How long could WW1 have lasted if the US never entered?

Winning was enough to push Italy over the edge, what's a white peace going to do to them?
Closer to Nazism than Fascism, I'd expect - complete with "stab in the back" myth. Italy could have won, if (((they))) hadn't refused to support the war effort - to intentionally choke down the strength and valor of the Italian people, no doubt.
 
Closer to Nazism than Fascism, I'd expect - complete with "stab in the back" myth. Italy could have won, if (((they))) hadn't refused to support the war effort - to intentionally choke down the strength and valor of the Italian people, no doubt.
It has the same problem as the French version, namely that it's ending with foreign troops deep inside Italy. And there's the issue that Italy was clearly the agressor in this case too, so it's harder to sell it as sacrifices made while defending the nation as the Germans did.
 
It has the same problem as the French version, namely that it's ending with foreign troops deep inside Italy. And there's the issue that Italy was clearly the agressor in this case too, so it's harder to sell it as sacrifices made while defending the nation as the Germans did.
The thing is, the defense on the Piave assumed mythical proportions almost immediately - and if stuff goes more or less as OTL offensive-wise (which makes sense - a Spring offensive is not something that original) it's not impossible for the Austrians to fall into the same floods that sealed the legend. If Caporetto is seen as "a minor setback" (myopic, not impossible), something Italy could have recovered from (which is in fact true), then the Americans and British cutting the lifeline of Italian warmaking effort is going to be seen as the prime and only reason for the white peace. Hell, push a bit and it might be seen as the reason for Caporetto itself.
 
Look at the home front of the British +French+Italians. Substract all the material, fuel, food, troops they received in the April 17 to November 18 period from the US - or reduce it by 80 - 90 %. And then marvel at how wrong your assessment is.

Easy enough. During the course of the war the Germans produced 680 million shells to the Allies 790 of which 50 million were US made. No US means the Allies still have a comfortable superiority.

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At no point did Germany ever have a material superiority and after October 1914 it lacked the ability to knock the Western Allies out of the war. Sooner or later that would tell, in this case by January 1919 at the latest.

An example Britain produced 9908 QF 18-pounders aka their basic field gun, Germany produced about 8106 7.7 cm KK 96 and FK16's their basic field gun. The same basic ratio applied at every level from trench supports to Battleships. In material terms the British Empire alone produced more than Germany and that advantage was backweighted. In 1914 and 1915 Germany outproduced Britain and the material balance was fairly even. By 1917-18 it was significantly stacked in the Allied favour. Compare the Kaiserschlacht with the Hundred Days and the tactics used, the Germans were undeniably innovative and effective but they took proportionally higher casualties and achieved less because they could only use innovative tactics, the Allies used weight of firepower.
 
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Its pure personal opinion but I would actually be interested in the answers even if im simply corrected.

There is an argument that the Entent and specially Brittain can endure just as much suffering as Germany.

IMO there are some problems with that:
1. Brittain is sitting securely on its island. Even if the Entente looses they are untouchable. Germany's prospect for loosing are much worse to put it mildly. This means the incentive is greater.
2. Germany was forced to adopt a war economy of self sustance because of the blocade from the get go. The Entente OTOH created a war economy that relied heavily on USA imports - because for them they were aveilable. To change from this model after 2-3 years of total war to the german one would be likely incredibly painful - I think harder than if they did this from the get go - and leave them very weak till the transition process finishes.
3. The Entente Homeland have already endured a fair bit of suffering - not nearly as much as the CP's but still. So they wouldnt start from zero.
 

Medved

Banned
Easy enough.

And how many of these shells very produced because of delivery of US raw materials? On what fuel did the French-British war machine run? How about the moral boost of :"help is comming"? How about food etc etc It's fascinating how people can't discern between ATL and OTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

Easy enough. During the course of the war the Germans produced 680 million shells to the Allies 790 of which 50 million were US made. No US means the Allies still have a comfortable superiority.
How many of those British made shells were filled with US made explosives?
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17011607
It also, crucially, tasked the Manchester-based chemist Chaim Weizmann with producing large quantities of acetone from readily available raw materials. It had previously been made chiefly from the dry distillation of wood; hence most of Britain's acetone was imported from timber-growing countries like the United States.

