Not that I'd want the tail to wag the dog by building ships to keep yards open, but surely the postwar RAN was or should have been big enough to avoid the boom and bust building cycle.

I don't think so really. We seem to have averaged about a dozen or so surface combatants. If we go back to, say, the mid '80s, you had the three Perth (Charles F Adams) class destroyers, four Adelaide (Oliver Hazard Perry) class frigates, and six home-built River class destroyer escorts (the eldest, Yarra, paid off in 1985), for a surface force of 13 ships. By '95, only two of the latter were left, plus the three destroyers and six frigates (two newest ones built in Australia), for a surface force of 11 ships. At the beginning of 2005, those destroyers were all gone, so you had an all frigate force - the six Adelaides and six of the Anzacs. The last two Anzacs came at the expense of two of the Adelaides. And now, of course, we have the three Hobarts and eight Anzacs, with a plan to replace the latter with nine Hunters. Long story short, I don't see how about 12 ships is sufficient a fleet size to have an efficient-ish, sustainable naval shipbuilding industry, even allowing for the building of other vessels. I think you'd need at least 16 and preferably 18 warships to make that happen. That means you could commission a new one every 18 months or so and keep them in service for about 24-25 years. That's doable.
 
Australia has long been a land oriented power, even since colonisation in fact. We have never been a maritime orientated nation. We have never had a maritime strategy until the last 10 years. We have built and maintained a land army, which is the envy of many other nations but we don't have a navy of similar proportions.
Eh, looking at peace time expenditure...
1911-1912, Army 3.1M Pounds, Navy 2.4M Pounds (Per Australia Year Book 1913, Section XXVIII, Subsection6, Table 2, Navy might skew high due to construction of the almost entire RAN from scratch)
1933-1934 Army 1.69M Pounds, Navy 1.69M Pounds (Per Australia Year Book 1935, Chapter XVI pp. 456)
1963-1964 Army 79M Pounds, Navy 56M Pounds (Per Australia Year Book 1965, pp. 1196, Army might skew high due to Vietnam)

(Incidentally, 1911-1912 total Australian defence expenditure adjusted to per capita terms was five times that of Japan, a bit more than Germany and a bit less than France...)

A VERY quick survey suggests that naval vs army budgets have usually been comparable during peace-time/low level combat situations. The supposed "land orientation" I suspect is one part ANZAC myth and one part "PBI with rifle" being easy to raise in a pinch (WW1, WW2) or cheap to deploy/an easy token effort to support allies (Korea, Vietnam).
 
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Riain

Banned
I don't think so really. We seem to have averaged about a dozen or so surface combatants. If we go back to, say, the mid '80s, you had the three Perth (Charles F Adams) class destroyers, four Adelaide (Oliver Hazard Perry) class frigates, and six home-built River class destroyer escorts (the eldest, Yarra, paid off in 1985), for a surface force of 13 ships. By '95, only two of the latter were left, plus the three destroyers and six frigates (two newest ones built in Australia), for a surface force of 11 ships. At the beginning of 2005, those destroyers were all gone, so you had an all frigate force - the six Adelaides and six of the Anzacs. The last two Anzacs came at the expense of two of the Adelaides. And now, of course, we have the three Hobarts and eight Anzacs, with a plan to replace the latter with nine Hunters. Long story short, I don't see how about 12 ships is sufficient a fleet size to have an efficient-ish, sustainable naval shipbuilding industry, even allowing for the building of other vessels. I think you'd need at least 16 and preferably 18 warships to make that happen. That means you could commission a new one every 18 months or so and keep them in service for about 24-25 years. That's doable.

In the Cold War we built 3 V class gun destroyers, 6 River class frigates and 2 Adelaide class ffgs plus cats and dogs like an oiler and destroyer tender. It wouldn't take much to fill this out to an almost continuous build: the 4th V class, the 4 LST Mk2, the 4 DDLs, a 2nd oiler should keep the 60s and 70s fully employed.
 
