How Long Can China Last In the Sino-Japanese War

[Jim Smitty]

Ok here is the set up. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident still happens as per OTL (The POD is post-Munich ITL). The US embargoes the Japanese of oil and scrap iron earlier than OTL in early 1940. However the Japanese get oil from the Germans via the Soviets with the Trans-Siberian Railway. The US embargo hurts but its not crippling like it was OTL. Peace comes to Europe in the Winter of 41 with the British being lead by Lord Halifax. The British under pressure from the Japanese have shut down the Burma Road. The Hump is the only way to get supplies to China. However instead of the USAAF, you got a proto-Air America flying in the supplies. The Soviets (No Operation Barbarossa) are also turning the screws against the Chinese (See Xingiang War of 1937).

How long can China last before they throw in the towel because they just don't have the supplies needed to keep the fight on going.

 

[zeppelinair]

Without foreign support I can still envision China lasting into the 1940s - compared to the USSR, China received a bare minimum of L-L. Furthermore even after the entirety is invaded the Japanese can't enforce a stable rule because 1. they're spread too far out to successfully control China, 2. their objective is pushing the front quickly, so they'll now be engaged by wars in Burma and India, 3. and their harsh treatment of the Chinese can't be expected to be better and ultimately the Chinese will turn to the CCP. Maybe it'll last 5 years.

 

[galveston bay]

The KMT would eventually collapse in this situation, and what would be left would be a bunch of warlords some of whom cooperate with Japan, some of whom do not, and I am including the Chinese Communists in this as well. The death toll would be even worse (depending on your source ranges 15-35 million) than in OTL. In this situation, especially if the Japanese continue their 3 Alls offensives (loot all, kill all, burn all, and yes they really called them that) along with an increase in fraticidal killing between the warlords and a lack of any foreign aid to speak of, the KMT has no carrot to offer warlords to cooperate with it. So the KMT goes down..

It would take a very long time for China to recover if the Japanese ever left.

If the Japanese attack the US, then after Japan is defeated the CCCP is probably again the winner as being the least tainted of the surviving factions

 

[dandan_noodles]

If the European war ends in a negotiated peace, then Germany's control over the Netherlands might give them leverage to keep the Dutch East Indies as a supply of oil for the Japanese.

Considering Ichigo was launched when Japan was on its last legs in the Pacific, and they still managed to take control of the Beijing-Canton railroad, in addition to the Yangtze river, the Yellow river, and the Grand Canal, I think the war on the KMT is definitely winnable by the mid 40s. Chongqing falls, Chiang is either assassinated or just loses control, and 90% of China's GDP is in Japanese hands.

What's interesting for me is the war between the Japanese and the communists. Without the Pacific War, was Imperial Japan strong enough to crack down on the CCP (probably stronger than the KMT in 45)? Chiang had them on the ropes in 1937, but how much of their strength had they rebuilt by 1943? What level of commitment could the Japanese sustain in China? Could they economically integrate their conquests into their empire? What would it take to legitimate the Wang Jingwei regime to the Chinese? etc etc

 

[Jim Smitty]

So China can last till about 1945-46ish with only min resupply from the Americans flying the hump?

 

[Magnum]

If the European war ends in a negotiated peace, then Germany's control over the Netherlands might give them leverage to keep the Dutch East Indies as a supply of oil for the Japanese.

The fact that it didn't happen OTL should be an indication it wouldn't ITTL, especially since the only way the British are agreeing to an armistice(1) is if the Nazis offer significant concessions(2), which at the minimum would include no military or economic domination(3), of any sort, of France and the Low Countries.

And if by some strange twist of fate, the Germans do evacuate western Europe pronto(4), they will be facing some very serious issues (5) in a very short term (6) as their economy implodes, all while Britain and the Soviet Union are re-arming like crazy.

Bottom line - any peace in Europe that results in Japan getting free oil via the Trans-Siberian RR is going to be a very short one at best. And since Japan on a war footing has no means of financing its oil and scrap metal imports even absent any kind of embargo, all a Halifax-induced armistice does is delay Japan's choice of war or loss of face by about a year, long enough for more of the US ships then under construction to come online.

1 - which btw happens close to the Fall of France or doesn't at all, certainly not as late as winter '40
2 - and we all know how magnanimous Hitler can be when victorious
3 - preventing a continental hegemon had been the cornerstone of British foreign policy for centuries
4 - meaning no chance to extensively loot the local economies
5 - e.g. lack of hard currency with which to finance external trade
6 - even OTL, they would probably have been unable to fulfill their end of the (very advantageous) trade deal with the Soviets by July 1941

 

[dandan_noodles]

The Southern Expansion strategy was a key tool for securing funding for the Navy in the constant battles over the Japanese military budget; if Nanshin is no longer necessary for the China enterprise, then the Navy loses one of their biggest bargaining chips, and necessary cuts to keep up oil and scrap imports for the Army can come from them. Unlikely to be enough to make up for the deficit, but it gives the Japanese more options. They can (sort of) control the scale of their own war funding, but an embargo gives them no options besides war or withdrawal and collapse.