In May 1915, after Weizmann had demonstrated to the Admiralty that he could use an anaerobic fermentation process to convert 100 tons of grain to 12 tons of acetone, the government commandeered brewing and distillery equipment, and built factories to utilise the new process at Holton Heath in Dorset and King's Lynn in Norfolk.
Together, they produced more than 90,000 gallons of acetone a year, enough to feed the war's seemingly insatiable demand for cordite. As a result, shell production rose from 500,000 in the first five months of the war to 16.4 million in 1915.
https://blog.maryevans.com/2017/05/...st-world-war-britain-relied-heavily-on-i.html
Before the start of the First World War, Britain relied heavily on imported grain from America for the production of bread. With the availability of grain limited by unrestricted German submarine warfare from January 1917, combined with a poorer than expected harvest in 1916 and the continued depletion of man power following conscription, resources were rallied to the important cause of providing the populous with bread.

France was in a similar situation:
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17011607
By importing coal from Britain and steel from the United States, releasing 350,000 soldiers to the war industries, and bolstering them with more than 470,000 women, it was able to increase its daily output of 75mm shells from 4,000 in October 1914 to 151,000 in June 1916, and that of 155mm shells from 235 to 17,000. In 1917 it produced more shells and artillery pieces per day than Britain.
So France was dependent on imports as well to make their shells. Since their domestic steel production was less than 10% of Britain's even in 1917, they needed US steel to function.
 
And how many of these shells very produced because of delivery of US raw materials? On what fuel did the French-British war machine run? How about the moral boost of :"help is comming"? How about food etc etc It's fascinating how people can't discern between ATL and OTL.

Not many, the UK used Chilean saltpetre and Iranian oil. American wheat absolutely was vital, while Canadian wheat would prevent starvation without any American wheat rationing would have to be significantly tightened, instead of twice the calories per person compared to Germany it would drop to only 50% more. Then again unless the US goes for an embargo Britain would simply buy less munitions and use its foreign exchange to maintain wheat imports.

So long as the RN controlled the North Sea Britain could access the worlds resources, the US was a convenient source of imports but it wasn't vital, the Empire was and there was significant scope for import replacement, Canada, New Zealand and South America all had large timber industries.

You would see a drop in production but the Allies would still have a material superiority and they just needed to hold on until Jan 1919 and a 10% decline in shell production from reduced US supplies isn't going to collapse the Allied front.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Not many, the UK used Chilean saltpetre and Iranian oil. American wheat absolutely was vital, while Canadian wheat would prevent starvation without any American wheat rationing would have to be significantly tightened, instead of twice the calories per person compared to Germany it would drop to only 50% more. Then again unless the US goes for an embargo Britain would simply buy less munitions and use its foreign exchange to maintain wheat imports.

So long as the RN controlled the North Sea Britain could access the worlds resources, the US was a convenient source of imports but it wasn't vital, the Empire was and there was significant scope for import replacement, Canada, New Zealand and South America all had large timber industries.

You would see a drop in production but the Allies would still have a material superiority and they just needed to hold on until Jan 1919 and a 10% decline in shell production from reduced US supplies isn't going to collapse the Allied front.
Nonsense, the UK imported US oil, because Persian oil (didn't become Iran until 1940) was too far away. Same in WW2 for the same reason.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_United_Kingdom_during_the_First_World_War
Energy was a critical factor for the British war effort. Most of the energy supplies came from coal mines in Britain, where the issue was labour supply. Critical however was the flow of oil for ships, lorries and industrial use. There were no oil wells in Britain so everything was imported. The U.S. pumped two-thirds of the world's oil. In 1917, total British consumption was 827 million barrels, of which 85 percent was supplied by the United States, and 6 percent by Mexico.[154] The great issue in 1917 was how many tankers would survive the German u-boats. Convoys and the construction of new tankers solved the German threat, while tight government controls guaranteed that all essential needs were covered. An Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference allocated American supplies to Britain, France and Italy.[155]
The US oil industry owned the Mexican one, the Mexicans only nationalizing it in the 1930s.
Kind of hard to control the waves without 91% of your oil...
The US wasn't a 'convenient' source, it was the only source capable of feeding the UK and Entente everything it needed. That included gun cotton, food, steel, oil, explosives precursors, etc.

