the peasant uprisings so nothing unique with the 1st example. And, of course, it is an open question what was the quality and weaponry of the infantry in the remaining cases. Quality is a keyword: during the Wars of the Roses English archers and foot soldiers more than once demanded that the knights dismounted and served as a “quality infantry” to protect them. OTOH, the true quality infantry like Swiss or Landsknechts routinely stood up to the armored cavalry which was heavier than its middle eastern equivalents. More than that, during the Burgundian Wars the knights were quite often just fleeing at the sight of the advancing Swiss columns.
 
In the Western Europe the heavy cavalry also was routinely crushing the peasant uprisings so nothing unique with the 1st example. And, of course, it is an open question what was the quality and weaponry of the infantry in the remaining cases. Quality is a keyword: during the Wars of the Roses English archers and foot soldiers more than once demanded that the knights dismounted and served as a “quality infantry” to protect them. OTOH, the true quality infantry like Swiss or Landsknechts routinely stood up to the armored cavalry which was heavier than its middle eastern equivalents. More than that, during the Burgundian Wars the knights were quite often just fleeing at the sight of the advancing Swiss columns.

That is quite a late period though, is it not? Further, surely, we understand that the extremely heavily armored anti-cavalry infantry both recent and antiquated were able to decimate a cavalry charge. However, what occurs when said infantry is fired by arrows prior to said charge and is unable to adjust fast enough to stop the enemy from engulfing them from different sides? It is not so easy as to just march in and expect the enemy to flee, if they have resolved to fight a pitched battle. Certainly the heavy infantry thus, requires assistance and a combination of arms to be able to be extremely useful, just like heavy cavalry.
 
Cavalry charges are always frequently shown as terrifying in general history books, movies, TV, video games, and fantasy novels. Even accurate historical accounts mentions the ground having an earthquake and things moving in slow motion as you stand with your legs shaking but stuck still on the ground due to fear.

However I borrowed a book from the library today on Medieval Warfare, and on the Battle of Hasting it described the Norman Knights charges against the Anglo-Saxon shieldwall as something so terrifying that the Norman knights "displayed a most legendary courage very rarely seen in the early Medieval battlefield" and mentions several times how the Norman knights almost routed.

In addition the book has some battles during the fall of the Roman Empire and the years following it where the last of the Roman Equites and Patricians fought against impossible odds that would have "made brave men flee" as they made desperate attempts to fend off Germanic tribes using their cavalry or to hold onto far away territory. It mentions in Britannia how typical Roman cavalry would hesitate to charge even disorganized Celtic warbands wandering the countryside especially in forests and swamps and it took the Equites, the most elite of the Roman Army's horsemen and often coming from Rome's aristocracy, to be able to hunt down these disorganized local bandits.

And of course the book praises the Germanic horse warriors in its Rome sections especially after the final Sack of Rome where it was the horsewarriors of the Barbarians who would be the "hammer" of the Catholic Church as it was bringing stability into Europe during the Dark Ages. Especially the Frankish heavy cavalry who would become the basis of the Medieval Knight and the book mentions the Catholic Church's honoring the Frankish horse warriors as the "bravest" of the Church's military and who often took the most difficult and scariest tasks of guarding the Church's laymen throughout Europe.

I am curious. Nowadays cavalry men especially heavily armored and armed ones such as knights and samurai are often described as being the most terrifying force on the battlefield and since they were so armoured and trained, they had the least chance of dying in war. Modern internet discussion make it sound like being a

I used to be part of an English civil war recreation society and have portrayed a pike man in a pike muster.
Even when you know the cavalry are going to break left/right I can assure you it's bleeding terrifying and I wasn't the only one.
 
Hey, lets just say battle is terrifying and most folks are ready to cut & run on the smallest incentive. My fave example of infantry making a terrified stand would be the Brit 93rd Regiment that stood in the face of Russian cavalry at Balaklava. Just a few hours before the charge of the Light Brigade. The regiment was less than half strength. Most of the ranks sick from the weather and bad food. Further this regiment had not been in very little combat since the Napoleonic wars thirty years earlier. But there were very disciplined and drilled to the point of doing it in their sleep. A series of precisely placed volleys in sixty seconds brought the four squadrons of cavalry to a halt just paces from the line.

