How generous could FDR be?

AIUI, as PotUS, FDR had the ability to declare surplus any military or gov't gear he wanted to. So, suppose shortly after WW2 starts (or after the Fall of France), he declares surplus a variety of stuff & offers it for sale to Britain (or the gov'ts in exile of France, the Netherlands, Poland, or whoever), & possibly Canada, at bargain-basement prices, with the idea of "pushing the war offshore".

What limits, if any, were there on FDR's generosity? I'm picturing about 100 of the old 4-pipers, a few dozen ancient O- & R-class subs, the S-class subs, the big V-boats (Bass, Bonita, Barracuda, maybe Narwhal & Nautilus), all the antique Krags in storage (some of the '03 Springfields, too?), a few older fighters (P-26s? P-36s? {Too new?}), plus a lot of the .30-'06 ammo (replaced by .276 for the Garand?).

This could have two benefits: it aids the weakened Allies, & it creates jobs by creating a need to replace the surplussed-off items.

Is this credible? Could Congress stop it? What else, if anything, could get handed over? What effect would it have on the war? On U.S. preparedness, given production of subs & DDs would have to increase much sooner to make these up?
 

jahenders

Banned
While he could have done this, Congress would likely have a conniption fit and the public wouldn't take kindly to 'giving away US stuff and leaving us defenseless.' Congress might not have been easily able to stop it (short of court fights), but they COULD refuse to fund additional build up with the argument that he had wasted previous equipment.

AIUI, as PotUS, FDR had the ability to declare surplus any military or gov't gear he wanted to. So, suppose shortly after WW2 starts (or after the Fall of France), he declares surplus a variety of stuff & offers it for sale to Britain (or the gov'ts in exile of France, the Netherlands, Poland, or whoever), & possibly Canada, at bargain-basement prices, with the idea of "pushing the war offshore".

What limits, if any, were there on FDR's generosity? I'm picturing about 100 of the old 4-pipers, a few dozen ancient O- & R-class subs, the S-class subs, the big V-boats (Bass, Bonita, Barracuda, maybe Narwhal & Nautilus), all the antique Krags in storage (some of the '03 Springfields, too?), a few older fighters (P-26s? P-36s? {Too new?}), plus a lot of the .30-'06 ammo (replaced by .276 for the Garand?).

This could have two benefits: it aids the weakened Allies, & it creates jobs by creating a need to replace the surplussed-off items.

Is this credible? Could Congress stop it? What else, if anything, could get handed over? What effect would it have on the war? On U.S. preparedness, given production of subs & DDs would have to increase much sooner to make these up?
 
IIRC a president cannot do that without the approval of Congress.

Congress was already irritated that the U.S. had not be repaid for World War One. They aren't likely to okay free stuff to the allies.

Remember they only allowed the 50 destroyers to go to the British in exchange for the basing rights on the various British controlled islands around the world.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The US provided the UK with 60 ocean-going escorts

AIUI, as PotUS, FDR had the ability to declare surplus any military or gov't gear he wanted to. So, suppose shortly after WW2 starts (or after the Fall of France), he declares surplus a variety of stuff & offers it for sale to Britain (or the gov'ts in exile of France, the Netherlands, Poland, or whoever), & possibly Canada, at bargain-basement prices, with the idea of "pushing the war offshore".

What limits, if any, were there on FDR's generosity? I'm picturing about 100 of the old 4-pipers, a few dozen ancient O- & R-class subs, the S-class subs, the big V-boats (Bass, Bonita, Barracuda, maybe Narwhal & Nautilus), all the antique Krags in storage (some of the '03 Springfields, too?), a few older fighters (P-26s? P-36s? {Too new?}), plus a lot of the .30-'06 ammo (replaced by .276 for the Garand?).

This could have two benefits: it aids the weakened Allies, & it creates jobs by creating a need to replace the surplussed-off items.

Is this credible? Could Congress stop it? What else, if anything, could get handed over? What effect would it have on the war? On U.S. preparedness, given production of subs & DDs would have to increase much sooner to make these up?

The US provided the UK with 60 ocean-going escorts in 1940-41 (the 50 destroyers and all ten of the Lake-class cutters, equivalent to a RN sloop), submarines and escort carriers and various and sundry merchant ships and naval auxiliaries (new and from the reserve and active fleets), and shiploads of small arms and artillery after the fall of France, as well as huge numbers of aircraft, both from the existing pools and new-builds, plus armored and other vehicles, etc.

