How not to build a submarine. The Collins Class.

[McPherson]

It has long been my contention that the Australian government, of the day, made one fundamental error when it chose a vendor for its first indigenous submarine project.

RAND.

Kockums, the core designer and vendor for the Collins Class submarine project, had no tradition or history of building a submarine designed for long endurance operations in the Pacific ocean environment. Nor was its tech base and experience, compatible with either British or American practice. The blunt facts of the situation as the Australian government went into the submarine building business, was that it was an inexperienced nation trying to learn how to build the most complex weapon system afloat, short of an aircraft carrier with no experience of its own at all in the management or process for such an undertaking.

And to be frank, one should have wondered why it choose Sweden, of all the possible vendors?

The history of submarine manufacture and operation does not list Sweden as a prime candidate of first notice.

The usual suspects: France, Germany and the UK were available, but their bids were rejected.

And despite the whitewash of the program since then: the actual life cycle price operating costs to fix these gold plated turkeys is an eye popper. Not even the Americans have a blow-out per unit life cycle cost this big and they are legendary for their programs going off budget.

MOO...

a. Take a look at the environment in which the system operates. In this case the western Pacific basin and the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos and the east Asia littoral waters are an extremely challenging submarine environment, by far the worst operations area on earth for an operator to conduct naval patrol missions by submarines.
b. Develop a list of criteria for what the nation expects it submarine force to accomplish in peace and war.
c. Start asking friendly nations about the true STAGGERING costs of operating submarines, from initial industrial startup to life cycle maintenance, to human costs, to institutional training and education maintenance, to just plain fixing the inevitable day to day goofs.
d. Develop a real budget from c.
e. Sell the program and get the navy, the professional bureaucracy and then the polity on board for the 3 to 5 decade life of the program.
f. Then submit requests for information.
g. Then draw up the requirements as a formal request for bids.
h. The g. involves bow-waking the construction of a shipyard, the training of a workforce, the creation of satellite industries, and the plank-owning of EVERYTHING from mining the ores and gathering the raw materials to actually making all the components to rolling the end-product out of the assembly shed, to building a submarine base and school to house and train and man the boats and crews.

This is an undertaking that would daunt a major first class power who would be able to launch moon-rockets! For that is the comparable aviation type program in complexity with all of its uncertainties. Building a blue water diesel-electric submarine from practically zero is the functional equivalent to building a moon rocket from the same start point.

A nation which embarks on such an endeavor should select its partner vendors with the greatest of cares with the chief criteria, not being the lowest bids, but which consortium has the greatest proven expertise and most successful track record as submarine builders or operators in an environment most like what the end-user desires? Money is going to be spent and it must be spent wisely.

At the time, there were only three realistic choices. The Germans, the French or the Americans.

Given the politics of the time and the costs and experience, the first end-user choice should have been FRANCE. If the Americans had been possible, then they would be Plan B, as they finally turned out to be in reality.

 

[alspug]

Regardless of what anyone says the Collins class is a superbly functional long range Submarine with excellent weapons and sonar. The process of getting to that point was long and expensive. Realistically the Collins class should have become an evolutionary design with a tranche of 4 subs every 15 years being built etc. The current French Submarine is the most expensive submarine ever designed with 80 billion dollars being earmarked for what is a very troubling program. As for conventional Submarines being built at present the options are few, The Germans make excellent boats with short legs, The French build good subs but every nut and bolt had better be pure gold for the cost. Japan builds probably the worlds best conventional Submarines and is not far away.

I have zero doubt the French Submarine will be as good if not better than a Collins but at a cost of 7.8 billion per submarine we could buy 2 Virginia class Submarines at the same price, Alternatively the Japanese Submarine costs 600 million roughly, even at double that figure the choice of DCNS is highly suspect.

Australia is sadly unable politically to operate the Submarines that would give it the capability it wants, ie nuclear powered mobility. Our Collins class are a threat to any maritime power.

