how long could HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Duke of Edinburgh lasted

[McPherson]

CVA-01 would have been more than capable of operating the heavy late war US carrier aircraft, even the giant Tomcat (though hanger space issues would make operating the type impractical). A phantom and buccaneer air group would have mulched anything the Argentinian Navy ventured to oppose it.

The Junta may have been dumb enough to pick a fight with a Britain armed with proper fleet carriers, but they would bitterly regret it.

They were dumb enough to engage a nuclear weapon armed power with a nuclear powered submarine force. Think about what I just wrote and put this addenda to work. The RN was trained and equipped for the SLOC mission in the North Atlantic against the Soviet Naval Aviation, which flew LRMP aircraft that launched H/A plunging cruise missiles, each the size of a MIG. The RN, when it tried to find Argentine conventional diesel electric subs, failed miserably. The RN was trained and equipped to search and fight noisy Russian nuclear boats. The RN when it confronted an Argentine air force trained and equipped by the French and the Americans failed miserably, because they were not prepared for low level cruise missile and toss bomb attacks right out of the French and American playbooks for killing RUSSIAN surface action groups. The RN radar systems, AAA, and missile systems were not suited to track and engage Skyhawks and Exocets. Now to be honest, any navy I know of the era would have had a tough time with the Argentine air force. Those guys were a heck of a professional outfit, and with the defective means they had, put up an awesome and terrifying show with the little they actually had.

None of those problems are alleviated by moving to a ski jump and SHARs.

I never said that anything would change the situation for the better. It is my understanding that the Crown government of the time, just before Thatcher, was intent on the social welfare state and that the decision was to concentrate the military, such as it was, on home defense and NATO obligations, and to weasel out of as many NATO obligations as possible, because the monetary means to meet those obligations was lacking. This goes into economic policy and political philosophy. Let me be brief about it: the British people elected the governments they chose because of those policies that were well known and clearly enunciated. It is not my place to comment on the decisions of the British people. I can however comment on what the lack of money allocated and intent of will by those chosen governments to fail to build not only the proper attack carriers, but the proper bodyguard ships, underway replenishment ships, proper aircraft mixes and outfit an entire task force with the proper defenses to operate in a medium air threat environment would mean for the two carriers above, insofar as the RN mission would be strictly convoy defense, they would be converted to that mission profile.

A ski jump conversion would only happen for budgeting reasons, not problems with the layout of the ship.

I maintain that a insular parochial view of British defense needs would have just as much as an undersized and badly designed aircraft carrier, would have led to another pair of Hermes in the ATL being postulated here. Work space for the air wing, flight deck parking, air-ops and the things I have previously mentioned would be bolos.

ontop of that if the RN has two phantom capable carriers and a decently sized naval airwing then it's unlikely to spend the money developing the SHAR.

Why not? Her Majesty's government had already committed to Harrier in the ground attack role for Central Europe. The bird would be built. A short skip to Sea Harrier follows.

and if there is no SHAR, there is no really practical possibility of a Ski jump conversion, so budgetary problems would probably result on one carrier being mothballed.

But... part of the Ground Attack Harrier program is a portable ski-lift for autobauns so the bird can fly off burdened and carry a usable bomb-load. It, again, is a short step to use a ski-ramp for naval Harrier for rolling take-off purposes from a carrier, unless you are the Americans and have a different way to pitch the plane into the air, burdened.

The CVA-01 would have been able to operate Phantom, if it can launch and retreive Phantoms, it can do the same for any later aircraft. Tomcats would be possible, but impracticle due to the cramped nature of the hanger and flight deck. The RN wouldn't operate them, instead sticking with Phantoms until the 90s when they would replace them with carrier-EFA or Hornets.