There's a question as to what else (or how much more) the British and Commonwealth (and governments in exile) could have actually absorbed, because of their manpower limitations; as it was, a lot of the escorts and escort carriers - in commission and operational - spent weeks being "modified" for RN service, which, on balance, didn't help the cause.

As it was, the US (and Philippines) forces mobilized in 1940-41, which would have used the equipment provided to the British in the same period otherwise, ended up with very limited stocks for training.

The Marine and Navy fighter squadrons that had Buffalos as late as Midway, for example, presumably could have used the Wildcats/Martlets that went to the Allies. Same for the USAAF squadrons equipped with P-35s and P-36s that could have used the P-40s that went to the Allies in 1940-41.

Having said that, the number one priority for the US was keeping the British in the fight; number two was keeping the Soviets in ... so if the Americans and Filipinos were equipped with material that had been substitute standard in 1918, so be it.

Best,
 
Dayton Kitchens said:
IIRC a president cannot do that without the approval of Congress.
That could be. Does anybody know for sure?
Dayton Kitchens said:
Congress ... aren't likely to okay free stuff to the allies.
Not free, just really cheap.;)
Dayton Kitchens said:
Remember they only allowed the 50 destroyers to go to the British in exchange for the basing rights on the various British controlled islands around the world.
IIRC, that was after British credit had gotten pretty short.
TFSmith121 said:
The US provided the UK with 60 ocean-going escorts in 1940-41 (the 50 destroyers and all ten of the Lake-class cutters, equivalent to a RN sloop), submarines and escort carriers and various and sundry merchant ships and naval auxiliaries (new and from the reserve and active fleets), and shiploads of small arms and artillery after the fall of France, as well as huge numbers of aircraft, both from the existing pools and new-builds, plus armored and other vehicles, etc.
AIUI, any transfers of subs were pretty limited numbers; there were, frex, S-boats that could easily have been turned over, & more of the O- & R-boats. (Most of those were on training duties; S-boats could've been "demoted", if retained.) The merchant shipping, AIUI, was mostly civil & at extortionate prices.:eek: If there's more, I've never seen it mentioned; thx for the info.
TFSmith121 said:
There's a question as to what else (or how much more) the British and Commonwealth (and governments in exile) could have actually absorbed, because of their manpower limitations
That's a fair point, & I hadn't thought of it.:eek: My thinking was, these would (could) replace losses at, frex, Dunkirk, or free yard space for other construction. There's also the chance to use the older subs (especially the O- & R-boats) for ASW training, freeing up newer, better boats for front-line ops.
TFSmith121 said:
As it was, the US (and Philippines) forces mobilized in 1940-41, which would have used the equipment provided to the British in the same period otherwise, ended up with very limited stocks for training.

The Marine and Navy fighter squadrons that had Buffalos as late as Midway, for example, presumably could have used the Wildcats/Martlets that went to the Allies. Same for the USAAF squadrons equipped with P-35s and P-36s that could have used the P-40s that went to the Allies in 1940-41.
And here's where I'd say FDR could sell it to Congress, if he has to, both as keeping war away & creating jobs: if U.S. (& P.I.) forces are "underequipped", it makes sense to replace the surplus gear with new-built; that creates jobs...

In the long run, you end up with U.S. forces better equipped when Japan attacks... (Maybe the P-38 gets a volume order from AAF, instead of Britain?:cool:)
TFSmith121 said:
Having said that, the number one priority for the US was keeping the British in the fight; number two was keeping the Soviets in ... so if the Americans and Filipinos were equipped with material that had been substitute standard in 1918, so be it.
Agreed. Moreover, at the time, there was no way to know the U.S. would be actively involved in a year...

One thought: if Britain, in particular, is getting more & better gear at better prices, does she hit her credit limit later? What does that mean for other "cash & carry" orders? What does that do to, frex, the Mustang proposal? Does it get pushed back--maybe enough it never happens (because Japan attacks), replaced by P-38s or something?:eek:

If the U.S. does increase construction of DDs &, especially, subs in 1940, does this impact the war against Japan at all? (I'm doubting a half-dozen or so more fleet boats matters, & I really doubt DoD would accelerate building to the wartime rate.) Replacing the S-boats in P.I. with fleet boats would cost a handful of Asiatic Fleet successes in the early days, but nothing huge IIRC.

