How long can WWI be prolonged before a mutual collapse occurs?

Sure, they can do small attacks. But if their strategy is to defeat the Entente in the field, then big attacks are required. And since one of the two quickest ways to exit the war would appear to be to defeat the Entente in the field, then they need to go big at some point in 1918. (The other big method is to turn to the U-boats, but, you know...)

No, the Entente does not have no hope of American support ever, because they do not know the future. We can handwave that the US never actually joins the war or offers financial support, but we cannot handwave the Entente hope of that happening based on the hostility previously shown by the US to Germany.

Emphasis on "faith". They know that the blockade is hurting Germany. Even if there is no expectation of imminent revolution or collapse, then they will hope for it in the medium term while they sit on the defensive, during which time the blockade is the Entente's only offensive strategy. Again, the Entente does not know the future and will hope that the blockade works. They do not need to be right.

Again, no, your interpretation of the German situation is all wrong. Sitting there occupying territory is not useful, Germany needs to actually win the war, and that requires attacking. It's not just an absurd strategy, it's alien to the military mindset of the day.

"We finally have a decisive advantage in the West and can win the war in one month if we attack!"
"Agreed. Which is why my plan is to do... nothing!"

Sorry, but it's nonsense.
 
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You seem to be assuming that some sort of total victory is necessary for the Germans here. If the Entente can never dislodge them from their positions offensively, and the Germans don't make significant advances that could dilute their strength, then the ceasefire lines will be in France. That's symptomatic of a German victory. Why do you think they need to be in Paris? I can only assume you think the Entente would never negotiate otherwise. But they really, really don't want a war that sputters out on the ceasefire lines, since that's a de facto German annexation of more of France. Attacking or negotiations are their only choices.
 
It's not just the direct loans to Britain and France, there's a whole net of of loans and subsidies from Britain and France to "minor" Entente players like Russia, Italy, Romania, Belgium, Serbia-in-Exile, various Arab groups etc.
While some of that can be in goods (at least to Belgium, Italy, "Serbia" and the Arabs) part of it has to be in hard currency which will be in short supply from '17 on, and will be critically needed to keep up the main war on the western front

The main reason the russians stayed in the war after the february revolution was the british subsidy, once that is no longer forthcoming (or even starts to look dubious) the Kerensky government (or whoever is in charge at the time) will have to face the inevitable, an early mini-Brest-Litovsk is likely.

Once that happens Romania will be up against the wall, probably before the end of 1917.
After that Albania and Salonica would be ripe for the taking, and Greece might get an offer they could not refuse. Would Britain & France be willing to pour more troops, supplies & treasure into Salonica - and from where ?

Caporetto is another place where butterflies might swarm, though supplies appear to have been the determining factor.
Though if Britain & France had had to cut supplies & subsidies the italians might be in even worse trouble than OTL...

Thus you might end up with a situation where by spring 1918 it is only Britain, France & Belgium on the Western Front plus some minor stuff in the Middle East with everything in between settled, while the CP powers would have time to recover - it certainly would LOOK to anyone as if the CP was winning...
 
, because they do not know the future. We can handwave that the US never actually joins the war or offers financial support, but we cannot handwave the Entente hope of that happening based on the hostility previously shown by the US to Germany.

In 1916/17 the US was if anything more hostile to the Entente (over issues relating to the blockade and to blacklists) than to Germany. It took USW and the ZT to turn this around.



"We finally have a decisive advantage in the West and can win the war in one month if we attack!"
"Agreed. Which is why my plan is to do... nothing!".

They didn't have a decisive advantage in 1918. They had a superiority in numbers sufficient to give them a chance of winning, but by no means assuring it. They took the gamble because they had no choice. Within a few more months, American reinforcements would make the Entente invincible. Spring 1918 was their last window of opportunity.

And as previously stated, a defensive strategy need not equal doing nothing. It could have included limited attacks, perhaps one toward Belfort to eject the Entente from the one sliver of Germany that it occupied - a morale boost for Germany and a blow to France. However, that's a frill. The basic point is that with no prospect of US reinforcements, the Entente can't settle for a defensive strategy since this leaves Germany with all the cards at a peace conference. The Germans can afford it as they need only hold their own to have effectively won the war.
 
