How much of our modern consensus of the inevitability of Allied victory in WWII is due to information after the fact?

[David Flin]

The sitzkrieg with the UK scenario would probably not have much effect on the Eastern Front in 1941. Assuming that the Italians can be persuaded not to precipitate a conflict with the UK, the primary differences would be - 1. diversion of resources from the Med front to the Eastern Front, 2. less submarine construction, 3. less need for defending coastal areas, 4. less damage from bombing and fewer resources devoted to defense against bombing, 5. more possible support from Finland and conceivably Turkey, and 6. possibly an earlier start due to the absence of the Balkan diversion (I am not sure about this - there are arguments that an earlier start was impossible due to weather conditions and I haven't evaluated those arguments).

1. Diversion of resources from Med to Russia. How significant a difference would that actually make? The numbers of tanks, infantry, artillery and planes would be trivial compared to what's already there; the problem wasn't the number of troops, it was supporting them. Any trucks would have been far more important and I have been advised that no North Africa means no captured British trucks which formed a significant proportion of German logistics anyway. So, stuff all difference, in effect.

2. Less submarine construction means less trouble in the Atlantic for Britain, which means more stuff gets through more easily. Which means build-up in UK proceeds faster.

3. Less need to defend coastal areas. That implies Italy will be hung out to dry. That could easily result in Italy switching sides earlier than OTL.

4. Huh? Why on earth would Britain, less troubled in North Africa and able to devote more resources to building up a bomber fleet, bomb Germany less? That's counter-intuitive, to put it mildly.

5. More support from Finland? You'll have to explain the logic there to me. Why would a larger German investment into resources for Barbarossa mean more support from Finland. There's a step or two in that logic train that I'm just not seeing. More support from Turkey. Right. Without German involvement in the Med, the Med has become a de facto British lake. That becomes a problem for Turkey if Turkey becomes a German co-belligerent, as it becomes a valid target for British activity. As Britain has forces that were earmarked for North Africa that are now rattling about looking for something to do, that becomes a problem for Turkey. The Turkish leadership stayed out of things for very good reason, just like Spain did.

6. The troop movements and the weather are quite clear. The myth that the Balkans delayed the launch of Barbarossa is just that - a myth.

 

[durante]

The GDP of most of the overseas Empire was buried in subsistence economies and of no practical use to fighting a world war. (Canada, Australia, New Zealand excepted, of course). The populations of these lands were also extremely poor, mostly illiterate, and not suitable to replacing the missing 34 million Soviet troops should these sit out the war. India contributed the most number of troops, peaking at 2.5 million, which was not enough to do much beyond the Indian Ocean.

But they absolutely wouldn't have to replace the Soviet Troops. Because they wouldnt have to invade Europe. Because the German economy was a house of cards. They were making uniforms out of nettles dude.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Was the US even guaranteed to enter the conflict? Against Japan for sure...

After the re-election of Roosevelt in 1940, pretty much, unless Germany collapsed first, or made a "white peace" acceptable to Britain. (I have a scenario in which the war ends before the US gets into it.)

but if they are at war with Japan can they justify LL to fight Germany if they are not at war with it - for example if Hitler doesnt DoW?

As David T. has pointed out, a Gallup poll taken just after the US DoW on Japan showed over 90% support for declaring war on Germany as well. Many (perhaps most) Americans blamed Germany for inciting the attack, or thought Germany provided the airplanes. (I knew an elderly man - not well-educated - who said that.) Some even thought Germans participated. One must remember that a lot of Americans found it incredible that mere Asians had done this to white men.

Since Britain was also at war with Japan, Lend-lease to Britain would be entirely justified, and no distinction would be made between shipments directly to Britain and shipments to British outposts in Asia (or to Australia, which had troops fighting Germany). Lend-Lease to the USSR might be a harder sell, but not much; Americans had come to view the Axis powers as different heads on a single beast.