The big impact on the U.S. sub force from doing this would be freeing up trained crews & maintenance personnel from S-boats (especially), which is a good thing for effectiveness. Some very aggressive S-boat skippers would get fleet boats (only to be smacked with the lousy Mk 14:eek::rolleyes:). OTOH, fleet boats could absorb all the Mk 10s--& the contrast in performance between them, aboard the same boat (if it happened, which might take some handwavium:p), might lead to solving the Mk 14's problems a lot sooner.:cool:
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The thing is, even the older WW I-era material was necessary for the US for training

That could be. Does anybody know for sure?

Not free, just really cheap.;)

IIRC, that was after British credit had gotten pretty short.

AIUI, any transfers of subs were pretty limited numbers; there were, frex, S-boats that could easily have been turned over, & more of the O- & R-boats. (Most of those were on training duties; S-boats could've been "demoted", if retained.) The merchant shipping, AIUI, was mostly civil & at extortionate prices.:eek: If there's more, I've never seen it mentioned; thx for the info.

That's a fair point, & I hadn't thought of it.:eek: My thinking was, these would (could) replace losses at, frex, Dunkirk, or free yard space for other construction. There's also the chance to use the older subs (especially the O- & R-boats) for ASW training, freeing up newer, better boats for front-line ops.

And here's where I'd say FDR could sell it to Congress, if he has to, both as keeping war away & creating jobs: if U.S. (& P.I.) forces are "underequipped", it makes sense to replace the surplus gear with new-built; that creates jobs...

In the long run, you end up with U.S. forces better equipped when Japan attacks... (Maybe the P-38 gets a volume order from AAF, instead of Britain?:cool:)

Agreed. Moreover, at the time, there was no way to know the U.S. would be actively involved in a year...

One thought: if Britain, in particular, is getting more & better gear at better prices, does she hit her credit limit later? What does that mean for other "cash & carry" orders? What does that do to, frex, the Mustang proposal? Does it get pushed back--maybe enough it never happens (because Japan attacks), replaced by P-38s or something?:eek:

If the U.S. does increase construction of DDs &, especially, subs in 1940, does this impact the war against Japan at all? (I'm doubting a half-dozen or so more fleet boats matters, & I really doubt DoD would accelerate building to the wartime rate.) Replacing the S-boats in P.I. with fleet boats would cost a handful of Asiatic Fleet successes in the early days, but nothing huge IIRC.

The big impact on the U.S. sub force from doing this would be freeing up trained crews & maintenance personnel from S-boats (especially), which is a good thing for effectiveness. Some very aggressive S-boat skippers would get fleet boats (only to be smacked with the lousy Mk 14:eek::rolleyes:). OTOH, fleet boats could absorb all the Mk 10s--& the contrast in performance between them, aboard the same boat (if it happened, which might take some handwavium:p), might lead to solving the Mk 14's problems a lot sooner.:cool:

The thing is, even the older WW I-era material was necessary for the US for training; the six S-boats and three R-boats transferred to the RN were used, for the most part, for ASW "tame submarine" duties for the RN and RCN in Canadian waters; the O- and R-boats recommissioned by the USN were used for the same duties with the USN & USCG and Allied navies, as well as being assigned to the Submarine Force for training duties at New London. More of these boats go to the British means more of the fleet boats are needed for both submarine force training and ASW training.

Merchant shipping transfers were pretty extensive; along with various pre-war ships, WW I-era vessels pulled from the reserve fleet or what-have-you, the Allies - including the UK - got brand new construction as well, along with all the LSTs, etc.

The same holds true for most of the other existing - as opposed to new construction - material supplied to the UK & Allies in 1940-41; if anything, the US could have put more of it to as good or better use, certainly in 1942 - than the British did.

Best,
 
TFSmith121 said:
The thing is, even the older WW I-era material was necessary for the US for training
I don't doubt some of it was. My understanding is, there was more than a little (in the Navy anyhow) still mothballed until after Pearl Harbor.
TFSmith121 said:
the six S-boats and three R-boats transferred to the RN were used, for the most part, for ASW "tame submarine" duties for the RN and RCN in Canadian waters; the O- and R-boats recommissioned by the USN were used for the same duties with the USN & USCG and Allied navies, as well as being assigned to the Submarine Force for training duties at New London.
I assumed as much. My thinking is, taking the S-boats out of front-line service & putting the newest ones on training, & turning over the rest to the Allies, would still free up a lot of manpower, & their torpedoes. (A handful of exercise fish for the Sub School is all they'd need.) That means, what, 40 S-boats (of the, IIRC, 48 survivors) handed over? That's enough experienced men for the cadres of 120 fleet boats.:eek: (And, recall, only 218 were built for the duration.)

