How long would it have taken the British Empire and the Soviets to defeat the Nazis alone?

The entry of the USAAF into the air war, first over Ploesti in June 1942, which created the huge resource sinkhole that was it's air defense system, and over France in August drew in major fighter and other air defense resources. The summer 1942 fighter sweeps over France was mainly a British effort, so that won't change much. The actual damage of the bombing that happened in Europe 1942 by the USAAF was limited, but the reaction it provoked drew resources away from other more active fronts.

Ploesti became a resource sink in 1943, sure. But not in 1942, the resource sink just wasn't there. And the summer air sweeps over France were mainly driven by the British, even if the Americans participated. Nothing in the links you've provided indicates the American efforts drew any additional resources that the British own efforts were not also already drawing, save indirectly (ie: how lend-lease was supporting British efforts). I can't help but notice how nothing you seem to have linked has any sort of comparison between American efforts at this time and their British counterparts in terms of scale and impact.

That said HALPRO did have an impact on the fighting in North Africa, as US heavy bombers, the heaviest in theater on any side, were vital to strike deep logistics targets hard, like Benghazi and Tobruk, which really screwed the Axis forces in the region in Egypt. The bombing in June, right after the Ploesti raid and reinforced by B17s, without a doubt had an impact on what the Axis could get to the front in Egypt. On top of that they even bombed Axis forces around Alamein prior to Monty's offensive.

The Americans were certainly there, but again the British used considerably more bombers, dropped considerably more bombs, and hence did considerably more damage to targets like Benghazi and Tobruk. Your gonna need to provide a bit more then the fact that this or that operation or raid occurred to demonstrate that said operation or raid had a noticeable impact, much less a decisive one. I mean, look at your making a big ballyhoo about the Americans having CAS while giving zero sense of the scale of the contribution: the USAAF proportion of British tactical air support on October 27th 1942 constituted 86 aircraft compared to 544 RAF aircraft.

Additionally, your source on the bombers directed against the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi makes rather clear that the Americans were operating alongside and does not disentangle the efforts of the two. It's reference to British Halifaxes operating alongside the B-17s and B-24s also possibly contradicts your claim on the American aircraft being the heaviest bombers operating against these ports... depending on what metric you are using to determine which one is "heaviest".

As to forces diverted from the East, you're also forgetting the 5th Panzer Army being able to deploy east to aid against the Soviets if the US wasn't in the picture, making Operation Torch impossible.

Well, the forces of the 5th Panzer Army wasn't deployed east all the way into early-November despite the Germans thinking that no Allied landing was going to occur either on the continent (as a result of Dieppe) or in Northwest Africa (as a result of Allied deception efforts) prior to Torch occurring and I haven't seen any sign it was going to be deployed later in the month to the East pre-Uranus. Even assuming that changes, it is likely to be directed to Army Group Center, where there was a major perceived threat, rather then the Stalingrad region, where no more then spoiling attacks were expected. So that makes it unlikely to having any impact on Uranus. After Uranus, they would undoubtedly be sent down south, but the Soviets had massive reserves (when I said the Soviet victory after Uranus was not close, I meant it) and I don't see how the addition of a mere 2 panzer divisions, one of which wasn't even fully finished training in November/December can match the multiple armies the Soviets have. Maybe their able to prevent the Soviets from seizing some of the territory they picked up west of the Don, particularly around Kursk. But the Germans are still going to be compelled to withdraw from the Caucasus and the region within the bend of the Don, as the holes in the line left by the encirclement and destruction of 6 armies are simply too large for the Germans to plug with just 2 more panzer divisions and a smattering of poor-quality infantry and Luftwaffe field divisions...

I would be interested in getting a source on that Soviet cavalry division and the Stuka attacks.