 

[Fred the Great]

Regardless of what anyone says the Collins class is a superbly functional long range Submarine with excellent weapons and sonar. The process of getting to that point was long and expensive. Realistically the Collins class should have become an evolutionary design with a tranche of 4 subs every 15 years being built etc. The current French Submarine is the most expensive submarine ever designed with 80 billion dollars being earmarked for what is a very troubling program. As for conventional Submarines being built at present the options are few, The Germans make excellent boats with short legs, The French build good subs but every nut and bolt had better be pure gold for the cost. Japan builds probably the worlds best conventional Submarines and is not far away.

I have zero doubt the French Submarine will be as good if not better than a Collins but at a cost of 7.8 billion per submarine we could buy 2 Virginia class Submarines at the same price, Alternatively the Japanese Submarine costs 600 million roughly, even at double that figure the choice of DCNS is highly suspect.

Australia is sadly unable politically to operate the Submarines that would give it the capability it wants, ie nuclear powered mobility. Our Collins class are a threat to any maritime power.

Largely agree. A more constructive offering than the OP here, though am not really sure what the point is.

 

[McPherson]

Purely technical answer. No politics.

Regardless of what anyone says the Collins class is a superbly functional long range Submarine with excellent weapons and sonar. The process of getting to that point was long and expensive. Realistically the Collins class should have become an evolutionary design with a tranche of 4 subs every 15 years being built etc. The current French Submarine is the most expensive submarine ever designed with 80 billion dollars being earmarked for what is a very troubling program. As for conventional Submarines being built at present the options are few, The Germans make excellent boats with short legs, The French build good subs but every nut and bolt had better be pure gold for the cost. Japan builds probably the worlds best conventional Submarines and is not far away.

1. The Collins class currently is capable. However, the RIMPAC flashbulb reports on proven capability may give the wrong impression of what is possible with these boats. See 2. (Especially the underlined.).
2. The Collins class was first out the gate. It was to be expected that there would be problems with welds, with sound isolation and with the combat control systems. Buying the subs at the 1985-1990 computer revolution was most unfortunate. These were simple, though expensive back-fit fixes. However, shaft alley seal leakage, harmonics in-balances, the diesel engines, wrong screw selection, completely botched periscope mounting, wrong hull form, (non-correctable by the way.), and botched tail control should have been foreseen before the first hull metal went wet. And there will never be a way to fix that drive train misalignment, either, or actually the sail turbulence fails. Mitigations did / will help, but the boats are floating sound shorts. With full war capability employed and not exercise limited, foreign boats will be able to exploit these factors against the Collins class.
3. Japan's submarines are evolved 3rd generation Barbels. The baseline Soryu uses an all Japanese developed diesel-electric power train propulsion system with a Stirling AIP tertiary creep speed motor and with dense battery (Lithium-ion is speculated as being back-fit as the result of results with the battery in the 11 th boat which tested it.). How much of the combat control systems and weapon effectors is "Japanese" is speculative. When it looks like a duck and quacks Yankee, one starts to look at the red, white, and blue feathers.
4. Best D/E boats? Well, those who are incompetent in the trade are the UK and Germany among the western builders. Sweden is another one. The Netherlands has been out of the business for too long. They would be a start-up. FRANCE is worrisome, because they proposed a nuke boat as their baseline for an Australian D/E model. The current builders in the Pacific, the RoKs and Japan, are the best local vendors aligned with the West. There is little to choose between the two... technically. What problems they represent are NCP issues.
5. Then, there are the Russians. Do not laugh. Their diesel boats are "decent".

I have zero doubt the French Submarine will be as good if not better than a Collins but at a cost of 7.8 billion per submarine we could buy 2 Virginia class Submarines at the same price, Alternatively the Japanese Submarine costs 600 million roughly, even at double that figure the choice of DCNS is highly suspect.

Australia is sadly unable politically to operate the Submarines that would give it the capability it wants, ie nuclear powered mobility. Our Collins class are a threat to any maritime power.

6. NCP about nuclear power. Technically, Australia has little civil nuclear tech based infrastructure to piggyback a fission reactor propulsion or fueling program off. A marine nuclear plant would be an out of nation purchase event as would be its fueling and MAINTENANCE. Look at the problems the UK has with its nuclear fleet. If Australia had bought nuclear boats for the Collins class she would have tied herself almost irrevocably to a foreign navy and lost her independent action options. This has not been a technical route and limitation that Australian naval professionals have been willing to accept, for sound geo-strategic reasons as well as practical technological ones in the past, since WWII.

