The Sudeten wasn't the problem per se. Hitler was able to sell that as a reunification of ethnic Germans. However he promised that this would be his last territorial demand (which it obviously wasn't) and that he wouldn't invade the rest of Czechoslovakia (which he got round on a technicality via Slovakian secession). This is what convinced the Western powers that he couldn't be satiated or trusted.
Obviously we say this with hindsight that German leaders would not have had, so inclined to agree with ObsessedNuker above, but the Sudeten would have been as far as they could push their luck. However a Germany that honoured its analogue with Munich and didn't occupy the rest of Bohemia/Moravia/Czechia would probably been able to retain fairly good diplomatic relations. After the French occupation of the Rhineland, Britain and the US could see that the German position wasn't totally unreasonable and everyone privately conceded that the Austrian Anschluss probably had genuine majority support.
Another German leadership might have pressurised Italy over the South Tyrol. The British and French would have supported Italy but in such a way that the German threat was still present in order to drive Italy into their camp - support in event of a war but not unqualified support ("If the Reichskanzler wants a boundary commission, it would be hard for us to disagree or to offer support in event of any escalation of the situation consequent on your refusal. However in event of a direct military threat rest assured..."). They would probably be prepared for some German territorial gains in Tyrol in return for the elimination of any threat of an Italo-German entente.
Obviously we say this with hindsight that German leaders would not have had, so inclined to agree with ObsessedNuker above, but the Sudeten would have been as far as they could push their luck. However a Germany that honoured its analogue with Munich and didn't occupy the rest of Bohemia/Moravia/Czechia would probably been able to retain fairly good diplomatic relations. After the French occupation of the Rhineland, Britain and the US could see that the German position wasn't totally unreasonable and everyone privately conceded that the Austrian Anschluss probably had genuine majority support.
Another German leadership might have pressurised Italy over the South Tyrol. The British and French would have supported Italy but in such a way that the German threat was still present in order to drive Italy into their camp - support in event of a war but not unqualified support ("If the Reichskanzler wants a boundary commission, it would be hard for us to disagree or to offer support in event of any escalation of the situation consequent on your refusal. However in event of a direct military threat rest assured..."). They would probably be prepared for some German territorial gains in Tyrol in return for the elimination of any threat of an Italo-German entente.