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East. On November 23rd, the 112th Cavalry Division was subjected to 300 sorties, with each attack executed by some 10 to 30 aircraft. There was also the day before, when the 55th Cavalry Division with the attached 35th Guards Motorized Regiment also fended off attacks by elements of the 22nd Panzer Division supported by Stukas, but less information is available on the scale of that air attack. The weather these days was described as "tolerable" for such operations, but the total number of sorties flown for the entire day as a whole I can't seem to find. Still, 300 sorties against one division is quite considerable and certainly a vast improvement in the first few days: the 19th, a day when the weather was described as "dreadful", the Germans only managed to generate 120 dive bomber sorties across the whole of the Luftwaffe units supporting the Stalingrad region.

Hans Rudel also recounts in his memoir his unit being repeatedly deployed against Uranus, although as you might imagine he is relatively long on imagery and light on specifics.
 
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How does that follow?

It follows from the initial assumption that the Japanese military junta falls. Japan becomes not-a-threat. It's entirely unlikely if you ask me, but if we have to run with that, then you can't have your pie and eat it.
 
Just for the fun of it, it took me about 5 minutes to find RAF #160 Squadron. Equipped with Liberators, it was moved to the Far East, not without a stop in Egypt and Palestine in the summer of 1942. From its base in Aquir (Rehovot), Ploesti would have been within range.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ploesti became a resource sink in 1943, sure. But not in 1942, the resource sink just wasn't there. And the summer air sweeps over France were mainly driven by the British, even if the Americans participated. Nothing in the links you've provided indicates the American efforts drew any additional resources that the British own efforts were not also already drawing, save indirectly (ie: how lend-lease was supporting British efforts). I can't help but notice how nothing you seem to have linked has any sort of comparison between American efforts at this time and their British counterparts in terms of scale and impact.
The build up that confronted Tidal Wave started in June 1942 right after the HALPRO raid. I can't find the details of the build up, but it was a process that started in 1942 and complete well before the August 1943 raid.
Have I denied in any way that the British effort was heavier in 1942? The additional help the 8th Air Force provided, running dozens of missions in 1942 with their heavy bombers, was a wake up call for the Germans, as their fighters couldn't down them without special weaponry. Not only that, it forced the fighter groups to intercept every raid by the Americans, instead of declining to in the case of the RAF, because of the damage even the limited number of B17s could do given their heavy payload for the short ranged missions in France and the Lowlands. This is per the book JG26 by Caldwell. It also caused Hitler to order 'revenge' raids on Britain as they were able to attack with very limited losses and still hit their targets. Then of course when Torch happened the Channel Front was stripped out and dispatched fighters to North Africa.

The Americans were certainly there, but again the British used considerably more bombers, dropped considerably more bombs, and hence did considerably more damage to targets like Benghazi and Tobruk. Same for their CAS. Your gonna need to provide a bit more then the fact that this or that operation or raid occurred to demonstrate that said operation or raid had a noticeable impact, much less a decisive one.
Twin engine bombers, not heavy bombers. They also didn't have the range to strike deep into Axis logistics in Libya, the Desert Air Force was primarily an army support force. And of course that ignores the additional US desert air task force operational in August 1942:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/559th_Flying_Training_Squadron#World_War_II

https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-13/CMH_Pub_72-13.pdf
USAMEAF started small, but with the experience already gained by the North African mission in studying the tactical and logistical problems of the British, Brereton was able to coordinate effective support almost immediately. The situation in front of the British Eighth Army was deteriorating rapidly; Rommel had captured Tobruk on 21 June, and the Axis offensive was continuing to make progress toward Egypt. As early as 30 June Brereton had directed the B–17s which he had brought from India to move their operations to Palestine, while the B–24s of the Halverson Detachment continued to fly their missions from Fayid in Egypt. But both units flew day and night bombing missions against the Axis’ increasingly inadequate supply lines, concentrating their efforts against the port of Tobruk. The missions were small when compared to what the Allies were able to put into the air 15 later in the war; no more than ten American bombers flew together at one time, and most missions were even more modest. Nonetheless, the bombing put further pressure on Rommel’s tenuous enemy supply lines as his offensive finally reached its culminating point at El Alamein. By the end of July both sides had settled into defensive postures on the ground to rest and await reinforcements.