 

[1Big Rich]

I have zero doubt the French Submarine will be as good if not better than a Collins but at a cost of 7.8 billion per submarine we could buy 2 Virginia class Submarines at the same price, Alternatively the Japanese Submarine costs 600 million roughly, even at double that figure the choice of DCNS is highly suspect.

I thought Soryu (Toryu is the latest, IIRC?) would have been the best choice for a conventional submarine to replace the Collins boats. To your point, if the political paradigm shift can be undertaken, Viriginias would be the best option....

Australia is sadly unable politically to operate the Submarines that would give it the capability it wants, ie nuclear powered mobility. Our Collins class are a threat to any maritime power.

I thought the RAN missed a narrow window of opportunity to acquire some second-hand Los Angeles class boats when the US downsized it's SSN force in the late '90s-early 2000s. Mildly dated, the Global Security article on refuelings and overhauls

SSN-688 Los Angeles-class

www.globalsecurity.org

Looking at the ship list, say the candidates are Phoenix (SSN-702), Boston (SSN-703), Baltimore (SSN-704) and Atlanta (SSN-712); all decommissioned early with only about 17 years of service. If they're given a comprehensive overhaul and refueling to last another 23 years (about 2 years in the yards) the RAN would have had four modern SSNs that would only now be approaching the end of their service lives. They could be disposed of quite easily by sending them into the USN's recycling program.

That window may reopen if the US balks at refueling additional 688-class boats after Cheyenne

Caldwell: Los Angeles-class sub refueling will start with Cheyenne in 2023 | InsideDefense.com

The Navy will begin refueling the first Los Angeles-class submarine starting with the Cheyenne (SSN-773) in 2023, according to the director of the naval nuclear propulsion program.

insidedefense.com

if the USN balks at refueling additional Los Angeles class after Cheyenne.

If the Americans had been possible, then they would be Plan B, as they finally turned out to be in reality.

As the US (IIRC, Electric Boat) was for the Astutes.....

Regards all,

 

[Korlan]

And to be frank, one should have wondered why it choose Sweden, of all the possible vendors?

The history of submarine manufacture and operation does not list Sweden as a prime candidate of first notice.

The usual suspects: France, Germany and the UK were available, but their bids were rejected.

Were the Italians considered as possible suppliers ?

They have been building subs since before WW1, and their boats are generally considered to be good.

 

[McPherson]

Odds and ends.

Were the Italians considered as possible suppliers ?

They have been building subs since before WW1, and their boats are generally considered to be good.

Italy Submarine Import and Export Behavior | NTI

www.nti.org

Fincantieri has not succeeded in its efforts to independently increase submarine exports, despite having entered numerous bids. It entered a bid based on the Sauro-class to replace Australia's Oberon-class vessels, but later withdrew its offer. [9] Similarly, the shipyard was an unsuccessful contender for the South African and Portuguese Agosta and Daphne-class replacement programs. [10] Reportedly, eight Italian submarines were offered to the Taiwanese Navy, which may have been a combination of decommissioned and about to be decommissioned Sauro and older Toti-class units, but ultimately Taiwan preferred to purchase new submarines. [11]

I do not know. Let me look at it. Might be a few days before I have a good answer as to why that happened.

 

[Blue cat]

Regardless of what anyone says the Collins class is a superbly functional long range Submarine with excellent weapons and sonar. The process of getting to that point was long and expensive. Realistically the Collins class should have become an evolutionary design with a tranche of 4 subs every 15 years being built etc. The current French Submarine is the most expensive submarine ever designed with 80 billion dollars being earmarked for what is a very troubling program. As for conventional Submarines being built at present the options are few, The Germans make excellent boats with short legs, The French build good subs but every nut and bolt had better be pure gold for the cost. Japan builds probably the worlds best conventional Submarines and is not far away.

I have zero doubt the French Submarine will be as good if not better than a Collins but at a cost of 7.8 billion per submarine we could buy 2 Virginia class Submarines at the same price, Alternatively the Japanese Submarine costs 600 million roughly, even at double that figure the choice of DCNS is highly suspect.

Australia is sadly unable politically to operate the Submarines that would give it the capability it wants, ie nuclear powered mobility. Our Collins class are a threat to any maritime power.