In the Cold War we built 3 V class gun destroyers, 6 River class frigates and 2 Adelaide class ffgs plus cats and dogs like an oiler and destroyer tender. It wouldn't take much to fill this out to an almost continuous build: the 4th V class, the 4 LST Mk2, the 4 DDLs, a 2nd oiler should keep the 60s and 70s fully employed.

It's not massively implausible, but it would take a not insignificant political commitment across governments and it wouldn't be a big vote winner. Could be done. Then you have the challenge though of the opportunity cost - that is, you can't spend the money you'd need on something else. And the crewing. That would be a tough one too.
 

McPherson

Banned
it would take a not insignificant political commitment across governments and it wouldn't be a big vote winner.
The PPF and HDF factions have to agree on a navy. Then the fight is "what kind of navy"?

Subs or surface ships: only recently have the two factions decided on subs. Ever ask oneself, "Why subs?":
 
The PPF and HDF factions have to agree on a navy. Then the fight is "what kind of navy"?

Subs or surface ships: only recently have the two factions decided on subs. Ever ask oneself, "Why subs?":
Subs make life difficult for anybody attempting to attack Australia. Suddenly they need to train their forces in ASW. ASW is one of the most difficult tasks facing a navy. Subs are hard to find. They are hard to destroy. The Ocean is a vast area in which to hide. Life for a potential aggressor suddenly becomes a great deal harder. Submarines are a great deterrent force for Australia to have and to use. They can attack a long way from Australian shores and they can make an attacking force vulnerable.
 
A VERY quick survey suggests that naval vs army budgets have usually been comparable during peace-time/low level combat situations. The supposed "land orientation" I suspect is one part ANZAC myth and one part "PBI with rifle" being easy to raise in a pinch (WW1, WW2) or cheap to deploy/an easy token effort to support allies (Korea, Vietnam).
I have been talking about lack of a maritime mentality. The RAN has been a relatively expensive purchase throughout it's life but when asked, about which force is the most famous, nine times out of ten, the punters would point towards the Army - the ANZACs of fame and myth. We named our national rememberance day "ANZAC Day" not "RAN Day" or "RAAF Day". Sure, they their sacrifices are well remembered but they are folded into rememberance for the Army's sacrifice. It was the ANZACs who stormed ashore at Gallipoli, the Army on the Western Front, the Army in the Western Desert and toiling up the golden staircase and onto the Kakoda Track, it was the Army at Kapyong, Long Tan, in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq and numerous other peace-keeping missions. Yes, they were PBI but they were our PBI, no one elses.
 
The PPF and HDF factions have to agree on a navy. Then the fight is "what kind of navy"?

Subs or surface ships: only recently have the two factions decided on subs. Ever ask oneself, "Why subs?":

Really? So why do we have six Collins and before them six Oberons? I'm sorry, you might know about submarines, but you're not showing much knowledge of Australian defence thinking.
 
Why does Australia now have a submarine centered navy?

McPherson

Banned
Really? So why do we have six Collins and before them six Oberons? I'm sorry, you might know about submarines, but you're not showing much knowledge of Australian defence thinking.
Read the ...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided. Current contributor.pp30-50 and then we will discuss how much I know about Australian Defense Thinking. Pay close attention to the infrastructure, logistics, hydrographic and other battlespace characteristics issues.

The argument about and for submarines is actually WWII lessons learned; specifically USN WWII lessons learned in the Southwest Pacific Ocean Area as applied to sea denial and control when the enemy has absolute naval and air superiority which the Australian political class and RAN observed and absorbed. Prior to that experience, what was the Australian policy and attitude on subs and the RAN in general? Muddled and confused.
 
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Riain

Banned
It's not massively implausible, but it would take a not insignificant political commitment across governments and it wouldn't be a big vote winner. Could be done. Then you have the challenge though of the opportunity cost - that is, you can't spend the money you'd need on something else. And the crewing. That would be a tough one too.

