How much of a better show could Tunisia have been?

Lets say in 1942 in Russia the 4th Panzer army wasn't diverted to cross the Don, the Germans take Stalingrad earlier and have more reserves to watch the flanks. Stalingrad isn't encircled, the Germans might get pushed back in the Winter due to covering multiple threats but no big encirclement and no big airlift.

Could all those transport aircraft and extra reserves thus available make the German effort in Tunisia much better in December - February 1943 when they still could compete????

Assume:
Since 320 JU52s were used in the Stalingrad airlift during that period, lets assume here half of that total (160) are available starting in December 1942. Due to rail limitations most of the transports have to fly from the Naples area to Tunisia. Allied airpower would be able to shoot down most of them from April 1943 on but until then the attrition rate is acceptable.
 
Outclassed in the air and hopelessly outclassed at sea means the number of German POWs in Allied prison camps or KIA goes up by the number of additional Germans sent to Tunisia...and as to how all those changes on the Eastern Front take place with Germany then deciding to effectively take a stalemate for a few months...
 
Not much of one at all. The Germans strategically lost the North African war with the one-two of Second El Alamein and with Operation Torch. And in the two years prior to that the stalemate had more to do with Rommel's skillful use of his enemy's mistakes than anything inherently favoring the Germans. The Germans *had* to launch Blue to make up oil shortfalls, it was necessity, not opportunism in this case. To accept stalemate militarily is a political and propaganda coup for the USSR and you'd better believe Moscow propaganda will be exploiting it mercilessly.
 
All more airlift gives you are more German troops that eventually surrender.

The British and Americans control the Mediterranean Sea. They have theatre wide air superiority. Tunisia is caught between two Allied forces to their west and east. Defeat is inevitable.

Unless the fighting is really, really dragged out longer because of the additional troops, it may not even impact the eventual invasion of Sicily.

It's also important to note that even with Stalingrad in German hands and the 4th Panzer Army nearby, the Soviets are still going to smash the Romanian and Hungarian Armies and cause a rout. Even if there is no actual encirclement, the Soviets will threaten encirclement - it's just that the Germans might be able to extract the 6th Army in time and still hold the front.
 
All more airlift gives you are more German troops that eventually surrender.

The British and Americans control the Mediterranean Sea. They have theatre wide air superiority. Tunisia is caught between two Allied forces to their west and east. Defeat is inevitable.

Unless the fighting is really, really dragged out longer because of the additional troops, it may not even impact the eventual invasion of Sicily.

It's also important to note that even with Stalingrad in German hands and the 4th Panzer Army nearby, the Soviets are still going to smash the Romanian and Hungarian Armies and cause a rout. Even if there is no actual encirclement, the Soviets will threaten encirclement - it's just that the Germans might be able to extract the 6th Army in time and still hold the front.

With "extraction" meaning an army sorely and totally depleted of all its heavy equipment, and already having been depleted by a Pyrrhic victory in one of history's first large-scale urban battles.
 
The Germans *had* to launch Blue to make up oil shortfalls, it was necessity, not opportunism in this case. To accept stalemate militarily is a political and propaganda coup for the USSR and you'd better believe Moscow propaganda will be exploiting it mercilessly.

I was thinking by December 42 the Germans would be in a stalemate situation at best anyway on the eastern front regardless if they played Blue better. Perhaps they have secured Stalingrad's flanks better or taken Grozny but wouldn't be advancing much further.

But your argument implies that if the Germans were in better shape in the November 42 time frame, they would use the reserves/air supply to push deeper or at least try and hold the area and whatever oil supplies/installations thay had already captured instead using that capability in Tunisia. Could be I suppose. But since Hitler committed a bunch to North Africa during that time anyway I don't think its unreasonable that he might commit more to the North African region if it wasn't for the need to relieve and supply Stalingrad.
 