Well, the main problem with this specific example is that it almost a complete BS (or rather a set of the BSs :) ) staring with the popular painting. Which is a rather typical example of the overdramatized military encounter used for the propaganda purposes. Similar cases can be found all over the time and geography (including legendary Polish cavalry attacks on the German tanks, BS stories about Russian peasants partisans in 1812, etc.).

To start with the numbers, there were 200 - 300 Scots of the 93rd (by some accounts the Ottoman infantry on their flank) and only 400 Russians (by the Russian accounts 600) got engaged. This was the 1st Ural Cossack Regiment, which means that hussar uniforms on a painting are BS (and uniforms of the Cossack regiment were dark blue). The Scots gave 3 salvos: from 800, 500 and 350 yards (another account: 600, 350 and 150 yards) after which the Cossacks turned away so depiction of the Russian cavalry getting close is one more BS. BTW, the Cossacks did not have squadrons (they had hundreds) so your source is clearly inventing things. Ditto for “few steps” unless 150 amounts as “few”.

Losses on both sides were zero (so much for the well aimed salvos) so that Russian cavalryman falling from his horse is one more BS. Actually, the whole implication that the Russian cavalry was planning to advance in that direction endangering the allied camp is one more BS because the main body of the cavalry (hussar brigade, total approximately 2,500) advanced in a different direction and was engaged by the British heavy cavalry brigade (each side claimed a victory) while the infantry was busy attacking the redoubts. Even if there were no Royal Marines near Balaklava and if the Ottoman troops were completely missing from the picture, what potential damage a single Cossack regiment could do to the allied camp? Anyway, the task of the Russian cavalry was to attack the British artillery park, not to storm Balaklava.

So the whole episode was blown out of proportion by the British journalist and hardly an example of anything except a well done propaganda. :)
 
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That is quite a late period though, is it not? Further, surely, we understand that the extremely heavily armored anti-cavalry infantry both recent and antiquated were able to decimate a cavalry charge. However, what occurs when said infantry is fired by arrows prior to said charge and is unable to adjust fast enough to stop the enemy from engulfing them from different sides? It is not so easy as to just march in and expect the enemy to flee, if they have resolved to fight a pitched battle. Certainly the heavy infantry thus, requires assistance and a combination of arms to be able to be extremely useful, just like heavy cavalry.

Of course, I’m talking about the later period but you can consider an earlier battle of Tours (742 AD) as an example of a heavy infantry successfully standing up to what then was passing for a heavy cavalry.

Now, your question about the archers is a completely different can of worms because it expands beyond the heavy cavalry vs. infantry.

At Falkirk after initial cavalry charges failed the Scottish formations had been “softened” by the English archers making the cavalry attacks effective enough to penetrate the shiltrons. OTOH, at Bannockburn an earlier attack of the light Scottish infantry on unprotected English archers drove them away leaving the English knights to deal with the shiltrons which, unlike Falkirk, were acting offensively.

The English tactics of the 100YW heavily relied upon combination of the archers, foot soldiers and dismounted knights (heavy infantry) backed up by a cavalry reserve for counter attack. The weak side of this schema was a need of a good position and time to make the necessary arrangements. When the enemy attacked too early or when the English were forced to abandon their position, the tables could be reversed as happened at Patai and Fromigny.

However, in the Western Europe there was a limited supply of the effective archers and situation you described was mostly limited to the Franco-British conflicts on the West and Christian-Ottoman on the East and for a while Christian-Mongolian/Tatar encounters as long as Tatar side still had a heavy cavalry. However, in the Eastern cases situation was different because the “wrong” side had the archers: Western armies facing the Ottomans and Mongols/Tatars did not have quality infantry until reasonably late period which was closely followed by development of the firearms and serious tactical changes.

As far as combination of arms is involved, of course it was helpful to have heavy infantry backed up with the marksmen and cavalry and even the Swiss when they acted as the armies and not just mercenary contingents had some backing cavalry and some troops with the long range weapons. However, as far as expectation of the fleeing enemy is involved, the Swiss heavily relied upon it and worked hard to achieve that perception by demonstrating terrifying fierness and cruelty. Wouldn’t you be scared by an oponent that was attacking in a complete disregard of your fire and the losses and about whom you know that it is not going to take prisoners? The Burgundian knights simply were panicking and running from the field and the same goes for the less aristocratic troops.
 