 

[Garrison]

Against Japan for sure but if they are at war with Japan can they justify LL to fight Germany if they are not at war with it - for example if Hitler doesnt DoW?

You have to bear in mind that as a far as Hitler was concerned the USA was already at war with Germany. Not only was Lend-Lease bolstering the war efforts of Britain and the USSR but the US navy was actively engaging the Kriegsmarine in the Atlantic. For Hitler the DoW after Pearl Harbor was a formality, timed for maximum effect as the US tried to recover from the effects of the Japanese attacks by turning the U-Boats loose in US coastal waters. Even if Hitler doesn't make the declaration on 11th December its coming sooner rather than later.

Further - and this is simply a doubt of mine - the idea that nazi germany was on the brink of collapse because of a miriad - mostly economic - reasons even when they had most of continental Europe under their thumb doesnt sound convincing. It seems like a narrative of "the nazis were stupid incompetent evil idiots who would destroy themselves because of their incompetency etc anyway".

Well when it came to economics incompetent is the apt description for Nazi Germany, it went from one crisis to another, usually staved off by another unfortunate country being looted. In fact controlling Western Europe proved to be a net loss for Germany as industrial and agricultural productivity collapsed. Part of this came down to the looting. In France, which was a far more motorised country than Germany, the seizure of their oil reserves dealt a huge blow to their transportation network, made even worse by the seizure of large amounts of rolling stock from the French railways to prop up the German rail industry that was badly overstretched courtesy of high demand and lack of investment. Add to this the loss of imports of oil, coal and fertilizers, and the inevitable reluctance of many in occupied Europe to work hard for the benefit of the Germans and it is hardly surprising that the Nazis acquired nothing but short term gains from their conquests, they actually found that it was more effective to ship French workers to German factories than try and squeeze production out of them in French ones.
This is of course a very brief description, If you want a more comprehensive review, and if I was getting paid for mentioning it I could probably retire by now, 'The Wages of Destruction' by Adam Tooze does a very detailed job of laying out the whole sorry saga of the Nazi war economy.

 

[Fulton 44]

1. Diversion of resources from Med to Russia. How significant a difference would that actually make? The numbers of tanks, infantry, artillery and planes would be trivial compared to what's already there; the problem wasn't the number of troops, it was supporting them. Any trucks would have been far more important and I have been advised that no North Africa means no captured British trucks which formed a significant proportion of German logistics anyway. So, stuff all difference, in effect.

2. Less submarine construction means less trouble in the Atlantic for Britain, which means more stuff gets through more easily. Which means build-up in UK proceeds faster.

3. Less need to defend coastal areas. That implies Italy will be hung out to dry. That could easily result in Italy switching sides earlier than OTL.

4. Huh? Why on earth would Britain, less troubled in North Africa and able to devote more resources to building up a bomber fleet, bomb Germany less? That's counter-intuitive, to put it mildly.

5. More support from Finland? You'll have to explain the logic there to me. Why would a larger German investment into resources for Barbarossa mean more support from Finland. There's a step or two in that logic train that I'm just not seeing. More support from Turkey. Right. Without German involvement in the Med, the Med has become a de facto British lake. That becomes a problem for Turkey if Turkey becomes a German co-belligerent, as it becomes a valid target for British activity. As Britain has forces that were earmarked for North Africa that are now rattling about looking for something to do, that becomes a problem for Turkey. The Turkish leadership stayed out of things for very good reason, just like Spain did.

6. The troop movements and the weather are quite clear. The myth that the Balkans delayed the launch of Barbarossa is just that - a myth.