As for them being "clockwork mice", IMO, that doesn't need many boats anyhow, nor necessarily the newest types; the O- or R-boats could do that (& RCN could have made good use of a couple, at least).

More than that, turning over even a handful of 4-pipers to RCN might offer an opportunity to get trained crews, which could give RCN the chance to escort fast convoys. (OTL, it was impossible; even had there been DDs, there were no trained men for them...:eek:)
TFSmith121 said:
More of these boats go to the British means more of the fleet boats are needed for both submarine force training and ASW training.
Turning over a handful of the oldest fleet boats to training wouldn't be a huge loss; the Cachalots were a bit small for PTO ops anyhow, & the likes of Bass were pretty decrepit. I'd suggest, tho, retaining even a handful of S-boats for ASW (tho the R-boats might do just as well) beats keeping all the survivors on active USN duty. (See above for why.)

I'm not at all sure the USN needed over 50 ancient 4-pipers for training, either... Nor am I aware they were used as such.
TFSmith121 said:
Merchant shipping transfers were pretty extensive; along with various pre-war ships, WW I-era vessels pulled from the reserve fleet or what-have-you, the Allies - including the UK - got brand new construction as well, along with all the LSTs, etc.
For the duration, true. By the Fall of France, my understanding is, most of what the Brits got was real bottom-of-the-barrel stuff at very inflated prices. More to the point, doing this might just encourage an upgrade to USN capacity (building all-new AOs, frex)
TFSmith121 said:
The same holds true for most of the other existing - as opposed to new construction - material supplied to the UK & Allies in 1940-41; if anything, the US could have put more of it to as good or better use, certainly in 1942 - than the British did.
In 1942, yes. In 1939-41, I'd say not.

Beyond that, as noted, does this encourage (compel?) the U.S. to upgrade? Like, frex, with Link trainers & T-6s & such? (Maybe even 2-seater TP-39, TP-40, & TP-38 conversion trainers? {On the P-38, that would have been an excellent idea.:cool:})
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Actually, not really...

1) I don't doubt some of it was. My understanding is, there was more than a little (in the Navy anyhow) still mothballed until after Pearl Harbor.

2) I assumed as much. My thinking is, taking the S-boats out of front-line service & putting the newest ones on training, & turning over the rest to the Allies, would still free up a lot of manpower, & their torpedoes. (A handful of exercise fish for the Sub School is all they'd need.) That means, what, 40 S-boats (of the, IIRC, 48 survivors) handed over? That's enough experienced men for the cadres of 120 fleet boats.:eek: (And, recall, only 218 were built for the duration.)

As for them being "clockwork mice", IMO, that doesn't need many boats anyhow, nor necessarily the newest types; the O- or R-boats could do that (& RCN could have made good use of a couple, at least).

More than that, turning over even a handful of 4-pipers to RCN might offer an opportunity to get trained crews, which could give RCN the chance to escort fast convoys. (OTL, it was impossible; even had there been DDs, there were no trained men for them...:eek:)

3) Turning over a handful of the oldest fleet boats to training wouldn't be a huge loss; the Cachalots were a bit small for PTO ops anyhow, & the likes of Bass were pretty decrepit. I'd suggest, tho, retaining even a handful of S-boats for ASW (tho the R-boats might do just as well) beats keeping all the survivors on active USN duty. (See above for why.)

4) I'm not at all sure the USN needed over 50 ancient 4-pipers for training, either... Nor am I aware they were used as such.

5) For the duration, true. By the Fall of France, my understanding is, most of what the Brits got was real bottom-of-the-barrel stuff at very inflated prices. More to the point, doing this might just encourage an upgrade to USN capacity (building all-new AOs, frex)

6) In 1942, yes. In 1939-41, I'd say not. Beyond that, as noted, does this encourage (compel?) the U.S. to upgrade? Like, frex, with Link trainers & T-6s & such? (Maybe even 2-seater TP-39, TP-40, & TP-38 conversion trainers? {On the P-38, that would have been an excellent idea.:cool:})

1) Actually not; remember, the US mobilized in 1940, and so between activating the reserves and selective service, there was plenty of manpower; very little was left in mothballs by the autumn of 1941.