I would also note that Greco-Roman, Phoenician, Iberian, Numidian and Celto-Germancavalry did not have stirrups, while Sarmatian and Parthian Cavalry (as is most Steppe Nomads) already have them since 200 BC. The Classical Age Europeans knew the existence of Stirrups, but they doesn't adopt them until relatively very late (about 500-600 AD, although might be much earlier in Steppe frontier regions).

Charging up close without stirrups are essentially a deadly gamble. If the infantry hold, they would be easily unseated and thus become sitting ducks. But since untrained infantry are much likely to break anyway, it might still worth the try. Yet at the same time, disciplined, highly trained infantry force EXISTS (Roman Legionaries, Hellenistic Phalanxes, Greek Hoplites, Phoenician Pseudo-Hoplites & Phalanxes, Celtic Neitos, etc) that would not just flee when charged, but stand their ground and inflict horrific casualties to the horsemen. Of course, knowing that, Charging disciplined infantry is essentially a suicide for the cavalrymen of this era.

Stirrup-wearing forces of the Parthians and Sarmatians, however, is perfectly able to charge into Roman Legionnaries, retreat, and charge again. This is particularly well known in the battle of Carrhae, as Parthian Cataphract charge slaughtered the Romans who survived bombardments from the horse archers.

Of course, after adopting stirrups, live is much easier now for heavy cavalrymen. But disciplined, determined infantry with pole weapons still manage to spoil their day, if said infantry keep their nerve.
Stirrups made almost no difference in mounted warfare; they were primarily considered an aid to mounting, rather than a tool for combat. Parthians didn't have them; rather, they had good saddles, but even this wasn't necessary for good cavalry charges. Alexander's companions had no saddles or stirrups, but still rode over steady heavy infantry fairly regularly. Their descendants, the Agema of Antiochos, broke the Roman left wing at Magnesia and chased them back to their camp. Even vanilla Greek cavalry could be devastating even in small numbers. Even failed charges rarely resulted in heavy casualties for the horsemen.

also LOL @calling Greek hoplites disciplined/trained.
 
A series of precisely placed volleys in sixty seconds brought the four squadrons of cavalry to a halt just paces from the line.

Notably the casualties they caused were actually none, and the thing that failed was the Russian cavalry's morale. Of course it's terrifying to charge anything, let alone rifles that don't look like they're about to break. And for a horseman, it must be more tempting to run away because that way he increases his chances of survival, rather than decreases them.

Not always, but often, when you read about a successful heavy cavalry charge, you'll have plenty of details about that, and then, some sort of footnote: oh, and the charge was prepared by light infantry/archers/horse archers peppering the enemy with missile weapons. And weakening and demoralizing them, of course. Adn the presence of heavy cavalry had forced them to bunch up, so as to become a perfect target for volley arrow fire. Combined arms, in other words, not just knights in shining armor.

Same in reverse. Many a time when you read about "famous infantry victories" people also omit the fact that the infantry was dug in, the ground was a nightmare, they outnumbered the cavalry by some mindboggling margin, and had supporting arms of their own.

In fact, any attacking side is usually at a massive disadvantage unless the defender's morale breaks or the defender is disorganized. And attacking sides that are actually very good do well against all opposition. The Swiss ran right over Austrian and Burgundian knights? Fair, fair. But they ran over English (this does mean the famous longbowmen), Neapolitan and French infantry and artillery with even greater ease in their heyday. If anything, knights and men at arms were about the only thing that gave them any problems at all until the Landsknecht companies were established. Does this mean that archers and cannons weren't useful?

Army organization is more important than the precise nature of the weaponry.
 
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Notably the casualties they caused were actually none, and the thing that failed was the Russian cavalry's morale. Of course it's terrifying to charge anything, let alone rifles that don't look like they're about to break. And for a horseman, it must be more tempting to run away because that way he increases his chances of survival, rather than decreases them.

