So I am just going with my favourite head cannon for an ATL, regarding Barbarossa, with two major POD:
1. No BoB, on the June 16th when the Fuhrer Directive 16 was given for a certain sea mammal. Our favourite junky, Air Marschall Göring was once again in dreamland. So instead more level headed generals and admirals convince Hitler to go with submarine warfare reinforced with all the long range bombers the Luftwaffe had;
a. Save a ton of experienced pilots and aircrews (somewhere in excess of 4.000 where lost)
b. Massive amount of fuel and supplies
c. A large amount of planes (OTL 1.977 planes were lost)
d. And maybe no Lend Lease, the photos of suffering by the Brits under the Blitz where a major tool in getting Lend Lease approved.
2. No coup in Yugoslavia, instead of signing just the Tripartite pact on March 25th. It is done earlier in January with some additional sweeteners for Yugoslavia.
a. 14 infantry divisions will be mobilised and serve with the German forces mostly in anti-partisan and garrison roles, armed and equipped by the Germans. But for pay equal to that of German troops, much higher than Yugoslavian pay, or even British and French pay levels. Pulling any and all of the ambitious and energetic officers who usually form the backbone of a coup. Also by the time a coup could be organised half of the army would be hostages to the Germans.
b. Two accepting a large number of Yugoslavian men say 200.000 men into the Reichsarbeitsdienst, mainly for construction of infrastructure in Poland. This should have calmed down the civilian protest in Belgrade quite a bit.
Leading to an improvement for the forces for Barbarossa by;
1. Some 2500 planes as losses did not have to be replaced and spare parts usage would have been much less without BoB and the April Campaign.
2. 14 Divisions of German infantry not needed for rear area duty.
3. The supplies wasted on Yugoslavia would have been earmarked for use in Barbarossa and added to the staging supply dumbs.
4. Better infrastructure in Poland.
5. A 200.000 men ready and trained in improving logistical infrastructure.
6. Starting the campaign in April not June, gives longer until the mud season and winter.
7. There also would have been only a handful of T-34’s and KV-1’s in service at the beginning. Remember production of the T-34’s only started in September 40, and that with the inferior T-34-40. So by April only and I guestimating here only maybe 300 T-34-40’s, 200 KV-1-39’s and 100 KV-2’s would have been in regimental service.
Taking this as a starting point the fall of Moscow would no longer be ASB.
Then the effect of Moscow in German hands would in fact be quite catastrophic. Let me list the ways in which it would be a real disaster:
1. Logistics
a. The railways though Moscow
b. The train stockyards, coaling sites, stations and repair facilities in and around Moscow
c. Coordination of transport
d. Volga and Oka rivers as far downstream as Nizhny Novgorod would be interdicted by LW stationed around Moscow, and the same for railway traffic in the area.
I think that would have fouled up the transport any reinforcements coming from Siberia probably forcing to detrain at basically at the crossing of the Volga.
2. Organization
a. STAVKA, Red Airforce, MD Moscow and the Moscow Front all had their headquarters in Moscow. Retreating from Moscow would have caused massive disruptions in the chain of command. Above that already in place because of enemy action.
b. All industrial control and planning was done from Moscow, these where civilians, any retreat would have caused months of disruptions throughout the production chain. You know the whole for a want of a nail.
c. NKVD was run purely from Moscow, while most personnel would make it out their vast files would not. Can you imagine the Gestapo getting their hands on that archive. And without some serious prep time the archive would have been mostly intact for capture.
d. The Polit bureau would relocate to the east but how much of their surrounding bureaucracy would they manage to take with them.
So while fleeing several hundred kilometres it would be somewhat hard to organize effective resistance never mind a counter attack.
3. Industrial
a. Disruptions as mentioned above
b. Leningrad contained roughly 9% of 1940 USSR production, one can therefore assume that Moscow was well into the double digits.
c. Moscow was the only place where electronics where produced. So say goodbye to any new radio’s or ignitions for tanks and planes.
d. Most of the other ‘high tech’ industries where also centred in Moscow. Thinks like optics, tool making, and precision machinery.
Losing such capacity and top level labour would be devastating to USSR production literally setting them back buy as much as 20 years.
4. Propaganda
a. Goebbels would still be droning on about it to this day. (and yes I know he would be 119 by now)
b. The diplomatic core would have to evacuate as well, don’t know how many foreign governments would approve that. Then to have diplomatic reports pouring in about the chaos and disaster of the relocations would destroy Soviet reputation.
c. The perception abroad that the Soviets where done for would have been overwhelming. Most likely ending Lend Lease by the UK and USA to the USSR. Buying on credit already difficult for the Soviets from neutral parties would completely dry up. Sales conditions would likely change to only prepaid purchases.
d. The morale among Soviet civilians would also take a nose dive. Recruitment of things like Cossacks and other non-Russian rebels by the Germans would take near flood like proportions.
e. The morale in the Red Army, Navy, Airforce, and even the NKVD would also crater. Desertions would take epic proportions, failure to report for induction into the armed forces would become systemic. Even warlordism would rear its ugly head why obey a STAVKA that lost freaking Moscow.
And this is not even counting the tactical effect of a German army siting in Moscow.
