How late could Nazi Germany have turned the tide of war?

I think Germany never should have got involved with Japan. They were too far away to assist each other in any significant capacity.
Also, Germany had plenty of business interests in China. They could have kept up the civilian business contracts with China while not opening picking a side in the China-Japan war. (Covert weapons shipments could continue???)
that would draw US attention away from Nazi Germany and after OP Barbarossa, Japan would still attack Pearl Harbor. They only needed assurances that the USSR wasn't going to crush them in Manchuria.
A Japan-first policy would give Germany a better chance at winning a Limited Victory.
Imperial Japan is useful for helping to finish off the British - not least by taking away their tin and rubber production in Malaya and adding to the chaos and unrest in India.
The problem is Germany needs Imperial Japan in as soon as possible, and ideally without bringing the United States fully in as well.
And I think the Imperial Japanese might feel constrained in their ability to act by wanting their naval building program as far forward as possible 'just in case' and as much of French Indo-China occupied (and with at the very least airbases established there) as possible.
 
June 15, 1941 without earlier POD. After that the Reich required a defeat of the USSR simply to survive. That is, while not impossible, extremely unlikey, and requires a couple additional POD related to the Med. If the Reich leave Mussolini to his own devices, maybe, at most, providing enough stiffening to keep the Greeks from stomping his ass, that might provide enough additional combat mass to allow the capture of Moscow before the first serious snows. That, in turn might cause a series of strategic errors by Stavka as Stalin stops listening to anyone but the voices in his hear.

Of course even the above noted POD is insufficient if Hitler declares war on the U.S. Once the U.S. in all in and on track it's over.

IMO, the best chance the Reich had was to flat stop after they reached the Channel and North Sea in June of 1940. No BoB, no Sealion discussion, nada. Purely defensive activity by the Luftwaffe, no air attacks on the UK at all. Very public offer of a cease fire in place, including exchange of any prisoners wishing to return home, with the British, end of the U-Boat campaign and demilitarization, if not outright scuttling of all French warships overseen by the U.S. and the Swiss

Churchill will, of course, smell a rat, but as Bomber Command and merchant marine losses mount with zero Nazi aggression eventually the voters will get sick of fighting alone when the Reich has clearly decided it has achieved its goals and either turn Churchill out or the Government will have to accept the cease fire. This, of course, requires Hitler to actually have a lick of sense, so the odds are REALLY long, but it would give the Reich a good year to refit, train, stockpile, and prep for taking on the Bolsheviks (there is zero chance Hitler allow the "Jewish dominated" USSR to survive).
Calbear, let's say that Hitler is exploded before fall weiss and whoever takes over after does exactly what you said above. Would the German economy implode after the war?
 
1942 isn’t relevant here. I’ve already said that 1941 is the latest that they can win. The United States declared war in December of 1941 and their first time coming to blows with Germans was in 1943.
1943?? Huh, no. Look up the Greer, the Kearny, the Reuben James, all torpedo exchanges happening in 1941. The USA and Germany were warring in the Northern Atlantic well before the DoW, in 1941, and regardless of whether the Heer wins or not by October 1941 in the Soviet Union, that undeclared war goes on because the USA were escorting those convoys to Britain then, not to the SU.
Even assuming the British are of a mind to seek terms after the SU has been defeated, that won't happen soon enough to prevent further torpedo fights in the Atlantic involving the USN, with further sinkings and losses of US lives. If the British just hang on for six months, the US public opinion will come to the unavoidable conclusion that going to another war in Europe is necessary -
and that is regardless of the fact that all of the above doesn't stop the Pearl Harbor attack, which drags the USA in the war anyway.
 
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Only two points of hesitation to your case I would suggest are that without the significant losses drawing in greater numbers of German troops and equipment to the city itself throughout 1942, unlike OTL the Stalingrad Front's flanks would be less likely to be sparsely defended or held by other Axis allies such as Romania, Hungary, Italy or Bulgaria. German forces would likely have been able to more effectively defend against a potential Operation Uranus or equivalent.
I already acknowledged the point above. The Soviets not being able to launch the encirclement of Stalingrad, or launching it and failing to achieve that exceptionally successful breakthrough, is far from being the same as the Germans winning that year's campaigning, not to mention "turning the tide" of the war.

Bulgaria was not at war with the SU in 1942-43, only with the Western Allies. If given a choice, the Bulgarians would never have gone to war with the Soviets, it was the latter who declared on them in 1944.
 