The Germans should have made a strategic decision at the end of 1942 or the first half of 1943 to fight for a draw. The units committed to Tunisia might have been better used in Russia, With these Stakingrad might have been relieved or Kursk won. Alternatively they might have been used as a reserve for a defensive canpaign in the Eastaimed at bleeding the Red Army to the point where Stalin would negotiate. The price might have been abandoning the conquests in the Soviet Union but this would mean Germany could redeploy a significant reserve west. That would secure France and part of Italy. In particular this would make Overlord prohibitively costly. This could well force the US and Britain to seek a political solution. Germany may have to pull out of the West and the Balkans leaving Germany with the 1939 borders in the West but the Nazis probably keep Poland and the 1939 borders elsewhere. A military stalemate but a political victory.
 
The units committed to Tunisia might have been better used in Russia

Could be, but there are arguments the other way.

Tunisia did buy Germany from November 42 through May of 43 a period of time where the Allies were committed a far way away from anything terribly important to Germany.

If the Germans just quit africa on November 9th and fly out Rommel's remanants. The divisions and air power committed to Tunisia will have to go to defend southern Europe instead (Sicily etc...)

Hitler is also worried that the Italians might make a separate peace (earlier than they did OTL) and also worried about Turkey (cutting off Chromium supplies) so a big bridgehead was thought necessary for political purposes as well as just military.

Without the commitment to Tunisia. The Allies could commit to an invasion of France in 43 which rules out any separate peace with the Soviets (thats Soviets were kinda pissed there wasn't going to be one in 43 so they teased at negotiating with Germany) or just push ahead Sicily and Italy several months which will force German reserves from the eastern front anyway.

However if half the Stalingrad airlift capability was available to just build a stockpile of supply in Tunisia in the December - January time frame I could see the Germans holding out for an extra month, month and a half in North Africa. Delay Husky until September 1st or so and maybe you have time to negotiate something with the Soviets if you do something impressive on the Eastern front in June, July and August.
 
I was thinking by December 42 the Germans would be in a stalemate situation at best anyway on the eastern front regardless if they played Blue better. Perhaps they have secured Stalingrad's flanks better or taken Grozny but wouldn't be advancing much further.

But your argument implies that if the Germans were in better shape in the November 42 time frame, they would use the reserves/air supply to push deeper or at least try and hold the area and whatever oil supplies/installations thay had already captured instead using that capability in Tunisia. Could be I suppose. But since Hitler committed a bunch to North Africa during that time anyway I don't think its unreasonable that he might commit more to the North African region if it wasn't for the need to relieve and supply Stalingrad.

No, they really can't do that, not so long as their plan relies on them cutting off oil fields in the USSR from the rest of it and then exploiting those fields. Stalingrad *must* fall for that to happen, and the Germans *must* cover the vast expanse of both Transcausia and the Caucasus proper. Blue is a fine example of the brilliant planning that ensured Germany would lose both World Wars, its course and seeming success is again a testament more of how poor at mechanized war the 1942 allies were than a military judgment of German strength.
 
The Germans should have made a strategic decision at the end of 1942 or the first half of 1943 to fight for a draw. The units committed to Tunisia might have been better used in Russia, With these Stakingrad might have been relieved or Kursk won. Alternatively they might have been used as a reserve for a defensive canpaign in the Eastaimed at bleeding the Red Army to the point where Stalin would negotiate. The price might have been abandoning the conquests in the Soviet Union but this would mean Germany could redeploy a significant reserve west. That would secure France and part of Italy. In particular this would make Overlord prohibitively costly. This could well force the US and Britain to seek a political solution. Germany may have to pull out of the West and the Balkans leaving Germany with the 1939 borders in the West but the Nazis probably keep Poland and the 1939 borders elsewhere. A military stalemate but a political victory.

Nonsense, the Germans have a shot at this only if the USSR is stupid enough to give it to them. If they go on the full defensive, the USSR, bereft of the massive losses of a Stalingrad campaign will begin the hammering-clumsy offensives of OTL 1943-4 in 1942-3 and by 1944 the question for the WAllies will be how soon can they land in Europe to prevent the USSR overrunning all of it.
 
