The entry of the USAAF into the air war, first over Ploesti in June 1942, which created the huge resource sinkhole that was it's air defense system, and over France in August drew in major fighter and other air defense resources. The summer 1942 fighter sweeps over France was mainly a British effort, so that won't change much. The actual damage of the bombing that happened in Europe 1942 by the USAAF was limited, but the reaction it provoked drew resources away from other more active fronts.
Ploesti became a resource sink in 1943, sure. But not in 1942, the resource sink just wasn't there. And the summer air sweeps over France were mainly driven by the British, even if the Americans participated. Nothing in the links you've provided indicates the American efforts drew any additional resources that the British own efforts were not also already drawing, save indirectly (ie: how lend-lease was supporting British efforts). I can't help but notice how nothing you seem to have linked has any sort of comparison between American efforts at this time and their British counterparts in terms of scale and impact.
That said HALPRO did have an impact on the fighting in North Africa, as US heavy bombers, the heaviest in theater on any side, were vital to strike deep logistics targets hard, like Benghazi and Tobruk, which really screwed the Axis forces in the region in Egypt. The bombing in June, right after the Ploesti raid and reinforced by B17s, without a doubt had an impact on what the Axis could get to the front in Egypt. On top of that they even bombed Axis forces around Alamein prior to Monty's offensive.
The Americans were certainly there, but again the British used considerably more bombers, dropped considerably more bombs, and hence did considerably more damage to targets like Benghazi and Tobruk. Your gonna need to provide a bit more then the fact that this or that operation or raid occurred to demonstrate that said operation or raid had a noticeable impact, much less a decisive one. I mean, look at your making a big ballyhoo about the Americans having CAS while giving zero sense of the scale of the contribution: the USAAF proportion of British tactical air support on October 27th 1942 constituted 86 aircraft compared to 544 RAF aircraft.
Additionally, your source on the bombers directed against the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi makes rather clear that the Americans were operating alongside and does not disentangle the efforts of the two. It's reference to British Halifaxes operating alongside the B-17s and B-24s also possibly contradicts your claim on the American aircraft being the heaviest bombers operating against these ports... depending on what metric you are using to determine which one is "heaviest".
As to forces diverted from the East, you're also forgetting the 5th Panzer Army being able to deploy east to aid against the Soviets if the US wasn't in the picture, making Operation Torch impossible.
Well, the forces of the 5th Panzer Army wasn't deployed east all the way into early-November despite the Germans thinking that no Allied landing was going to occur either on the continent (as a result of Dieppe) or in Northwest Africa (as a result of Allied deception efforts) prior to Torch occurring and I haven't seen any sign it was going to be deployed later in the month to the East pre-Uranus. Even assuming that changes, it is likely to be directed to Army Group Center, where there was a major perceived threat, rather then the Stalingrad region, where no more then spoiling attacks were expected. So that makes it unlikely to having any impact on Uranus. After Uranus, they would undoubtedly be sent down south, but the Soviets had massive reserves (when I said the Soviet victory after Uranus was not close, I meant it) and I don't see how the addition of a mere 2 panzer divisions, one of which wasn't even fully finished training in November/December can match the multiple armies the Soviets have. Maybe their able to prevent the Soviets from seizing some of the territory they picked up west of the Don, particularly around Kursk. But the Germans are still going to be compelled to withdraw from the Caucasus and the region within the bend of the Don, as the holes in the line left by the encirclement and destruction of 6 armies are simply too large for the Germans to plug with just 2 more panzer divisions and a smattering of poor-quality infantry and Luftwaffe field divisions...
I would be interested in getting a source on that Soviet cavalry division and the Stuka attacks.
Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East. On November 23rd, the 112th Cavalry Division was subjected to 300 sorties, with each attack executed by some 10 to 30 aircraft. There was also the day before, when the 55th Cavalry Division with the attached 35th Guards Motorized Regiment also fended off attacks by elements of the 22nd Panzer Division supported by Stukas, but less information is available on the scale of that air attack. The weather these days was described as "tolerable" for such operations, but the total number of sorties flown for the entire day as a whole I can't seem to find. Still, 300 sorties against one division is quite considerable and certainly a vast improvement in the first few days: the 19th, a day when the weather was described as "dreadful", the Germans only managed to generate 120 dive bomber sorties across the whole of the Luftwaffe units supporting the Stalingrad region.
Hans Rudel also recounts in his memoir his unit being repeatedly deployed against Uranus, although as you might imagine he is relatively long on imagery and light on specifics.
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