Both of which were quite different than Iran or the USSR, they were both outposts in the western hemisphere that were used to secure the Atlantic security zone, not move L-L into a belligerent country. Also Iceland invited the US in to get the British out, who had occupied the country illegally. In the Case of Suriname the US was also invited in by the Dutch and they went there to protect the Bauxite mines that the US company Alcoa owned.
Heh-heh. Sure, the Icelanders invited the US in. Don't you think the Iranians might be somehow convinced to do the same?
Besides, you should really know better than to claim tha Iceland was not occupied in order to move supplies to a belligerent country. The principal activity of the US Navy, agreed upon with the British admirals in the ABC-1 staff agreement in March 1941, would be to protect allied shipping. The first act of the undeclared USA-Germany war was the USS Niblack's attack on an U-Boot, and where did it take place? Off Iceland. And how did it happen that USN assets, still in peacetime for the USA, escorted convoys to Britain? Well, because they were headed to Iceland - a US base. That is how the subsequent shoot-outs (one involving the USS Greer in September, another the Kearny in October, until the sinking in the same month of the Reuben James) all took place in strict correlation with Iceland.
So think again about that.
Surinam was occupied by the USA for its resources, they even said so explicitly in their diplomatic note.
The Soviets basically couldn't build locomotives because it would mean less tanks. Plus they didn't start getting L-L locomotives until 1944, so must not really have needed them given their shrunken rail mileage and evacuated pool of rolling stock.
Glad to see that. So not doing something does not mean being unable to do something.
The British may not have had any heavy bombers to spare to risk against Ploesti, nor a desire to risk it. Lancasters were needed in Britain to bomb Germany, plus had a pretty weak defensive armament/armor layout for daylight operations, which is why they were mostly used at night. Unescorted missions at extreme range was generally not the RAF modus operandi. Plus the RAF strategy was NOT to attack the oil, as Harris was against panacea targets that weren't cities, and it took the USAAF to strong arm the Harris into the oil campaign of 1944. After all the British didn't really have manpower to spare, especially in 1942. Any B24s the Brits were getting were going into Coastal Command anyway.
So no real obstacle. Glad we agree.
The Lancasters were vulnerable in daylight - sure, just like the B-24s, look at their main attack against Ploesti.
The Lancasters were not normally used in daylight - sure, but this wouldn't be a "normal" raid. It would be a demonstrative one. FYI, two dozens of Lancasters bombed Augsburg in full daylight in April 1942 (and yes, they took unsustainable losses - like the B-24s of Tidal Wave). Things went better in another daylight operation against the Schneider works at Le Creusot, that same year. Or over the Caproni factory in Milan, that same year. All Lancaster raids. Another interesting daylight raid took place in August 1944, with a couple hundred bombers of different types, and the target was the Meerbeck synth oil plant.
The Lancasters were needed to bomb Germany - sure, as a rule, yet they also bombed occupied France, Norway, Holland etc. To carry out a demonstrative bombing of Ploesti they'd need to redeploy one squadron, certainly no big deal.
The RAF strategy certainly was not to attack specific industrial targets - but the examples above prove they did as an exception to the rule (and there's plenty of other examples). And they'd try to achieve higher accuracy for those, if possible by daylight raids, even with heavy bombers.
Any B24s would be going in Coastal Command - not in this timeline. The Germans have given up the Battle of the Atlantic. Coastal Command is getting very little at all.