Nobody has seen a Hornet by the time the Falklands War operate from a carrier yet. (Trials in 1982). That means the underpowered and overweight Tomcat which can only operate from the powerful catapults of USN carriers or from long land based runways is the F-4 replacement. I'm more concerned about the Buccaneer, which if it got into a fight with an Argentine Mirage, a Dagger or a Skyhawk is dead meat. I don't deny that the Phantom in the hands of a well trained pilot is a deadly foe, but I point out sourly that in USN dissimilar air combat training, which pitted Phantom pilots against Skyhawks, the Phantoms did not fare too well either. And pardon my French, but the Fleet air arm was not that hot. They bungled a lot of intercepts during the Falklands War. In a peculiar way, the Harrier was the right plane in the right place in the right time, because despite the bungled intercepts, the Harriers could get back into position to chase down the fuel conserving Argentine pilots and Sidewinder them in stern chase AFTER the Argentine pilots reached their bomb release points. This was good enough to attrite the Argentine air force below effective sortie rate. In other words, in the mad race between blown up frigates and splashed Skyhawks, the RN had enough ships to outlast the Argentinians, just enough to last until the ground was won.

Yes the CVA-01 was badly laid out and designed, but that would just impact the number of modern aircraft it could operate, not preventing them from operating them at all.

See above. Getting sunk is not operating aircraft.

Even if the Argies mission kill a carrier, guess what? The USN will instantly bail out one of THE most important members in NATO.

I was there. Nobody in Washington was happy at all that Whitehall had screwed up and placed the United States in the middle of a NATO / OAS mess. Don't believe the propaganda about the "special relationship". The Reagan Administration was split down the middle about what to do. The Haig faction wanted to let the British stew and simmer in the hot mess of their own making. Weinberger and Haig were at cross purposes, Bush was hands off and let's see what happens, It was Reagan who swung the deal Thatcher's way, but he demanded a lot of her in return. Confine the war to the Falkland Islands, let the US mediate if it could (Galtieri was a fool, he should have taken the deal, Haig offered.), and postwar, when the US called in her markers, Thatcher was to shut up and soldier. The British government took a lot of domestic heat for the US forward basing of Pershings and GLCMS IN BRITAIN. You think this was somehow Thatcher standing shoulder to shoulder with her American allies?

USS Forrestal or some such would have been immediately put up for "Sale" to the RN, 'renamed' Ark Royal or some such, and crewed by a bunch of Englishmen with funny accents.

Weinberger, who was not a fool, pointed out to Haig when that "genius" proposed the cockamamie idea, that for the Forrestal to be effective, she would need an AMERICAN air wing, an AMERICAN URG, an American naval staff and air division, and a YEAR at least to train the RN how to merely operate an "obsolete" American carrier. The two navies had different methods and procedures for almost everything aircraft carrier related. The British would have been better off borrowing the Foch. The French carrier was closer to their methodology and capability to operate a 1950s style attack carrier.

Or as was actually planned, USS Iwo Jima. I'm pretty sure the Argies are going to run out of ASM's before the Brits run out of hulls.

The Iwo Jima had no air operations center for offensive operations or proper task force fleet defense at sea. She would have operated Harriers no better than an Invincible did. Six more Exocets (On the way, during the war despite Britain's tacit agreement with France to stop further sales.) would have made even the Iwo Jima a mission kill.

Disagree - way I understand it, the Argies didn't think the UK would fight, not that they couldn't. Even with the respective inventories of OTL the UK armed forces significantly overmatched what the Argentinians could throw at them. The only way the war made sense is if those forces weren't going to be used, and the Argentinian leadership managed to convince themselves that they wouldn't be. Once that piece of mental gymnastics has been achieved, the presence or absence of a couple of fleet carriers is irrelevant. The decision was never made on the basis of a comparison of forces in OTL, and I don't see why it would be ITTL.

I agree. Everything I saw, indicated delusion in London and Buenos Aires respectively. Neither side believed the other was as capable or incapable as they proved to be on various fronts. Even to this day, I am surprised by the myths a lot of people hold about that war. Luck and a certain lack of skill demonstrated by both sides shaped the fighting and the results.

 

[Jack1971]

Though maybe it'd end up with the cancellation of the helicopter escort cruiser that had been planned to complement the CVA's

I thought that was the Bristol class air defence destroyer. What cruiser was planned?

 

[StevoJH]

I thought that was the Bristol class air defence destroyer. What cruiser was planned?