Do any other nations currently expect to use conventional submarines in all the roles that Australia does ?

 

[Riain]

Mmmmmm. I'm not a great fan of how the Collins played out but Australia is in a unique situation which requires unique solutions, this is particularly relevant for nukes. I'm very interested to see how @McPherson addresses this reality.

For mine I'd try to work on making Australia less unique rather than trying to fit submarines into this niche by establishing Darwin and Cairns as forward operating bases for submarines. Much of the Collins and future sub's size comes from the need to sail an extra 8,000km per patrol from Perth or 5,000km from Sydney to get to the threshold of the operational area. If say 2/3 of patrols were launched from Cairns and Darwin and much smaller submarine, one that much more closely approaches an 'off the shelf' design could be utilised.

I'd also attempt at least to use existing naval ship building yards and organisations rather than attempt to develop them from scratch. It's likely a small thing, but a yard building FFGs should be more easily able to transition to building subs than developing a greenfields site from scratch.

 

[gatordad699]

I thought Soryu (Toryu is the latest, IIRC?) would have been the best choice for a conventional submarine to replace the Collins boats. To your point, if the political paradigm shift can be undertaken, Viriginias would be the best option....



I thought the RAN missed a narrow window of opportunity to acquire some second-hand Los Angeles class boats when the US downsized it's SSN force in the late '90s-early 2000s. Mildly dated, the Global Security article on refuelings and overhauls

SSN-688 Los Angeles-class

www.globalsecurity.org

Looking at the ship list, say the candidates are Phoenix (SSN-702), Boston (SSN-703), Baltimore (SSN-704) and Atlanta (SSN-712); all decommissioned early with only about 17 years of service. If they're given a comprehensive overhaul and refueling to last another 23 years (about 2 years in the yards) the RAN would have had four modern SSNs that would only now be approaching the end of their service lives. They could be disposed of quite easily by sending them into the USN's recycling program.

That window may reopen if the US balks at refueling additional 688-class boats after Cheyenne

Caldwell: Los Angeles-class sub refueling will start with Cheyenne in 2023 | InsideDefense.com

The Navy will begin refueling the first Los Angeles-class submarine starting with the Cheyenne (SSN-773) in 2023, according to the director of the naval nuclear propulsion program.

insidedefense.com

if the USN balks at refueling additional Los Angeles class after Cheyenne.



As the US (IIRC, Electric Boat) was for the Astutes.....

Regards all,

Interesting idea but I don’t think the USN, NAVSEA08, or NNSA would ever agree to it. USN reactors use highly enriched uranium (Our own NNSA wants them to go to 5% due to, well not really having a mission), just don’t see that being sold. The USN is crazy secret about their sub technology, even older 688s. Then the Nuke problem. Where does the RAN get people to operate the reactor plant? Send them to the USN pipeline for 1.5-2 years? That’s every officer and around 40 enlisted per boat. The Nuke pipeline is designed for just the amount of people the US needs. The prototypes don’t have the capacity for extra people. Then you need replacements and shore based repair people. I’d love for them to buy 12 Virginia’s instead of a new conventional class. Just can’t see it happening though.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

It has long been my contention that the Australian government, of the day, made one fundamental error when it chose a vendor for its first indigenous submarine project.

Oh but it did produce this gem

 

[Sam R.]

To get SSNs you need to be willing to continue to mobilise the population against the government in the decade after 1975. Historically parties chose to demobilise the population and the end result was the self-castration of the union movement and the evaporation of working class mobilisation through the labour left and communist party.

that’s a massive domestic win for the kind of people who build submarines. Probably worth more than a nuclear capacity. I’m not going to propose that Fraser or Hawke had such prescience but both those and potential Peacocks or Early Howards would be pushed away from a nuclear option due to the central issue of taking generalised Australian manufacturing out the back and putting it out of its misery. All while knackering the unions for 20 years until my ban on contemporary politics horizon kicks in 20 years ago.

Nuclear is off the table for domestic reasons. And not “oh but it’s nasty,” instead, “it’d give life to that annoying 100 year old social movement that is busy tearing its own life support out hand over fist.”