 

[Blackfox5]

In this extremely strange and unrealistic scenario, China is forced to make peace around 1943. The deck is completely stacked against them. As part of the deal, Chiang temporarily goes into exile to save face rather than accept defeat. Everyone understands Chiang will come back and resume power after a certain amount of time.

North China is officially split from the rest of the country, and the Japanese penetrate much of the Chinese bureaucracy.

China is destabilized internally, but most of the Chinese just want peace. The Communists are crushed. The Japanese no longer need to fear Nanking's rapprochement or crushing them since Japanese influence will be pervasive.

Chiang comes back at some point, and promises to be nice to Japan, while trying to prepare for the day when China can throw off the Japanese yoke which will take at least one to two decades.

 

[dandan_noodles]

Chiang comes back at some point, and promises to be nice to Japan, while trying to prepare for the day when China can throw off the Japanese yoke which will take at least one to two decades.

Honestly think it's impossible, unless he can get massive Soviet support; if the Japanese control the Beijing-Canton line, 90% of China's GDP is behind that line, especially if they take Sichuan. Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet just don't have the resources to support a reconquest of the Yangtze, Pearl, and Yellow Rivers.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

Depends on how much effort the Japanese put into it. Historically prior to the outbreak of the wider war in the Pacific Japan's total war potential was nowhere near maxed out.

 

[NamelesStatistic]

In what strange world would the Russians be allowing the Japanese to be supplied with oil transported (from Germany of all places which in OTL faced crude shortages and had to rely on synthetic) over Russian soil? They were rivals for influence in the far-east and Russia and Japan had had numerous border incidents and undeclared wars throughout the late 1930s (culminating in the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol). Even if the USSR was not at war with Nazi Germany, and the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was in effect in 1941 (as in OTL) they certainly would not be in anyway trying to strengthen Japan's position in Asia. Indeed the Soviets would likely be trying to covertly undermine them.

 

[ZhugeLiang]

In what strange world would the Russians be allowing the Japanese to be supplied with oil transported (from Germany of all places which in OTL faced crude shortages and had to rely on synthetic) over Russian soil? They were rivals for influence in the far-east and Russia and Japan had had numerous border incidents and undeclared wars throughout the late 1930s (culminating in the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol). Even if the USSR was not at war with Nazi Germany, and the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact was in effect in 1941 (as in OTL) they certainly would not be in anyway trying to strengthen Japan's position in Asia. Indeed the Soviets would likely be trying to covertly undermine them.

Exactly my question. Why would the Soviets be hostile to the Chinese? They know that after Japan defeats China, they're going for the Soviets next. The moment the KMT seem close to collapse, Stalin is going to go crazy and funnel everything he can across the border.

Meanwhile, I don't think that the Japanese will be able to crush the CCP. Their control was mainly coastal and urban-based, and they simply could not control the peasants.

In such a scenario, I can see the KMT either going into exile, beginning their own guerilla, or just surrendering.

Note that this doesn't mean that China is going to surrender. If the KMT surrenders, expect the CCP to continue the struggle from rural land, areas the Japanese could barely penetrate.

 

[Seleucus]

However the Japanese get oil from the Germans via the Soviets with the Trans-Siberian Railway.

<snip>

The Soviets (No Operation Barbarossa) are also turning the screws against the Chinese (See Xingiang War of 1937).

It's probably a statement on the U.S. conception of history that the Soviets were seen as anti-KMT. In fact, they generally supported the KMT more than the CHC and provided a lot more support to the KMT than the U.S. did during the early stages of the war, probably for primarily realpolitik reasons. Everyone's heard of the Flying Tigers, but few are aware of the Soviet Volunteer Group, which was sent to China as soon as the war began, and numbered up to ~800 aircraft and 400 personnel [in comparison, the Flying Tigers arrived four years later in 1941 after the Soviet withdrawal due to neutrality with Japan; they only amounted to ~100 aircraft and ~60 personnel]

Yes, the Soviets also intervened in Xinjiang. This was a relatively small conflict characterized essentially by spheres of influence [Xinjiang was effectively a Soviet puppet state since 1931; the KMT attempted to take advantage of a rebellion in Xinjiang to intervene, resulting in a request from the Xinjiang government for Soviet intervention.] The equivalent would be to characterize the US/UK/etc. as anti-KMT due to the concessions in China which aligned them with Japan until the war [if anything, the concessions were far more destructive to the KMT than the Soviet puppet state of Xinjiang; the concessions made it impossible to defend its core territory - e.g. the prohibition on Chinese troops in Shanghai due to the foreign concessions there, with obvious consequences when the war broke out.] The reality of the situation was far more complicated than your depiction in that both the US/UK/etc. and the Soviet Union were engaging in realpolitik defense of their interests, while simultaneously attempting to support the KMT against the Japanese [also partly for realpolitik reasons.]