1943?? Huh, no. Look up the Greer, the Kearny, the Reuben James, all torpedo exchanges happening in 1941. The USA and Germany were warring in the Northern Atlantic well before the DoW, in 1941, and regardless of whether the Heer wins or not by October 1941 in the Soviet Union, that undeclared war goes on because the USA were escorting those convoys to Britain then, not to the SU.
Even assuming the British are of a mind to seek terms after the SU has been defeated, that won't happen soon enough to prevent further torpedo fights in the Atlantic involving the USN, with further sinkings and losses of US lives. If the British just hang on for six months, the US public opinion will come to the unavoidable conclusion that going to another war in Europe is necessary -
and that is regardless of the fact that all of the above doesn't stop the Pearl Harbor attack, which drags the USA in the war anyway.
I obviously meant that it was their first time fighting the Germans on land.

You didn’t really address my point about Normandy. If the Germany army and airforce are largely still in tact, how are they going to successfully land in Europe?
 
I already acknowledged the point above. The Soviets not being able to launch the encirclement of Stalingrad, or launching it and failing to achieve that exceptionally successful breakthrough, is far from being the same as the Germans winning that year's campaigning, not to mention "turning the tide" of the war.
It could well be winning. Going by Mark Harrison's analysis of the Soviet economy in 1942 they were red lined badly and about to come off the rails; Stalingrad and the huge reverse with the subsequent regaining of economic areas, population, and transport lines prevented that collapse.
His analysis helps make Stalin's brutal choices in the conduct of the war more understandable.
I know that the entire point of the campaign from the German/Axis perspective was to gain the Caucasus oil, but collapsing the Soviet economy would have been a much bigger win considering the course of the war thereafter and would have netted them some of the oil especially after repairing Tuapse.
 
It could well be winning. Going by Mark Harrison's analysis of the Soviet economy in 1942 they were red lined badly and about to come off the rails; Stalingrad and the huge reverse with the subsequent regaining of economic areas, population, and transport lines prevented that collapse.
The study you quote cites Stalingrad exactly once, to say that evacuation of civilians from it was delayed. That's the argument that supports the notion that it was the Staligrad victory that reversed the Soviet economy's imminent demise? If so, a very poor argument.
 
I know that the entire point of the campaign from the German/Axis perspective was to gain the Caucasus oil, but collapsing the Soviet economy would have been a much bigger win considering the course of the war thereafter and would have netted them some of the oil especially after repairing Tuapse.
what is the difference between Rostov and Stalingrad? meaning the marginal difference, to put them right on the Volga of that great importance? (they could still attack by air, and likely the Soviets are swimming in enough oil for a year or two?)

my scenario is always Leningrad and Rostov in 1941. as both could have been supplied by sea had eliminating the Soviet fleet been a priority.
 
The study you quote cites Stalingrad exactly once, to say that evacuation of civilians from it was delayed. That's the argument that supports the notion that it was the Staligrad victory that reversed the Soviet economy's imminent demise? If so, a very poor argument.
Stalingrad was one part of a the wider offensive success and as a place didn't specifically matter that much once it became a battleground. It was the entire region that was liberated during that Winter Offensive that mattered and it was the encirclement at Stalingrad that made that possible. If that fails and the Axis hold their ground then the offensive breaks down; without that and the regained territory, especially the vital rail line at Voronezh and the food producing region of the Kuban among other areas the Soviets would be in serious trouble come Spring-Summer 1943. If you bothered to read the whole thing, especially the final section, it covers the point that the Soviet economy in 1942 was at the breaking point.
You can see the drop in Soviet GDP from 1941-42 and then the recovery in 1943, which coincided with the recovery of territory, especially economically important territories in the Caucasus and Ukraine. The damage to agricultural output was so severe that even in 1943 it still was slightly below that of 1942 (in part because the German offensive didn't start until late June so some of the 1942 harvest could still be brought in). In 1943 the working population increased by over 2 million, so the recovery of territories lost in 1942 was a pretty vital help beyond just the resources regained or increased L-L. That doesn't even count the conscriptable population recovered either, which was important to sustaining the military.

Then there is the Axis side of the equation. They simply could not replace the manpower lost during the Stalingrad offensive. Losing several armies, not just German, were extremely damaging, same with the loss in equipment.
 
I do think that without no retreat orders weighing down the east there could have been alot less casualties on the german side . Also not preparing for the russian winter when it was literally the reason that napoleons russian adventure failed was actually criminal and it being one of the worst winters in history helped tough.

Also diverting resources south and north in 41 from army group center to complete encirclements and reducing pockets might be a thing to consider to make the battle of moscow maybe succeed for the german side.

Cause hitler got distrated by leningrad when he should have been focused on moscow instead to be honest.
 
