The aim of the KM should have been;
- Interdict the supply line to the BEF, for obvious reasons
- Interdict through-shipping of the channel, as supply chains were dependant on direct delivery of food to London docks
- Disrupt Entente trade/shipping globally
The fleet as built to 1914, when combined with the capture of the forward position in Belgium and the war emergency building programme, was sufficient to attempt all three tasks. The Flanders bases were proven to be able to be able to handle 23 destroyers in late 1916, deployed from the HSF in a single night, yet despite being well defended by March 1915 it took until Feb 1916 to permanently base a (so named) half-flotilla of destroyers at Flanders, June 16 for a full flotilla to deploy temporarily and Oct 16 for two flotilla to deploy to Flanders for several months.
A better strategy would have been to deploy light units to Flanders to fight the small war in the narrow seas, threatening the BEF supply lines and through channel traffic and when things got too hot redeploy these back to the North Sea Station and do a sortie or two with the HSF to remind the RN of the Riskflotte. This is not going to smash the RN, but the RN doesn't exist to smash or be smashed, it exists to defend Britain from invasion, to support the deployment of her armies and protect her lifeblood trade, particularly vital imports such as food.
This person claimed that the leadership of the German navy was lackluster
On this particular point the other person was dead right.
This sums it up:
Highest Level of Leadership and Organisation - Kaiser Wilhelm II was the Commander-in-Chief of the Kaiserliche Marine. All power and authority was in his hands. All decisions and orders were made and issued by him and not just in his name. There was no single senior component of the KM to either advise or challenge his authority.
The administration of the KM was not a coherent unified body capable of either advising or carrying out his orders. The KM was divided in to a number of components, all of which were in a direct line of command to the Kaiser. There was no admiral in overall command of the KM. There was no equivalent of the First Sea Lord or the US Chief of Naval Operations. This was a recipe for bureaucratic rivalry, and confusion in the implementation of policies.
These bodies were:
1. The Naval Cabinet
2. The Admiralty Staff
3. The Imperial Naval Administration
4. The Inspector-General of the Navy
5. The Baltic Naval Station
6. The North Sea Naval Station
7. The High Seas Fleet
8. The Overseas Squadrons
In contrast the RN command structure in 1914 was vested in the Board of the Admiralty.
The chairman of the Board was the First Lord of the Admiralty. He was a member of the Cabinet and responsible to the Parliament for all aspects of the naval service: including policy, senior appointments, budgets and ship building programmes.
The four naval officers were:
- the First Sea Lord whose duty was to ensure the 'fighting and seagoing efficiency of the fleet;
- the Second Sea Lord for manpower and training;
- the Third Sea Lord for the design and construction of ships and weapons; and
- the Fourth Sea Lord for supplies and transport.
Two other politicians were the Civil Lord, responsible for works and buildings, and the Political and Financial Secretary, responsible for the budget.
A second Civil Lord was appointed in 1912 to look after contracts and the dockyards.
- Finally, the Permanent Secretary was the lone civil servant.
A major aspect of this organisation, which was created by Sir John Fisher when he became First Sea Lord was the absence of any naval staff or machinery for planning naval strategy and for the conduct of naval operations. This was the prime task of the First Sea Lord who, without any staff or advisers, evolved a naval strategy which remained hidden in his head. To counteract that, a Naval War Staff was created on 8th January 1912. Formed by the enlargement of the Directorate of Naval Intelligence, its Chief supervised directorates on:
operations,
intelligence,
mobilisation and
trade.
The role of the Chief of the War Staff was to advise the Board on all the matters relevant to the staff. He could not make decisions on the conduct of operations. The relationship between him and the First Sea Lord was ill-defined both by role and by rank.
During the war this organisation was proven to be deficient and in 1917 was changed.
The War Staff was developed into a properly organised naval staff and placed under the command of the First Sea Lord who became First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. As such he had the executive authority - free from the Board - to conduct naval operations.
To balance this change of role, the Admiralty was effectively divided into two bodies. The operations staff was the naval staff while the administrative staff dealt with non-operational matters.
In practice these command structures were like chalk and cheese. While Fisher moved ships, squadrons and flotillas around to put his strategy into action the Baltic and High Sea Fleet commanders would not release a handful of destroyers or uboats to the Marine Korps Flanders despite them doing nothing in order not to diminish their own commands. The KM needed an Admiral between these 2 fleets and 3 naval stations to allocate resources between them as requirements changed, this Admiral would know that the Baltic was frozen in winter and that the HSF had no operations planned, and could send ships and flotillas elsewhere as a result.