Don't forget the British shipping crisis either:
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/sea_transport_and_supply
Without access to US shipping and interned German shipping seized upon US entry into the war and pressed into Allied service, the Entente would be pretty screwed.
 
Don't forget the British shipping crisis either:
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/sea_transport_and_supply
Without access to US shipping and interned German shipping seized upon US entry into the war and pressed into Allied service, the Entente would be pretty screwed.

Actually on US entry into the war they took over tankers that had been building for the British. It was lack of sufficient tankers at the start of the war that created the dependency on the US as a source of supply. By 1917 you have one positive factor, a dramatic increase in tanker capacity sufficient to relieve the distance issue versus a negative factor which was the massive increase in oil usage by the Army. Thus you probably won't see the British simply switch over with no issues but again we are not looking at a complete cessation of supply. Most of the oil would now come from Iran with a balance supplied from the US as gold/currency exchange allows.
 

Deleted member 1487

Actually on US entry into the war they took over tankers that had been building for the British. It was lack of sufficient tankers at the start of the war that created the dependency on the US as a source of supply. By 1917 you have one positive factor, a dramatic increase in tanker capacity sufficient to relieve the distance issue versus a negative factor which was the massive increase in oil usage by the Army. Thus you probably won't see the British simply switch over with no issues but again we are not looking at a complete cessation of supply. Most of the oil would now come from Iran with a balance supplied from the US as gold/currency exchange allows.
Got some sourcing?
 
The massive increase in German soldiers surrendering and the Kiel mutinies were products of the realization that the war was lost. The Frontschwein did not want to die for nothing, and the sailors had no desire to be part of some mad Valkyrie death ride against the Entente fleet (primarily RN) for some sort of "honor". The decisive spring offensives were, in fact decisive - in their failure they were the last straw that doomed Germany to military defeat. If the troops don't see the situation as hopeless, you don't get the surrenders/mutinies.

If the USA does not enter the war in 1917 there is no flood of manpower on the way to the Entente, and no unsecured loans - both of those were completely dependent on the USA in the war. Economically this is a serious hit and all sorts of materiel from the USA flowing to the Entente is markedly reduced. Absent the expected manpower and with the restricted supply situation, every theater except the Western Front is going to see reduced Entente strength in personnel and material - there is absolutely no way around this. Best case for the Entente is that Italy does not drop out, IMHO the odds are more in favor of Italy taking a reasonable peace offer in this situation but we're talking best case. No matter what the situation on the Italian Front is going to be much less of a drain on the CP especially A-H than OTL. The same applies for Macedonia/Bulgaria - the Entente can't push as hard there. The Ottomans are still shambolic, but again diffusion of effort means Entente progress against them is probably somewhat slower, so while I expect the Ottomans are going to fold or at least come apart postwar, this is delayed. Russia pulls out and you get a Brest-Litovsk on schedule or even sooner - perhaps Kerensky realizes Russia staying in will let the revolutionaries take control. Even if things go exactly as OTL there, they are out.

Even in the best case scenario for the Entente as 1918 rolls around, they are worse off and the CP are better off. The CP can be more concentrated on the Western Front, and there is no reason to roll the dice with Michael. IMHO this butterflies away the mass surrenders and the Kiel mutiny. OTOH even if Pétain manages to quell the mutinies, and there is no "the Americans are coming" here, the French Army is going to be much more brittle than OTL and IMHO anything more than small tactical offensives is not going to work for the poilu in the trenches, defense only. While things are tight in the CP for civilians, I agree that with no eastern front and some relief on food (whether exported to Germany or simply food not sent to the army there living off the land), CP civilian morale is not going to be as bad as OTL at this time and the military picture is much brighter. On the Entente side Russia is out, and absent US forces and US products the home front is going to be hurting with much stricter rationing and increased casualty lists (each American that stops a bullet is one French or British soldier that does not).