Speaking of the morale, the cavalry inquestion were a single Cossack regiment of either 400 or 600, in other words, irregular light cavalry which was not supposed to attack infantry in formation. Which they actually did not because, besides the above mentioned reason, it would not make a slightest tactical or practical sense: they were separated from the Russian main cavalry force and most probably were on a scouting mission because cavalry’s task was to find and destroy British artillery park and nobody on the Russian side knew for sure where it was located (Rizov, commander of that force, mistook camp of the British heavy cavalry brigade for that park); then, what would be a result of even an absolutely successful attack? 600 Cossacks capturing the allied camp at Balaklava? Not even funny. So commander of this Cossack regiment did an absolutely sensible thing: made a “demonstration” at the safe range and then ordered his regiment to turn back in a correct assumption that on close distance the opponent may finally hurt somebody.

Quite agree with what you wrote about the Swiss: the pre-landsknecht infantry was doing even worse against them then the knights and a moral factor was critical: with their reputation of not taking prisoners opponent’s morale was often broken before the contact. The knights were practically the only ones who dared to attack them but on their own they had been at a serious disadvantage attacking the deep pike formations. Actually, and this is a questionable compliment, during the Italian Wars the French gendarmes often demonstrated a suicidal bravery.
 
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Stirrups made almost no difference in mounted warfare; they were primarily considered an aid to mounting, rather than a tool for combat. Parthians didn't have them; rather, they had good saddles, but even this wasn't necessary for good cavalry charges. Alexander's companions had no saddles or stirrups, but still rode over steady heavy infantry fairly regularly. Their descendants, the Agema of Antiochos, broke the Roman left wing at Magnesia and chased them back to their camp. Even vanilla Greek cavalry could be devastating even in small numbers. Even failed charges rarely resulted in heavy casualties for the horsemen.

also LOL @calling Greek hoplites disciplined/trained.

Are hoplites not trained to world such large polearms? Or was it a custom in Greece for peasants to use 4 meter long poles for their daily life and protection? You have to be trained and outfitted for this sort of activity, unless this was a common rural tradition, then they had to have learned somewhere.
 
Are hoplites not trained to world such large polearms? Or was it a custom in Greece for peasants to use 4 meter long poles for their daily life and protection? You have to be trained and outfitted for this sort of activity, unless this was a common rural tradition, then they had to have learned somewhere.
Hoplites never trained with their weapons. Macedonian style pikemen did, but the Spartan and Athenian hoplites of the Persian Wars-Macedonian conquest period never did so far as we can tell.
 
Hoplites never trained with their weapons. Macedonian style pikemen did, but the Spartan and Athenian hoplites of the Persian Wars-Macedonian conquest period never did so far as we can tell.

I suppose they might practice on campaign or maybe the citizens who could spend time at the gymnasium could practice marching, but that wouldn't be the whole hoplite body. Later cities did have the Fields of Mars where people did practice communally, but I definitely can't think of a direct equivalent in the Persian Wars era. There were citizen/sacred bands that were almost like standing units in some of the Mediterranean poleis and there were royal bodyguards, but once again this is later than the classical hoplite period.
 
I suppose they might practice on campaign or maybe the citizens who could spend time at the gymnasium could practice marching, but that wouldn't be the whole hoplite body. Later cities did have the Fields of Mars where people did practice communally, but I definitely can't think of a direct equivalent in the Persian Wars era. There were citizen/sacred bands that were almost like standing units in some of the Mediterranean poleis and there were royal bodyguards, but once again this is later than the classical hoplite period.
A couple people might have practiced, but the sources we have describe the great body of citizens mocking the few people who trained with their weapons. Some rich greeks practiced athletics, but most didn't, and contemporary writers noted that the bodies of athletes and good soldiers are very difference, so this had only limited military application. Even for picked bodies like the Thousand of Argos, there's not actually evidence of them training. The Spartans did train their confederate armies in basic formation drill (their allies greatly resented this, and sometimes physically assaulted their commanders as a result), and the Thebans maybe did some wrestling for training, but most Greek hoplites were completely untrained in any military skills. For what it's worth, they believed hoplite combat was more a contest of manly courage than skill at arms or military discipline.
 
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Hoplites never trained with their weapons. Macedonian style pikemen did, but the Spartan and Athenian hoplites of the Persian Wars-Macedonian conquest period never did so far as we can tell.

So, we are saying that for no reason, they decided to carry such long poles into battle? They had to have at least practiced a thrust and given some sort of explanation as to how it works.
 

