How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS?

How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS during WW2?

Was there anything the IJA performed better at than their German counterparts?
 
They were mostly conscripts, just like the Germans were. Like the Germans, they had different formations for different duties that ranged from "best in the world" to "semi-reliable at best," usually depending on the history and mission type of the unit in question. For what it's worth, the only American General to have fought both (Joe Collins), rated the Germans as more 'professional,' but the Japanese as tougher and more fanatical.

Compared to the German Army and SS, the Japanese were inferior in tanks and tank warfare, roughly comparable in artillery and mortars, and superior in infantry combat, especially when on the defensive.
 
I think the Germans had a far better officer corp though. I think this was partially due to of course them being far more experienced in modern warfare. The Japanese fought in China against KMT units and guerillas, and the occasional German trained KMT division (which were at least equal to front line IJA units) but not against a modern army.
 

Deleted member 1487

How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS during WW2?

Was there anything the IJA performed better at than their German counterparts?
The IJA in general was a less profession organization than the regular German army, but more so than the Waffen-SS, which was a political army and generally suffered heavy losses in situations that would have been low cost for the regular German army to deal with. I'm not away of any area where the IJA performed better than the regular German army, they just lacked WW1 combat experience to really professionalize and the Russo-Japanese war and Sino-Japan war were not enough to compensate; they were certainly invaluable experiences, but the wrong lessons were learned in terms of bayonet charges being useful in modern warfare.
 
I think the Germans had a far better officer corp though. I think this was partially due to of course them being far more experienced in modern warfare.

This as well. The Japanese officer corps was hampered by rampant factionalization and nepotism. Historically most of the senior leadership came from the Choshu region of feudal Japan while most of the Navy came from Satsuma.. this arrangement led to less qualified men being over-promoted while many more skilled "rising stars" ended up getting sidelined solely because of their background and political connections (or lack thereof). As a result, there were precious few high ranking figures who could legitimately be argued as being on the level of a von Rundstedt, Manstein, or even an administrative leader like Halder.

Zhukov probably hit the nail on the head when he described the IJA: first-rate enlisted personnel and NCOs, excellent junior officers, but plodding and ineffectual senior leadership.

It is important to remember that 1940s Japan, although industrially modern, was only a few decades removed from what was essentially a quasi-medieval society and that the popular mindset had not yet caught up.
 

CalBear

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The German General Staff was likely the best in the world, with only the British Imperial General Staff. The IJA was far too deeply involved in politics, with the Army (and Navy) having the ability to bring down a government at will. This led to any number of questionable political AND military decisions.

Below the General Staff/HQ level the IJA had a rather bizarre mix of strict, often brutal, discipline and open defiance. Field grade officers in the Kwantung Army were almost directly responsible for getting the Japanese into a war with China AND the USSR at the time time in 1938, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was the final straw in bring the Japanese into total war with China was a local decisions (think about that for a second; a LOCAL commander was directly responsible for starting the entire Pacific War, not by accident, but intentionally).

There were a number of exceptional IJA senior officers (Yamashita , as an example, was brilliant) but overall the officer corps was not only equal to the Heer's but probably less professional than the IJN.
 
Field grade officers in the Kwantung Army were almost directly responsible for getting the Japanese into a war with China AND the USSR at the time time in 1938, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was the final straw in bring the Japanese into total war with China was a local decisions (think about that for a second; a LOCAL commander was directly responsible for starting the entire Pacific War, not by accident, but intentionally).

In 1939 it was even worse, at least where the Kwantung Army and its Nomonhan battle with Zhukov were concerned. During that year the principal theater for Japan was China (already retroactively approved by GHQ in Tokyo), and with the country not totally mobilized for war the Kwantung Army and all its component units were still at peacetime strength. Despite this, Kwantung Army commander Ueda's policy of dealing with Soviet border incursions was very aggressive, i.e, not just to repel any invader but also to launch a counterattack and destroy them with overwhelming force. It was this specific set of guidelines that led to Lt. Gen Komatsubara and his green 23rd Division starting the battle in the first place - he was merely acting on the orders of his superiors in accordance with established policy.

The problem was, the 'established policy' was tantamount to an invitation for a tit-for-tat serial escalation with the Soviets at a time when the balance of power in the Far East was as follows: *

Japanese.............................................Soviet
Divisions......................9..............................33
Manpower...........270,000.......................570,000
Tanks.......................200..........................2,200
Aircraft.....................560.........................2,500
* Coox, "Nomonhan" p. 84. Some sources give somewhat higher figures for the Japanese, but I'm using these for internal consistency

In other words, the Japanese were setting themselves up for defeat. Not only would the Kwantung Army have been hard-pressed to hold its ground in a purely defensive setting, but thanks to General Ueda the onus was actually on them to attack and destroy anything that violated Manchuria's frontiers. Given this aggressive approach and the innumerable instances of Japanese-Soviet conflict along the borders it was only a matter of time before Khalkhin Gol or a Khalkhin Gol-style battle took place. All things considered the responsibility for the defeat probably rested more squarely on the shoulders of Ueda than Komatsubara and the 23rd Division, who performed admirably given the circumstances they were dealt.