As the fighting in the desert reached a temporary halt, the American materiel shipped from the United States in late June began to arrive. The first American planes flew into Egypt by the end of July, and ground support personnel and equipment began to arrive by ship in early August. In the same month the American and British governments officially agreed to mount Operation TORCH in November 1942 to relieve the increasing German pressure on the Soviet Union and to remove, once and for all, the Axis domination of North Africa.
......
By October, as the British prepared to resume the offensive at El Alamein, USAMEAF had established the IX Bomber Command in order to effectively coordinate the activities of all heavy bombers in the theater. Although it initially controlled only the American heavy bombers in the 1st Provisional and the 98th Groups, those units constituted 80 percent of the heavy bombers then available in the Middle East. Subsequent agreements with the RAF put the British heavy bombers of the 160 Squadron under the control of the IX Bomber Command as well.

https://www.historynet.com/book-rev...ply-lines-1942-1943-by-alan-j-levine-wwii.htm

https://books.google.com/books?id=z...e&q=usaaf bombing rommel supply lines&f=false
supply.jpg



Well, the forces of the 5th Panzer Army wasn't deployed east all the way into early-November despite the Germans thinking that no Allied landing was going to occur either on the continent (as a result of Dieppe) or in Northwest Africa (as a result of Allied deception efforts) prior to Torch occurring and I haven't seen any sign it was going to be deployed later in the month to the East pre-Uranus. Even assuming that changes, it is likely to be directed to Army Group Center, where there was a major perceived threat, rather then the Stalingrad region, where no more then spoiling attacks were expected. So that makes it unlikely to having any impact on Uranus. After Uranus, they would undoubtedly be sent down south, but the Soviets had massive reserves (when I said the Soviet victory after Uranus was not close, I meant it) and I don't see how the addition of a mere 2 panzer divisions, one of which wasn't even fully finished training in November/December can match the multiple armies the Soviets have. Maybe their able to prevent the Soviets from seizing some of the territory they picked up west of the Don, particularly around Kursk. But the Germans are still going to be compelled to withdraw from the Caucasus and the region within the bend of the Don, as the holes in the line are simply too large for the Germans to plug with just 2 more panzer divisions and a smattering of poor-quality infantry and Luftwaffe field divisions...
Huh? 10th Panzer was retained in France to counter any invasion effort even after Dieppe (which BTW may not happen without the US in the war), no one though that after Dieppe any threat was done, it was a relatively small scale raid and hardly crippled potential Allied offensive abilities IOTL. After Uranus without Tunisia or say Rommel being shattered deep in Egypt (unlikely ITTL due to the extra Australian divisions, including an armored one, preventing the invasion of Egypt) at the same time, the hot spot is Stalingrad. Operation Mars was already being countered with AG-Center forces on hand. All Mars did was prevent AG-Center resources being shifted south, it didn't prevent outside forces from moving south, like 11th and 6th Panzer divisions, who IOTL were transferred from reserves and western europe to support Operation Winter Storm. They didn't go to AG-Center.
As nothing was likely to be moved to AG-South or Center pre-Soviet offensives there is no reason that 10th Panzer division/5th Panzer Army would be headed to any place in the eastern front until both operations had started. Since Stalingrad happened first and got the extra panzer divisions there is every reason to believe that is where 5th Panzer Army would head instead of Rzhev.

Assuming that butterflies haven't impacted any of the situation leading up to Uranus and things play out exactly the same despite the lack of US entry into the war or Japanese aggression against the US and UK, then yes they would need to retreat from the Caucasus, but then have considerably extra forces to fight in Wintergewitter. Given that there would be vastly more transportation resources due to the lack of an Operation Torch ITTL, rather than the weak force that was able to be deployed for that operation, they'd have quite a few more divisions and an extra Tiger brigade to deploy East.

