Wait what? Source please? I did not think "German logistical collapse" was that literal!
Would the Red Army have been able to capitalize on a German attempt to focus on Moscow (at the expense of other sectors)?
How Serious Would The Lose of Moscow Have Been to the USSR in 1941?
- Thread starter Anaxagoras
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- 1941 eastern front hitler stalin wwii
Wait what? Source please? I did not think "German logistical collapse" was that literal!
Would the Red Army have been able to capitalize on a German attempt to focus on Moscow (at the expense of other sectors)?
Precisely. It's important to keep in mind that it's usually two parties involved in a struggle.
Meaning that you can improve the relative strength of one party by either:
(1) increasing the strength of that party
(2) decreasing the strength of the other party
In the context of Barbarossa and whether the German side could capture Moscow without a Soviet collapse, increasing the strength of the German side is difficult due to logistical constraint.
Although a stronger focus on logistics in the preparation phase certainly would help...
That leaves us with option (2) - reducing the strength of the Soviet side.
As an example, let's assume a more succesful opening phase of Barbarossa inflicts 250k (*) additional casualties on the Soviet side in the period from 22.06 - 10.07.
That gives you a roughly 10% reduction in Soviet strength for the remainder of the campaign (assuming Soviet casualty and replacement numbers stays the same),
(*) as an aside, the opposite also would be true. If the Germans had inflicted 250k fewer casualties, the Soviet side would be roughly 10% stronger for the remainder of the campaign.
Which again triggers three questions:
(1) would it be possible for the German side to inflict additional casualties in the opening stage?
(2) we know that the Soviets at 100% strength (for the period Jul-Dec) were able to defend Moscow. But how low could they go before they couldn't?
(3) would the Soviet casualty and replacement numbers stay the same in such a scenario
The answer to (1) is certainly yes. Personally, I've been arguing that a two-pronged attack in AG South (as originally envisioned) withouth the Med distractions would produce much heavier initial Soviet casulaties.
The answer to (2) is much harder to answer definitely, as it would depend on a host of different decisions. But I'm far from sure that the Soviets would be able to hold the line at say 90% strength.
The answer to (3) is also difficult to answer. I would be inclined to believe that both the casualty numbers and the replacement number would go up in this scenario. But how much again depends on a lot of variables.
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Crewald's Supplying War. By December, approximately 80% of German engines were down due to boiler explosions from the extreme cold. And that number probably kept rising through the winter. They just weren't built to handle the weather conditions in Russia.
The Soviets could strip a part of the line in order to focus on defending Moscow and keep the defenses there at 100% relative to OTL, but that obviously means having a harder time on another part of the line. Which could have interesting repercussions on its own. For example, with AGS, how would the 1942 campaign develop without the Germans getting thrown back at Rostov? Certainly something to think about...
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the figure of 90% of Soviet food production gets thrown around for Ukraine, not sure if that includes other "black earth" regions adjacent? have wondered the effects if Axis had not gone for Caucasus and possibly not even Crimea but attempted to hold as much Soviet farmlands for as long as possible?
(coupled with naval strategy to bottle up Soviet Black Sea fleet)
Not sure why. It's more like 50-60%, which is still admittedly a pretty big chunk.
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The Ukrainian SSR's share of grain production in in '40 was less than 30%.
However, the RSFSR's production drops dramatically in '42/'43 which probably is partially due to the loss of the adjacent black earth regions.
In summary, these regions seems to have had a share of 50/60% as ObssesedNuker mentioned.
Leningrad is probably in trouble as well.
In OTL, the situation on the frontline in late August (when the Germans closed on Leningrad) didn't look catastrophic for the Soviets.
Around Smolensk, the Red Army was on the offensive, while they were still holding on to the Dnieper river frontline further south.
Which enabled the Soviets to send sizable reinforcements north to man the eastern frontline and prevent the Axis from fully encircling the city.
That is to say, the timing of this was pretty good for the Soviets.
In an ATL in which the Soviets are facing a more desperate situation elsewhere, they might not be able to free up enough reinforcements.
Given that the Germans spent the better part of Jul-Nov '42 repairing rail infrastructure (north) west of Rostov, leading to great logistical problems at the frontline, getting a 8 month headstart in the repair works would certainly improve the situation for the Germans once they extend to Stalingrad/Caucasus.
I think the OP asks wrong question, loss of Moscow in 1941 is not cause but effect.
If the Germans are to take and hold Moscow, then Red Army or Soviet government needs to collapse either prior to reaching the city or immediately after that. If Red Army is willing and able to fight, then Germans are screwed.
Different rail gauge and winter are foreseeable problems, so if the Hitler and OKH had addressed the clusterfsck that was the Deutsche Reichsbahn organization and prepared locomotives for winter then they may have reached Moscow in 1941, but as I said earlier, I don't think they would have been able to keep the city. Of course they originally thought the fighting would be effectively over when reached Smolensk. So Germans would need to believe that they have to fight to take Moscow to make those preparations. Even then the Germans would be relying on single double track line for supply, which puts hard limit on the size of AGC, it couldn’t be dramatically stronger than in OTL.
If the Germans are to take and hold Moscow, then Red Army or Soviet government needs to collapse either prior to reaching the city or immediately after that. If Red Army is willing and able to fight, then Germans are screwed.
Different rail gauge and winter are foreseeable problems, so if the Hitler and OKH had addressed the clusterfsck that was the Deutsche Reichsbahn organization and prepared locomotives for winter then they may have reached Moscow in 1941, but as I said earlier, I don't think they would have been able to keep the city. Of course they originally thought the fighting would be effectively over when reached Smolensk. So Germans would need to believe that they have to fight to take Moscow to make those preparations. Even then the Germans would be relying on single double track line for supply, which puts hard limit on the size of AGC, it couldn’t be dramatically stronger than in OTL.