All of that being said, both sides are pretty exhausted, however when they come to negotiate, and they will, the Germans are in a better position as they hold most of Belgium and important parts of France. A-H has Serbia and parts of Italy. If anybody is giving up any land in Western Europe of the Balkans it is the Entente, not the CP. Most assuredly not one inch of Alsace-Lorraine is going back to France.

It is important to note, that while the British are able to produce large amounts of acetone for explosives on their own thanks to Chaim Weizman, they use grain for the starting material - so producing explosives comes at the expense of bread. If you are freely importing a lot of American grain (bought with loans) you don't feel a pinch. If you are not importing all that grain, or the acetone which now you cannot pay for, every shell made with the acetone Britain produces now means one less oaf of bread for the home front. This is not going to be a plus for morale.
 

Deleted member 1487

It is important to note, that while the British are able to produce large amounts of acetone for explosives on their own thanks to Chaim Weizman, they use grain for the starting material - so producing explosives comes at the expense of bread. If you are freely importing a lot of American grain (bought with loans) you don't feel a pinch. If you are not importing all that grain, or the acetone which now you cannot pay for, every shell made with the acetone Britain produces now means one less oaf of bread for the home front. This is not going to be a plus for morale.
At no point in the war even with increased farming did Britain become self sufficient in grain production enough to feed everyone even with rationing and that doesn't include the explosives production aspect. So while Irish and Canadian imports cover the food needs of the public, that really isn't a surplus for acetone production.

Well then you'd be mistaken. The primary reason they expected problems late in 1918 was because of the anticipated military situation once the US had so many more boots on the ground, making the war unwinnable, which would then increase the expected demands for immediate peace by the public. The German public was willing to go along with the war while it was winnable, but were growing restive with the feeling that it was becoming unwinnable and inevitably lost. Hence the increased strikes and problems after the 'peace offensive' failed and the collapse of domestic morale once the Germans army was severely defeated in the counterattacks starting with 2nd Amiens. You cannot divorce 1918 strategic planning from the US being in the war, since the strategic thought process in late 1917/early 1918 was entirely predicated on the impact of US entry and shipment of troops to France, who started arriving June 1917.
 
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Got some sourcing?

Well I know I have shared this with you before but The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939 contains some interesting information

A tanker could complete only four round trips a year to Abadan compared to six to the Gulf of Mexico.

From the above page 142

Tanker construction in Britain was accelerated, and more oilers were added to the fleet to cope with the increase of oil-burning warships and relieve larger vessels for overseas transport service. Six large, 5,800 tons, fast tankers were launched in 1917 and fifteen standard dry cargo vessels redesigned as oil tankers entered service with RFA as the `War' Class.

Same as above page 154

So oil imported would be reduced by about 1/3 and need slightly more refining to address viscosity issues assuming all tankers had to be switched to the Iran route. Of course there would be more British tankers ITTL without unrestricted submarine attacks.

I will look up the story of the construction of tankers in American yards which I thought was covered in Warwick Brown's text but seems to actually be located in another.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well I know I have shared this with you before but The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies 1898-1939 contains some interesting information

A tanker could complete only four round trips a year to Abadan compared to six to the Gulf of Mexico.

From the above page 142

Tanker construction in Britain was accelerated, and more oilers were added to the fleet to cope with the increase of oil-burning warships and relieve larger vessels for overseas transport service. Six large, 5,800 tons, fast tankers were launched in 1917 and fifteen standard dry cargo vessels redesigned as oil tankers entered service with RFA as the `War' Class.

Same as above page 154

So oil imported would be reduced by about 1/3 and need slightly more refining to address viscosity issues assuming all tankers had to be switched to the Iran route. Of course there would be more British tankers ITTL without unrestricted submarine attacks.