The premise is that the Germans decline to mount any offensive operations against the UK. As a result, the UK itself becomes reluctant to escalate things - there was an assumption that bombing would be absolutely devastating and so the UK might not want to start in for fear of retaliation. This is partly political. While the UK leadership might or might not think it ideal to sit things out, the political support for offensive operations at a time when Germany was passive might not be present. The UK can build up but it might refrain from setting off a repeat of WW1. Finland may be willing to advance beyond its pre-39 borders because of a perception that Germany was more likely to be successful. The same with Turkey - kind of a bandwagon effect.
All of this is fairly debatable. But I do think that there is some likelihood that the UK would be satisfied with a sitzkrieg - they seemed to be in 1939 and by mid-1940 a sitzkrieg might be even more attractive. For example, it might not be very popular to take the initiative and commence bombing Germany while Germany was announcing it would not bomb the UK first. Finally, support for shipping supplies to the Communist USSR was based on the premise that the UK was in a fight for its life. If Germany is in sitzkrieg mode, that argument goes away and the Conservative Party distaste for the USSR may become decisive.

 

[Post]

The premise is that the Germans decline to mount any offensive operations against the UK. As a result, the UK itself becomes reluctant to escalate things - there was an assumption that bombing would be absolutely devastating and so the UK might not want to start in for fear of retaliation. This is partly political. While the UK leadership might or might not think it ideal to sit things out, the political support for offensive operations at a time when Germany was passive might not be present. The UK can build up but it might refrain from setting off a repeat of WW1. Finland may be willing to advance beyond its pre-39 borders because of a perception that Germany was more likely to be successful. The same with Turkey - kind of a bandwagon effect.
All of this is fairly debatable. But I do think that there is some likelihood that the UK would be satisfied with a sitzkrieg - they seemed to be in 1939 and by mid-1940 a sitzkrieg might be even more attractive. For example, it might not be very popular to take the initiative and commence bombing Germany while Germany was announcing it would not bomb the UK first. Finally, support for shipping supplies to the Communist USSR was based on the premise that the UK was in a fight for its life. If Germany is in sitzkrieg mode, that argument goes away and the Conservative Party distaste for the USSR may become decisive.

The issue I have with the Sitzkrieg idea is that you have to convince:
1) Hitler not to attack the UK;
2) Göring that the Luftwaffe cannot bomb the British into surrendering;
3) Raeder and Dönitz that the Kriegsmarine (the U-boats) cannot starve the British into surrender.

And doing that while the UK tries to attack Germany with their bombers.

I think it's only a little more plausible than a succesful Sealion.

 

[Kalga]

The thing about a phony war redux between Germany & UK post June 1940s is that while we know for certain (and probably Churchill and certain members of the UK government & military) that the balance of economics, resources, finances, etc. are in the UK's favor, especially as time goes on, the question is whether the UK's population would continue to tolerate such a state of affairs indefinitely, as the UK is a democratic constitutional monarchy and such. Nazi Germany doesn't necessarily have the same concerns for the simply fact that they don't have to pay as much attention to their populace's wishes (they can't completely ignore it of course, as even the most totalitarian governments are not as absolute as the average RTS/4X player).

So while in terms of raw number crunching the UK will outlast the 3rd Reich, the question is whether the UK's people will go along with a indefinite state of phony war and what amounts to a mind game played on the macro scale... While OTL's cold war suggests that the western democracies' populations have the patience for that kind of long term waiting game the situation isn't an exact 1 to 1 comparison...

 

[durante]

The thing about a phony war redux between Germany & UK post June 1940s is that while we know for certain (and probably Churchill and certain members of the UK government & military) that the balance of economics, resources, finances, etc. are in the UK's favor, especially as time goes on, the question is whether the UK's population would continue to tolerate such a state of affairs indefinitely, as the UK is a democratic constitutional monarchy and such. Nazi Germany doesn't necessarily have the same concerns for the simply fact that they don't have to pay as much attention to their populace's wishes (they can't completely ignore it of course, as even the most totalitarian governments are not as absolute as the average RTS/4X player).

So while in terms of raw number crunching the UK will outlast the 3rd Reich, the question is whether the UK's people will go along with a indefinite state of phony war and what amounts to a mind game played on the macro scale... While OTL's cold war suggests that the western democracies' populations have the patience for that kind of long term waiting game the situation isn't an exact 1 to 1 comparison...