As you say, for a variety of reasons all these decisions are implausible given the Nazis goals and strategic thinking in July 1940. But none are impossible - though to make a TL many here would probably demand an ASB intervention!!
Still, here goes.I'm not sure the oil fuel usage of the KM would actually be enough to improve fuel deliveries on the Eastern Front, but it can't hurt. The steel would probably be most useful in tank production, and could keep German tank strength up to TOE - provided the railroads can carry them to where tank transporters could move them to the Frontline. Actually, thinking on that, building locomotives that can operate on Russian gauges might be preferable IF the Germans can get them to the railheads. Or could they manage to design and build dual gauge locomotives? Certainly anything that improves German logistics is key to a better performance in Barbarossa. Maybe assign suitable KM personnel to rail repair/conversion units, am on holiday so can't consult Creveld to get their names, as these were understaffed.
No Batle of Britain (or the night bombing blitz?) is also helpful to the Luftwaffe in that it will have more pilots and aircraft available in June 1941. Perhaps this will get an even faster breakthrough by the Panzergruppes in the border battles but as the front moves forward the benefits will lessen without improvements to logistics. Though at least some planes could fly fuel to Panzer spearheads I not think this could get Panzergruppe IV to Leningrad before the city's defenses become too strong to overcome without more infantry, which simply can't get there in time.
Preparing for a long Total War has many ramifications beyond the obvious that Germany produces more weapons and ammunition. In fact IIRC the Germans did ramp up production up to early 1941 but then sent factory workers back to the army. A faster and more sustained build up is feasible but requires earlier actions to get labourers from Occupied Europe, more investment in producing machine tools, building factories and obtaining raw materials.
ISTM that all three of these moves by Germany will be obvious to Stalin and the USSR, which changes the dynamics of the pre-Barbarossa period. Stalin will be very much more suspicious of the German build up in occupied Poland when it is not actively fighting Britain in the air or threatening to starve it into submission through submarine warfare. What he can do about it is a matter of debate but at the least a better prepared Red Army can demolish bridges and hinder the Germans in many ways in the opening weeks.
And of course also changes how Britain behaves. Without the Battle of Britain the RAF is also potentially stronger. Does it still bomb Germany without being bombed itself? Probably IMHO. With no fear of invasion more troops and equipment can be sent to the Middle East. The British offensive against the Italians could be earlier and maybe reach Tripoli before the Germans react? With no Battle of the Atlantic, or at least a diminishing threat, British war production won't suffer from shortages. The naval programmed would not be so disrupted by a shift to building escorts, and with no need to keep a strong Home Fleet thee will be more of a presence in both the Mediterranen and Singapore. With no need to take short northern routes and no shipping losses, the UK will not be so dependent on lend lease as it can source raw materials from the sterling zone.
So, many ramifications and butterflies
I do think you've hit on two crucial things that are essential for a more successful Barberossa. Better logistics AND making peace with the British Empire. Or at least, as in your scenario, by not wasting your strength fighting it at the same time as invading the USSR. We're probably lucky that Nazi Germany couldn't manage either precondition.
Was this a known problem or did this blindside German logistics?
Crewald doesn't precisely say, but it appears to have mostly been a blindside. It's possible that it was a known potential problem in the abstract sense but the hundreds of other more immediate problems which were going on right at the moment kind of "drowned it out" until it was too late.
Or the people who pointed it out were ignored since it meant going against Hitler to get the time to fix the problem.
I'm a little bit of an amateur on the period, but would the fall of Moscow (maybe in November of 1941) coupled with the complete dysfunction of Soviet rail and communication lines that would follow compel the Japanese to jump in and maybe strike at Vladivostok/Sakhalin in lieu of an attack on the United States?
If they could even take the city. It's more than likely they would face fanatical resistance in a city much larger than Stalingrad, with stronger concrete buildings and plenty of defensive benefits that would turn "Stalingrad" into a comparative walk in the park. Meanwhile, the Soviets can funnel everything they have since they aren't supplying over the Volga by boat. In the end, it will attrite their forces to hell and back where they can be encircled on the flanks since they're dedicating to directly attacking Moscow.
This assumes that the Germans are dedicated to directly attacking Moscow instead of encircling it.
In the latter case, the Stalingrad comparison might still hold - although I'm not so sure they would last as long as the encircled 6th Army at Stalingrad.
In that case, it could be even worse. First, Guderian would have to get past Tula, and then perhaps Ryazan and then to Noginsk while along the Volokolamsk highway, Moscow would have to be bypassed to the north and this would have to happen before December 5. Even more extended flanks as they'd be basing all their bets on a spearhead to encircle Moscow, while also on a logistical shoestring. In the event that they are encircled that way, instead of having a city as protection there would not be such good protection and the Germans would fall pretty easily.
Yeah, an encirclement of Moscow in '41 is just not happening unless, once again, the Red Army has already crumbled in which case it's pointless and the Germans might as well just route march into Moscow and be done with it. The way the road network is set up, to say nothing of the rail network which the Germans are pretty heavily tied too, is set-up doesn't really permit it.
Once again, we're back to how much damage the Germans had to inflict in the opening stage of the invasion in order for them to capture Moscow at the end of the campaign.
Would a Red Army at 90% (in the period July-December) do the job? A Red Army at 75%? A Red Army at 50%?
A weakened initial Red Army would probably also lead to an improvement in the German logistical situation.
Case in point: the 87th infantry division
Would a Red Army at 90% (in the period July-December) do the job? A Red Army at 75%? A Red Army at 50%?
A weakened initial Red Army would probably also lead to an improvement in the German logistical situation.
Case in point: the 87th infantry division
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