The IJA in general was a less profession organization than the regular German army, but more so than the Waffen-SS, which was a political army and generally suffered heavy losses in situations that would have been low cost for the regular German army to deal with. I'm not away of any area where the IJA performed better than the regular German army, they just lacked WW1 combat experience to really professionalize and the Russo-Japanese war and Sino-Japan war were not enough to compensate; they were certainly invaluable experiences, but the wrong lessons were learned in terms of bayonet charges being useful in modern warfare.How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS during WW2?
Was there anything the IJA performed better at than their German counterparts?
I think the Germans had a far better officer corp though. I think this was partially due to of course them being far more experienced in modern warfare.
Field grade officers in the Kwantung Army were almost directly responsible for getting the Japanese into a war with China AND the USSR at the time time in 1938, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was the final straw in bring the Japanese into total war with China was a local decisions (think about that for a second; a LOCAL commander was directly responsible for starting the entire Pacific War, not by accident, but intentionally).
Imperial general staff? Of all of the British services the British army was not the most competent in WW2 especially early in the war. Later it certainly was effective, but then I'd probably rate the Soviets higher by the time it counted. Otherwise you're right about the IJA.The German General Staff was likely the best in the world, with only the British Imperial General Staff. The IJA was far too deeply involved in politics, with the Army (and Navy) having the ability to bring down a government at will. This led to any number of questionable political AND military decisions.
Below the General Staff/HQ level the IJA had a rather bizarre mix of strict, often brutal, discipline and open defiance. Field grade officers in the Kwantung Army were almost directly responsible for getting the Japanese into a war with China AND the USSR at the time time in 1938, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was the final straw in bring the Japanese into total war with China was a local decisions (think about that for a second; a LOCAL commander was directly responsible for starting the entire Pacific War, not by accident, but intentionally).
There were a number of exceptional IJA senior officers (Yamashita , as an example, was brilliant) but overall the officer corps was not only equal to the Heer's but probably less professional than the IJN.
How do you figure? They're insubordination problem was a problem in peacetime, in war they followed orders AFAIK.Not very,the IJA had a serious insubordination problem that seriously effected command and control, pretty much making it useless in a large scale battle.
Stavka?Imperial general staff? Of all of the British services the British army was not the most competent in WW2 especially early in the war. Later it certainly was effective, but then I'd probably rate the Soviets higher by the time it counted. Otherwise you're right about the IJA.
Not really. The massacre at the Tenaru River was the direct result of Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao (this is the same officer who was scheduled to lead the amphibious assault on Midway) violating specific orders and attacking 11,000 Marine with ONE battalion of his 28th Infantry Regiment, not even waiting for the other two battalions to arrive on scene. He started the day with 917 men (including around 100 who were leaf at the landing site to await the rest of the regiment), his replacement (Ichiki was killed or committed Seppuku, accounts vary) finished the day with 123 men. 777 men in the command were KIA, 15 were taken prisoner (this was the first time the U.S. encounter the Japanese practice of refusing to surrender, or faking a surrender as ruse to lure U.S. troops to their death). That was just the first example involving U.S. troops, there were many more, especially when field and/or company grade officers refused order to fall back to new defensive positions and conducted pointless, hopeless "Banzai Charges" that hastened the defeat of defending garrisons.How do you figure? They're insubordination problem was a problem in peacetime, in war they followed orders AFAIK.
STAVKA was the high command of all the military, I'm talking about the army general staff and don't mean in 1941. In 1942 and on it was highly professional even with Stalin meddling via STAVKA. Stalin's interference was the problem, not the organization itself, much like Hitler ordering crazy nonsense from 1943 on. And how did STAVKA delay the capture of Berlin? AFAIK they rushed it to force though and capture it before the Wallies. How did the Soviets ensure the US wouldn't cross the Elbe?Stavka?
Really?
IMO it was worse than a joke. Politics above plan, even when the Red Army was rolling up the Heer. Stalin, as head of Stavka, actually delayed the capture of Berlin in order to ensure that that the WAllies didn't cross the Elbe. Prior to that time, Stavka was the source of the "No Retreat" orders that allowed the Heer to conduct a series of incredible double envelopments that came close to gutting the Red Army.
The best Red Army staff officers wound up with the brains being exposed to daylight during the purges.
Alright, I stand corrected.Not really. The massacre at the Tenaru River was the direct result of Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao (this is the same officer who was scheduled to lead the amphibious assault on Midway) violating specific orders and attacking 11,000 Marine with ONE battalion of his 28th Infantry Regiment, not even waiting for the other two battalions to arrive on scene. He started the day with 917 men (including around 100 who were leaf at the landing site to await the rest of the regiment), his replacement (Ichiki was killed or committed Seppuku, accounts vary) finished the day with 123 men. 777 men in the command were KIA, 15 were taken prisoner (this was the first time the U.S. encounter the Japanese practice of refusing to surrender, or faking a surrender as ruse to lure U.S. troops to their death). That was just the first example involving U.S. troops, there were many more, especially when field and/or company grade officers refused order to fall back to new defensive positions and conducted pointless, hopeless "Banzai Charges" that hastened the defeat of defending garrisons.
This literally lasted until the end of the war. It was a small group of field grade officers that attempted to capture and destroy the recording the Emperor had made for broadcast announcing the surrender. They not only were willing to disobey their direct CO, but the EMPEROR.