Stalingrad was one part of a the wider offensive success and as a place didn't specifically matter that much once it became a battleground.
The part missing in your post is the one in which you acknowledge that the source you quoted actually doesn't say anything about the importance of the Soviet military success in the fall of 1942, or about the importance for the economy of regaining ground.

The point your source makes actually is that it was chiefly Soviet morale (few enough Soviet citizens being "rats") that held the SU together through in 1942. Now, a point could be made that a victory in the field bolsters morale, and thus the Stalingrad success would have factored in into this, even though this would be not at all the correlation (ground regained - economic benefits) you strangely claimed.
But in that case, the effect would have been apparent after the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, and their victory i.e. in 1943, while your claim was that the critical year was 1942.

You did not actually read through the source you chose to quote, and it would be honest of you to admit that.
 
The part missing in your post is the one in which you acknowledge that the source you quoted actually doesn't say anything about the importance of the Soviet military success in the fall of 1942, or about the importance for the economy of regaining ground.

The point your source makes actually is that it was chiefly Soviet morale (few enough Soviet citizens being "rats") that held the SU together through in 1942. Now, a point could be made that a victory in the field bolsters morale, and thus the Stalingrad success would have factored in into this, even though this would be not at all the correlation (ground regained - economic benefits) you strangely claimed.
But in that case, the effect would have been apparent after the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, and their victory i.e. in 1943, while your claim was that the critical year was 1942.

You did not actually read through the source you chose to quote, and it would be honest of you to admit that.
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Think of two economies closer to each other in size, for example Germany and the USSR, engaged in a military struggle that had become too close to call. Consider the Soviet war effort in the winter of 1942. Huge Soviet wealth had already been destroyed or lost to the invader. In figure 4 panel (A) illustrates this case. Controlling for rats, the payoff per mouse had been depressed by capital losses. Controlling for mice, the anarchy in the civilian economy and the dangers of outright defeat had raised the payoff per rat. The net effect was to shift the good equilibrium dangerously close to the point of collapse. Stalin could rationally fear that with only a small additional capital loss the good equilibrium and the point of collapse would converge and then disappear, making a disintegration of the Soviet war effort inevitable. This case is illustrated in panel (B): there is only one equilibrium where collapse has already occurred.
 
The part missing in your post is the one in which you acknowledge that the source you quoted actually doesn't say anything about the importance of the Soviet military success in the fall of 1942, or about the importance for the economy of regaining ground.

The point your source makes actually is that it was chiefly Soviet morale (few enough Soviet citizens being "rats") that held the SU together through in 1942. Now, a point could be made that a victory in the field bolsters morale, and thus the Stalingrad success would have factored in into this, even though this would be not at all the correlation (ground regained - economic benefits) you strangely claimed.
But in that case, the effect would have been apparent after the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, and their victory i.e. in 1943, while your claim was that the critical year was 1942.

You did not actually read through the source you chose to quote, and it would be honest of you to admit that.
Nowhere do I actually see a counter argument, just a bunch of lame nitpicks on just one of the sources I provided. There are more details in Harrison's book "Accounting for War" if you want to get into the details.

Are you actually going to claim that if the front lines remained static through Spring 1943 that the Soviet economy would have been just fine sans the millions of workers it recovered and millions of new men it could recruit for the military...or the arable land and raw material deposits in those territories? Or that Soviet morale would survive yet another strategic failure to recover Stalingrad and the Caucasus? Operations Uranus and Little Saturn were vital to keeping morale going in the midst of serious starvation ("Taste of War" and "Hunger and War" for details on that) and tens of millions of casualties on top of massive loss of land and industrial resources, not to mention civilians behind the lines.
Are you really going to argue that Stalingrad wasn't the turning point of WW2 in Europe and that nearly every historian has gotten that part wrong and the USSR could continue to fight despite losing over 60% of their food production and an enormous part of their economy behind German lines? My claim about 1942 being the decisive year is because that is when the Stalingrad encirclement happened and Axis lines fatally ruptured, making the follow on offensives successful, because German reserves were stripped to aid the Stalingrad pocket and forced their retreat from the Caucasus, barely escaping in time to avoid annihilation. Thereafter the Soviets barely had a serious defeat all the way to Berlin and they endlessly recovered lost territory and through that were rapidly able to boost their economy from it's nadir. 1943 was the year the fruits of the victory at Stalingrad started to be shown, late 1942 is when the war changing victory happened.

If you were honest you'd admit your not even arguing point, just trying to nitpick to avoid admitting you're wrong.
 
