How long can Britain supply France's enemy?

I recently read that Britain's war budget was close to three times that of France during the Napoleonic wars. One of the major counterpoints of any french victory timeline is that no matter who Napoleon defeats, Britain will still back up other enemies.

But how long? Will such an enormous military spending eventually prove to costly in Britain? How many years can Britain cover Germany in gold to keep the blood flowing?
 
I don't know the specific budgetary details, but in political terms they could not do so endlessly. British opinion was not unanimous in favor of war. Some British people admired the French Revolution and Napoléon, and others wanted peace simply on pragmatic grounds - the war was costing a lot of lives and money, and there was an unpopular income tax to pay for it.

The peace of Amiens was achieved because a pro-peace government came to power. After Austerlitz/Trafalgar, the British government again made peace overtures, but these broke down and the pro-war party came back. By 1812, there was discontent that could have caused the government to fall again - but then events in Russia/Spain encouraged it to keep going forward. If 1812-13 go differently for Napoléon, he has a real chance at peace (though it may not last long).
 
Longer than France can supply themselves. If I remember correctly Britain's economy actually did pretty well during the war. But as funnyhat pointed out, the real issue was exhausting political capital rather than exhausting actual money.
 

Lusitania

Donor
The British occupation of the french Caribbean islands was actually a profitable enterprise with the proceeds from the sugar planting paying a huge part of the Royal Navy costs.
 
Longer than France can supply themselves. If I remember correctly Britain's economy actually did pretty well during the war. But as funnyhat pointed out, the real issue was exhausting political capital rather than exhausting actual money.

Actually, situation was quite complicated:

"Total British debt increased from £229,614,446 in February 1793, to £497,043,488 in February 1802 and to £816,311,939 in February 1816." (http://resmilitaris.net/ressources/...itary_mobilization_in_the_napoleonic_wars.pdf). Which was almost almost 200% of GNP.

Now, the allies:

"in 1813 the British provided £7,000,000 to the Prussians and the Russians in order to fight Napoleon. Another £1,000,000 was given to Sweden in order to form a 30,000-strong force and fight the French on the Continent. In total, for 1813 British military aid to its allies was £11,294,416 and an additional sum of £11,355,412 came from war loans. Thus total British aid for 1813 to its allies was £22,649,828."

Russia did not consider the British financial help adequate and in April 1813, the Russian fiscal situation was so critical that policy-makers fully expected the banking system to collapse completely if war operations were prolonged for another year or more (Russian government spending increased from 79,303,355 roubles in 1802, to 287,541,557 in 1812).

In Prussia accumulated war-related debt covered by the public borrowing in 1810 reached 100 million thaler, 132 in 1813 and at least 218 in 1820.

"Austria’s participation in that Fifth Coalition against Napoleon only occurred after British promises to the Austrian Emperor of financial aid, and of military action in Italy and Holland in order to tie down French troops... Austria’s economic mobilization was also important and, just as in the Russian case, relied heavily on money supply increases. To illustrate, in September 1806 money circulation was just 440,549,000 paper gulden ; in July 1810, it was increased to 1,011,801,000 paper gulden. In February 1811, the exchange rate between a paper and a silver gulden was 12:1. At that point, the Austrian government decided to impose new rates, which accelerated the currency’s depreciation. 77 The war proved financially catastrophic." Only £250,000 in silver bars materialized.

In other words, it was not only an issue of Britain agreeing to pay subsidies but also ability and willingness of the continental countries to contribute the huge amounts of their own money (and people) for a war effort. Not that Britain would be able to keep increasing the national debt forever.

OTOH, "The industrial index of France was stronger than Britain’s. To illustrate, coal production increased from 250,000 tons in 1794 to 800,000 in 1814. The production of iron increased from 60,000 tons to 112,000 tons and salt-mine production increased from 40,000 tons to 150,000 tons over the same period.93 In this time frame, France’s arms industry went through a steep and immense transformation."

"Yet, France’s budget could hardly compare with Britain’s, of which it represented a fraction: 36% in 1805, 42% in 1813. In spite of the exploitation of occupied countries, the French debt increased from 47 million francs in 1809 to 220 million in 1813. By 1814, the fiscal situation had become extremely problematic. On January 25 that year, a Cabinet meeting concluded that monthly State revenues amounted to only 367,000 francs, as opposed to the 10 million which would normally accrue in peacetime. French defence spending could not possibly equal the combined spending of Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. This undoubtedly was one of Napoleon’s greatest sources of weakness."