I'd say you have an excellent point - before the Nazis bombed London.

After that, you'd have a hard time calling the Empire off.

Canada, for example, did not have conscription during WWII. Every single person who served was a volunteer.

 

[TDM]

Also there's the flip side to Germany not supporting Italy in North Africa. it almost certainly means the British finish off Libya a year to eighteen months sooner, which leaves a lot of men and materiel looking for a target. Also how far does Germany not helping the Italians go? Does it cover Greece? Sicily? The entire Med would be wide open and without German intervention it might really be 'the soft underbelly'.

Yes, and you raise a good point

Yes just going by the numbers vs. the eastern front* or the fact that victory there doesn't end with boots in Berlin, London, Moscow or Washington, N.Africa is a side show.

But that doesn't mean the Axis can just give it up, because while yes being a side show by the above definition in and of itself, ceding control of N.Africa can lead to some bad things quite quickly for the Axis (and yes GB obviously has some direct vested interest as well).


More over it's a side show that the axis is already committed to anyway. The British and Co started raiding into Italian Libya a day after Italy declared war in June 1940, and three months later Italy invaded British Egypt. In East Africa Italy attacked the RAF in Kenya 2 days after the declaration of war.

It's going to be impossible for the Axis to just decide "nope not doing N.Africa", and even if they did GB & Co will just say "OK cool we'll use it as an operating base to mess with you in Southern and Eastern Europe". So even if Hitler can get Mussolini to ignore his own ambitions just at the time when it seems like the best time to expand them (because GB is detracted), the people who Mussolini just declared war on won't ignore it.

The more I think about this idea, it seem based on two unsupportable things:

1). The Axis would or even could just ignore the whole region and leave the GB & Co free run of the place which also means Italy just giving up what it had pre-declaration of war

2). any likely increased availability in invasion resources freed up by doing so in June 1941 is going to be the magic thing that changes the result in the USSR.



Don't get me wrong I get the point that if the whole African front didn't exist it would have made life easier for the Axis despite both sides spending resources there, but that's not how it works



*and frankly by that metric pretty much all fronts are a side show!

 

[Workable Goblin]

Of course, the obvious conclusion from this is that Italy remaining neutral would have been advantageous for Germany--they would lose Italian troops, true (unless Mussolini sent a lot of "volunteers"), but they wouldn't have to worry about any of that because the Med would be very quiet. Of course, the British would redeploy out of the Med themselves, so...

 

[TDM]

Of course, the obvious conclusion from this is that Italy remaining neutral would have been advantageous for Germany--they would lose Italian troops, true (unless Mussolini sent a lot of "volunteers"), but they wouldn't have to worry about any of that because the Med would be very quiet. Of course, the British would redeploy out of the Med themselves, so...

Thing is Mussolini needed to ally with Germany because France, GB and the US aren't going to support Italy reclaiming her 'stolen place in the sun'.

And it is a two way relationship, Germany gains by Italy doing this and causing issues for GB & Co who get very stressed when it comes to Suez and the arteries of empire.

But it gamble that only works if Italy can successfully chew what they bite off, but they can't and both Italy and Germany suffer for it.

Plus there's the perception at the time, in May 1940 Germany has just done the impossible thing and France. GB & Co are looking pretty humbled. So if you are Italy I can see why you go in with Germany and try you luck with GB & Co.

Another winkle is if Italy stays neutral, that might have ramifications for OTL axis allies in Eastern Europe,

 

[Glenn239]

But they absolutely wouldn't have to replace the Soviet Troops. Because they wouldnt have to invade Europe. Because the German economy was a house of cards. They were making uniforms out of nettles dude.

The German economy was not going to collapse in a solo war with Britain, dude.

 

[cerebus]

The German economy was not going to collapse in a solo war with Britain, dude.

I think we need to define. German, Britain, collapse and solo before we can argue about this

 

[Garrison]

The German economy was not going to collapse in a solo war with Britain, dude.

