How Serious Would The Lose of Moscow Have Been to the USSR in 1941?

[ObssesedNuker]

Arguably it was possible with luck in October had they not dispersed their forces during and post-pocket battles.

No, it was not. The German forces had already overextended themselves after creating the Bryansk-Vyazma Pocket and the advance was bogging even before the rains set in. The logistics network was already inadequate and getting worse, Soviet resistance was already stiffening, and many German formations had already been worn down to the numbens. The Germans had already rolled past their culmination point and no amount of positing "well maybe if they zig instead of zag!" is going to alter that reality.

The reverse Stalingrad would happen in 1942. Had Moscow fell early and cheaply then the Germans would actually not be that exhausted or strung out, at least not compared to December 1941 IOTL when they were bleeding heavily and wearing themselves down trying to fight through stiffening Soviet reserves.

No it would not. Absent a collapse of the Red Army, Moscow was never going to fall, much less fall easily and cheaply, no matter how much the wishful thinking OKH applied in their planning. It would invariably only fall after a multi-month city battle that tears up German forces.

a lot of supplies and resources in Moscow

It would net the Germans nothing more then burnt out ruins. Whatever the Soviets can't move they'll destroy. In the meantime, the German logistical net will still have already collapsed behind them, rendering them physically unable to solidify their position. They'll be trying to defend an even longer front with even weaker forces and even worse logistics then OTL where they only avoided encirclement and annihilation with the narrowest of margins.

due to the relocation of the government and STAVKA

Which had largely already been done.

and the loss of the central rail and communications hub.

For which the Soviets had emergency plans to compensate for in the short-term.

 

[Wertmon505]

Assuming that far more resources and effort were expended to capture Moscow than the significant amount already directed toward the capture of the city, I believe other fronts would be significantly hindered due to reinforcements originally earmarked for the siege of Leningrad and the effort to reach and take the southern oilfields and Stalingrad going to take Moscow. In the short term the loss of Moscow would be a serious blow, but in the long term the German war effort would suffer far worse.

 

[david_herdson]

The question is not just how serious a loss would Moscow be (of itself) but how serious a problem would it reveal about the Soviets' fighting capacity. If the Germans do take it in 1941 or later, it'd have to be either because the Soviet High Command had done something incredibly stupid or because the Red Army had ceased to function effectively. Neither possibility can be excluded. Indeed, considering what the army had been through in the previous three years, never mind the previous few months, it's remarkable that it didn't collapse. Many other armies having suffered less traumatic defeats had done, as had the societies supporting them. It's more likely that the fall of Moscow would be the consequence of civil or military strife, rather than cause of it.

 

[Theoretical_TJ]

You'd need a combo of better winter logistics for the Germans and Stalin's depression to also lead to an Army purge after the initial defeats.

 

[merlin]

With - "the Germans are coming, the Germans are coming", and signs of the Civil authorities packing up and leaving, civil unrest is possible. While it may not be likely with the NKVD etc., keeping an eye open - but still possible. So, if civil unrest takes 'hold' - fed by rumours of German tanks at the 'gates' - then organised resistance may crumble.
Trouble is (for the Germans), their next move will be for the Volga, and the oil fields of Baku etc., rather than further east.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

With - "the Germans are coming, the Germans are coming", and signs of the Civil authorities packing up and leaving, civil unrest is possible.

There was civil unrest caused by all of that for a almost a week in mid-October. Then Stalin ordered martial law and had NKVD troops shut it down with strict orders to shoot looters and panicmongers.

 

[Redbeard]

It appears like Hitler had read his Clausewitz to closely - i.e. going for the enemy's main army and not his capital. That sure was the lesson after Napoleon's campaign and so eloquently explained by Clausewitz, but by 1941 Moscow wasn't just a concentration of wooden houses but the all important railway hub of the USSR. There of course were lines going outside Moscow, but they were few and the overall capacity for the Soviets to keep up and distribute production and troops would be severely curtailed.