I will look up the story of the construction of tankers in American yards which I thought was covered in Warwick Brown's text but seems to actually be located in another.
So how much hauling capacity did those 15 converted cargo vessels have? How much time per year did those and other tankers require down time for maintenance? What about risk of loss to Uboats or accidents? Tankers wouldn't be using convoys the entire way, so would still be vulnerable to Uboat attack even without USW, in 1916 over 1 million tons of shipping were lost in the Mediterranean alone under cruiser rules:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat_Campaign_(World_War_I)#Mediterranean_waters
During 1916 the commerce war continued unabated in the Mediterranean. Allied countermeasures were largely ineffective; the complex arrangements for co-operation between the various navies meant a fragmented and unco-ordinated response, while the main remedy favored by the Allies for the U-boat menace, the Otranto Barrage, was of little value.

Just two U-boats were caught in the barrage in all the time it was in operation; meanwhile merchant shipping suffered huge losses. In 1916 the Allies lost 415 ships, of 1,045,058 GRT, half of all Allied ships sunk in all theatres.

If anything being forced to take the longer route only increases the vulnerability of tankers, as it was the most vulnerable route for shipping.
 
So how much hauling capacity did those 15 converted cargo vessels have? How much time per year did those and other tankers require down time for maintenance? What about risk of loss to Uboats or accidents? Tankers wouldn't be using convoys the entire way, so would still be vulnerable to Uboat attack even without USW, in 1916 over 1 million tons of shipping were lost in the Mediterranean alone under cruiser rules:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat_Campaign_(World_War_I)#Mediterranean_waters


If anything being forced to take the longer route only increases the vulnerability of tankers, as it was the most vulnerable route for shipping.

The answers is more than there was and this is of course not all that was added OTL, in addition we have fewer losses than OTL because of no USW. The second answer would be the same as OTL per the route. Again the same. Actually there is no reason why tankers would not be convoyed in this scenario but even so with cruiser rules losses are still going to lower than OTL even with passage through the Med hot zone.
 

Deleted member 1487

The answers is more than there was and this is of course not all that was added OTL, in addition we have fewer losses than OTL because of no USW. The second answer would be the same as OTL per the route. Again the same. Actually there is no reason why tankers would not be convoyed in this scenario but even so with cruiser rules losses are still going to lower than OTL even with passage through the Med hot zone.
Fewer compared to OTL 1917, not fewer than 1916 before USW. Since losses were over 2 million globally for the Entente in 1916 before USW, with half in the Mediterranean, the route the tankers would have to take to get the number of missions per year you quoted, they'd be exceedingly vulnerable, as they'd have to travel alone as was the practice before USW and be the primary targets of Uboats, as was the practice due to their cost, limited number, and exceeding value. Convoys reduce rate of travel, especially over large distances. When USW hit convoys cut shipping efficiency down by at least 1/3rd, which was very nearly more fatal than the losses to Uboats.
 
Fewer compared to OTL 1917, not fewer than 1916 before USW. Since losses were over 2 million globally for the Entente in 1916 before USW, with half in the Mediterranean, the route the tankers would have to take to get the number of missions per year you quoted, they'd be exceedingly vulnerable, as they'd have to travel alone as was the practice before USW and be the primary targets of Uboats, as was the practice due to their cost, limited number, and exceeding value. Convoys reduce rate of travel, especially over large distances. When USW hit convoys cut shipping efficiency down by at least 1/3rd, which was very nearly more fatal than the losses to Uboats.

Hum I think the issue here is that this all still falls below the level of reduction you were arguing for earlier.
 
That‘s exactly it. Without the USA entering the Entente runs out of money in May/June 1917.

How long can they hold on without the imports?
The USA would still have sold wheat and probably have lent money to the Entente whether or not they entered the war, as they had been for years, not to do so hurts US farmers and banks as much as it does the allies. The only way the USA stops doing that is in the impossible situation that the USA enters on the CP's side, failing the RN going batshit insane that cant happen. whilst the assumption is made that the this would not happen by some historians and commentators ,due to the dollar shortage, the economic harm, to the USA if it did not occur would have been substantial.
 
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