So it seems that the key component were willing coalition members.
 
"The industrial index of France was stronger than Britain’s. To illustrate, coal production increased from 250,000 tons in 1794 to 800,000 in 1814. The production of iron increased from 60,000 tons to 112,000 tons and salt-mine production increased from 40,000 tons to 150,000 tons over the same period.93 In this time frame, France’s arms industry went through a steep and immense transformation."
This claim is crazy, not least because you can't illustrate that one country is stronger than another without providing statistics from both.
  • French coal production was 800,000 tons in 1814; British coal production was 16,590,000 tons. Sidney Pollard, 'A New Estimate of British Coal Production, 1750–1850' (The Economic History Review, Volume 33, Issue 2, May 1980).
  • French iron production was 112,000 tons in 1814; British iron production was 400,000 tons. Philip Riden, 'The Output of the British Iron Industry before 1870' (The Economic History Review, Volume 30, Issue 3, August 1977).
It doesn't help that you've selectively quoted the paper. For instance, although the quote given cuts off at 'France’s arms industry went through a steep and immense transformation,' on the next page it says "while the French arms industry was more developed than its British counterpart in 1803, by 1811 its advantage had vanished."
 
Longer than France can supply themselves. If I remember correctly Britain's economy actually did pretty well during the war. But as funnyhat pointed out, the real issue was exhausting political capital rather than exhausting actual money.

I don't have the source handy, but the merchant class in GB took a pretty substantial hit from the admittedly porous Continental System. They weren't bankrupted, but it wasn't a tenable, long term situation for them either, but neither was the Continental System for Napoleon.
 
This claim is crazy, not least because you can't illustrate that one country is stronger than another without providing statistics from both.

Author was talking about the "industrial index" not about the absolute numbers.


It doesn't help that you've selectively quoted the paper.

Of course, I'm noт quoting its all: this is what link is for. I'm quoting just the pieces directly related to the military efforts and expenses of main participants by the reasons which should be obvious if you read my post carefully.

For instance, although the quote given cuts off at 'France’s arms industry went through a steep and immense transformation,' on the next page it says "while the French arms industry was more developed than its British counterpart in 1803, by 1811 its advantage had vanished."

And if you read carefully the parts I quoted, you could easily find out that the overall conclusion was in the British favor. However, the French state debt in relation to GDP was seemingly well below the British level and it is anybody's guess for how long the British government could keep spending money at that rate.

Another part which you clearly ignored was dedicated to the British allies and their problems related to the Napoleonic wars: the British subsidies had been covering just a part of their expenses and of course could not compensate for the human losses. Which means that continuation of the wars depended not just upon the British capacity to lend money (as implied by the thread's title) but also upon the willingness and ability of other coalitions members to maintain their military efforts for indefinite time.
 
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Author was talking about the "industrial index" not about the absolute numbers.
Which is the problem - did you not notice? The 'industrial index' compares both countries to their own output in 1913. 1814 Britain represented 9% of 1913 Britain, and 1814 France represented 19.2% of 1913 France. However, all that means is that British industrial output grows more in the nineteenth century than does France. Britain and France both accounted for about 4.2% of world manufacturing output in 1800; by 1913, Britain accounted for 13.6% and France accounted for 6.1%. As such, the 'industrial index' is based on two different metrics in a way that heavily favours France.

What actually matters in relation to the ability to fight wars is that Britain is producing far more iron (4x) and coal (21x) than France in 1814. It's exactly the same as with army size: absolute size counts more than how much the army grows over the period, or how big it is in relation to the army a century later.

Of course, I'm noт quoting its all: this is what link is for. I'm quoting just the pieces directly related to the military efforts and expenses of main participants by the reasons which should be obvious if you read my post carefully.
It seems odd that "France's arms industry [going] through a steep and immense transformation" should be "directly related to the military efforts... of [the] main participants", but the British arms industry performing a similarly immense transformation, to the extent it actually outstripped France by 1811, shouldn't be.

And if you read carefully the parts I quoted, you could easily find out that the overall conclusion was in the British favor.
You'll notice that I didn't take issue with those parts- you posted something that was blatantly wrong, and I corrected it. I did so in large part because the incorrect claim that Britain is France's industrial inferior supports your point that coalition members were key, whereas Britain being her industrial superior contradicts it.
 