Considering how strained the Soviets were in first halt of OTL 1942 I think a "loss of Moscow" PoD could very well have meant the Soviets giving in or at least the campaign remaining defensive for the Soviets for years if not for ever.

BTW does anybody know where the Soviets got most of the coal and iron from in 1942-45? From a quick search it appears like the Urals hadn't any coal and the closest under control were in eastern Siberia. Iron ore appear to be available in the Urals, but if the coal had to transported thousands of km to the factories in the Urals it would be a severe logistic strain.

Being in control of Moscow from somewhere in 1941 would also mean a dramatic improvement in the German logistic situation.

Could the Germans have taken Moscow in 1941 - perhaps, perhaps not - but certainly can't be excluded.

Could they have held it once taken? No problem!

 

[ObssesedNuker]

BTW does anybody know where the Soviets got most of the coal and iron from in 1942-45? From a quick search it appears like the Urals hadn't any coal and the closest under control were in eastern Siberia. Iron ore appear to be available in the Urals, but if the coal had to transported thousands of km to the factories in the Urals it would be a severe logistic strain.

The Soviets set-up new enterprises over the course of 1941-42 and this did involve coal from the Urals. There were towns like Tuymazy, Buguruslam, Voktinsk, and several sites near Perm, Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Sverdlovsk, just to name a few.

Being in control of Moscow from somewhere in 1941 would also mean a dramatic improvement in the German logistic situation.

Not until spring 1942. The collapse of German logistics stemmed from the inadequacy of German resources to handle the distances, climate, terrain, and infrastructure of the USSR. Taking Moscow would not alter this. However, given that Moscow would only fall if the Red Army (or the Soviet Union as a whole) has already collapsed then this isn't really an issue. It would be a simple matter for the Germans to wait out the winter and improve their conditions in the Spring.

Could the Germans have taken Moscow in 1941 - perhaps, perhaps not - but certainly can't be excluded.

It can be if the Red Army hasn't collapsed. If it has collapsed, then the fall of Moscow is pretty much an irrelevancy.

 

[Redbeard]

The Soviets set-up new enterprises over the course of 1941-42 and this did involve coal from the Urals. There were towns like Tuymazy, Buguruslam, Voktinsk, and several sites near Perm, Chelyabinsk, Magnitogorsk, and Sverdlovsk, just to name a few.



Not until spring 1942. The collapse of German logistics stemmed from the inadequacy of German resources to handle the distances, climate, terrain, and infrastructure of the USSR. Taking Moscow would not alter this. However, given that Moscow would only fall if the Red Army (or the Soviet Union as a whole) has already collapsed then this isn't really an issue. It would be a simple matter for the Germans to wait out the winter and improve their conditions in the Spring.



It can be if the Red Army hasn't collapsed. If it has collapsed, then the fall of Moscow is pretty much an irrelevancy.

Thanks for the info on the coal from Urals, that makes sense.

"Collapse in logistics" is relative. Sure the Germans never brought forward the optimal amount of supplies but the Soviets most of the time were even further from and especially in the first half year of the campaign. If you haven't got it yet I would recommend Nigel Askey's: "Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis". It is quite comprehensive and especially you might here and there be irritated over Askey often being rather "pro-Barbarossa", but actually I think he does a good job in documenting his views. Anyway he has some interesting data on Supply Distribution Efficiency from, which you clearly see the problems the Germans had, but also how much bigger the Soviet problems were.

You of course can find a lot of things were you (and I) would disagree with his assessments, but all in all I think he gives a until now unseen deep access to insight in the campaign - and all the tables, data and statistics are just - yummy!