Remember that they converted two Tiger Class Cruisers to Carry four Sea Kings at huge cost. The replacement cruiser was HMS Invincible.

 

[Viper91]

Well the US was able to keep USS Kitty Hawk up and running for close to 50 years. I could see both ships lasting til about the late 2010s, maybe 2020 or so depending on how good they are maintained and upgraded.

To trim supply lines and better integrate with US and other forces, I could see the British maybe not going for the F-14, but definitely looking into the possibility of purchasing the F/A-18 Hornet, and later possibly the Super Hornet. The UK might even look at hypothetically getting the EA-18G Growler as well.

 

[Ato]

They were dumb enough to engage a nuclear weapon armed power with a nuclear powered submarine force. Think about what I just wrote and put this addenda to work. The RN was trained and equipped for the SLOC mission in the North Atlantic against the Soviet Naval Aviation, which flew LRMP aircraft that launched H/A plunging cruise missiles, each the size of a MIG. The RN, when it tried to find Argentine conventional diesel electric subs, failed miserably. The RN was trained and equipped to search and fight noisy Russian nuclear boats. The RN when it confronted an Argentine air force trained and equipped by the French and the Americans failed miserably, because they were not prepared for low level cruise missile and toss bomb attacks right out of the French and American playbooks for killing RUSSIAN surface action groups. The RN radar systems, AAA, and missile systems were not suited to track and engage Skyhawks and Exocets. Now to be honest, any navy I know of the era would have had a tough time with the Argentine air force. Those guys were a heck of a professional outfit, and with the defective means they had, put up an awesome and terrifying show with the little they actually had.



I never said that anything would change the situation for the better. It is my understanding that the Crown government of the time, just before Thatcher, was intent on the social welfare state and that the decision was to concentrate the military, such as it was, on home defense and NATO obligations, and to weasel out of as many NATO obligations as possible, because the monetary means to meet those obligations was lacking. This goes into economic policy and political philosophy. Let me be brief about it: the British people elected the governments they chose because of those policies that were well known and clearly enunciated. It is not my place to comment on the decisions of the British people. I can however comment on what the lack of money allocated and intent of will by those chosen governments to fail to build not only the proper attack carriers, but the proper bodyguard ships, underway replenishment ships, proper aircraft mixes and outfit an entire task force with the proper defenses to operate in a medium air threat environment would mean for the two carriers above, insofar as the RN mission would be strictly convoy defense, they would be converted to that mission profile.



I maintain that a insular parochial view of British defense needs would have just as much as an undersized and badly designed aircraft carrier, would have led to another pair of Hermes in the ATL being postulated here. Work space for the air wing, flight deck parking, air-ops and the things I have previously mentioned would be bolos.



Why not? Her Majesty's government had already committed to Harrier in the ground attack role for Central Europe. The bird would be built. A short skip to Sea Harrier follows.



But... part of the Ground Attack Harrier program is a portable ski-lift for autobauns so the bird can fly off burdened and carry a usable bomb-load. It, again, is a short step to use a ski-ramp for naval Harrier for rolling take-off purposes from a carrier, unless you are the Americans and have a different way to pitch the plane into the air, burdened.



Nobody has seen a Hornet by the time the Falklands War operate from a carrier yet. (Trials in 1982). That means the underpowered and overweight Tomcat which can only operate from the powerful catapults of USN carriers or from long land based runways is the F-4 replacement. I'm more concerned about the Buccaneer, which if it got into a fight with an Argentine Mirage, a Dagger or a Skyhawk is dead meat. I don't deny that the Phantom in the hands of a well trained pilot is a deadly foe, but I point out sourly that in USN dissimilar air combat training, which pitted Phantom pilots against Skyhawks, the Phantoms did not fare too well either. And pardon my French, but the Fleet air arm was not that hot. They bungled a lot of intercepts during the Falklands War. In a peculiar way, the Harrier was the right plane in the right place in the right time, because despite the bungled intercepts, the Harriers could get back into position to chase down the fuel conserving Argentine pilots and Sidewinder them in stern chase AFTER the Argentine pilots reached their bomb release points. This was good enough to attrite the Argentine air force below effective sortie rate. In other words, in the mad race between blown up frigates and splashed Skyhawks, the RN had enough ships to outlast the Argentinians, just enough to last until the ground was won.