The coalition were in power from 49 to 73 and again from 75 to 83 so presumably they could make it happen from a political standpoint. The opportunity cost is tougher, the Govt didn't buy the 4th V class DD nor the 4th DDG although they did build 2 Rivers to replace the Voyager and Army 8 Balikpapan LCH to replace their 4 LST when the Navy wouldn't build the LST Mk2.

Ideally in my mind we'd build 4 V class, 4 Rivers, 4 LST, 4 DDLs which would be more in the vein of the Type 21 frigate because we bought 4 DDGs from the US. I'd also prefer if we bought Barbel class SSK from the US rather than the Oberons. But that's just me.

The PoD would be Menzies merging all 4 Defence Departments in 1958 as a result of the Moreshead report recommendations.
 
As I said, you know about submarines. What I’ve seen of that work I appreciated. But the decisions that led to the Colllins - along with the not inconsiderable problems that plagues it - must be understood in the context of the politics. That’s where your thinking is lacking.
 
Politics? What do I know about politics?

McPherson

Banned
As I said, you know about submarines. What I’ve seen of that work I appreciated. But the decisions that led to the Colllins - along with the not inconsiderable problems that plagues it - must be understood in the context of the politics. That’s where your thinking is lacking.
Howso? Seems to me, that the politics is clear enough. I am not unfamiliar with the pork barrel.
A factory was built in 1907 to manufacture steam torpedoes for the Navy. The torpedo factory became a major employer in the Newport area, as Rhode Island congressmen protected it from competition. The Torpedo Station designed the Mark VI magnetic influence fuze for torpedoes during the 1920s.[3] The Naval Torpedo Station researched and tested underwater weaponry through World Wars I and II, creating additional facilities on Rose Island, Fox Island, and Gould Island. In 1951, the station on Goat Island was reorganized:
Point is that politics was a prime problem behind the US Navy torpedo scandal.

The Great Torpedo Scandal: Lessons Learned

E. W. BLISS CO. v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | US Law ...

Because of Congress and the short-sightedness of politicians... The Mark XIII torpedo, designed by the Bliss Leavitt company and NOT Goat Island was made in two batches. The last of the 200 fish made by Bliss Leavitt were used at Coral Sea with fair to good results. They worked and HIJMS Shōhō sank as a result of some of those Bliss Leavitt torpedoes blowing out her bottom.

But then Goat Island made the second batch and the further follow-ons. The Rhode Island Congress cretin delegation pushed for the government arsenal to be the sole source supplier in the early 1930s. Now that was not just the Mark XIII air dropped weapon, but the Mark XIV submarine torpedo and the Mark XV destroyer weapon. Stinking politics. I cover that in the SAME section in (...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided. Current contributor.) where I pointed out that Darwin was impossible as a base because of hydrography and no railroad and poor roads from Alice Springs existed (political decisions not to build or improve.), The Battle of the Coral Sea that led to Midway, historically to the USN, is especially bitter because of the break in the torpedo production runs occurred in the national stockpile right at the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea. All of the Bliss Leavitt fish were used up and now; the only fish left were the Goat Island "civil service made" products. Stinking politicians made that decision without understanding, that you always use TWO independent sources of production and proof to check each other as to quality control and test-evaluation.
“let’s build it here,” has been done a bunch of times. Sometimes the product is eventually admirable. It’s construction is fraught, corrupt, political, anti-union mobilisation, and on the whole a sup to regions: Australian politicians are involved.
Some 57 American airmen died to drop torpedo weapons that failed to function at Midway. Another 160 or so died in support or in attempts to drop faulty bombs also developed out of those accursed Goat Island workshops.

Want to hear about the uniformed politician who managed to screw up the Wildcat because he would not listen to end-user's complaints or to Grumman Aircraft? Another 50 airmen died at Coral Sea and Midway because of "politics". The United States Navy Air Service was practically massacred to achieve anything at all at Coral Sea and Midway because of "politics" that I supposedly don't understand.