 

[Drizzt]

I voted for the 2nd worst option. In addition to the logistics issue Moscow was also the center of the most heavliy centralized nation on the planet. You can't just move all those institutions as easily as designating a new capital. Without it they may still have a lot of industry, land etc, but making sure raw material, processed material, weapons, ammo, supplies, food etc actually gets shipped from where it's produced to where it's needed is another matter. The USSR didn't exactly encourage low-level initiative. So not neccessaryliy nothing but a lot less gets done without someone giving an official order to do it until new capital restores the bureocractic apparatus to some semblance of function.

 

[DerWonderWaffles]

I know I'm butting in with some far-out hindsight and fantasy, but could the fall of Moscow along with successfully holding it have happened on these conditions:

-Junk the whole navy after the fall of France and put the steel and oil into making motor vehicles for the Wehrmacht in preparation for Barbarossa

-Never engage in the Battle of Britain/Blitz saving planes and experienced pilots for Barbarossa to disrupt more divisions/destroy more resistance of Soviet Forces

-Go into a all out Total War economy with the curtailing of aircraft production and focusing on making motor vehicles right after the Fall of France.

Now please ignore the unrealism of this post, and I would just like an answer if the conditions I listed would be plausible for outcome to occur as I stated

 

[sloreck]

Whether or not the Germans could have taken Moscow, and when, and if so how long they could have held it is another question. ASSUMING it was done, perhaps by Barbarossa kicking off a little sooner without some of the distractions that delayed it, and by fall 1941 the Germans have taken Moscow and I'll assume they can hold on to it until at least spring 1942, this is a disaster for the USSR. This means a good number of bureaucrats are taken out of business - not all of the bureaucracy made it out of Moscow to Kyubishev, and a good chunk of vital records also never left Moscow. This will reduce the efficiency of the Soviet war effort, especially as has been noted that the economy was run from a central office. As has been mentioned many times the Soviet rail system had Moscow as a major hub. Getting rid of this makes moving goods and forces, already much less efficient for reasons mentioned above even worse or in some cases impossible. With poring over a RR map of the USSR in 1941 (and wondering how accurate that would be) I have to ask is there anyway with Moscow out of business that supplies can be close enough to Leningrad so that the OTL truck line could work? Absent Moscow what is the capacity of the rail lines from Murmansk and Archangelsk that don't go through Moscow (in fact are there any) - LL that piles up in warehouses in Murmansk does no good for the USSR.

With the Germans in Moscow, retaking the city will become the number one priority for the USSR. It might not be the right choice militarily, but my bet is Stalin will be as anxious to do this as Hitler was to take Stalingrad as a symbol. Does all this mean the Germans win in the east or the USSR/Red Army collapses - most likely not, and I expect the eastern front will continue to suck up German troops and equipment. When the war ends, which may be later and may see instant sunshine in Germany, I expect the "iron curtain" may be as far east as the 1938 border of the Soviet Union.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Whether or not the Germans could have taken Moscow, and when, and if so how long they could have held it is another question. ASSUMING it was done, perhaps by Barbarossa kicking off a little sooner without some of the distractions that delayed it, and by fall 1941 the Germans have taken Moscow and I'll assume they can hold on to it until at least spring 1942, this is a disaster for the USSR. This means a good number of bureaucrats are taken out of business - not all of the bureaucracy made it out of Moscow to Kyubishev, and a good chunk of vital records also never left Moscow. This will reduce the efficiency of the Soviet war effort, especially as has been noted that the economy was run from a central office. As has been mentioned many times the Soviet rail system had Moscow as a major hub. Getting rid of this makes moving goods and forces, already much less efficient for reasons mentioned above even worse or in some cases impossible. With poring over a RR map of the USSR in 1941 (and wondering how accurate that would be) I have to ask is there anyway with Moscow out of business that supplies can be close enough to Leningrad so that the OTL truck line could work? Absent Moscow what is the capacity of the rail lines from Murmansk and Archangelsk that don't go through Moscow (in fact are there any) - LL that piles up in warehouses in Murmansk does no good for the USSR.