While we can rightfully lambaste Japanese mid-level officers for singlehandedly starting wars in both China and Manchuria on their own accord, we should also remember that at least some senior figures seemed bent on it as well. Fortunately for Japan, in the aftermath of the Khalkhin Gol debacle Ueda was sacked and replaced with the far more level-headed Umezu, who ran a 'tight ship' during his tenure.
 
Trying my best to look through the eyes of observers on the ground and in that era it appears the Japanese are highly regarded for their tenacity, ruggedness and ferocity. Marine Colonel Carlson for one observed them in battle in China and seems to have much respect for their ability to march long distance over broken terrain in harsh weather, he lauded the lightness of their weaponry to aid in their mobility, but I think he saw their weakness too. Beyond their rigidity to stick to plan or refuse to improvise once contact is made and the plan falters, the Japanese were arrogantly conquerors. The IJA suffered from becoming an anti-insurgency Army, it failed to learn lessons in war fighting it would need to oppose the USSR, a genuine KMT Army equipped and trained fully to the standards the Germans advised or further afield the USA. It is unfair to say they were not professional, but it is fair to say they were too inflexible in their methods. They proved a cunning, audacious and bedeviling foe throughout the war, but their fate was sealed far beyond weapons or tactic, it was determined by logistics and ultimately by the fact that they could oppress China but never truly conquer it, they more they squeezed the more it slipped from their grasp.
 

Deleted member 1487

The German General Staff was likely the best in the world, with only the British Imperial General Staff. The IJA was far too deeply involved in politics, with the Army (and Navy) having the ability to bring down a government at will. This led to any number of questionable political AND military decisions.

Below the General Staff/HQ level the IJA had a rather bizarre mix of strict, often brutal, discipline and open defiance. Field grade officers in the Kwantung Army were almost directly responsible for getting the Japanese into a war with China AND the USSR at the time time in 1938, and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which was the final straw in bring the Japanese into total war with China was a local decisions (think about that for a second; a LOCAL commander was directly responsible for starting the entire Pacific War, not by accident, but intentionally).

There were a number of exceptional IJA senior officers (Yamashita , as an example, was brilliant) but overall the officer corps was not only equal to the Heer's but probably less professional than the IJN.
Imperial general staff? Of all of the British services the British army was not the most competent in WW2 especially early in the war. Later it certainly was effective, but then I'd probably rate the Soviets higher by the time it counted. Otherwise you're right about the IJA.
 
Not very,the IJA had a serious insubordination problem that seriously effected command and control, pretty much making it useless in a large scale battle.
 

Deleted member 1487

Not very,the IJA had a serious insubordination problem that seriously effected command and control, pretty much making it useless in a large scale battle.
How do you figure? They're insubordination problem was a problem in peacetime, in war they followed orders AFAIK.
 

CalBear

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Imperial general staff? Of all of the British services the British army was not the most competent in WW2 especially early in the war. Later it certainly was effective, but then I'd probably rate the Soviets higher by the time it counted. Otherwise you're right about the IJA.
Stavka?

Really?

IMO it was worse than a joke. Politics above plan, even when the Red Army was rolling up the Heer. Stalin, as head of Stavka, actually delayed the capture of Berlin in order to ensure that that the WAllies didn't cross the Elbe. Prior to that time, Stavka was the source of the "No Retreat" orders that allowed the Heer to conduct a series of incredible double envelopments that came close to gutting the Red Army.

The best Red Army staff officers wound up with the brains being exposed to daylight during the purges.
 

CalBear

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How do you figure? They're insubordination problem was a problem in peacetime, in war they followed orders AFAIK.
Not really. The massacre at the Tenaru River was the direct result of Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao (this is the same officer who was scheduled to lead the amphibious assault on Midway) violating specific orders and attacking 11,000 Marine with ONE battalion of his 28th Infantry Regiment, not even waiting for the other two battalions to arrive on scene. He started the day with 917 men (including around 100 who were leaf at the landing site to await the rest of the regiment), his replacement (Ichiki was killed or committed Seppuku, accounts vary) finished the day with 123 men. 777 men in the command were KIA, 15 were taken prisoner (this was the first time the U.S. encounter the Japanese practice of refusing to surrender, or faking a surrender as ruse to lure U.S. troops to their death). That was just the first example involving U.S. troops, there were many more, especially when field and/or company grade officers refused order to fall back to new defensive positions and conducted pointless, hopeless "Banzai Charges" that hastened the defeat of defending garrisons.