It was tottering along going from one crisis to another, and increasingly dependent on those supplies the Soviets could cut off whenever it suited them. The food situation in particular got increasingly serious and it was only the new capacity laid down before the war, and Arthur Harris' insistence he could win the war by bombing Berlin that saved Germany from a serious crash in war production in the latter half of 1943, not Speer's myth of him suddenly turning it into a model of efficiency.

 

[durante]

The German economy was not going to collapse in a solo war with Britain, dude.

It absofuckinglutely was.

 

[Count of Crisco]

It absofuckinglutely was.

Yeah second that. Pretty much all research, and even knowledge available at the time to both sides, says the German economy was basically a stiff breeze from collapse for most of WWII and even before.

 

[cerebus]

It absofuckinglutely was.

Now now be polite.
The German economy probably collapsed in about 1937 and what was left was an elaborate procurement system for the armed forces. This operated reasonably well so long as it had access to other countries to steal from and capture slaves from.

 

[Workable Goblin]

I always feel like "collapse" needs to be defined here. What does it actually mean in this context? I mean, to me "collapsed" sounds more like "industrial plants are abandoned because they can't procure critical supplies and everyone is fleeing to the countryside in search of food" than anything else, and I don't think any country had that happen during World War II (well, Japan got close). Generally speaking what has happened then and since then has been that people manage to keep finding ways to get by no matter how much pressure it put on them, so I'm a bit skeptical of the likelihood of it happening in any dramatic or obvious way...in any case, it's definitely not precise enough to be used here without further definition.

 

[durante]

I always feel like "collapse" needs to be defined here. What does it actually mean in this context? I mean, to me "collapsed" sounds more like "industrial plants are abandoned because they can't procure critical supplies and everyone is fleeing to the countryside in search of food" than anything else, and I don't think any country had that happen during World War II (well, Japan got close). Generally speaking what has happened then and since then has been that people manage to keep finding ways to get by no matter how much pressure it put on them, so I'm a bit skeptical of the likelihood of it happening in any dramatic or obvious way...in any case, it's definitely not precise enough to be used here without further definition.

Yes, they won't revert to the stone age. But they lack the resources necessary to maintain an army of invasion and occupation indefinitely.

 

[Glenn239]

I always feel like "collapse" needs to be defined here. What does it actually mean in this context?

It means, within the context of this discussion, a collapse of the German controlled European economy sometime after 1944 so profound that Britain could defeat Germany in the war without allies and without the need to fight a continental campaign in order to strip Germany of its conquests and thrust its armies back into Germany proper. On the British side, not so much a collapse along these lines, but a general weariness and resignation, also after 1944, in which the plucky island loses hope in successfully prosecuting the war and Churchill falls as a precursor to the British exiting the contest.

On the German side, cerebus writes,

This operated reasonably well so long as it had access to other countries to steal from and capture slaves from.

Cerebus is on the right track for identifying the problem with expecting a German collapse lollop along for the British in time for the 3rd act. Violent dictatorships like Germany and the USSR in the short term could adapt to adverse conditions better than democracies. Only in the longer term, (ie, much longer than the timescale of any Anglo-German war), would the inherent violent defects in the German system prove its undoing. (The Soviet Union's economic performance in WW2 under unbelievable conditions could never have been replicated by a democracy, for example). But we are not talking Germany vs. the USA in some post war Cold War struggle. We are talking of the British somehow winning the war without allies prior to 1946 when war weariness in Britain would surely have been reaching a fever pitch, and pressure building to the breaking point in India for independence.

If the USSR is neutral then the Germans and Italians could have demobilized large portions of their armies into the labor force and pursue more of a guns and butter approach than just guns, meaning less strain on the economy overall. The British will go all-in on their night bomber doctrine against cities, the Germans a sea and air campaign against British shipping. The Germans would have to moderate their operations to keep the USA neutral, the British corresponding nightmare would be drifting into open hostilities with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf region.