Darwin and Cairns basing (not forward basing, but basing) makes expensive sense and plays perfectly into a nationalist production narrative right when you’re killing off bonds undies or Eveleigh railway workshops.

 

[Riain]

Just to provide some context around Australia's nuclear industrial capacity.

• 1958-2007 10mW thermal, HEU reducing to LEU HiFAR research reactor from Britain
• 1961-1995 100kW thermal, HEU MOATA training reactor from USA
• 1965-1983 secret, small scale centrifuge uranium enrichment, reduced from small scale to very small in 70s.
• 1996 SILEX laser enrichment developed, not used on a large scale in Australia
• 2007 20mW thermal, LEU OPAL research reactor from Argentina

None of this is remotely close enough to provide a basis to support the operation of nuclear submarines.

A possible route might be getting a small power reactor from the US rather than MOATA in 1961, and then using the enrichment plant to partly supply it. This might give us enough momentum to support nuclear submarines, but would be vastly less than other SSN operators.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

While Australia has since WW2 often struggled to make its own equipment and ships on time and on budget I can fully understand why it wanted to pick a design that it had the ability to make and support and use as it saw fit.

Take for example the use or lack of use of RAAF Mirage III fighters during the Vietnam war.

They were prevented from using the Aircraft due to the 'Embargo controversy'

Sweden and Switzerland had also restricted use of their equipment in the Vietnam war

So Australia has several issues with the building of the submarines

• It has to be built domestically to prevent the above situations from occurring - so they cannot and will not buy from abroad
• It has to be none nuclear - because Nuclear is bad (meanwhile would you like to buy some of our uranium)
• It has to be capable of delivering on its role
• It has to be capable of being built by Australian industry

In the 80s when the design was being picked the obvious designs for the type of Submarine required are the Vickers Type 2400 and the Dutch Walrus (both long range long endurance D/E boats with an advance sensor and a heavy weapon loadout)

However both are top shelf complex and expensive designs that while right for the role are not capable of being built by Australia's Industry of the day

So 'lesser' designs are looked at and eventually the Kockums Type 471 is picked

Now remembering the 4 points above it was always going to be a difficult and expensive process regardless of the design they chose and given no prior SS building experience.

I equate the Collins to the F22 Raptor production (other examples are available) which due to politicians wanting to show that every state in the USA had an equal share in its construction, rather than a proper tendering process ensuring that the best bidder and best cost were chosen this resulting in increased cost and time (in this case resulting in the fleet being limited to 200 odd airframes and not the 500 it should have been).

Due to the nature of way in which Australia decided the Collin class needed to be built domestically and the same sort of Politics that hamstrung the Raptor also in play here we end up with domestic Australian Industry attempting to deliver the majority of the construction and parts for the Collins - with the corresponding increased cost and increased time and issues due to inexperience.

The only way to avoid this would be to buy from abroad but as we have already established this was not politically acceptable - so we are left with only the OTL process which was always going to be fraught with issues and the subsequent overruns and technical issues that plagued the subs and of course made apparently worse as it was used as a useful political bat for the then opposition and hostile press to beat the labour government of the day over the head with.

So the only real alternative - is not to have submarines in the RAN

 

[Riain]

Darwin and Cairns basing (not forward basing, but basing) makes expensive sense and plays perfectly into a nationalist production narrative right when you’re killing off bonds undies or Eveleigh railway workshops.

There would be a limit to what level of maintenance could be undertaken at a regional city like Darwin or Cairns so they'd have to go back to Perth or Sydney after a certain number of patrols. This might be 2 or it might be 5, but the intervening patrols could be of reasonable length and undertaken by a much more reasonably sized submarine.

 

[Rickshaw]

And to be frank, one should have wondered why it choose Sweden, of all the possible vendors?

Sweden was chose because they were the only nation that satisfied the contractual obligations. The British offered a built class to Australia and Canada. Only Canada bought the UPHOLDER class and paid the price for a series of boats with design flaws. France was never a contender because if it's nuclear testing in the Pacific. Germany refused to supply the required information before the closure of the contract. Sweden was the last nation left standing.

The COLLINS class were an excellent choice, being the largest, longest ranged conventional powered submarines. The Swedes however did the dirty on Australia and supplied an example boat that required about half it's welding to be redone. The COLLINS class failed to be twice as quiet as an OBERON class boat but it is nearly 80+% quieter.