See above. Getting sunk is not operating aircraft.



I was there. Nobody in Washington was happy at all that Whitehall had screwed up and placed the United States in the middle of a NATO / OAS mess. Don't believe the propaganda about the "special relationship". The Reagan Administration was split down the middle about what to do. The Haig faction wanted to let the British stew and simmer in the hot mess of their own making. Weinberger and Haig were at cross purposes, Bush was hands off and let's see what happens, It was Reagan who swung the deal Thatcher's way, but he demanded a lot of her in return. Confine the war to the Falkland Islands, let the US mediate if it could (Galtieri was a fool, he should have taken the deal, Haig offered.), and postwar, when the US called in her markers, Thatcher was to shut up and soldier. The British government took a lot of domestic heat for the US forward basing of Pershings and GLCMS IN BRITAIN. You think this was somehow Thatcher standing shoulder to shoulder with her American allies?



Weinberger, who was not a fool, pointed out to Haig when that "genius" proposed the cockamamie idea, that for the Forrestal to be effective, she would need an AMERICAN air wing, an AMERICAN URG, an American naval staff and air division, and a YEAR at least to train the RN how to merely operate an "obsolete" American carrier. The two navies had different methods and procedures for almost everything aircraft carrier related. The British would have been better off borrowing the Foch. The French carrier was closer to their methodology and capability to operate a 1950s style attack carrier.



The Iwo Jima had no air operations center for offensive operations or proper task force fleet defense at sea. She would have operated Harriers no better than an Invincible did. Six more Exocets (On the way, during the war despite Britain's tacit agreement with France to stop further sales.) would have made even the Iwo Jima a mission kill.



I agree. Everything I saw, indicated delusion in London and Buenos Aires respectively. Neither side believed the other was as capable or incapable as they proved to be on various fronts. Even to this day, I am surprised by the myths a lot of people hold about that war. Luck and a certain lack of skill demonstrated by both sides shaped the fighting and the results.

Spagehtti posting is a sin, so im going to condense you arguments down.

It seems like you are arguing that the RN got supremely lucky not to be utterly wrecked by the Argentine Airforce in otl. I don't see how given the facts this opinion is reasonable. The SHAR pilots were generally ex-Phantom pilots, and contary to what you describe were very skilled at air defence missions. Being regularly described so by allied airforces in joint exercises, and during their frequent exchanges with the US NAVY, who often employed them as instructors. Which is why despite having aircraft that were almost entirely outmatched by their opponents, they managed to score several air to air victories, and prevented any damage whatsoever from happening to the vital carriers fo the task force. The success of the Sea HArrier during the Falklands war was almsot entirely a story of skill in spote of inferior equipment, not the qualities of the aircraft it self. The main rreal advatage the SHAR offered was it ability to get down to the South Atlantic in the first palce, a quality that with the existance of a proper carrier equipped with Phantoms, would be totally superfluous.
Give those same pilots their high performance Phantoms back, along with AEW from Gannets, and long range radar guided skyflash missiles, and they will be at a massive advatange compared to the Argentine Aifrorce, who whilst skilled would have none of those advanatges, and retain all the disadvatages they had in otl. (operating at the limit of their range, faulty weapons, micro-management from command to target ships and not attack the CAP.) With a Phantom CAP operating above the task group, the Argentine air strikes would have been intercepted far away from the British ships, and it is highly likely that there would have been no British ships lost.

You say that the RN 'Failed miserably' to find the Argentine diesel electric submarines, but this ignores entirely how anti-submarine operations work. Successful ASW defence lies in preventing the nemy for even mounting attacks on your forces, this was accomplished, no rgentine submarine even made an attack on the task force. This was abecaue the British ASW measures were formidable enough to prevent even the msot patriotic of Argentine sub commanders from attmepting a suicide mission to get in amongst them. The best way for a subamrien to avoid detection, is afterall not to be where the enemy is looking. The British were defending their taskforce, the Argentine submarines (after a few intial attmepts where they were decsisvely chased off) were very wisely not there. Sucessful ASW doctrine since the second word war has been to protect the task force or convoy, and deter future attacks, not to go off hounding every possible contact.