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Which is the problem - did you not notice? The 'industrial index' compares both countries to their own output in 1913. 1814 Britain represented 9% of 1913 Britain, and 1814 France represented 19.2% of 1913 France. However, all that means is that British industrial output grows more in the nineteenth century than does France.

Yes, I noticed this and this seems to be one of the points that author is making: that France was initially better prepared but it was later bypassed by Britain.


Britain and France both accounted for about 4.2% of world manufacturing output in 1800; by 1913, Britain accounted for 13.6% and France accounted for 6.1%. As such, the 'industrial index' is based on two different metrics in a way that heavily favours France.

Yes, this is quite obvious but rather irrelevant to the main point.

What actually matters in relation to the ability to fight wars is that Britain is producing far more iron (4x) and coal (21x) than France in 1814. It's exactly the same as with army size: absolute size counts more than how much the army grows over the period, or how big it is in relation to the army a century later.

If you are taken literally, Britain should be able to defeat France highhandedly by the virtue of producing more iron and coal (a big part of which had been used for heating). :winkytongue:

In a reality, the most important factor, as far as Britain was involved, was British ability to finance the military efforts of the European coalitions. On the other side of equation was willingness and ability of the British allies to raise the armies and keep fighting against French because on her own Britain could not do this with any chance for an ultimate success, at least in Europe.

It seems odd that "France's arms industry [going] through a steep and immense transformation" should be "directly related to the military efforts... of [the] main participants", but the British arms industry performing a similarly immense transformation, to the extent it actually outstripped France by 1811, shouldn't be.

It would if Britain was a major combatant on the continent, which it was not. The relevant comparison should be with Russia and by 1812 it was on the level with France: annual production of 1200—1300 artillery pieces vs. 900—1000 of France and 43 - 96,000 muskets vs. 100,000 French. However, with population almost equal to one of the French empire (40M vs. approximately 45M) Russia could not put the numbers of troops equal to the opponent (with the allies) on the main front: out of a total of 480,000 there were less than 200,000 facing 490,000. British iron and coal production could not help in this equation.

You'll notice that I didn't take issue with those parts- you posted something that was blatantly wrong, and I corrected it. I did so in large part because the incorrect claim that Britain is France's industrial inferior supports your point that coalition members were key, whereas Britain being her industrial superior contradicts it.

If you are saying that coalition members were not the key for the victory, we definitely studied the different histories.
 
I don't have the source handy, but the merchant class in GB took a pretty substantial hit from the admittedly porous Continental System. They weren't bankrupted, but it wasn't a tenable, long term situation for them either, but neither was the Continental System for Napoleon.

It can be argued that Continental System was a REALLY BAD idea both because it was making a decisive military confrontation with Russia inevitable and because it never could be completely enforced: besides Russia, Sweden, Germany, Holland and even France had mutual trade interests with Britain so it did not take too long to invent the ways to bypass it. Still, it was limiting trade to a noticeable degree.
 
Yes, I noticed this and this seems to be one of the points that author is making: that France was initially better prepared but it was later bypassed by Britain
Either the author is wrong, then, or you're failing to understand his argument. He attempts to illustrate his claim that 'The industrial index of France was stronger than Britain’s' with reference to coal and iron. But Britain didn't surpass French coal and iron production during the war - they had done so years ago:
  • French coal production was 250,000 tons in 1794; British coal production was 9,750,000 tons. Sidney Pollard, 'A New Estimate of British Coal Production, 1750–1850' (The Economic History Review, Volume 33, Issue 2, May 1980).
  • French iron production was 60,000 tons in 1794; British iron production was 110,000 tons. Philip Riden, 'The Output of the British Iron Industry before 1870' (The Economic History Review, Volume 30, Issue 3, August 1977).
If you are taken literally, Britain should be able to defeat France highhandedly by the virtue of producing more iron and coal (a big part of which had been used for heating). :winkytongue:
Of course, I've made no such claim. Though there's a certain bittersweet irony in the way that, if I had claimed that, I'd still be closer to the truth than you are in arguing that France's slow nineteenth-century growth makes her industrially superior to Britain in 1814.

