The Dacians were a Thraco-Phrygian race, who originated in north-west Asia Minor.2
They possessed a strong sense of national identity, strengthened by their location in the
Transylvanian Basin, a fertile area enclosed by the Carpathians, a mountain chain ranging
from 4,520 to 8,200ft (1,378–2,500m) high, with few natural access routes to the
interior.3 Trade with the Hellenistic world, based upon Dacia’s considerable mineral
reserves, especially of gold and silver, exposed them to more advanced technological and
cultural strategies than their Celtic and German neighbours. In particular, the ashlar walls
and projecting rectangular towers surrounding the Greek colonies of the Black Sea littoral
influenced their own development of the unique murus Dacicus. Quite unlike the
earthworks or palisades that fortified most towns in barbarian Europe, these drystone
revetments retained a timber-reinforced rubble core, for resilience against batteringrams,
and incorporated towers modelled after their Greek prototypes, for providing
flanking fire for archers and missile-throwing engines. Earlier Dacian strongholds already
made skilful use of natural defences, hilltops or promontories surrounded by precipitous
slopes, dominating the chasm-like routes into their heartland: the addition of advanced
defensive systems now made them an almost insuperable obstacle to any invader, each
necessitating reduction before further passage through the extremely difficult terrain.
The introduction of the murus Dacicus coincided with the reign of King Burebista. He ruled
from the basileon or royal centre of Sarmizegethusa Regia (Dealul Gradistei), a fortified
complex set at 3,930ft (1,200m) in the southern Carpathians. Covering an area of 22
acres (9ha), centred on an acropolis of 7.5 acres (3ha), it was the largest industrial,
political and religious centre of prehistoric Europe, and it was from here that Burebista
unified the disparate Dacian septs and organized federations with the less-developed tribes
on his frontiers, making his kingdom the nucleus of the only viable barbarian empire in
Europe, and the only one powerful enough—militarily and economically—potentially to
rival Rome itself.4
The Dacian army could never equal that of Rome in open combat, however. Dacia, like
other barbarian kingdoms in Europe, never fielded a standing army, even though there was
a warrior-class of sorts, the comati, the ‘long-haired ones’ (Pl. 10B). Instead, local
chieftains, the pileati—so called because of the conical felt cap that denoted their rank
(Pl. 10A)—raised a levy when required, a force only available after the harvesting season
ended. The men themselves fought in everyday clothing defended merely by an oval
shield, for body armour and helmets were only worn by the nobility. Even so,
led into battle to the sound of the boar-headed carnyx war-trumpet, following the draco, an openjawed
zoomorphic standard streaming a wind-sock of striped and coloured cloth, the
Dacian levy was renowned for its ferocity, and dreaded because of its principal weapon,
the terrifying falx: shaped like a bill-hook (Pl. 8B), it was used in a slashing action with
devastating effect against unprotected limbs.5
Rome had good reason to view with some disquiet the expansion of Burebista’s
incipient empire. They had attacked Olbia, a Greek enclave in the Crimea, and an attack
on Macedonia was considered a possibility. Caesar himself made preparations for war
against the king, although in the event, both men died within the same year, removing the
crisis. Lacking strong leadership, the Dacian kingdom gradually splintered among warring
factions and eventually collapsed. Their territory south of the Danube was taken by
M.Licinius Crassus in 27 BC, the Hungarian Plain was lost to the indigenous Celtic tribes,
and the Banat to the Iazyges, nomadic Sarmatians who occupied the area after 7 BC with
Roman support.6
By 7 BC, Burebista’s empire was so reduced that instead of the 200,000 warriors he
fielded, only 40,000 could now be called to arms.7 None the less, Dacia remained a
formidable foe: in the winter of 10 BC, for example, a raid across the frozen Danube was
barely repulsed by M.Vinicius. As a direct consequence, Lentulus established praesidia,
permanent forts, north of the river in the area of the Iron Gates Gorge, securing a cordon
sunitaire where no native settlements were allowed.8 But despite the creation of one of the
earliest preclusive Roman frontiers, attacks across the river continued, and the influence
of Dacia again expanded, into Slovakia, Moldavia and the Wallachian Plain. Dacian
aggression became more direct: a raid into Moesia in 69 was just checked by Licinius
Mucianus, fortuitously passing through the province on his way to Rome to battle
Vitellius at Bedriacum. Another attack in 85/86 ended with the death of the Moesian
governor, Oppius Sabinus, and only the rapid response of Domitian saved the province.
Then, the following year, under their new king, Decebalus, a Dacian force annihilated the
Praetorian Prefect Fuscus and his army, precipitating a crisis not resolved until 88, when
Tettius Julianus achieved the desperately needed victory at Tapae. But even then military
superiority could not be imposed on the Dacians, because at the crucial moment,
Domitian was instead diverted to engage the troublesome Suebi and the Iazyges on his left
flank. They had failed to support the emperor against Decebalus, and to punish them a
campaign was launched into their territories. Ironically, to ensure its success a treaty was
agreed with Dacia, and a client relationship established. Decebalus sent a proxy, Diegis, to
receive from Domitian the sovereignty over Dacia, ‘large sums of money’ were paid over
with more promised in the future, and ‘artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace
and war’ were seconded to Sarmizegethusa.9
This arrangement did not bring glory to Rome, nor did the subvention enhance Roman
prestige. On the contrary, it confirmed the prominent and menacing position of the
Dacian kingdom and Decebalus’ status as Burebista’s heir, for—even if the realm was
nominally reduced to a client state—Dacia rapidly became the nucleus for anti-Roman
sentiment, welcoming deserters and malcontents from areas already absorbed within the
empire. Assured, it seemed, of Rome’s unwillingness to pursue him into the tangled
terrain of the Carpathians, Decebalus set about eliminating internal dissension and
fortifying his kingdom, using the engineers supplied by Domitian to build up a formidable
assortment of torsion weapons to add to those captured from Fuscus. The strategy
of Burebista was repeated and foreign alliances were formed, notably with the Getic
Bastarnae and the Sarmatian Roxolani, although Decebalus failed to secure the support of
the Quadi, Marcomanni and Iazyges. Their acquiescence was ensured, however, through
treaties with the tribes to their north, trapping them between their traditional German
enemies on the one side, Rome on another, and Dacia on the third.
Even before he became emperor, Trajan had recognized the special problem that
Decebalus—through his personality, character and actions—constituted for the safety of
the northern provinces, establishing on its borders an autocratic regime which posed a
tangible threat to Roman authority in the region. This accounts for his decision, after
learning of Nerva’s death and his own accession, to return to Rome via the Danube
provinces in order to examine and secure the situation at first hand. It was probably now
that he organized the founding of praesidia on the left bank of the Danube across from
northern Pannonia, and ordered the reconstruction of the Djerdap tow-path, the
rebuilding of auxiliary forts in stone, and the cutting of the Karatash—Gradac canal to
eliminate the dangers posed to river transport by the rapids of the Ister. None of these
construction works in itself, however, necessarily meant that Trajan had already decided
to invade Dacia: Decebalus seems to have remained content with the existing
arrangements and offered no open aggression. Rather, it suggests a degree of caution on
Trajan’s part, the introduction of a policy to guarantee defensive and logistical support
should the need arise, even if defensive measures often formed the framework—if not
disguise—for an offensive strategy.
) being Bourobista.