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You seem to be assuming that some sort of total victory is necessary for the Germans here. If the Entente can never dislodge them from their positions offensively, and the Germans don't make significant advances that could dilute their strength, then the ceasefire lines will be in France. That's symptomatic of a German victory. Why do you think they need to be in Paris? I can only assume you think the Entente would never negotiate otherwise. But they really, really don't want a war that sputters out on the ceasefire lines, since that's a de facto German annexation of more of France. Attacking or negotiations are their only choices.

You mentioned Paris, not me. I didn't mention total victory either.

While you're correct to say that if nobody does anything, then the ceasefire lines will be in France, the bit that both you and Mikestone are missing is the timing of this ceasefire. Without German pressure leading to a meaningful victory in the field there is no pressure on France to do anything. Limited attacks aren't good enough by definition. Without this pressure, the war will just drag on and on, probably for several more years. I don't believe that such delay is acceptable to Germany.

The basic point is that with no prospect of US reinforcements, the Entente can't settle for a defensive strategy since this leaves Germany with all the cards at a peace conference.

Your basic point is flawed because it relies on prescience! And it disregards the timing of this peace conference and the political decisions required to have one.

As I keep explaining, there is not "no prospect" of US support because the Entente can't predict the future. The hope may be slim, but faced with the alternative of accepting defeat, the politicians will have to put their faith in it. Nor would Entente strategy be the permanent defence that you describe, because, again, the Entente cannot predict the future! Their strategy would be to recover, reorganise and to attack at another time or another place or when "the conditions are right", such as when the blockade has had "a decisive effect", or to focus on the Med, which is the sort of strategy that the troops would probably be quite happy with and can be strung out for a long, long time.

In spring or summer of 1918, Germany has the ability to mount a successful offensive against a weakened Entente that would short-circuit the months or years of pointless dithering and continuing grinding blockade that your strategy would require, by demonstrating to the Entente that they are beaten in the field and must ask for terms before their their situation becomes worse. For Germany, to not make use of their advantage is political and military nonsense.
 
You mentioned Paris, not me. I didn't mention total victory either.

You implied as much by repeatedly asserting that heading into eventual peace negotiations with the clear advantage is somehow not good enough.

While you're correct to say that if nobody does anything, then the ceasefire lines will be in France, the bit that both you and Mikestone are missing is the timing of this ceasefire. Without German pressure leading to a meaningful victory in the field there is no pressure on France to do anything. Limited attacks aren't good enough by definition. Without this pressure, the war will just drag on and on, probably for several more years. I don't believe that such delay is acceptable to Germany.

You know who a delay is even less acceptable to? France, who needs to keep their country's farmers mobilized so long as Germany is squatting on their territory, which means they need to keep on importing their food and going deeper and deeper into debt. And given the whole problem with the Entente exhausting its foreign reserves, a continued stalemate promises food shortages, riots, and all that good stuff. And if they demobilize their army to grow food again, the Germans would be sure to notice and then start attacking again. But other than impending famine, no pressure, I guess.


Your basic point is flawed because it relies on prescience! And it disregards the timing of this peace conference and the political decisions required to have one.

All the prescience that's required is the belief that there will probably be a peace settlement eventually. I guess there doesn't have to be one, but that still cedes more of France to Germany, leaves Verdun under the shadow of German artillery, and there's still the food concerns.

As I keep explaining, there is not "no prospect" of US support because the Entente can't predict the future. The hope may be slim, but faced with the alternative of accepting defeat, the politicians will have to put their faith in it. Nor would Entente strategy be the permanent defence that you describe, because, again, the Entente cannot predict the future! Their strategy would be to recover, reorganise and to attack at another time or another place or when "the conditions are right", such as when the blockade has had "a decisive effect", or to focus on the Med, which is the sort of strategy that the troops would probably be quite happy with and can be strung out for a long, long time.

You're one to complain about prescience when there's no contemporary sources that suggest the Entente ever believed that the blockade would win the war for them. And why should they? The UK had never won a major war by blockade alone before (or after!). You are right that they'd be unlikely to just sit there. However, as @wiking could easily tell you, they went all out on the offensive in 1917 IOTL, and their efforts were ineffective. In Italy, they nearly lost everything thanks to Caporetto, and things only went so much better in France. Without American food and munitions (and yes, troops), they wouldn't be able to sustain those efforts into 1918.

In spring or summer of 1918, Germany has the ability to mount a successful offensive against a weakened Entente that would short-circuit the months or years of pointless dithering and continuing grinding blockade that your strategy would require, by demonstrating to the Entente that they are beaten in the field and must ask for terms before their their situation becomes worse. For Germany, to not make use of their advantage is political and military nonsense.