And don't get me started about the 3000 American submariners who died because of this bastard uniformed politician and apple polisher who failed to make sure the weapons effectors worked when he was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance when the weapons were "tested".

Upthread I posted a video about how Australian politicians, both uniformed and in the government, are SCREWING UP Australia's latest submarine buy. Might want to watch it.

I'll post it again in case it was missed.

 
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How many times does it need repeating for you to understand? Australia is not America. American examples are examples of American incompetence, not Australian incompetence. A Youtube video is very poor evidence that you understand Australian procurement processes. Australia is a unique environment different to America. The SW Pacific in WWII is not the SW Pacific in 2021. Things have changed and changed markedly, in politics and military matters.

Indeed, Indonesia has just announced the likely loss of one of their submarines and has request Australian help. A friend who is a submariner has shaken his head and said it is more than likely exceeded it's crush depth and is unrecoverable, with a loss of all hands on board. Australia was once quite suspicious of Indonesia and had been for over 40 years.

I remember when the Dibb Report was issue in 1986. I did my Master of Defence Studies at ADFA the following year and was assigned to write a review of the report and it's implications to regional stability. I contacted the Indonesian Embassy and asked to speak to their defence attache and asked for a comment. He was rather bewildered by the Dibb Report. It supposedly had a secret section which detailed how much Indonesia was a danger to Australian security. Australia had a long history in Indonesian affairs. Our union movement had refused to load Dutch ships with WWII munitions after the war because the munitions were to be used to suppress the Indonesian Resistance in the Civil War. Something that Indonesia was always grateful for.

Our conservative government at the time, under Menzies believed that Sukarno was a closet Communist and railed against the Unions on the waterfront. The munitions weren't loaded. Sukarno believed in Konfrontasi - a policy of confronting the colonial powers and forcing them to relinquish their holdings. It worked in West New Guinea against the Dutch. If failed against the Malaysians backed by the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Sukarno hated Australia as a consequence. Then Sukarno was ousted in the Coup and counter-Coup of 1965.

Australia, still under a conservative government remained suspicious of Jakarta after Sukarno was replaced by Suharto. We just didn't trust them. That suspicion lasted until Suharto was ousted and afterwards. The Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor didn't help matters. We have become less suspicious under an ALP Government and have signed a defence pact with Indonesia. We helped oust them from East Timor. We reinforced that by the provision of a billion dollars of aid after the Boxing Day Tsunami.

Indonesia in the meantime had focused it's attention away from Australia towards China. The Indonesians had a long history of animosity towards the Chinese. Australia was basically ignored until the Dibb report refocused it's attention south eastward. The Indonesian defence attache didn't understand why we were so worried by Indonesian intentions. Indonesia was no threat, according to him, to Australia as long as Australia didn't interfere in Indonesian interests.

Indonesia is key to Australia's defence. Without bases in Indonesia any aggressor would have an extremely difficult time attacking the "top end" of Australia, as the Japanese proved in WWII. All rhetoric to the contrary, China is not a direct threat to Australian territory. China is over 5,000 kilometres from Australia. China lacks the long distance experience to mount such a massive operation. It lacks the support ships to maintain a task force that far from home. It lacks ships with the range to directly threaten Australia. The COLLINS class complicates any aggressor's efforts to threaten Australia. ASW is a massive undertaking and the Chinese lack the experience in such operations.

Australia does, however, have a stake in the South China sea dispute. The COLLINS class allows us to exercise that. It has the range and the ability to operate undetected there. We are worried by the possibility of China trying to take over Taiwan in the face of a US response.
 
This thread is a bit of a mess. The problem with defence in Australia is pretty simple - we combine a lack of specific threats with a general reluctance to spend money but also some LARPist fantasies from our political leaders. The end result is a defence force that can do a little bit of everything but which if actually required to fight a high intensity wore would be unable to function for more than a month or two due to the absurdly shallow force structure.