 

[ZhugeLiang]

It's probably a statement on the U.S. conception of history that the Soviets were seen as anti-KMT. In fact, they generally supported the KMT more than the CHC and provided a lot more support to the KMT than the U.S. did during the early stages of the war, probably for primarily realpolitik reasons. Everyone's heard of the Flying Tigers, but few are aware of the Soviet Volunteer Group, which was sent to China as soon as the war began, and numbered up to ~800 aircraft and 400 personnel [in comparison, the Flying Tigers arrived four years later in 1941 after the Soviet withdrawal due to neutrality with Japan; they only amounted to ~100 aircraft and ~60 personnel]

Yes, the Soviets also intervened in Xinjiang. This was a relatively small conflict characterized essentially by spheres of influence [Xinjiang was effectively a Soviet puppet state since 1931; the KMT attempted to take advantage of a rebellion in Xinjiang to intervene, resulting in a request from the Xinjiang government for Soviet intervention.] The equivalent would be to characterize the US/UK/etc. as anti-KMT due to the concessions in China which aligned them with Japan until the war [if anything, the concessions were far more destructive to the KMT than the Soviet puppet state of Xinjiang; the concessions made it impossible to defend its core territory - e.g. the prohibition on Chinese troops in Shanghai due to the foreign concessions there, with obvious consequences when the war broke out.] The reality of the situation was far more complicated than your depiction in that both the US/UK/etc. and the Soviet Union were engaging in realpolitik defense of their interests, while simultaneously attempting to support the KMT against the Japanese [also partly for realpolitik reasons.]

Yup, I agree with everything said here.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Japan had several problems in China. The first is that any agreement about anything with anyone could be overturned by relatively junior Army officers who did whatever they liked. So, why come to any agreement with the Japanese if they'll just void it anyway?

Secondly, when the Japanese did set up puppet states, they demanded total submission. Not just nominally independent puppet states, but slave states.

So there was no way the Chinese could surrender, really. Which mean that Japan had to keep expanding and trying to control more of China, and they just didn't have the men or resources to occupy that large a country.

So. How long can China last? Far longer than Japan can. Japan can win every battle, but they can't win the war.

 

[dandan_noodles]

The Japanese can't occupy every square inch of the Republic of China's claimed territory, but they don't necessarily need to. Armies require resources to support them, and the armies Xinjiang and Tibet can support could not drive the Japanese out. That's what the KMT would have left if the Japanese broke through to Chongqing and Chengdu, and that's if Chiang can hold his alliance together in the face of decisive defeats. The Japanese would control 90% of China's population and GDP, and it'll be a long time before any force could push them back down the Yangtze, which gives them more time to integrate Jiangnan, Guangdong, and the Central Plains into their economic sphere.

 

[ZhugeLiang]

The Japanese can't occupy every square inch of the Republic of China's claimed territory, but they don't necessarily need to. Armies require resources to support them, and the armies Xinjiang and Tibet can support could not drive the Japanese out. That's what the KMT would have left if the Japanese broke through to Chongqing and Chengdu, and that's if Chiang can hold his alliance together in the face of decisive defeats. The Japanese would control 90% of China's population and GDP, and it'll be a long time before any force could push them back down the Yangtze, which gives them more time to integrate Jiangnan, Guangdong, and the Central Plains into their economic sphere.

'Integrate'

Nope, not happening. Japan can 'control' and 'integrate' as much as they want to, but it's not going to be successful. Not when they're trying to kill and loot and smash everything (literally their Three Alls Policy).

The more they control, the less they have the ability to control; guerillas will pop up more and more frequently, and as I've said before, they don't control rural areas. That's perhaps 90% of the Chinese GDP.

 

[dandan_noodles]

Even if most of the population is rural, they're still concentrated within a day or two's travel of a river, railway, or canal, and thus under the Japanese shadow.

You can't win a war against a conventional, industrialized army without a conventional, industrialized army of your own, plucky Vietcong guerrilla mythmaking notwithstanding; the Maoist theory of guerrilla warfare requires a transition to conventional operations for victory, which would be impossible as long as the Japanese control all of China's industrial and transportation infrastructure.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

China can't win militarily, sure. But neither can Japan. As I said, they can win every single battle, but they can't effectively occupy and run the whole country.

It's like attacking water with a sword.

 

[John Farson]

'Integrate'

Nope, not happening. Japan can 'control' and 'integrate' as much as they want to, but it's not going to be successful. Not when they're trying to kill and loot and smash everything (literally their Three Alls Policy).

The more they control, the less they have the ability to control; guerillas will pop up more and more frequently, and as I've said before, they don't control rural areas. That's perhaps 90% of the Chinese GDP.

Isn't it so that throughout the Sino-Japanese War the frontlines didn't tell the whole story? That you could have large formations of Japanese, KMT and CCP forces on both sides of the "official" frontline that one sees on maps? From what I've heard said, the main point in the war was control of various nodes and LOCs, i.e. cities, railways, rivers and so forth. Like previously said, the Japanese couldn't physically occupy every square mile of China.