Dolan

Banned
also LOL @calling Greek hoplites disciplined/trained.
So, we are saying that for no reason, they decided to carry such long poles into battle? They had to have at least practiced a thrust and given some sort of explanation as to how it works.
This.

Hoplites standing in close-order ranks, holding their spears overarm while large, 6-8 kg Aspis hanging from their shoulder, supported only by grip near the edge. In combat, they literally stand shoulder-to-shoulder in Phalanx Formation, a formation who depends on your neighbor to actually protect your right side as you protect the other on your left, individuals broke up or acting without coordination would easily compromise the formation too.

Yes, the majority of Hoplites are Militia Forces raised by the city-states, but their style of battle meant that they are definitely noted for their discipline, as proven time to time again that they are far superior soldiers compared to both undisciplined Barbarians and Persian Infantry during the Greco-Persian Wars, and even up to the Hellenistic Period. Sure, their discipline was still below the Macedonian-style Pezhetairoi or the Roman Legions, but they are still considerably more disciplined than their contemporary Persian and Barbarian infantrymen. Sure, they are not invincible, but there are reasons why Persia didn't just roll into Greece despite their crushing numerical superiority.

It was only later the Persians started to hire Greek Mercenaries/Heavy Infantry of their own (the Kardaka / Cardaces), too bad, Philip and Alexander already evolved Hoplite Phalanx into Macedonian Phalanx and still roll over them.

...

Compared to the Dark Age to Early Medieval era infantrymen (in Europe, North Africa, and Near East, at least), the infantry force of the Civilized Ancient World on average was superior in their discipline and cohesion (only their equipments was technologically worse, Medieval armor and weapon quality are still better than Greco-Roman era on average). While it might be exaggerating, the average Dark Age and Early Medieval infantry (both European and Middle Eastern) have more in common with Barbarian and Tribal Warbands rather than Greco-Roman soldiers. Only during the High period, disciplined infantrymen starts to regularly appear again.
 
BTW, the Cossacks did not have squadrons (they had hundreds) so your source is clearly inventing things.
Or, you know, using an equivalency translation instead of a literal translation. Using a term from the target language that conveys the idea even if it misses the literal meaning is a perfectly common and reasonable procedure. To take a modern example, the xián of the People's Republic of China is certainly not a "county," but since they tend to have a similar size and role (as a local governmental organ) to counties in the United States and Britain, that is precisely what they are called.

In this case, the term "squadron" gets across the idea of a relatively smallish (compared to, say, a regiment or division) group of cavalry, regardless of the fine details of how it's organized. As it happens, squadrons typically had (roughly) a hundred men, so it would indeed be reasonable to call a Cossack hundred a "squadron" unless the technical details of Cossack organization were actually particularly important.
 
This.

Hoplites standing in close-order ranks, holding their spears overarm while large, 6-8 kg Aspis hanging from their shoulder, supported only by grip near the edge. In combat, they literally stand shoulder-to-shoulder in Phalanx Formation, a formation who depends on your neighbor to actually protect your right side as you protect the other on your left, individuals broke up or acting without coordination would easily compromise the formation too.

Yes, the majority of Hoplites are Militia Forces raised by the city-states, but their style of battle meant that they are definitely noted for their discipline, as proven time to time again that they are far superior soldiers compared to both undisciplined Barbarians and Persian Infantry during the Greco-Persian Wars, and even up to the Hellenistic Period. Sure, their discipline was still below the Macedonian-style Pezhetairoi or the Roman Legions, but they are still considerably more disciplined than their contemporary Persian and Barbarian infantrymen. Sure, they are not invincible, but there are reasons why Persia didn't just roll into Greece despite their crushing numerical superiority.

It was only later the Persians started to hire Greek Mercenaries/Heavy Infantry of their own (the Kardaka / Cardaces), too bad, Philip and Alexander already evolved Hoplite Phalanx into Macedonian Phalanx and still roll over them.

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Compared to the Dark Age to Early Medieval era infantrymen (in Europe, North Africa, and Near East, at least), the infantry force of the Civilized Ancient World on average was superior in their discipline and cohesion (only their equipments was technologically worse, Medieval armor and weapon quality are still better than Greco-Roman era on average). While it might be exaggerating, the average Dark Age and Early Medieval infantry (both European and Middle Eastern) have more in common with Barbarian and Tribal Warbands rather than Greco-Roman soldiers. Only during the High period, disciplined infantrymen starts to regularly appear again.