The idea that money would be wasted developing a specialised naval varaint of the Harrier, when the FAA would already have Phantoms is laughabley ignorant of how Britihs defence procuremnt works. The CVA-01 would had Phantom from day 1 in service, in the Treasury's mind this would be good enough, until the Navy started making serious noise about wanting soemthing better. They would under no circumstances spend money to force the Navy to take a less capable aircraft, and also to convert the carriers to operate theat less capable aircraft. No the Navy very much liked the Phantom, and the CVA-01s would have soldierd on with the Phantoms till the 90s when they would be repalced by the carrier variant of the EFA. If the EFA is signficantly delayed, Hornets would have been either bought or leased to cover the gap.

Jsut the because the CVA-01 is badly laid out, reducing thje capability of its airwing, via poor strike generation, servcing, and overal airgroup size, does not mean they would abandon the whole concept and move to a point defence STOVL fighter. The Navy would of course become very aware of their carriers' shortcomings and would want a new, better designed one to replace it, but the MoD and Treasury ever concerned about costs, would keep telling them to suck it up until the economy improved in the 90s.


Also the idea that the British government created the Falklands crisis, by drawing down its military strength in the region, is both extremely offensive,and victim blaming of the highest degree.
The blame for the war lies squarely and solely on the shoulders of the imperialist, militarist dictatorship in Buenos Aires, who decided that a territorial dispute could be settled by violence. Britain actions whilst, seemingly foolish, was entirely reasonable when you consider that Argentina was supposedly an ally of their major ally, and that the SOuth Atlantic was well outside any spehere of operations where they might need to deploy forces to combat the real geopolitcal threat.

 

[McPherson]

In summary and to keep it brief, since all of the arguments arrive at the same central fact, spaghetti posting or not, YES, the RN was lucky. They were not prepared well for what they ran into. They were incredibly lucky.

Here:

The best in the world learn there. Notice the lecture. And note the lecturer. It is LUCK that carries the RN through. It is not politic to say it, but the RN leadership, training and actual performance was shockingly substandard by USN standards. The only reason the Argentinians came off worse, was because they were not as well equipped and were led by even more incompetent senior commanders as I have already noted.

A Harrier is not a Phantom. PILOTAGE is not the same. Training is not the same. Transition caused no end of accidents and incidents.

And as for the USN describing the RN as a good navy or using RN FAA fliers as instructors? Nope. That is not even remotely accurate.

The only reason the RN through deck cruiser, and demi-carrier survived; is because they were just outside Skyhawk reach and had to be plinked by Exocets instead. that was what snuffed Atlantic Conveyor. that robbed the land forces of their airlift and prolonged the land campaign too long. I* will say something to say about THAT in a moment. Those ships in San Carlos channel were within reach and were the reason the "carriers" were supposed to be there, to protect the landings. How did that work out for RFA Sir Galahad? SS Atlantic Conveyor? HMS Sheffield? HMS Coventry? HMS Antelope? HMS Ardent? The proper comparison is SAVO ISLAND, Ato. And there Fletcher did his job, (Battle of the Eastern Solomons) while Admiral Sandy Woodward had to rely on HMS Conqueror, a submarine, to do HIS.

Thank Murphy for the atomic subs and US recon satellites.

With Atlantic Conveyor's loss the British troops had to hoof it across to Goose Green and to Stanley and that gave the Argentine air force a whole month of target practice.

 

[Mist]

your argument is essentially "The RN got a surprising number of incredibly lucky breaks IRL, therefore if they had a better ship and better aircraft they would have lost?"

And then they would have modified said ships to support an aircraft there is no longer any justification for the development of because irl they made decisions to cancel the ships that are the subject of this discussion and developed an aircraft to mitigate the loss of capability that came with cancelling the ships that are the subject of this discussion.

 

[Riain]

It is LUCK that carries the RN through.

You make your own luck.