Just to comment, original timeline 1942 also saw the Australians (finally with a competent British army commander and staff and army organization AND a decent plan from said army commander and staff) plus some Indians, plus some other Imperial/Commonwealth forces, kick Panzer Army Africa's butts in North Africa at Second El Alamein, the Torch landings, and Germany and Italy being forced to occupy Vichy France.
The western allies were doing their bit to push over dominos against the Axis before the big one went down at the end of the year at Stalingrad.
 
Last chance of a good outcome in WW2 for Germany? August 31, 1939.

Nazi economy can not survive without looting. Nazi Germany can not loot workout war. Nazi Government can not survive war.
Technically speaking, last good chance would've been January 29, 1933. Because not only are all of the above are true. The shear matter of fact that war was practically a part of Nazi Ideology (specifically a war with the Soviet Union) meant that Germany was destined to fall long before the first shots are fired, and Germany was not winning vs. the Soviet Union. Not by itself, not when France hates your guts, and not when your ideology for Greater Germanicism means claiming most of Europe. Even with Hitler gone and it being reduced to just Greater Germany, that's still largely against all your neighbors, and likely Britain as well.
 
Technically speaking, last good chance would've been January 29, 1933. Because not only are all of the above are true. The shear matter of fact that war was practically a part of Nazi Ideology (specifically a war with the Soviet Union) meant that Germany was destined to fall long before the first shots are fired, and Germany was not winning vs. the Soviet Union. Not by itself, not when France hates your guts, and not when your ideology for Greater Germanicism means claiming most of Europe. Even with Hitler gone and it being reduced to just Greater Germany, that's still largely against all your neighbors, and likely Britain as well.
Also even if the Nazis win a total victory and last a thousand years it isn't good for Germany. Famine, genocide, oppression I wouldnt wanna live in a victorious Nazi Europe even if I was 6 foot blue eyed and blond haired. The Nazis made Germany worse even when they were winning.
 
Also even if the Nazis win a total victory and last a thousand years it isn't good for Germany. Famine, genocide, oppression I wouldnt wanna live in a victorious Nazi Europe even if I was 6 foot blue eyed and blond haired. The Nazis made Germany worse even when they were winning.
Morally and ethically worse. Not necessarily in terms of lifestyle, unfortunately:
...What we do know is that German society changed fundamentally during the war. Previously it had been a country whose government preached the values of racism: now it was a country that benefited from racism. As Professor Geyer says, 'Within Germany about 30 per cent of the industrial and agricultural labour force was foreign - forced labour, POWs, or even concentration camp inmates that were parcelled out basically on the principle of expendable labour.' And the disturbing conclusion historians such as Professor Geyer come to about the racist state Germany had become is that 'the Germans not only experienced it but by and large liked it.' The arrival of a huge class of people in Germany who were by definition inferior to the lowest German was plainly of benefit. At the very least, it enabled Germans to feel that they were superior and that the Nazi propaganda was correct - they were a 'master race.' The lowly German worker could become a foreman; the housewife could have servants. Society had changed in a profoundly racist way...
- The Nazis: A Warning from History, chapter 9, 'Reaping the Whirlwind' (Laurence Rees, 2005 BBC books edition)
 
Winning might not be an option. Stalemate could have been.

It still hinges on a few things: Knock out the oil from Baku (somehow - and it could have been done). That will settle the Eastern front into a big freeze.

That means: summer 1942 - conclusion of a successful case blue.

...and I still don't believe the bomb is the get-out-of-jail card.
 
...and I still don't believe the bomb is the get-out-of-jail card.
I'm not 100% sure that the US would be willing to nuke all of Europe even if they could. If the US starts killing civilians it is bad for PR. Way worse than the fire bombing of Dresden. There is definitely more sympathy for Germans in 1940s America than there was for Japanese. FDR/Truman would certainly be facing some back lash.
 
A couple of dates depending on choices made.
July 9th, 1940. As CalBear suggested Germany makes a serious attempt at peace following fall of France. Halifax attempted to go behind Churchill to ask for terms in real life. No Battle of Britain, dial backU Boat warfare. Offer actual terms rather than the rant Hitler did in in his July Reichstag speech.

June 21st, 1941 Going into USSR was a bad idea for various reasons well talked about on forum. Once war expanded unless USSR collapsed there was no way UK was going to exit war. I believe USSR could be defeated but its highly unlikely to just collapse in 6 months; possible but unlikely.

December 10th, 1941. A case could be made that that its over December 7th as once USA is at war sooner or later a reason will be found for US to declare war on its own. Declaring war just removed all doubt at final outcome.

Michael
 
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