A 1918 offensive might work well, yes. Still, it would probably be better to wait until the Entente flushes away what remains of their strength in whatever last ditch effort they could come up with that year. At that point, what the Germans do or don't do is academic, because the Entente would have become powerless, which is the point Mikestone and I have been making. Hell, without American fuel, even the British blockade would start to buckle, that's how bad it was.
 
As I keep explaining, there is not "no prospect" of US support because the Entente can't predict the future. The hope may be slim, but faced with the alternative of accepting defeat, the politicians will have to put their faith in it. Nor would Entente strategy be the permanent defence that you describe, because, again, the Entente cannot predict the future! Their strategy would be to recover, reorganise and to attack at another time or another place or when "the conditions are right",


And how long will the troops keep on enduring offensives which keep on ending in the same failure?

The French Army came close to cracking in Spring 1917. Petain was able to nurse it back to health (for the moment) by promising no more big offensives until the Americans were over to reinforce them. But absent US intervention that is only a palliative. Sooner or later the offensive must resume if the Germans are to be expelled from their conquests, and if these offensives do no better than previous ones (and there's no reason to expect otherwise) then at some point the men in the trenches (French and eventually British too) will get fed up with being killed for nothing. When that happens the politicians will have to seek peace whether they like it or not, as their German colleagues did OTL.
 
And how long will the troops keep on enduring offensives which keep on ending in the same failure?

This is getting repetitive and you seem to be misunderstanding my explanation. You're focusing on the Entente too much, when it's Germany who makes the decision whether or not to attack in 1918. And a passive Germany is not just bad strategy, the nature of the military system means that it has little chance of being proposed and no chance of being implemented. I'll try one last time to explain this.

The idea that Germany would decide to not mount a significant attack in 1918 despite knowing just how weak the Entente is absurd because that's not how military systems work. A general doesn't make a name for himself by proposing a strategy of doing nothing, and High Commands believe that to win wars you must attack. In this 1918, Germany will know that it has the advantage in the west and there'll be no shortage of people saying that one more blow will force the Entente to the table, even if somewhere like Amiens isn't taken. They will say that they can end the war in a month. They may or may not be right, but it's a hell of an easier sell than a strategy of doing nothing and hoping for the best. In short, "The sooner we attack, the sooner we win".

And I think your assessment of Entente strategy is all wrong too. You essentially have them repeatedly attacking and failing, learning nothing each time, despite knowing that their attacks very likely won't work because of their inferiority. It's lead paint time, really. Yes, they'll want to attack, but they will quickly realise that they are unable to do so with any great hope of success. So they will stop attacking and instead try to rebuild strength until they think they are in a position to do so successfully. The Entente troops will be quite happy with that, particularly in your improbable situation of not having to defend against a German offensive!
 
And I think your assessment of Entente strategy is all wrong too. You essentially have them repeatedly attacking and failing, learning nothing each time, despite knowing that their attacks very likely won't work because of their inferiority. It's lead paint time, really. Yes, they'll want to attack, but they will quickly realise that they are unable to do so with any great hope of success. So they will stop attacking and instead try to rebuild strength until they think they are in a position to do so successfully.

What choice has the Entente except to attack?

Germany is on their soil virtually everywhere, so they will be at a huge disadvantage in any peace conference. To get an acceptable peace they need to deprive Germany of her best bargaining chips by driving her out of France and Belgium, which with Russia out and the US not in, they aren't in a position to do - unless Germany obligingly breaks her own soldiers' morale by promising a knock-out blow and then failing to deliver it. That of course was what they did in 1918 OTL - because the prospect of massive US forces means that waiting was not an option. TTL that is not the case. Germany can wait just as long as the Entente.
 
Even with direct US support, the Anglo-French were just like the Germans in that they were unlikely to survive 1919 without Pre-1918 PoDs.
 
According to Harold I Nelson [1] the Imperial War Cabinet anticipated a grave manpower shortage if the war continued to Dec 1919. It expected that "British divisions in France would fall to 36, compared to 69 in August 1918. French divisions would total 65, American 112 [2] and German 170 - -".

These figures may, of course, have been overly pessimistic for some reason or other, but they don't point to any confidence in an Entente victory absent US support.

[1] Land and Power, Ch 2, pp42-43
[2] An even greater disparity than the raw figure suggests, as American divisions were considerably bigger then British, French or German ones.
 
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