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East. On November 23rd, the 112th Cavalry Division was subjected to 300 sorties, with each attack executed by some 10 to 30 aircraft. There was also the day before, when the 55th Cavalry Division with the attached 35th Guards Motorized Regiment also fended off attacks by elements of the 22nd Panzer Division supported by Stukas, but less information is available on the scale of that air attack. The weather these days was described as "tolerable" for such operations, but the total number of sorties flown for the entire day as a whole I can't seem to find. Still, 300 sorties against one division is quite considerable and certainly a vast improvement in the first few days: the 19th, a day when the weather was described as "dreadful", the Germans only managed to generate 120 dive bomber sorties across the whole of the Luftwaffe units supporting the Stalingrad region.
Got a page number? I have the book and so far for the 23rd all I'm seeing is talk about the bad flying weather, congested airfields as units retreated out of range of Soviet attacks, and the airlift debate. Plus references to how the Tunisian campaign consumed German airlift capacity and sent reserves to a pointless front and how those men could have been better used in November to help Stalingrad.

Hans Rudel also recounts in his memoir his unit being repeatedly deployed against Uranus, although as you might imagine he is relatively long on imagery and light on specifics.
Yeah I've seen some excerpts online, which weren't particularly helpful to figuring out what was going on.

It follows from the initial assumption that the Japanese military junta falls. Japan becomes not-a-threat. It's entirely unlikely if you ask me, but if we have to run with that, then you can't have your pie and eat it.
Even if the Junta falls the IJA still is a loose cannon. Japan's politics were complicated, in that it wasn't simply an issue of the civilian (as much as it could be called that as it was staffed with military officers) government alone, but also the independence of the services; you could have the military parties lose political power, but the military would still have it's frightening independence from Tokyo, as the war with China started before the military Junta was in power. Ironically even Tojo had problems controlling the military. So it is possible for the military dictatorship to be prevented in 1940, but for the military to still run itself as a state within a state and cause wars as it pleases.
 

Deleted member 1487

Just for the fun of it, it took me about 5 minutes to find RAF #160 Squadron. Equipped with Liberators, it was moved to the Far East, not without a stop in Egypt and Palestine in the summer of 1942. From its base in Aquir (Rehovot), Ploesti would have been within range.
Again that doesn't say anything about the RAF being willing to try to bomb the city. They never even planned on it IOTL and were against it when HALPRO tried, denying them closer bases in Cyprus to deter the effort, but the Americans went ahead with it, even violating Turkish air space to pull it off.
 
So it is possible for the military dictatorship to be prevented in 1940, but for the military to still run itself as a state within a state and cause wars as it pleases.

So we're back to OTL, the USA eventually join in the war. Fine with me, I'm glad you agree the premise is unlikely.
 
Again that doesn't say anything about the RAF being willing to try to bomb the city.

No. It does deny, however, the claim that the RAF would not have the means. First it has been established, up-thread, that Liberators were ordered and purchased earlier than L-L, so they'd be available regardless of this TL's variations. Then objections were raised about heavy bombers being needed in Britain only, and on the contrary, here's a RAF long-range heavy bomber squadron in theater at the right time in OTL.

Oh, edit. Kept looking at it, and guess what, The Army Air Forces in World War II (vol. II, Europe: Torch to Pointblank) says

"The RAF made available a plan, on which it had been working for
two years
, which involved flying via the Aegean, rendezvousing near
the target at daybreak for a formation attack, and returning to Egypt
over the same route. Halverson, however, whose command constituted
an independent task force, finally decided to return to Habbaniyeh
in Iraq despite the hazard of violating Turkish neutrality."

So the RAF never had any intention to do this, and discouraged Halverson?

Oh, I'll edit again. This Coastal Command Squadron, while in Egypt and Palestine, was chiefly used against enemy shipping, yes - but it also carried out three missions against the Maleme air base in Crete. Just to say that they very well could be assigned an unusual mission once in a while.
Another naysaying without real substance.
 
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Deleted member 1487

So we're back to OTL, the USA eventually join in the war. Fine with me, I'm glad you agree the premise is unlikely.
No, you're just grasping at straws. IJA efforts were against China and Russia, not the US or UK. Tokyo's junta government was the one that wanted war against the UK+European colonial powers+US to secure resources. A rational civilian government wouldn't pull that, but the IJA could still start conflict with Russia.