The Sea Harriers flew ~1300 sorties in 5 weeks, with GR3s flying another ~125, whereas the Argentines flew ~500 despite having triple the amount of fast jets. This happened because of the hard work of the Squadrons to keep availability high and the logistic train to keep spares up to the aircraft, not because of luck.

Maybe it was luck that the RN faced an enemy that was unprepared, didn't fight a 'whole of Air Force' campaign and have things like retardation devices for bombs or rockets to attack ships. But even if they did, working hard, flying missions, using ships and Harriers in conjunction would be the way to deal with such things as well.

 

[McPherson]

your argument is essentially "The RN got a surprising number of incredibly lucky breaks IRL, therefore if they had a better ship and better aircraft they would have lost?"

And then they would have modified said ships to support an aircraft there is no longer any justification for the development of because irl they made decisions to cancel the ships that are the subject of this discussion and developed an aircraft to mitigate the loss of capability that came with cancelling the ships that are the subject of this discussion.

I strongly suggest you listen to the 8 Bells lecture by the man who was there. The RN does not come off well.

 

[Riain]

As for the OP,it depends on the political decisions surrounding their acquisition. If it was because Britain decided that her main contribution to NATO was Atlantic Striking Group 2 then they would be safe all through the Cold War and the Falklands would only bolster this by showing how this NATO role could be used flexibly elsewhere.

The danger would be in the early 90s, as the Cold War ended just about the time the Phantoms and Buccaneers were out of life with the Super Hornet, Rafale and Eurofighter not available until 1999, 2001 and 2003 respectively, leaving the C/D Hornet the only choice during a time of a post war peace dividend. However my guess is that the RN would have already begun the process of buying the Hornet by 1991, a purchase which fits into the OTL Sea Harrier F/A 2 programme, so isn't unprecedented.

 

[McPherson]

You make your own luck.

The Sea Harriers flew ~1300 sorties in 5 weeks, with GR3s flying another ~125, whereas the Argentines flew ~500 despite having triple the amount of fast jets. This happened because of the hard work of the Squadrons to keep availability high and the logistic train to keep spares up to the aircraft, not because of luck.

Maybe it was luck that the RN faced an enemy that was unprepared, didn't fight a 'whole of Air Force' campaign and have things like retardation devices for bombs or rockets to attack ships. But even if they did, working hard, flying missions, using ships and Harriers in conjunction would be the way to deal with such things as well.

The correct way to deal with the Falklands mess, post facto analysis, was to post a sub, sink Argentine resupply missions and take the MEZ route and starve the garrison. But that is just 20/20 analysis. You can blame the Foreign Office, blame the admiralty, blame the British parliament, but the USN analysis summary is that the British used essentially WW II quality tech and tactics and were sitting ducks for any enemy who had tanker support for their air force. The Argentinians had one tanker which was down for maintenance. I do not have any illusions about how hard it is to dispel myths, but everything you wrote is a myth.

British bombs did not work. Luckily. And that Derby joke is not funny. (^^^)

 

[Mist]

I strongly suggest you listen to the 8 Bells lecture by the man who was there. The RN does not come off well.

how well the RN comes off in this guy presentation is besides the point.

your argument is literally that they would do worse then they did IRL if they had a better aircraft and a dramatically more capable airwing.

 

[McPherson]

how well the RN comes off in this guy presentation is besides the point.

your argument is literally that they would do worse then they did IRL if they had a better aircraft and a dramatically more capable airwing.

It is not equipment, it is the MEN who use it. That is the lesson. You could have given the RN of the day a Nimitz and they would have buffed it up and made a total mess of it.

 

[Mist]

It is not equipment, it is the MEN who use it. That is the lesson.

yes and your argument is that the exact same men who succeeded, abit by the skin of their teeth would do worse if they had better stuff.

at the very worst you could say they would do about the same.

 

[Mike D]

It is not equipment, it is the MEN who use it. That is the lesson. You could have given the RN of the day a Nimitz and they would have buffed it up and made a total mess of it.

You are aware that the UK won, aren't you?