This literally lasted until the end of the war. It was a small group of field grade officers that attempted to capture and destroy the recording the Emperor had made for broadcast announcing the surrender. They not only were willing to disobey their direct CO, but the EMPEROR.
 

Deleted member 1487

Stavka?

Really?

IMO it was worse than a joke. Politics above plan, even when the Red Army was rolling up the Heer. Stalin, as head of Stavka, actually delayed the capture of Berlin in order to ensure that that the WAllies didn't cross the Elbe. Prior to that time, Stavka was the source of the "No Retreat" orders that allowed the Heer to conduct a series of incredible double envelopments that came close to gutting the Red Army.

The best Red Army staff officers wound up with the brains being exposed to daylight during the purges.
STAVKA was the high command of all the military, I'm talking about the army general staff and don't mean in 1941. In 1942 and on it was highly professional even with Stalin meddling via STAVKA. Stalin's interference was the problem, not the organization itself, much like Hitler ordering crazy nonsense from 1943 on. And how did STAVKA delay the capture of Berlin? AFAIK they rushed it to force though and capture it before the Wallies. How did the Soviets ensure the US wouldn't cross the Elbe?

Granted the best guys in the 1930s were killed in the purges, but a new generation of officers came up in the 1940s who were competent:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Vasilevsky#World_War_II

The British general staff did not shower themselves in glory based on the performance of the British army. The British high command, the level above general staff of the army, though did become highly competent eventually, though Churchill would interfere quite a bit.

Not really. The massacre at the Tenaru River was the direct result of Colonel Ichiki Kiyonao (this is the same officer who was scheduled to lead the amphibious assault on Midway) violating specific orders and attacking 11,000 Marine with ONE battalion of his 28th Infantry Regiment, not even waiting for the other two battalions to arrive on scene. He started the day with 917 men (including around 100 who were leaf at the landing site to await the rest of the regiment), his replacement (Ichiki was killed or committed Seppuku, accounts vary) finished the day with 123 men. 777 men in the command were KIA, 15 were taken prisoner (this was the first time the U.S. encounter the Japanese practice of refusing to surrender, or faking a surrender as ruse to lure U.S. troops to their death). That was just the first example involving U.S. troops, there were many more, especially when field and/or company grade officers refused order to fall back to new defensive positions and conducted pointless, hopeless "Banzai Charges" that hastened the defeat of defending garrisons.

This literally lasted until the end of the war. It was a small group of field grade officers that attempted to capture and destroy the recording the Emperor had made for broadcast announcing the surrender. They not only were willing to disobey their direct CO, but the EMPEROR.
Alright, I stand corrected.
 

CalBear

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STAVKA was the high command of all the military, I'm talking about the army general staff and don't mean in 1941. In 1942 and on it was highly professional even with Stalin meddling via STAVKA. Stalin's interference was the problem, not the organization itself, much like Hitler ordering crazy nonsense from 1943 on. And how did STAVKA delay the capture of Berlin? AFAIK they rushed it to force though and capture it before the Wallies. How did the Soviets ensure the US wouldn't cross the Elbe?

Granted the best guys in the 1930s were killed in the purges, but a new generation of officers came up in the 1940s who were competent:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aleksandr_Vasilevsky#World_War_II

The British general staff did not shower themselves in glory based on the performance of the British army. The British high command, the level above general staff of the army, though did become highly competent eventually, though Churchill would interfere quite a bit.


Alright, I stand corrected.
If you are going to push into the middle of the War then the most professional Command Staff was the American Joint Chiefs. The German General Staff by then had been effectively destroyed by Hitler's on-going interference, the British had Churchill with his "one brilliant, followed by one idiotic" interference, and the added problems caused by Monty and Harris' unwillingness for follow orders.
 

Deleted member 1487

If you are going to push into the middle of the War then the most professional Command Staff was the American Joint Chiefs. The German General Staff by then had been effectively destroyed by Hitler's on-going interference, the British had Churchill with his "one brilliant, followed by one idiotic" interference, and the added problems caused by Monty and Harris' unwillingness for follow orders.
Right, but I think we are talking about different things? The German equivalent would be OKW, the Soviet equivalent would be STAVKA, and the British Joint Chiefs for the total armed forces. OKW was never competent to my knowledge thanks to Hitler taking over in 1938 and then having a malign influence on OKH from about 1942 on. So certainly we can't say that the German high command was anywhere near the best in the world, even in 1939. Now you said the general staff for the Germans, which I understand to be the army general staff; then the British general staff at the start of the war and probably through 1942 was not particularly good. I don't think they were particularly great ever in the war. I'd argue that the Soviet army general staff, the step below STAVKA was better than the British general staff in 1942 and on despite Stalin's interference via STAVKA. Not sure I'd really rank the US military Joint Chiefs as the world's best, they were certainly competent by 1943 and in good all around by 1944-45, certainly better than OKW by a mile and maybe better than the Brits. STAVKA might though have given them fits if they went up against each other in 1945.