The problem was that the Australian Government decided to downsize it's senior naval ranks and the retrenched sailors found a willing audience in the Murdoch press. The result was a long campaign of bullshit and lies which Rupert fanned quite happily because it embarrassed the ALP Government and sold papers.

 

[alspug]

The single biggest factor behind the purchase of a Submarine for Australia is not self defence it is instead as a deterrent. Our Collins class Submarines got designed and ordered back when the expected operational area was just like in ww2 up around Japan and further afield. The real problem with forward basing in Darwin and Cairns is one of strategic vulnerability. Sydney and Perth are far enough away from the rest of the world to have a significant defence by distance. This is not perfect but the advance towards those ports is not going to be fast. Cairns and Darwin also have choke points and other vulnerability.

The Conventional Submarine as ordered from DCNS is seen as highly capable by the Submariners who have the expertise and as a joke by the same experts who claimed the F-35 was not as good as an F-16. DCNS is a very experienced submarine manufacturer and apart from the price i can see no reason to complain.

 

[Sam R.]

To be slightly controversial on the possibilities of building whole bases up norf, and as a thought experiment on the limits of the possible:

North Queensland State movement
Strike at Lithgow and declining coastal coal => let the Yanks build Newcastle with SEZ regulations regarding union laws
Strike at Lithgow => Port Kembla
Couple of tram and rail strikes and coastal shipping comps and commo docks and “Jesus we need tanks” => Ford/Holden v8s and DMR funding to private roads constructors

If you can corruptly channel government money to private contractors while assuaging nationalism and the government has its head in a tizzy over an unnecessary defence capability while you castrate an active union movement full of lefties. Maybe still build it in Adelaide for the votes but base out of FNQ and WA for votes. Fifo the maintenance staff from Syd Perf and Use it to destroy a hold out red metals union or something. Yes I know the main metals were commo *and* invented the wages and prices accord to castrate themselves. But some kind of Nick Origlass and a pack of bastards who animate some cabinet member enough to build a major industry in a back water shithole. Obviously I’m not talking about wonderful Port Kembla as the comparison example, as I’m Novocastrian.

“let’s build it here,” has been done a bunch of times. Sometimes the product is eventually admirable. It’s construction is fraught, corrupt, political, anti-union mobilisation, and on the whole a sup to regions: Australian politicians are involved.

 

[Fred the Great]

To be slightly controversial on the possibilities of building whole bases up norf, and as a thought experiment on the limits of the possible:

North Queensland State movement
Strike at Lithgow and declining coastal coal => let the Yanks build Newcastle with SEZ regulations regarding union laws
Strike at Lithgow => Port Kembla
Couple of tram and rail strikes and coastal shipping comps and commo docks and “Jesus we need tanks” => Ford/Holden v8s and DMR funding to private roads constructors

If you can corruptly channel government money to private contractors while assuaging nationalism and the government has its head in a tizzy over an unnecessary defence capability while you castrate an active union movement full of lefties. Maybe still build it in Adelaide for the votes but base out of FNQ and WA for votes. Fifo the maintenance staff from Syd Perf and Use it to destroy a hold out red metals union or something. Yes I know the main metals were commo *and* invented the wages and prices accord to castrate themselves. But some kind of Nick Origlass and a pack of bastards who animate some cabinet member enough to build a major industry in a back water shithole. Obviously I’m not talking about wonderful Port Kembla as the comparison example, as I’m Novocastrian.

“let’s build it here,” has been done a bunch of times. Sometimes the product is eventually admirable. It’s construction is fraught, corrupt, political, anti-union mobilisation, and on the whole a sup to regions: Australian politicians are involved.

I really don’t know what to make of your latest screed seemingly about mostly dead politicians and union movements, but I will say something about northern basing: It’s fallen out of favour somewhat because it does nothing for retention, and personnel funnily enough are our biggest challenge.

 

[Rickshaw]

I am unsure why he is union bashing. The Unions were well onside from day one of the submarine and ship building programme. They have not had a day of strikes or stoppages during that time. Amazing what can be achieved through co-operation rather than conflict.