No. It does deny, however, the claim that the RAF would not have the means. First it has been established, up-thread, that Liberators were ordered and purchased earlier than L-L, so they'd be available regardless of this TL's variations. Then objections were raised about heavy bombers being needed in Britain only, and on the contrary, here's a RAF long-range heavy bomber squadron in theater at the right time in OTL.
Ok? The B24s were mostly used for long range recon and naval recon:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consolidated_B-24_Liberator#RAF
The unit you mentioned was bombing targets in Crete and Libya briefly before moving to India. Again no indication they had any interest in attempting a run on Romania. You're grasping at straws.
The RAF had no interest and much more pressing needs, especially without American air units there to help them, bombing Libya and Crete.
 
No, you're just grasping at straws. IJA efforts were against China and Russia, not the US or UK. Tokyo's junta government was the one that wanted war against the UK+European colonial powers+US to secure resources. A rational civilian government wouldn't pull that, but the IJA could still start conflict with Russia.

I'm the one grasping at straws? Who's the one conveniently talking only about the IJA and forgetting the IJN? You know, those guys whose plan won in OTL?
And that's just one glaring aspect of this latest reply of yours, let alone your overall attempts at cherry-picking situations that regardless of the PoD, will favor your preferred outcome.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm the one grasping at straws? Who's the one conveniently talking only about the IJA and forgetting the IJN? You know, those guys whose plan won in OTL?
Oh you mean the plan that was only adopted due to the military government, which was then able to force the army to join in? The IJN in irrelevant without the Tokyo Junta siding with them and forcing the IJA to submit to it's plans; without the IJA the IJN's operation is pointless, as they don't have ground armies to invade SE Asia and Pacific islands to actually seize the resources. Do you really need explanation as to how the OTL plan to attack the US and UK hinged on the Junta ordering it?

And that's just one glaring aspect of this latest reply of yours, let alone your overall attempts at cherry-picking situations that regardless of the PoD, will favor your preferred outcome.
The projection here is beyond laughable.
 
The IJN came up with the plan for PH and SEA at the "behest" of the IJA and IJA dominated militarists in Tokyo, not the other way around. To simplify the IJA/militarists were not going to settle for a negotiated end to the war in China, only "victory" and a Diktat peace would do. In general, the IJN, as exemplified by Yamamoto, thought this was a bad idea especially as it meant war with the USA. The Japanese faced a binary choice by summer, 1941. Either end the war in China on terms that were not "victory" or Diktat, or seize the resources especially petroleum needed to continue the war in China until "victory" was achieved. Since the first option was unthinkable, option number two was chosen leading to the events as we know them. The Japanese strategic concept was, "kick the Europeans and especially the Americans in the balls hard enough and they will accede to our demands for primacy in Asia". As non-Japanese the Europeans and especially the Americans were thought to weak, flabby, spineless and additionally the Europeans were either fighting for their lives close to home (the UK) or had already been defeated and occupied by Japan's ally Germany (Holland and France).

The IJN had not much of a dog in the fight in China, in many ways instigated by the Kwantung Army (IJA). Of course there were fire eaters in the IJN just as there were those in the IJA who were concerned about the China tar baby and war with the USA. Neither represented the majority position in their service. Of course once the order came down from above, the IJN/Yamamoto did their best to make it work.
 
Twin engine bombers, not heavy bombers. They also didn't have the range to strike deep into Axis logistics in Libya, the Desert Air Force was primarily an army support force.

With a strategic element (205 Group) with 4 squadrons of Wellingtons (range 2,500 miles) and at least 1 of Liberators.

Wellingtons had been bombing Benghazi since 1940.
 

Deleted member 1487

With a strategic element (205 Group) with 4 squadrons of Wellingtons (range 2,500 miles) and at least 1 of Liberators.