With the Germans in Moscow, retaking the city will become the number one priority for the USSR. It might not be the right choice militarily, but my bet is Stalin will be as anxious to do this as Hitler was to take Stalingrad as a symbol. Does all this mean the Germans win in the east or the USSR/Red Army collapses - most likely not, and I expect the eastern front will continue to suck up German troops and equipment. When the war ends, which may be later and may see instant sunshine in Germany, I expect the "iron curtain" may be as far east as the 1938 border of the Soviet Union.

If Moscow falls and stays in German hands Leningrad is doomed. There is simply no bypass without constructing a new rail line and that isn't happening quickly in wartime with Moscow out of the picture assuming it is at all possible. The loss of Moscow's electrical production would also be very bad for Soviet production in the Upper Volga area, which was still experiencing rolling blackouts IOTL even as late as early 1943 due to the grid being stretched to the limit with Moscow still in Soviet hands. So Leningrad will have to surrender some time in 1942.

http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png

 

[ObssesedNuker]

"Collapse in logistics" is relative

No it isn't. The German logistics collapsed after Typhoon is quite transparent: first the mud washed out the hastily reconstructed German railroads and then the freeze caused the boilers on German locomotive engines to explode. The result was a total collapse of German supply lines. Taking Moscow alters none of this.

If Moscow falls and stays in German hands Leningrad is doomed. There is simply no bypass without constructing a new rail line and that isn't happening quickly in wartime with Moscow out of the picture assuming it is at all possible.

Except there is. The Germans cut the direct Moscow-Leningrad line OTL when they took Kalinin. The Soviets just rerouted the supplies down a siding to the east of Moscow. Now how well that would have worked out in the long term is a bit of a open question, but in the short term the loss of Moscow doesn't compromise the defense of Leningrad.

Of course, in any scenario where the loss of Moscow occurs, then Leningrad has probably already fallen for the same reasons, rendering that debate a mute affair.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Except there is. The Germans cut the direct Moscow-Leningrad line OTL when they took Kalinin. The Soviets just rerouted the supplies down a siding to the east of Moscow. Now how well that would have worked out in the long term is a bit of a open question, but in the short term the loss of Moscow doesn't compromise the defense of Leningrad.

Of course, in any scenario where the loss of Moscow occurs, then Leningrad has probably already fallen for the same reasons, rendering that debate a mute affair.

Things worked out for several weeks, but with the fall of Moscow that siding would be gone. They are reduced them from 3 single track lines to 2 according to the Soviet map I posted above. Over winter that is probably fatal because the lines that remain are jammed up with all sorts of other rerouted traffic without Moscow.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Things worked out for several weeks,

Two months, actually. The Soviets didn't retake Kalinin until mid-December.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Two months, actually. The Soviets didn't retake Kalinin until mid-December.

Two months can equal several weeks.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

Two months can equal several weeks.

It depends on what you mean by several, since the dictionary definition is kinda vague. It is kinda getting pedantic though. My base point does remain that we don't precisely know what the remaining capacity to supply Leningrad would be after the fall of Moscow, but it doesn't really matter since the conditions which would cause the fall of Moscow would also cause the fall of Leningrad.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

It depends on what you mean by several, since the dictionary definition is kinda vague. It is kinda getting pedantic though.

Ya think? Of course isn't that how most of these types of discussions end up?

My base point does remain that we don't precisely know what the remaining capacity to supply Leningrad would be after the fall of Moscow, but it doesn't really matter since the conditions which would cause the fall of Moscow would also cause the fall of Leningrad.