2) The S-boats were certainly useful in the Southwest/South Pacific in 1941-42 and the North Pacific in 1942; after that, they were useful (both for ASW and submarine familiarization for PCUs for the new boats) ... and the RN was getting S, T, and U/V class boats by the dozen in 1942 and afterward.

As far as the Wickes/Clemson/Caldwell class destroyers (four-pipers/flush-deckers), seven did go to the RCN, and provided the RCN's escort groups with "fast" escorts for much of 1941-43.

3) The older fleet boats actually were split between the Caribbean/Panama and the Central Pacific, for operational duties in 1941-42 and training afterward. Again, the RN had plenty of more modern submarines by 1942 and after.

4) The USN was using Wickes/Clemson destroyers operationally in the Atlantic and Pacific from 1941-onward, and they scored their share of victories over u-boats and the IJN's submarines; most were converted for long range and with modern ASW suites in 1942-43 and served until large numbers of DEs were available; Borie got U-405 as late as November 1943, and the PUC.

5) Dunno; the lists are on the USMM website - in 1940, any cargo ship that ran was useful, of course.

6) Realistically, it's unclear the US could spare anything much beyond what was transferred in 1940-45, historically; there were plenty of US units that went without "modern" equipment for much of 1941-42, and weapons like the M1903 were standard for the USMC for much of the first year of the war.

Best,
 
TFSmith121 said:
Actually not; remember, the US mobilized in 1940, and so between activating the reserves and selective service, there was plenty of manpower; very little was left in mothballs by the autumn of 1941.
I won't argue it; it was an impression based on flimsy recall.
TFSmith121 said:
The S-boats were certainly useful in the Southwest/South Pacific in 1941-42 and the North Pacific in 1942; after that, they were useful (both for ASW and submarine familiarization for PCUs for the new boats) ... and the RN was getting S, T, and U/V class boats by the dozen in 1942 and afterward.
I don't argue useful. I just think the manpower would be better employed on new construction. And 1942's a bit later than I have in mind. Moreover, who says the boats have to go only to Britain? I'd guess the French, Dutch, & perhaps especially Australians (in South China Sea) could find them useful. (The last would free RN boats for Med duty, & maybe shift to building a few more U- or V-boats & fewer bigger T-boats.)
TFSmith121 said:
As far as the Wickes/Clemson/Caldwell class destroyers (four-pipers/flush-deckers), seven did go to the RCN, and provided the RCN's escort groups with "fast" escorts for much of 1941-43.
I did not know about that.:eek:
TFSmith121 said:
The older fleet boats actually were split between the Caribbean/Panama and the Central Pacific, for operational duties in 1941-42 and training afterward. Again, the RN had plenty of more modern submarines by 1942 and after.
Noted; as said, I'm looking at before '42, & also hoping (perhaps in vain) for an increase in building of new fleet boats.
TFSmith121 said:
The USN was using Wickes/Clemson destroyers operationally in the Atlantic and Pacific from 1941-onward, and they scored their share of victories over u-boats and the IJN's submarines; most were converted for long range and with modern ASW suites in 1942-43 and served until large numbers of DEs were available; Borie got U-405 as late as November 1943, and the PUC.
I don't dispute this, either. Would the turnover to RN have changed much? That is, more escorts for British convoys & USN using newer DDs for "Neutrality Patrol". The only change I see is less chance of mistaken U-boat attack on USN DDs. That and lower losses in RN-escorted convoys.;)
TFSmith121 said:
Dunno; the lists are on the USMM website - in 1940, any cargo ship that ran was useful, of course.
I won't argue it with you; I'm working off recall from a single source. It may be difference it perception as much as fact.
TFSmith121 said:
Realistically, it's unclear the US could spare anything much beyond what was transferred in 1940-45, historically; there were plenty of US units that went without "modern" equipment for much of 1941-42, and weapons like the M1903 were standard for the USMC for much of the first year of the war.
You're not wrong. The thing is, that's a kind of "20/20 hindsight" argument. I'm thinking, or trying to, as FDR in mid-'40, with Depression still in recent memory (& possible of returning:eek:) & foreign war raging. Maybe I'm overstating the willingness to "empty the cupboard".:eek:
 
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