Just about everything you said is exactly wrong.

Yeah, you don't need training to know what to do with a spear and shield. You can get better with it, but even in untrained hands, a large shield and spear are still effective weapons in group and individual combat. No hoplite needed training to know how to stab someone with the pointy end; no one needed long hours of painful discipline to learn how to hold a shield.

People have this idea that hoplites are only useful in close order phalanxes, but this is without basis in reality; the annals of Greek warfare are full of occasions where hoplites fought quite effectively in conditions that precluded forming a phalanx. Even in conditions where they could fight as part of a phalanx, hoplites did not display good discipline. In combat, they run at the enemy in a dead sprint; in an army of men green and gray, fit and fat, with differing levels of equipment, some ran much faster than the others, which would open the ranks considerably. The word phalanx isn't used until the 4th century BC; Herodotos never even tells us how many ranks deep Greek formations are. When he describes Spartan combat at Thermopylae and Plataea, it sounds more like the heroic combat of the Iliad and the war-song of Tyrtaios than your image of orderly phalanxes.

Your conception of discipline compared to the Persians is completely backwards. The Greeks were wholly untrained, and had no officers with less than several hundred men to command. By contrast, the Persians were drawn from a warrior caste, and practiced military skills from an early age; they had a detailed officer hierarchy based on the decimal system, with an officer leading files of ten; Xenophon notes with amazement the discipline on display when they advance into battle silently, without the shouting of Greeks armies, marching in equal step. Before Marathon, the Persians were on an unbroken winning streak against the Greeks; the Athenians were the first to see Median dress and not flee in panic.

Greek victory is properly credited to clever strategy to nullify the Persians' overwhelming advantage in open battle, sheer reckless courage, and superior numbers. They used deception and surprise attack to defeat the Persians in the naval battle at Salamis. At the decisive battle of Plataea, the Spartans outnumbered the Persians by 5-1; Mardonios had retained the 10,000 Immortals for his army of conquest, and these fought the Spartans, who had 5,000 Spartiates, 5,000 pereoikoi, 35,000 helots, 5,000 other Spartan light troops, 1,500 Tegean hoplites, and 1,500 Tegean light troops, for a total of 53,000-10,000. Still, the Persians fought on against overwhelming numbers until their general was killed. Earlier, Mardonios had offered to settle the war on the basis of a battle of champions, so to speak; his 10,000 immortals against the 10,000 Lakedaimonian hoplites. If he had superior numbers, the Greeks, if they really were superior fighters, would have had no reason to refuse this offer. The victory had almost nothing to do with discipline; militias of Greek cities are far more like tribal warbands than they are like the Imperial legionaires.

The Macedonian phalanx is in no way an evolution of the Classical hoplite. It represented a radical break from contemporary Greek practice. Macedonian armies had largely been made up of light armed levies, drawn from a servile peasantry without much in the way of hoplites; Philip didn't develop his phalanx from hoplites because he never had them. Instead, he turned this light armed mob directly into a professional phalanx of heavy pikemen. These men weren't citizens fighting for a commonwealth like in Athens or Thebes, but disenfranchised tenant farmers brought in for paid service. What he drew from the Greeks wasn't an evolution of hoplite armament, but the model of dictatorial rule, standing units, and well funded mercenary armies exemplified by the tyrants Iason and Dionysus, as well as perhaps the Thousand of Argos.

Lastly, it's hard to judge the warriors of the middle ages against the ancient world, since there's a lot we don't know about either period, but if their standard of comparison is Greek hoplites, the only place they fall short is in numbers, but the barbarian warbands of antiquity also shared this advantage. Unlike the Greeks, medieval soldiers trained to use their weapons more effectively, and often attained a semi-professional status, enlisting in multiple campaigns in succession. Classical hoplites are nothing more than armed citizens, without training or military discipline. They were overwhelmingly vulnerable to light troops and cavalry in just about every form of terrain; without good horsemen of their own, they were only safe on high/broken ground with ample light troops, or else they'd be torn apart.
 
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