 

[Ato]

I strongly suggest you listen to the 8 Bells lecture by the man who was there. The RN does not come off well.

I've just watched this lecture and what you described has not materialised,

The gentlemen has three main points.

1.The older British Air Defence systems were bad.

2. The SAS were terrible.

3. The CAP provided by Hermes and Invincible was not suffcient to protect the landing force. Especially the lack of AEW.


Whilst better carriers can't help with the SAS, 1 and 3 are pretty handily solved by being able to mount a proper long range CAP with AEW and radar guided missiles, preventing the Argentinian aircraft from getting into the low level close in attack positions they used to evade the escort air defences.

He also discusses how some WWII techniques for defeating close in air attacks such as laying smoke and barrage balloons how could have helped alleviate the lack of proper fleet air defence. Again a problem they wouldn't have had if they did indeed have the proper fleet air defence.


SHARs are point defence fighters, their shortcomings were expected to be covered by the presence of land based airand maritime patrol aircraft in the North Atlantic. In the South Atlantic they struggled to engage in a mission they were not designed or equipped for. The presence of long ranged, Radar guided missile equiped, AEW directed fleet defence fighters would have been a complete game changer.
Argentianian strikes would have been intercepted en route to the Falklalnds, not over the islands themselves. This is part of the reason the British fleet was so unprepeared for the low level clsoe in attacks thjat occured, becasue in the environment, they had trained to fight in they would have had the proper air defence to counter it. Deprived of a major aprt of their defensive system, they were vulnrable, whihc beacme obvious in the losses suffered.

 

[McPherson]

yes and your argument is that the exact same men who succeeded, abit by the skin of their teeth would do worse if they had better stuff.

at the very worst you could say they would do about the same.

They would have done worse. Remember what I wrote about the Forrestal?

I've just watched this lecture and what you described has not materialised,

The gentlemen has three main points.

1.The older British Air Defence systems were bad.

2. The SAS were terrible.

3. The CAP provided by Hermes and Invincible was not suffcient to protect the landing force. Especially the lack of AEW.

Whilst better carriers can't help with the SAS, 1 and 3 are pretty handily solved by being able to mount a proper long range CAP with AEW and radar guided missiles, preventing the Argentinian aircraft from getting into the low level close in attack positions they used to evade the escort air defences.

I do not agree. The British had no clue how to mount a vectored air defense or use SAM traps or apply the air defense onion. They lost their highly perishable WW II earned skills when they became a North Atlantic convoy navy. Significantly the French, who did not have that combat experience, developed and practiced a form of fleet attack and defense while the British lost theirs. But then the French navy expected to fight in the South Atlantic against their former colonies.

He also discusses how some WWII techniques for defeating close in air attacks such as laying smoke and barrage balloons how could have helped alleviate the lack of proper fleet air defence. Again a problem they wouldn't have had if they did indeed have the proper fleet air defence.

They had those means and did not use them. Someone should have remembered buzz bombs and barrage balloons. Someone should have picked up the phone and dialed 1-800-USN-HELP!

SHARs are point defence fighters, their shortcomings were expected to be covered by the presence of land based air and maritime patrol aircraft in the North Atlantic. In the South Atlantic they struggled to engage in a mission they were not designed or equipped for. The presence of long ranged, Radar guided missile equiped, AEW directed fleet defence fighters would have been a complete game changer.

In 1983? Not even the USN could guarantee a low-low-low defense. Still can't (Iraq 2003) unless look down radar is aloft and a Rorsat is keyed up for coverage.

Argentianian strikes would have been intercepted en route to the Falklalnds, not over the islands themselves. This is art of the reason the British fleet was so unprepeared for the low level clsoe in attacks thjat occured, becasue in the environment, they had trained to fight in they would have had the proper air defence to counter it. Deprived of a major aprt of their defensive system, they were vulnrable, whihc beacme obvious in the losses suffered.

Why send back to me what I wrote? I do not disagree that the British were ill-equipped. However:

They could have begged for US radar equipped FRAM destroyers laid up in reserve. It would have taken months to get the RN up to snuff on picket destroyer tactics, and it would have been expensive. Smoke generators can be improvised, even the kind that can carry a form of "Window" in 1983 that can fool an Exocet. Or simple balloon decoys. The RN refused to fit such decoys to Atlantic Conveyor because it would technically make her "a warship". Guess what their other warships lacked?