Wellingtons had been bombing Benghazi since 1940.
The Wellington with max payload (2000kg) only had a range of 1000 miles. With full range they were sub-1000kg.
http://www.airpages.ru/eng/uk/wel.shtml
Bombing Benghazi in Summer 1942 wasn't hard as they could be based in Libya or even the Egyptian border. As of OTL late summer when the Axis invaded Egypt then it took the longer range/heavier payload four engine bombers to make a significant dent in the ports. That isn't to say the Wellingtons had no role to play, but they were shorter range and lower payload, so were likely hitting closer targets like Bardia and perhaps Tobruk when the fighting in Egypt was going on.
 

Deleted member 1487

Distance: Cairo Benghazi 676 miles. :)
That's great. How about the return trip and maintaining a 25% reserve in case of getting lost or not being able to travel in a perfectly straight line or deal with wind/weather? The 1000 miles is total range, not one way.
 

hammo1j

Donor
I thought the premise was no Japan fight.

The RAF started as an area bombing night operation. It couldn't do anything see Wilhemshaven when 6 out of 12 Wellingtons shot down.

So in 1941-2 there was no alternative to area bombing. Stalin demanded an alternative front to the Russian one. Churchill could only do that through area bombing.

That got effective on 1943 but in that winter they were defeated.
 
I thought the premise was no Japan fight.

Yes, although somebody would like it both ways - Japan not in the fight so that the USA are not drawn in the war, but also Japan in the fight so that the British and the Soviets can't remove troops and resources from there. They want to have their pie and eat it.

The RAF started as an area bombing night operation. It couldn't do anything see Wilhemshaven when 6 out of 12 Wellingtons shot down.

Huh, no. It's weird that you claim that Bomber Command (which was only a part of the RAF) started as night bombing in the same sentence in which you mention a daylight raid at the beginning of the war.

So in 1941-2 there was no alternative to area bombing. Stalin demanded an alternative front to the Russian one. Churchill could only do that through area bombing.

Actually, the British resorted to area bombing after having experimented with various other solutions, including a doomed-to-fail attempt at precision bombing by night.
Also Stalin demanded a second front in Europe. If you phrase the demand as you did, then the British were fighting on an alternative front to the Soviet one; they were defeating the minor Axis partner in its colonies. And, taking account their resources not locked and expended in the far East and not committed to the Battle of the Atlantic, they can clear North Africa on their own and carry out Husky on their own - that would be a second front in Europe, as a matter of fact.

That got effective on 1943 but in that winter they were defeated.

Actually already in mid-1942 Bomber Command launched several 1,000-bomber raids, of which for example those against Cologne and Bremen were pretty effective. Destruction was extensive in the cities, but, additionally, key military industries got severely directly damaged.
By that time, mid-1942, it had already become obvious that, barring a change of weather over the target or particularly adverse circumstances, a 200+ bomber raid could very well be an area attack but at the same time accurate enough to hit, within the area, specific industrial targets. The industries' output would then suffer from both the direct damage (and the cost and manpower needed for repairs) and from the loss of man-hours resulting from the area bombing.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are redeploying entire armies - as opposed to select divisions - from their Far East to the fight with the Germans, too.
 
All Mars did was prevent AG-Center resources being shifted south, it didn't prevent outside forces from moving south, like 11th and 6th Panzer divisions, who IOTL were transferred from reserves and western europe to support Operation Winter Storm. They didn't go to AG-Center.

I'm on vacation and thus going off the top of my head here.

But the 6th Panzer Division received orders to deploy from France to the east before both Uranus and Torch (iirc either 4 or 5. November) (along with two other infantry divisions).
A few days later, the division was informed that they were slated to go into Army Group B's reserve - probably behind 8th Italian Army.
When Uranus started on 19.November, the the bulk of the division was in Poland, were it had to wait for some days because of partisan attacks on the railroad.

Source of this is the 6th Panzer divisions war diary.

An interesting ATL would be if the order to redeploy the division had been given about 2 weeks earlier.
In that case, 48th PzKp would likely have had an additional full strength panzer division available to counter the northern pincer of Uranus.
 
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