If you are going to push into the middle of the War then the most professional Command Staff was the American Joint Chiefs. The German General Staff by then had been effectively destroyed by Hitler's on-going interference, the British had Churchill with his "one brilliant, followed by one idiotic" interference, and the added problems caused by Monty and Harris' unwillingness for follow orders.STAVKA was the high command of all the military, I'm talking about the army general staff and don't mean in 1941. In 1942 and on it was highly professional even with Stalin meddling via STAVKA. Stalin's interference was the problem, not the organization itself, much like Hitler ordering crazy nonsense from 1943 on. And how did STAVKA delay the capture of Berlin? AFAIK they rushed it to force though and capture it before the Wallies. How did the Soviets ensure the US wouldn't cross the Elbe?
Granted the best guys in the 1930s were killed in the purges, but a new generation of officers came up in the 1940s who were competent:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Vasilevsky#World_War_II
The British general staff did not shower themselves in glory based on the performance of the British army. The British high command, the level above general staff of the army, though did become highly competent eventually, though Churchill would interfere quite a bit.
Alright, I stand corrected.
Right, but I think we are talking about different things? The German equivalent would be OKW, the Soviet equivalent would be STAVKA, and the British Joint Chiefs for the total armed forces. OKW was never competent to my knowledge thanks to Hitler taking over in 1938 and then having a malign influence on OKH from about 1942 on. So certainly we can't say that the German high command was anywhere near the best in the world, even in 1939. Now you said the general staff for the Germans, which I understand to be the army general staff; then the British general staff at the start of the war and probably through 1942 was not particularly good. I don't think they were particularly great ever in the war. I'd argue that the Soviet army general staff, the step below STAVKA was better than the British general staff in 1942 and on despite Stalin's interference via STAVKA. Not sure I'd really rank the US military Joint Chiefs as the world's best, they were certainly competent by 1943 and in good all around by 1944-45, certainly better than OKW by a mile and maybe better than the Brits. STAVKA might though have given them fits if they went up against each other in 1945.If you are going to push into the middle of the War then the most professional Command Staff was the American Joint Chiefs. The German General Staff by then had been effectively destroyed by Hitler's on-going interference, the British had Churchill with his "one brilliant, followed by one idiotic" interference, and the added problems caused by Monty and Harris' unwillingness for follow orders.
The German Army Staff was brilliant until early 1941, when Hitler's influence overtook the decades of professional training. Soviet officers training was never to the planning level of the Heer, far too much instruction at even Frunze were political in nature, and the inclusion of political officers at every level of the planning staff reduced the overall quality of both the work produced and the planning itself (something that was regularly punctuated by the elimination of some of the best brains that Frunze produced).Right, but I think we are talking about different things? The German equivalent would be OKW, the Soviet equivalent would be STAVKA, and the British Joint Chiefs for the total armed forces. OKW was never competent to my knowledge thanks to Hitler taking over in 1938 and then having a malign influence on OKH from about 1942 on. So certainly we can't say that the German high command was anywhere near the best in the world, even in 1939. Now you said the general staff for the Germans, which I understand to be the army general staff; then the British general staff at the start of the war and probably through 1942 was not particularly good. I don't think they were particularly great ever in the war. I'd argue that the Soviet army general staff, the step below STAVKA was better than the British general staff in 1942 and on despite Stalin's interference via STAVKA. Not sure I'd really rank the US military Joint Chiefs as the world's best, they were certainly competent by 1943 and in good all around by 1944-45, certainly better than OKW by a mile and maybe better than the Brits. STAVKA might though have given them fits if they went up against each other in 1945.
Harris AFAIK never disobeyed orders, but Monty was...well Monty and he took over the British army general staff post-war.
So what did you mean by the 'german general staff'? OKH? And at what point do you think they were the best and then stopped being the best?
No argument about the Soviet system...until 1942. Then commissars were largely excluded from decision making and purging stopped except if someone really screwed up.The German Army Staff was brilliant until early 1941, when Hitler's influence overtook the decades of professional training. Soviet officers training was never to the planning level of the Heer, far too much instruction at even Frunze were political in nature, and the inclusion of political officers at every level of the planning staff reduced the overall quality of both the work produced and the planning itself (something that was regularly punctuated by the elimination of some of the best brains that Frunze produced).
Gotcha, I thought you meant he was outright insubordinate, not 'interpreting' orders as he wanted and making arguments about why he couldn't do something that weren't true. Plenty of high level officers do things like that in war. Harris certainly missed out on winning the war in 1943 with the weapon he crafted in Bomber Command.Harris was justly famous for following Nelson's example of not hearing (or in Nelson's case putting the spyglass up to his blind eye) orders that he didn't want to follow. He failed to dedicate Bomber Command to the "oil campaign" as instructed, claiming that his forces were not effective at that sort of attack (ironically Bomber Command was actually spectacularly successful in the role, the same sort of pathfinder target marking used against city centers proved excellent when used against refineries and storage farms when given the opportunity). If Harris' instructions were not "kill German civilians and burn down their homes" he did his utmost to find a way out of compliance. He was true believer in the dehousing/morale breaking theory.
How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS during WW2?
Was there anything the IJA performed better at than their German counterparts?