The remaining capacity based on that Soviet map is 2 single track lines connected to the rest of the country, including Murmansk.
The fall of Moscow is the condition for the fall of Leningrad. Leningrad could easily be holding out if Moscow fell. For instance if the late August-September push against Leningrad was not launched, instead AG-North transitioned to the defensive in early August and resources were husbanded for the push on Moscow while putting more effort into containing/defeating the Soviet August-September offensives would help with the capture of Moscow, but leave Leningrad alone. Not dispatching VIII Fliegerkorps north for the Leningrad push means it can stay with AG-Center for August-September, which would be enormously helpful at defeating the Soviet offensives around Smolensk at much lower cost than they were historically and make Taifun easier in it's earlier stages due to less damaged German forces and perhaps even more damaged Soviet ones. The same amounts of bombs would be expended around Smolensk as were directed at Leningrad and any Soviet efforts at attacking out of Leningrad against AG-North are not going to go well in that terrain (as the Germans found out when attacking themselves). The Soviets lack the firepower and organization to push the Germans back in that area and IOTL the German push against Leningrad was largely wasted effort that consumed a lot of supplies and extended their supply lines unnecessarily. With the fall of Moscow any penalties accrued from not having isolated Leningrad would be more than offset by the loss of Moscow. Plus of course no stupid Tikhvin offensive that let the Soviets inflict pretty serious damage on the Germans in the Winter of 1941-42.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The remaining capacity based on that Soviet map is 2 single track lines connected to the rest of the country, including Murmansk.

And their capacity is unknow. It's entirely possible that they might have been adequate enough. Or they might not have. We don't really know since the severing ultimately never happened.

The fall of Moscow is the condition for the fall of Leningrad. Leningrad could easily be holding out if Moscow fell.

No and no. The condition for the Fall of Moscow is the collapse of the Red Army or the Soviet State. Under such circumstances, Leningrad also falls.

For instance if the late August-September push against Leningrad was not launched, instead AG-North transitioned to the defensive in early August and resources were husbanded for the push on Moscow while putting more effort into containing/defeating the Soviet August-September offensives would help with the capture of Moscow, but leave Leningrad alone. Not dispatching VIII Fliegerkorps north for the Leningrad push means it can stay with AG-Center for August-September, which would be enormously helpful at defeating the Soviet offensives around Smolensk at much lower cost than they were historically and make Taifun easier in it's earlier stages due to less damaged German forces and perhaps even more damaged Soviet ones. The same amounts of bombs would be expended around Smolensk as were directed at Leningrad and any Soviet efforts at attacking out of Leningrad against AG-North are not going to go well in that terrain (as the Germans found out when attacking themselves). The Soviets lack the firepower and organization to push the Germans back in that area and IOTL the German push against Leningrad was largely wasted effort that consumed a lot of supplies and extended their supply lines unnecessarily. With the fall of Moscow any penalties accrued from not having isolated Leningrad would be more than offset by the loss of Moscow. Plus of course no stupid Tikhvin offensive that let the Soviets inflict pretty serious damage on the Germans in the Winter of 1941-42.

In all these cases, the addition of resources the Germans are unable to support means they sit around doing nothing of use because they can't be supplied. The extra ammunition sits around in warehouses because the cargo space on the trains is unavailable to them. The extra trains sit around doing nothing because to commit them onto the already overcrowded railroads means a guaranteed collision (which did happen more then once as it was) with all the attendant gridlock that entails. No additional bombs can be expended because no additional bombs can be shipped to the air forces supporting AGC. The extra combat ground and air forces sit around well to the rear of the action doing nothing because the ammo and fuel to support them cannot be shipped down the overloaded logistical apparatus. As a function, there is no difference to Army Group Center, no difference to the battles of Smolensk or Kiev, no difference to Typhoon. Moscow does not fall.

The Germans were forced to spread their resources into three divergent axis of attacks because the logistical infrastructure didn't exist to support those resources on just one or two axis. You can try to ignore the fundamental physical limitations this imposed on the Germans, but that just highlights how you have been taken in so much by the historical German successes that you have been blinded to how impossible the task actually was. Your just like the German generals in the post-war writing their memoirs, trying to argue that they could have fought the same campaign better instead of recognizing they would have had to conceive it as a multi-stage, multi-year effort from the beginning.