It is important to remember that the Soviet Union had lost a lot of territory and Stalin wanted it back. Consider the size and scope of the 1942 - 3 Soviet winter Offensive in OTL at much the same time as the Tunisian campaign.. In OTL These offensives were going on along the whole of the Russian Front It is true that the Red Army was still devekoping as an effective fighting force but, if it was mounting a magor series of offensive operations at this point in the war there is no reason to suppose STAVKA would not have continued to do so under different circumstancesto recaptire at least some territory TheWehrmacht was beiing bled white too.
 
It is important to remember that the Soviet Union had lost a lot of territory and Stalin wanted it back. Consider the size and scope of the 1942 - 3 Soviet winter Offensive in OTL at much the same time as the Tunisian campaign.. In OTL These offensives were going on along the whole of the Russian Front It is true that the Red Army was still devekoping as an effective fighting force but, if it was mounting a magor series of offensive operations at this point in the war there is no reason to suppose STAVKA would not have continued to do so under different circumstancesto recaptire at least some territory TheWehrmacht was beiing bled white too.

There is much opinion on this board that there is sort of inevitable Russian steamroller that crushes Germany no matter what. These guys obviously know a bunch about WWII so their opinions have merit and I enjoy reading them in all the threads. I tend to be of the opinion that changing just one or two bad decisions here and there (like the 4th panzer crossing the Don) means the Germans could have fought a decent defensive campaign (i.e. at least holding the Panther line) from November 1942 until the time of Bagration by which time the Soviets are so much better (and the Germans so heavily committed other places) that its just impossible.
 
It is important to remember that the Soviet Union had lost a lot of territory and Stalin wanted it back. Consider the size and scope of the 1942 - 3 Soviet winter Offensive in OTL at much the same time as the Tunisian campaign.. In OTL These offensives were going on along the whole of the Russian Front It is true that the Red Army was still devekoping as an effective fighting force but, if it was mounting a magor series of offensive operations at this point in the war there is no reason to suppose STAVKA would not have continued to do so under different circumstancesto recaptire at least some territory TheWehrmacht was beiing bled white too.

Not to mention that if the Germans have clearly shown they're no longer able to or willing to maintain the offensive this gives the USSR a much bigger manpower base to use to work out the kinks in its own offensives, and by the time that it's got the full panoply of trucks and jeeps to enhance its mobility it really *will* overwhelmingly outnumber the Nazis in every single engagement soldier to soldier and spam them with firepower at the same time. Zerg Rushes + Dakka = Curbstomp.

There is much opinion on this board that there is sort of inevitable Russian steamroller that crushes Germany no matter what. These guys obviously know a bunch about WWII so their opinions have merit and I enjoy reading them in all the threads. I tend to be of the opinion that changing just one or two bad decisions here and there (like the 4th panzer crossing the Don) means the Germans could have fought a decent defensive campaign (i.e. at least holding the Panther line) from November 1942 until the time of Bagration by which time the Soviets are so much better (and the Germans so heavily committed other places) that its just impossible.

Eh, the Germans had no but to option to make those bad decisions from both political and military reasons and the Soviets' mistakes in those situations made the subsequent fighting far closer than it should have been. When the USSR's able to begin its own offensives and spamming the Germans with artillery corps-level bombardments, self-propelled artillery, and Stalin Organs the Germans are going to go down regardless as they will never have sufficient quantity of workable weaponry to match the Soviets on a tactical, much less operational, level after a certain point. The Soviet steamroller is hardly inevitable, but the Germans can't create a stalemate on their own, it requires *all* Soviet armies to be as poor in co-ordination and effective use of weaponry as the Leningrad Front troops remained for a good deal of the war for the entirety of the war, while the Germans will retain that mixture of fanaticism and tactical virtuosity as a counterbalance. Short of literal ASB intervention this is impossible to do, Soviet leadership had its problems but failing to adapt and learn from their mistakes were not among those problems.
 
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