The Collins Class is a very good boat if you want to have a long-range conventional submarine, but which cost more than it should have. There's a lot of emotion in that debate due to the questions of fundamental Australian industrial competence and the limited number of options we allow ourselves due to spending, but I don't think there's much serious debate these days as to the issues with the program. It was a mess that was eventually fixed and which delivered a good boat. Given that we don't have an active need for it the questions regarding the trade off between production and numbers versus bespoke capabilities is pretty abstract.

The nuclear debate is, I think, missing the point. We can talk for hours and years about the many differences between the two type of subs but the reality is that without a clear overriding mission it's extremely difficult to say with certainty what we should go for. In terms of what they actually do on a day to day basis, there's no difference. Australia is a rich country and would have a reasonably to very good boat irrespective of its type, capable of cruising around the region undetected by the likes of the ASEAN fleets. Beyond that is hypothetical - are we actually planning on fighting China in the Taiwan Straits? If so, conventional is better. Or are we expecting to have to fight to defend our trade routes not just in the SCS but around the continent? Nuclear probably is better there, though in part for the oft-citied industrial advantages we'd gain by just buying one. 'Sovereign Industrial Capabilities' sound good, but realistically we wouldn't have the time to build new boats during any plausible modern conflict. IMO there's no real end to this debate until we face a very specific threat, as a military that is unable to be geared to specific mission(s) is always going to be one without straightforward ways to analyse what makes a good or appropriate capability.

The ADF has not played a crucial role in Australia's security since at least Konfrontasi, as we have not been meaningfully threatened since then. The flag waving idiocy of following the US has been a waste of money and has had zero impact on the US' commitment to Australia - all expeditionism is the LARPist fantasy previously mentioned. It is unneeded but also unthreatening, and easily dispensed with whenever necessary. Defence in Australia is fundamentally not taken seriously by anyone outside of a small sphere of academics in and around Russell Hill because fundamentally it is not a pressing issue - though this might change sooner than we'd like. Until then, the capability debate will be a thoroughly cultural debate and no different to debates around ANZAC Day or indeed Australia Day.
 
"LARP"? What is that when it is at home?

The ADF has not had an active part to play in Australia's actual defence since WWII and then it was primarily involved in New Guinea and the islands, pushing the Japanese back with US help (Americans invariably believe they single-handed defeated the Japanese but in 1941-1943 it was Australia which contributed the bulk of Allied forces in the SW Pacific). Konfrontasi was a minor bun fight in Malaysian territory. Indonesia was never a threat to Australia or it's territories, all rhetoric to one side.
 
LARP = Live Action Role Play.

Traditionally done by students and teenagers in homemade capes throwing tennis balls and shouting 'magic missile' whilst running around in woods

In this case directed in derogatory fashion at politicians who wish to posture about their military without credible force to back it up
 
My military knowledge is only gleaned from public access information. I do however remember very clearly some of the political shenanigans our political parties have carried on with and the refusal to fund our defence in a non partisan manner is disappointing. Some of our purchases have had me scratching my head until the public access information catches up with true capabilities, a perfect case in point was the Purchase of the F-18F and G Super Hornets when the F-35 was looking at being late. It was described in the media as being a hedge against the F-35 not working out when the facts seem to show the ADF was more worried about the F-111 no longer being capable against SAM systems proliferating in the region and supporting a small fleet of aircraft with reduced spares availability. The fact the purchase was through the USN seems to indicate that the advice given that the USN was planning on operating the two types together concurrently was also important.

Now this has nothing to do with the Collins class and everything at the same time. The Collins class had a difficult gestation and was not a happy experience especially with proprietary information transfers etc and sadly I think the DCNS purchase has similar issues. The Kockums submarines had excellent reputations in the 80's and looked like a good deal. The fact the subs are still highly effective is testament to a lot of work by both the ADF and support from the USN. Yes the contractors got paid lots but a submarine is an area denial weapon from the second it leaves port and very very important for keeping any potential adversaries at arms reach.

