How soon can US win ACW?

Unlike your bog standard "How can CSA win ACW" I'd like to ask knowledgable people (and also members of this forum) assuming ACW and everything leading to it kicks os as per OTL how soon can US win?

Not ASB scenarios or USwank, but with different leadership and somesuch.
 
Have the battle of Bull Run/Manassas go the unions way, leaving a smashed and demoralized rebel army that wouldn't stand up to the union army for the rest of the war. Richmond falls in the first year or two. Sorta unlikely But possible
 
A couple ideas:

1) A more aggressive Little Mac. LM was a great organizer and administrator, back lacked the drive to use "his" army. he loved what he had created between the winter of '61 and spring of '62, but he didn't want to see it get hurt.

2) Less reliance on Pinkertons, who tended to inflate the numbers the confederacy had. This was especially true during the drive up the Peninsuler.

3) Get rid of Halleck. just....have him go home or something...
 
If I remember correctly Texas and maybe one other state almost didn't join the CSA. Perhaps have it so Texas stays in the Union and the US can have a Headstart to taking New Orleans and the West.
 
1) A more aggressive Little Mac. LM was a great organizer and administrator, back lacked the drive to use "his" army. he loved what he had created between the winter of '61 and spring of '62, but he didn't want to see it get hurt.
Was this the guy whom Lincoln kept writing to, telling him to attack, attack, and finally asked him, if you won't use your army, may I?
 
Was this the guy whom Lincoln kept writing to, telling him to attack, attack, and finally asked him, if you won't use your army, may I?

Yes it was. He also had the problem that aoravec75 referred to. He was using the Pinkerton's as his intelligence service and they vastly overestimated the size of the Confederate forces opposing him.
 
Thank you. Okay, so it was partially rational, partially not. Do you think he might also have been hoping for a political solution early on?
 
Yes it was. He also had the problem that aoravec75 referred to. He was using the Pinkerton's as his intelligence service and they vastly overestimated the size of the Confederate forces opposing him.

A bit of nuance on this issue. George Mcclellan's issues with intelligence began before he hired Allan Pinkerton. He was actually pulling entirely un-sourced allegations about Confederate strength out of thin air from the very beginning of his military career in the Civil War, in his first departmental command before going to the Army of the Potomac. When he signed Pinkerton to the team, the latter was told to make the figures ''large'' and to always err on the side of caution. In fact, an analysis of the Pinkerton papers features several examples of George unilaterally enlarging Pinkerton's estimates before sending them onto his superiors. One might reasonably conclude that George was no innocent scapegoat in the matter.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Couple of possibilities suggest themselves, in terms of

Couple of possibilities suggest themselves, in terms of the US military command.

First, Scott, despite his ailments, was the keenest strategist on the continent in 1861, and with an able chief of staff and bureau chiefs, certainly could have functioned well as general-in-chief; keep him in DC (rather than replacing him with McClellan) in 1861, and the overall war effort in the east, certainly, would go better. Give him AA Humphreys as a chief of staff, as an example, and that's an effective team - need someone else for his "unofficial" mission to France, but one could suggest Jerome N. Bonaparte would have been an interesting substitute.;)

Second, giving JKF Mansfield the command of the (US) Army of Northeastern Virginia at first Bull Run could have made a difference; McDowell was certainly a lot sharper than he is given credit for, but Mansfield had a lot more field experience - my bet is his plan for the campaign would have been much less complex than McDowell's, so the result would be better - whether the change would be enough to gain an actual victory, or even a stalemate on the battlefield, of course, would be an open question. Given McDowell a position as Mansfield's chief of staff would presumably be helfpul; replacing Patterson in the Shenandoah would not hurt, either - interesting choice there could have been John Wool; not any younger, but certainly more active.

Say the breaks are evenly divided, and the result is a drawn battle in both locations; given JE Johnston as the senior rebel commander, likely the rebels withdraw to the south, possibly as far south as the Rapidan. That gives the US a victory from Day One in the east (as they had in the west, thanks to Grant at Henry-Donelson) and the rebels look even weaker than they were historically.

If Scott does fade over the winter, than Mansfield is well-placed to replace him as G-in-C, with Humphreys continuing as chief of staff; EV Sumner can replaced Mansfield with the field army, with - perhaps - McDowell remaining as chief of staff at that level. By the spring of 1862, the now much enlarged US field forces drive overland, not unlike Grant's 1864 strategy, and find themselves battering their way south, river line by river line, against JE Johnston, PGT Beauregard (unless Beauregard goes west to serve with AS Johnston), GW Smith, and (presumably) RE Lee.

Henry Halleck remains a theater commander in St. Louis, and Grant is given full command of the trans-appalachian theater east of the Mississippi after Henry-Donelson; he wins Nashville and takes Memphis in the summer, and then drives east on Chattanooga (Buell takes Knoxville).

By the autumn of 1862, the US forces are besieging Richmond, poised to drive on Atlanta, and already control the Mississippi.

Lincoln gets Richmond and Atlanta as Christmas presents, and the whole rebellion is wound up by the spring of '63, two years ahead of time.

Best,
 
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Congressman

Banned
Lincoln waits to call for troops, but the CSA fires some more shots and takes more forts.

If Lincoln plays this right, he can keep the Upper South. The votes in some of these states were really close anyway.

The whole thing should be over by 1862, with it the CSA just being the Deep South.
 
And please remember Kentucky. At one point, Lincoln wrote in his diary something to the effect, as I think about it, it almost seems like Kentucky is the whole game.

And Kentucky went Union. At first it tried to remain neutral, but enough pro-secession people made horses' asses of themselves that a majority of people and elected officials voted to go Union, and that basically was the fact of the matter.
 
Unlike your bog standard "How can CSA win ACW" I'd like to ask knowledgable people (and also members of this forum) assuming ACW and everything leading to it kicks os as per OTL how soon can US win?

Not ASB scenarios or USwank, but with different leadership and somesuch.

1) Union victory at First Manassas. Almost certainly ends in a Confederate rout. The OTL result was psychologically very important. It confirmed Southern ideas about their prowess and Yankee weakness at a time when physical and psychological commitment of many Southerners was still tentative.

If instead the battle ends with "gallant Southern gentlemen" running for their lives, and hundreds of prisoners marched through jeering crowds in Washington... It means all the Fire-Eater gasconade is exploded. Yes, that happened later OTL, and the CSA didn't crumble - but that was after several additional months of organizing and commitment. Many more Southerners had invested far more money, blood, and time in the CSA.

At the time of First Manassas, the CSA was just barely started. It could unravel at once, with much of the army deserting immediately, and more following, various Southern politicos proposing to rescind secession, Kentucky and the Five Civilized Tribes declaring for the Union, more troops deserting and more politicos switching - a cumulative cascade.

2) Avoid McClellan commanding the AotP. Suppose that the western Virginia command goes to Thomas instead (because he's a Virginian). Then he replaces McDowell after Manassas. He's not bold - but he will attack, and with the odds in his favor, he'll win and keep winning till Richmond falls in 1862. By that time, Grant, Farragut, et al, will have the Mississippi and most of Tennessee.

The finish will not come till early 1863, though.
 
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