Stalin was unhappy with the losses, but “losses Stalin is unhappy with” is not the same as “unsustainable losses”. The claim that Soviet commanders lied about their losses is made without any basis and represents little more then conspiracy theory level denial of the historical data. I might as well claim the Germans lied about their losses to avoid upsetting Hitler, as there’s just as much evidence for it. That Soviet official histories after the war exaggerated their accomplishments does not change what Soviet internal reports during the war reported.
Unsustainable losses can mean different things. The losses were unsustainable in that it required weeks after to rebuild from the strategic reserves the effected tank units before they could fight again and they were about down to their last reserves in the salient that would be able to impact the situation on the southern flank.
Also I'm not claiming the Soviets lied outright about their losses, but hid the extent of them from STAVKA through creative accounting means to avoid Stalin's wrath. One book that noted the discrepancies in reports between what was reported to STAVKA and what was noted in unit records is linked below.
The Soviets internal reporting could lie like no tomorrow about what they killed, in a manner that went beyond the usual over claiming, but when it came to what they lost they were brutally frank.
Having seen some translated reports it was rather shocking the extent to what they claimed. As to their own losses it depends at what level we're talking. There were plenty of ways to hide losses when compiling higher level reports, but lower level stuff is accurate based on what I've seen. Historians have pointed out this discrepancy that appears in the original reports:
https://www.amazon.com/Kursk-1943-G...rsk+1943&qid=1563561180&s=digital-text&sr=1-1
The Soviets are hardly alone in that, an American historian working with Patton's 3rd Army files found that the various lower unit reports did not match the army level reports, which indicated Patton and/or his staff inflated enemy losses when reporting to higher authorities.
That the Soviet forces were still mustering up and deploying for their attack when the Germans withdrew does not change that those forces were there the attack. Suffice to say, the Germans still grinding themselves away at Soviet AT defenses they had become fully enmeshed in after Prokhorovka is not going to leave them in a better position to repel it. At least they got a few weeks worth of rest IOTL...
The last reserves were being plugged into the line at different points than that of the 5th GTA, but these were smaller than the forces that had already been trashed in previous days. Orders to the 5th GTA to keep attacking were unable to be carried out as there were no more reserves left to them and they were stuck just helping hold the line around Prokhorovka; I'm referring to the situation on the 16th, after the efforts to crush Totenkopf had been defeated and after Hitler's order to cancel the operation had been made, and with extra time for Manstein to keep going. There was another operation from July 14th-15th, which was Operation Roland, and forced the Soviets to abandon a bunch of their AT guns to avoid being encircled; historically that was the end of the operation, because the SS Panzer corps had to fall back, as they were to be redeployed to Italy and the rest of the corps to the Mius front.
IOTL the withdrawn units were in constant transit or combat from the pull back on, they effectively got no rest, while the Soviet survivors of Citadel did.
Except your quote doesn’t challenge that idea at all? It says that the Soviets didn’t launch a major attack between the 12th and the 15th. But that isn’t evidence the Soviets couldn’t attack. After all, if that were true then 4th Kharkov flat out wouldn’t have happened. But it did happen. Not only did it happen, but the sequence of offensives continued for far longer then Citadel did and saw Soviet forces take vastly heavier losses, yet did not exhaust Soviet reserves. From a strategic perspective, Soviet forces were facing major combat operations pretty much continuously from July 1943 all the way until March 1944 during which Soviet forces largely maintained, and even in a number of cases increased, their strength. This wouldn’t have been possible had the reserves they were deploying on July 15th been the last they had as you claimed.
They couldn't attack because they were trying barely holding on. Operation Roland ran from the 14th to 15th and during that the SS Panzer corps and III Panzer corps linked up, punching off the Belenikhino salient, forcing a rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces, which while they got out they had to abandon most of their AT equipment in the process.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Roland
The Belgorod offensive came weeks later after Citadel was over and forces had withdrawn, while Soviet forces were rebuilt from the STAVKA reserves. You're right that the Soviet strategic reserve wasn't depleted, but the on hand reserves of the Voronezh Front and forces able to be committed to the attack or defense were already committed as of the time the Germans pulled back on the 17th. You're conflating strategic with operational reserves and the impact that would have had on the Citadel operation, the former not mattering to the operation, just the ability to rebuild forces shattered during Citadel in the weeks between those forces exiting combat and starting the Belgorod-Kharkov operation.