Gatling guns. The USN started in 1980 urgent backfits on many ships with Phalanx. Not the best last ditch defense, but as low as those Skyhawks zipped through San Carlos Water? Buzzsaw. 20 mm is cheap. Even manual Gatling guns were /are better than Seacat and Seaslug in those conditions.

I would have seized a forward anchorage, parked subs off the western Falklands and built an airbase outside Argentine air coverage (South Georgia) and spent the 3-6 months to prepare properly (^^^) for an amphibious operation (Borrow or convert a STUFT tanker or 2 into an improvised flattop and DOUBLE load helo-lift, even if it has to be helos rented from the FRENCH in case one of the STUFT ships gets axed as happened. BUT that is just 20/20 and a bit of knowledge. it is a lot easier to do things the right way, even with the wrong equipment, than the wrong way with the "alleged" right equipment. Note Maggie Thatcher's cluelessness about her navy's capacity to charge in and put things to rights and her insistence that it do business right away? Never do a Halsey, when you have time to think it through.

 

[McPherson]

SHARs are point defence fighters, their shortcomings were expected to be covered by the presence of land based air and maritime patrol aircraft in the North Atlantic.

I need to address this one.

Nimrods?

Fantasy. Where is an entire squadron of KC-10s (or VIC Tankers) supposed to come? Not from the US or the RAF. They both have their assets overcommitted as is.

Now with South Georgia? You can KC-130 and use a squadron of Tornadoes to cover the run into East Falkland Island and make a direct smash at Stanley or try for the local airfield. It's risky, but you have to build a 3000 meter runway and staff up and build up the logistics for your run-in.

Get the airfield first. dig in. FLY IN reinforcements After that, comes the gravy part. The Argentinians are helpless.

That is how a proper operation is mounted. Use the geography for you, use what RTL assets you have with wisdom and do it right. Take the time and do it right.

 

[Mist]

You think they should have set up a base thousands of miles a way from the nearest friendly supply chain, and weathered it out for 3 to 6 months in the south Atlantic during winter?


Congratulations you have come up with what is quite possibly the worst possible way to have approached the situation.

And that's even without adding in the political arena they are operating in.
The longer they waited the less the public would be willing to support the governments attempts to retake the islands, and the less likely they would be to get the support they did from the Americans.

Had they waited out the weather in the UK for a more advantageous time to mount the operation their political support would have in all likelihood evaporated, not to mention the Argentinian defenders being a stronger position on the islands having had 3-6 months to prepare their defences.

Had they tried to set up a base as you suggest they would have exhausted their political capital even faster, as thousands of British servicemen and their equipment spend 3-6 months being battered by the worst the southern Atlantic can throw at them.
All at ruinous expense to the tax payer for little or no publicly appreciable gain.

E: you also seem to be laboring under the impression that the RN surface ships and Escorts did not have Chaff rockets, and that the RN has no appreciation for the threat posed by low level attacks and Anti ship missiles.

This could not be further from the truth, they had Exocet themselves and understood the threat it posed to the task force, this is exemplified pre-war by the effort put into developing the Seawolf point defence system and during the war by the great effort they went to to keep their carriers out of range of the the Entendards and the lengths the British government went to to prevent the Argentinians from acquiring More missiles.
the limitation on their efforts to counter this threat are as with all things limited by money, while they would most dearly have liked to have a surface fleet made up of Type 82s armed with both Sea dart and Sea Wolf, such was beyond the willingness of the treasury to provide.

As to fitting the taskforce with phalanx, waiting for a substantial number of them to be available would have taken more time then they had to prepare.

 

[Mike D]

you think they should have set up a base thousands of miles a way from the nearest friendly supply chain, and weathered it out for 3 to 6 months in the south Atlantic during winter?

The UK should have started out by invading the Frisian Islands. Or the Isle of Wight.

Everything else just falls into place from there.