(Incidentally, it's not a good idea to downplay the importance of coal for domestic heating. It meant that the British could farm land which was needed to cultivate firewood in France, and could use wood which would have been burned in France in the manufacture of pit props, ships, carts, wheels, houses, or even musket stocks. Coal is also the reason why the French output from salt mines is completely irrelevant in comparative terms: I do hope that Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos knew that the British were using the heat of coal to evaporate easily-accessible sea water instead.)

It would if Britain was a major combatant on the continent, which it was not. The relevant comparison should be with Russia and by 1812 it was on the level with France: annual production... 43 - 96,000 muskets vs. 100,000 French... British iron and coal production could not help in this equation.
The short-sightedness of this approach can best be illustrated by listing British small arms shipments to the Baltic, set against your estimate of Russia's total annual production (43,000 - 96,000 muskets)

20,000 - 25th July 1812
50,000 - 30th August 1812
50,000 - 19th October 1812
50,000 - 19th February 1813
20,000 - February 1813
10,000 - 23rd March 1813
30,000 - 1st April 1813
10,000 - 10th April 1813
20,000 - 26th April 1813
10,000 - 23rd June 1813
That's 270,000 guns in less than a year, of such high quality that the Russians handed them out as rewards. British industrial supremacy doesn't just enable her to arm her allies, of course. The surplus of British textile manufacture and uniform production was sufficient that the Prussian 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment fought at Waterloo in spare uniforms intended for the British 95th Rifles, which, like many other Prussian regiments clad in British uniforms, it had received in 1813. This is how British coal and iron (and, indeed, wool, leather, lead and saltpetre) help in this equation.

If you are saying that coalition members were not the key for the victory, we definitely studied the different histories.
You really seem to be struggling with the broader implications of British industrial superiority. For instance, you've made the argument that the British can only spend so much on the war, which is certainly true. However, in an era where 'the balance of payments' literally means shipping gold out of the country, the British can spend a lot longer fighting the war by paying British manufacturers to make guns and uniforms which it then ships to its allies, than it can by simply handing over cash subsidies to its allies. And that's why the recognition of British industrial superiority over France is so important, and why Britain outstripping France in musket production is not just a slight oversight.
 
You really seem to be struggling with the broader implications of British industrial superiority. For instance, you've made the argument that the British can only spend so much on the war, which is certainly true. However, in an era where 'the balance of payments' literally means shipping gold out of the country, the British can spend a lot longer fighting the war by paying British manufacturers to make guns and uniforms which it then ships to its allies, than it can by simply handing over cash subsidies to its allies. And that's why the recognition of British industrial superiority over France is so important, and why Britain outstripping France in musket production is not just a slight oversight.

You are still missing the fundamental issue: "paying British manufacturers to make guns and uniforms which it then ships to its allies" means that there are allies ready to fight on the British side. And if there are no allies (as was the case more than once), Britain is going to have all these uniforms and muskets but no soldiers to defeat Napoleon.
 
It can be argued that Continental System was a REALLY BAD idea both because it was making a decisive military confrontation with Russia inevitable and because it never could be completely enforced: besides Russia, Sweden, Germany, Holland and even France had mutual trade interests with Britain so it did not take too long to invent the ways to bypass it. Still, it was limiting trade to a noticeable degree.

Yes, it was a bad idea for France, but it did inflict damage on GB's trade, even if they were somewhat able to get through with smuggling/"allied countries" ignoring the system. It's not like GB was able to smuggle so well that they could just continue building their RN ships out of their preferred timber in Northern Germany. It was untenable for Napoleon, because his allies weren't going to go along with it, as evidenced by Russia, but it would have eventually wrecked GB's merchant class. It just so happens that the CS failed before GB, and probably by a long way at that.
 
You are still missing the fundamental issue: "paying British manufacturers to make guns and uniforms which it then ships to its allies" means that there are allies ready to fight on the British side.
Yes, this is quite obvious but rather irrelevant to the main point. After all, the question asked was not 'when will the allies get fed up of fighting Napoleon' but 'How long can Britain supply France's enemy?' Furthermore, my own interest in the thread was really only in correcting a flagrant misunderstanding of the overall industrial and economic position between the two sides. As I'm sure you'll admit, a Britain which is economically superior to France, to the extent that it can ship 270,000 small arms (plus uniforms, gunpowder, etc.) to a potential ally within a year, is much more likely to attract allies than one which is economically inferior to France and struggling to arm its own military. Nevertheless, now I've managed to correct that erroneous statement that 'The industrial index of France was stronger than Britain’s,' we have a much better impression of how long Britain can keep a coalition against Napoleon in the war.
 