Harris AFAIK never disobeyed orders, but Monty was...well Monty and he took over the British army general staff post-war.

So what did you mean by the 'german general staff'? OKH? And at what point do you think they were the best and then stopped being the best?
 

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Right, but I think we are talking about different things? The German equivalent would be OKW, the Soviet equivalent would be STAVKA, and the British Joint Chiefs for the total armed forces. OKW was never competent to my knowledge thanks to Hitler taking over in 1938 and then having a malign influence on OKH from about 1942 on. So certainly we can't say that the German high command was anywhere near the best in the world, even in 1939. Now you said the general staff for the Germans, which I understand to be the army general staff; then the British general staff at the start of the war and probably through 1942 was not particularly good. I don't think they were particularly great ever in the war. I'd argue that the Soviet army general staff, the step below STAVKA was better than the British general staff in 1942 and on despite Stalin's interference via STAVKA. Not sure I'd really rank the US military Joint Chiefs as the world's best, they were certainly competent by 1943 and in good all around by 1944-45, certainly better than OKW by a mile and maybe better than the Brits. STAVKA might though have given them fits if they went up against each other in 1945.

Harris AFAIK never disobeyed orders, but Monty was...well Monty and he took over the British army general staff post-war.

So what did you mean by the 'german general staff'? OKH? And at what point do you think they were the best and then stopped being the best?
The German Army Staff was brilliant until early 1941, when Hitler's influence overtook the decades of professional training. Soviet officers training was never to the planning level of the Heer, far too much instruction at even Frunze were political in nature, and the inclusion of political officers at every level of the planning staff reduced the overall quality of both the work produced and the planning itself (something that was regularly punctuated by the elimination of some of the best brains that Frunze produced).

Harris was justly famous for following Nelson's example of not hearing (or in Nelson's case putting the spyglass up to his blind eye) orders that he didn't want to follow. He failed to dedicate Bomber Command to the "oil campaign" as instructed, claiming that his forces were not effective at that sort of attack (ironically Bomber Command was actually spectacularly successful in the role, the same sort of pathfinder target marking used against city centers proved excellent when used against refineries and storage farms when given the opportunity). If Harris' instructions were not "kill German civilians and burn down their homes" he did his utmost to find a way out of compliance. He was true believer in the dehousing/morale breaking theory.
 

Deleted member 1487

The German Army Staff was brilliant until early 1941, when Hitler's influence overtook the decades of professional training. Soviet officers training was never to the planning level of the Heer, far too much instruction at even Frunze were political in nature, and the inclusion of political officers at every level of the planning staff reduced the overall quality of both the work produced and the planning itself (something that was regularly punctuated by the elimination of some of the best brains that Frunze produced).
No argument about the Soviet system...until 1942. Then commissars were largely excluded from decision making and purging stopped except if someone really screwed up.

Harris was justly famous for following Nelson's example of not hearing (or in Nelson's case putting the spyglass up to his blind eye) orders that he didn't want to follow. He failed to dedicate Bomber Command to the "oil campaign" as instructed, claiming that his forces were not effective at that sort of attack (ironically Bomber Command was actually spectacularly successful in the role, the same sort of pathfinder target marking used against city centers proved excellent when used against refineries and storage farms when given the opportunity). If Harris' instructions were not "kill German civilians and burn down their homes" he did his utmost to find a way out of compliance. He was true believer in the dehousing/morale breaking theory.
Gotcha, I thought you meant he was outright insubordinate, not 'interpreting' orders as he wanted and making arguments about why he couldn't do something that weren't true. Plenty of high level officers do things like that in war. Harris certainly missed out on winning the war in 1943 with the weapon he crafted in Bomber Command.
 
The U.S probably had the best general staff especially by the end of the war. FDR also meddled a lot less than Hitler, Churchill, Mussolini, or Stalin did.
 
How professional was the IJA compared to the Heer/Waffen SS during WW2?

Was there anything the IJA performed better at than their German counterparts?


I would highlight a lack of discipline at all levels of the Japanese army. At the top they were too involved in politics, in the middle there was too much plotting, factionalism and willingness to attempt coups as well as start wars with foreign powers. Meanwhile at the bottom the soldiers appear to have lived a rotten life and behaved poorly when exposed to civilians or prisoners.

Despite that both the German and Japanese armies can probably be fairly credited with being willing to innovate and pretty flexible in their actions.

Equipment wise the Germans were superior, along with having a better logistics system. But the Japanese could probably function on less which had its advantages.

The issue of discipline is I think the greatest factor and makes the Japanese far less 'professional'.
 
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