GERMANY AND THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I
Germany had been one of the few great powers trying to buck the trend towards protectionism in the early and mid-1890s. Recognizing that German industrial products could now match the goods of any state, Chancellor Caprivi set in place policies to expand German trade in Europe and overseas. Other great powers, however, indicated their opposition to any German penetration pacifique. Severe tariffs from the United States (McKinley tariff, 1890) and France (Meline tariff, 1892) were certainly worrisome. Even that bastion of free trade - Britain - indicated after 1895 that its fear of rising German commercial strength would soon lead to a reversal of policy. In 1896, the British had raided the Transvaal region of South Africa, jeopardizing German commercial interests. In mid-1897, Canada slapped a discriminatory tariff on non-British goods, contrary to the 1865 Most Favored Nation treaty between Germany and the British empire. Despite Germany's protest, the British, far from making amends, upheld the Canadian decision and then renounced the 1865 treaty in July 1897. Soon after this Joseph Chamberlain opened talks with British colonies on the possible formation a general imperial preference system.(45)
German expectations for future trade reflected these developments. On July 31, 1897, the Prussian minister in Munich informed Chancellor von Hohenlohe that public opinion saw the British "denunciation" of the 1865 treaty as "the prelude to a close trade relationship of England with her colonies." The kaiser's marginal comments indicated his agreement that "the denunciation is the beginning of a revolution in the whole system of British commercial policy." For the kaiser, any suggestion that the target of British action was the United States was "nonsense"; clearly "it is against Germany." He continued, "now that the superiority of German industry is recognized, [the British] will soon make efforts to destroy it."(46)
The "main worry" of German leaders during the late 1890s, as Fritz Fischer recounts, "remained . . . the extreme protectionist tariffs of the United States and the plans for a British customs association."(47) The German naval buildup after 1898 was partly designed to protect German trade, particularly imports of raw materials and food. Cecil notes that there was widespread recognition in Germany that with its fast growing population, Germany "could no longer subsist on native-grown foodstuffs" and that a strong navy was needed as "a necessary bulwark against starvation."(48)
German leaders had good reason to worry about the dependability of outside suppliers. In the decade and a half before the war, dependence on trade for vital goods increased dramatically, driven by phenomenal growth in both population and industrial size. Domestic oil production, for example, had gone up 140 percent from 1900 to 1913, but still accounted for only ten percent of total German oil needs. The state went from being a net exporter of iron ore as late as 1897 to relying on outsiders for close to 30 percent of its needs by 1913, despite domestic production increases of 120 percent. By 1913, over 57 percent of Germany's imports were in the form of raw materials, versus 44 percent in 1903 and 41 percent in 1893. All this was occurring at a time when Germany's ratio of trade to GNP was rising to new heights: from 32 percent in 1900, to 36 percent in 1910, to almost 40 percent in 1913.(49)
Of great concern as well were the growing French, Russian, and British efforts to obstruct German commerce. After 1897, Britain and the United States worked in tandem to preclude German colonial gains: despite Germany's efforts, for example, it received nothing from the dissolution of the Spanish empire. In both Moroccan crises, 1905 and 1911, Britain helped France thwart greater German economic penetration of Africa. In fact, from 1898 to 1913, the colonial territory Germany had been permitted to acquire was only one-seventh that acquired by the United States, a state less often thought of as "imperialist."(50)
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By 1911, after the failures of the second Moroccan crisis and "in response to the protectionist trends in the United States, Britain, and Russia," Germany "turned again to the idea of a central European economic area as a defensive measure."(58) Concern for economic security was tangible, transcending ideological and party lines. Future chancellor and National Liberal Stresemann stated in early 1913 that Germany must seek to "create a self-sufficient economic area, so as to make sure of our raw material requirements and to protect our exports." Basserman of the Centre Party in mid-1912 stated that "our trade declines more and more in certain places where we are pushed out or where it keeps its end up only with difficulties." Even the Social Democrat Hildebrand would write in 1911, "from a socialist standpoint the acquisition of colonial domains has become an acute economic necessity for Germany." Indeed, Fischer shows that after 1906 the Social Democratic party moved from opposition to acceptance of German colonial expansion.(59)
These views paralleled those within the government. Walter Rathenau, who was the influential head of the department of military raw materials in the War Ministry in August 1914, was arguing by December 1913 that Germany's raw material base was too "narrow," and that it depended on "the mercy of the world market as long as [Germany] did not itself possess sufficient raw material sources." In April 1914, Albert Ballin noted that the "expansion of our foreign markets is increasingly threatened," and in the oil-rich Near East in particular, "we have been thrown out of the most important regions there."(60)
The declining expectations of future trade contributed to the pervasive sense of general decline felt by the German leadership in July 1914. Extensive evidence shows that German leaders brought on world war for "preventive" motives, namely to forestall the rise of powers such as Russia.(61) Economic factors reinforced these motives. If France and Russia could be defeated, valuable areas in Europe would be incorporated under German tutelage, guaranteeing the raw materials and markets needed for future German economic power and therefore security; without major war, the economic policies of German adversaries would push Germany further into decline over the long term.
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Thus increasingly pessimistic German trade expectations had much to do with the German willingness to bring on a major war in July 1914. With Britain shutting Germany out of the oil-rich Middle East and resource-rich Africa, with France threatening Germany's access to iron ore, and with high French and Russian tariff levels limiting German economic growth versus "economic empires" like Britain and the United States, German leaders felt that only a major war would provide the economic dominance of Europe needed for long-term German survival.