So what I've understood from this thread is that Britain's sheer industrial superiority would have allowed them to continue to support the coalition to the point where it makes no sense to speak of the British running out of resources, but as to when the partners on the continent no longer have the will to fight.

Though I do feel that while its established that industrially and logistically the British could maintain a near indefinite supply, I don't think that we have covered whether they could have continued the effort monetarily. Did they really have the money to spare to keep paying large subsidies forever? It was mentioned that the Coalition budget was far larger than the french, and that the french suffered from a loss of revenue because of the war. Did the Coalition not experience the same difficulties, or just to a much smaller degree? and does Britain have the capacity to continue this huge war budget for say, another 5 years?
 
In terms of the political capital issue, it's worth pointing out that any British admiration for Napoleon largely went out the window when he declared himself Emperor.
 
In terms of the political capital issue, it's worth pointing out that any British admiration for Napoleon largely went out the window when he declared himself Emperor.

Perhaps, but they still tried to make peace with him after Austerlitz.
 
Yes, it was a bad idea for France, but it did inflict damage on GB's trade, even if they were somewhat able to get through with smuggling/"allied countries" ignoring the system.

As I understand, at least in the cases of German states and Holland the smuggling was mostly "in". The system (described IIRC by general Marbot) looked approximately as following: administration of the <whatever entity> (Marbot was stressing Bernadotte's role in inventing the schema and this is quite possible: he retained very good relations with the merchants of Hamburg well after he left Germany) had been issuing official permissions to the privateers. They had been sailing to the rendezvous points and after loading goods from the British ships returned to their ports to report the "confiscated" cargo which, after a small tax had been paid, was officially sold. Getting things "out" using the same schema would be more difficult and in the cases of the big exporters like Sweden and Russia the neutral (American?) ships had been often used both for "in" and "out". I suspect that at least in the case of Russia there was a direct involvement of the British ships, especially if they were going to Archangelsk (rather difficult to trace and easy to deny).


It's not like GB was able to smuggle so well that they could just continue building their RN ships out of their preferred timber in Northern Germany. It was untenable for Napoleon, because his allies weren't going to go along with it, as evidenced by Russia, but it would have eventually wrecked GB's merchant class. It just so happens that the CS failed before GB, and probably by a long way at that.

It was argued (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Континентальная_блокада#Континентальная_система) that in a long run the Continental System could be beneficial for the Continental Europe by removing the British competition to the local products. For example, period between Tilsit and 1812 saw a considerable growth of a domestic textile industry in Russia accompanied by the lower bread prices. Of course, the potential long-term benefits had been more than "compensated" by the obvious short-term inconveniences and losses (in the case of Russia financial losses of the nobility, which was quite dangerous for a ruler as had been demonstrated by the fate of Paul I assassinated as a result of the British-sponsored plot). The obvious problem was that France could not substitute Britain both in import and export area.

However, it also can be argued that at least in the case of Russia we have "self-inflicted wounds" (and IMO more or less the same goes for Prussia). Prior to 1812 there were no objective reasons for Russia joining the anti-French coalitions. Participation in the 2nd Coalition was purely voluntarily: French conquests in Italy did not infringe on the Russian interests in any form or shape and the whole thing was just a whim of Paul I easily reversed after he was screwed by the Austrians and Brits. 3rd Coalition was, again, pretty much a personal thing for Alexander (combination of a personal jealousy and over-developed Anglophilia) - no Russian interests had been involved. 4th Coalition was more or less the same: Austria bailed out but there was a cocky Prussia ready to go to war (for what exactly? fate of Hanover? they did not make a fuss when Bernadotte marched through Prussian Ansbach during the Austerlitz campaign) and Russia actively joined after Prussia was beaten (and Continental System was created). So, what would happen if Russia stayed out of the coalitions minding its own business (aka, fighting the Ottomans and Persians and subduing Caucasus)? Would Napoleon try to enforce the Continental System upon traditionally neutral Russia? What if Prussia remains neutral?
 
Yes, this is quite obvious but rather irrelevant to the main point.

This depends on what the main point is. For me it is a willingness of the continental powers to keep fighting Napoleon regardless the losses and expenses. As soon as the will is not there there is no "France's enemy" to supply and the issue of the British supplies becomes irrelevant. As was the case with Russia and Prussia after Tilsit.
 
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