On another note I would like to say Indonesia is our largest neighbour and one of our best trading partners, The Indonesian Navy has likely lost 53 gallant submariners and have my condolences.
 
LARP = Live Action Role Play.

Traditionally done by students and teenagers in homemade capes throwing tennis balls and shouting 'magic missile' whilst running around in woods

In this case directed in derogatory fashion at politicians who wish to posture about their military without credible force to back it up

Yep, a weak jab from the left who don’t really believe in investing in defence at all. ;)
 
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Oh dear. I get that you’re very passionate. I feel for those poor American submariners who died back in WW2 too, really I do. But the relevance is lacking. You just keep missing the point that for all your thoughts on the Collins project it didn’t happen in a vacuum. You have shown you don’t understand Australian politics around defence. You just don’t. And you don’t care to. Australians with even a passing interest in politics know there were serious shortcomings and cost overruns with the Collins subs. Those of us who post here and have an interest in defence know more, of course. And you’re not really shedding any light on facts we didn’t already know, while your opinions are just that - your opinions, devoid of any understanding of the Australian context.


Howso? Seems to me, that the politics is clear enough. I am not unfamiliar with the pork barrel.

Point is that politics was a prime problem behind the US Navy torpedo scandal.

The Great Torpedo Scandal: Lessons Learned

E. W. BLISS CO. v. UNITED STATES. | Supreme Court | US Law ...

Because of Congress and the short-sightedness of politicians... The Mark XIII torpedo, designed by the Bliss Leavitt company and NOT Goat Island was made in two batches. The last of the 200 fish made by Bliss Leavitt were used at Coral Sea with fair to good results. They worked and HIJMS Shōhō sank as a result of some of those Bliss Leavitt torpedoes blowing out her bottom.

But then Goat Island made the second batch and the further follow-ons. The Rhode Island Congress cretin delegation pushed for the government arsenal to be the sole source supplier in the early 1930s. Now that was not just the Mark XIII air dropped weapon, but the Mark XIV submarine torpedo and the Mark XV destroyer weapon. Stinking politics. I cover that in the SAME section in (...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided. Current contributor.) where I pointed out that Darwin was impossible as a base because of hydrography and no railroad and poor roads from Alice Springs existed (political decisions not to build or improve.), The Battle of the Coral Sea that led to Midway, historically to the USN, is especially bitter because of the break in the torpedo production runs occurred in the national stockpile right at the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea. All of the Bliss Leavitt fish were used up and now; the only fish left were the Goat Island "civil service made" products. Stinking politicians made that decision without understanding, that you always use TWO independent sources of production and proof to check each other as to quality control and test-evaluation.

Some 57 American airmen died to drop torpedo weapons that failed to function at Midway. Another 160 or so died in support or in attempts to drop faulty bombs also developed out of those accursed Goat Island workshops.

Want to hear about the uniformed politician who managed to screw up the Wildcat because he would not listen to end-user's complaints or to Grumman Aircraft? Another 50 airmen died at Coral Sea and Midway because of "politics". The United States Navy Air Service was practically massacred to achieve anything at all at Coral Sea and Midway because of "politics" that I supposedly don't understand.

And don't get me started about the 3000 American submariners who died because of this bastard uniformed politician and apple polisher who failed to make sure the weapons effectors worked when he was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance when the weapons were "tested".

Upthread I posted a video about how Australian politicians, both uniformed and in the government, are SCREWING UP Australia's latest submarine buy. Might want to watch it.

I'll post it again in case it was missed.

 
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Riain

Banned
The fact the purchase was through the USN seems to indicate that the advice given that the USN was planning on operating the two types together concurrently was also important.

You can't buy the Super Hornet from the USAF, it's a USN plane so thats who you buy it through via FMS regardless of how you intend to operate it.
 
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