No, you simply claim their closing on the front but that’s not what your maps show. They show the 27th Army still approaching and rather well positioned to deploy on the Germans left flank while the 53rd Army was still far enough back that it could conceivably be deployed anywhere along the line. It also does not change that the German forces by July 15th were literally collapsing from exhaustion, having exhausted the supplies of meth that kept them going since (and even during) Prokhorovka. They needed the subsequent time off even more badly then the Soviets did and continuing the offensive would mean they would be even weaker while the Soviets would only be gaining even more strength. Without any prospect of a breakthrough, Manstein would have no room to maneuver like he did at 4th Kharkov and would have been little more then a punching bag. If he was at the top of his game, the most he could hope to achieve is getting his forces out reasonably intact.
The text on the pages around the map makes it abundantly clear where they were being committed, it was directly to their immediate front, not a wider flank, they were trying to stop the Panzer corps west of the SS corps and the SS corps, which had just linked up linked up with III PC in Operation Roland, depriving a large part of Soviet forces their heavy equipment including AT weapons when they fled to avoid being pocketed. I'm at work now, so don't have access to the book to quote it directly, but remember clearly that particular argument about this issue.
What do you even mean by 'left flank'? 27th Army was deployed to stop the XXXXVIII PC. The 53rd army was deploying to help the smashed 5th GTA, which was in trouble after Operation Roland and the link up of the III and SS PC. What are you even basing the exhaustion claim on? Yes, Soviet reserves were fresh, but they hadn't done well in combat with 1 PC let alone two linked up with the rest of the Soviet forces on line having been deprived of their AT weapons in the retreat out of the pocket forming on the 13th-14th.
The Grossdeutschland Division was the most high profile example and the one that delayed the 11th Guards breakthrough at the critical moment long enough for 9th Army to withdraw additional panzer formations to guard the retreat.
"By late-July Soviet forces were introducing major new forces to combat and threatened, imultaneously, to collapse German defense around Bolkhov and lunge southward toward the key rail line at Karachev. Seizure of Karachev would sever all German communications with Orel. On 26 July the three tank corps of General Badanov's 496-tank 4th Tank ARmy struck west of Bolkhov and Bragramian committed the 2d Guards Cavalry Corps and a corps of the 11th Guard Army in a thrust on Karachev. Although the German XXIII and XXXXI Panzer Corps stubbornly resisted, the immense pressure forced the Germans to abandon Bolkhov and to withdraw to new defense lines northwest of Orel and less than ten kilomaters from the vital Briansk-Orel rail line. Only the timely arrival of the Panzer Grenadier Grossdeutschland contained the southward drive of Bagramians 11th Guards Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. A frustrated Begramian threw division after division against German forces defending Karachev as Model shifted his bedraggled panzer divisions westward from the Bolkhov sector to contain Soviet forces short of the critical rail line." -The Battle of Kursk, Glantz & House, Pg 240
Are we talking about what would happen IOTL or ITTL without the US in the war? Context would matter a whole lot and discussing a what if about OTL with the US in the war doesn't make sense in the context of this thread's scenario.
If in this thread's scenario (assuming the Eastern Front still leads to Kursk) there wasn't a Sicilian Front it's not like they couldn't have transferred other divisions, as IOTL 1st Panzer division was fresh and in Greece to counter a potential Allied invasion; the Brits alone won't warrant a Panzer division in Greece and by then the North African front might well still be ongoing without US help.
If about OTL then yes that would be an issue, but perhaps if those divisions were stuck in on the south flank of Kursk they would send a different armored division to help instead of GD. How did one depleted Panzer Division without rest or time to refit then stop the entire Soviet thrust of a Soviet army and cavalry corps by itself?
Sicily was Hitler’s stated reason for calling off Citadel, but it was neither the only reason nor even the most pressing.
What date are you talking about? Because Hitler called off Citadel on the 13th as a result of Sicily Landings and Soviet offensive against Orel, but only applied it to the northern face of the offensive, allowing it to continue with Manstein for a few extra days before the SS PC was broken up and shipped out. So while yes it was cancelled for two reasons, Sicily for the Southern flank, the Soviet Orel offensive for the North, it wasn't a clean cancellation of the entire thing at once and arguably could have continued in the South as the SS PC wasn't ultimately needed for Italy, while the Sicily Landings freed up 1st Panzer Division from Greece to be used elsewhere (it was held their to counter a potential landing in Greece and it showed up in the East eventually and could have left sooner than IOTL if needed).