How feasible is a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan?

Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan feasible

  • Yes

    Votes: 62 52.5%
  • No

    Votes: 40 33.9%
  • Unsure

    Votes: 16 13.6%

  • Total voters
    118
The key issues seem to be the defences at the landing points and the ease of Japanese reinforcement. Weather, terrain etc. are less important here, as they would benefit the Soviets is forced on to the defensive. Unfortunately, the Japanese defences and reaction are pretty much unknowable.
 
[QUOTE="ObssesedNuker, post: 16113820, member: 4102]*One question that's been rattling around in my head is if that plan would have extended to the rail net in Hokkaido. If so, that could compromise Japan's ability to reinforce and/or redeploy in anticipation and/or response to a Soviet attack.[/QUOTE]

If memory serves the focus was more on cutting off Hokkaido from Honshu rather than attacking Hokkaido itself, although Le May said post-war that he estimated the USAAF would have run out of targets by October so it’s entirely possible they would have then gone on to attack Hokkaido’s infrastructure, provided they didn’t have their hands full in preparing for the invasion of Kyushu.
 
Obsessed?
Let me spell this out one more time. (Putting aside your fantasies about actual soviet manpower, and how 'few' this would take, it's clear you haven't read all the records, and all the details.)

It's increasingly clear that's you. You act as if the Soviets couldn't afford to lose even a single man when anyone whose actually bothered to study their manpower and industrial situation in 1945 would acknowledge they'd be quite capable of carrying on fare more intense combat then anything they experienced against the Japanese for a number of years further, depending on the casualty rates.

Full disclosure : USA, Retired, Lt. Col, have graduated Long Course, and War College.

Great! That probably means you could rather easily access material that's come out on Soviet amphib operations during WW2 after the Cold War. I'd recommend you catch up on it.

What I have been saying: There is a high chance, in Nov (at least 80%) of failure, and in March, virtually assured. I also have been stating: That it would cost the Soviets far more than they'd ever gain, thanks to the lessened manpower.

And on that your wrong. In fact, a failed invasion would probably cost the Soviets less then a successful one, as the Soviets wouldn't have to deal with a more extended inland campaign. Given how the Soviets approached amphibious landings, a total wipe of the first echelon of the landing force would cost the Soviets 3,000 men. The Soviets wouldn't make any follow up in that case and would abort. A successful invasion would likely more run into the tens of thousands. Given Stalin's ruthless amorality and the perceived political leverage of holding Hokkaido, that'd probably be worth the cost to him.

1: Soviet full on seaborne assault doctrine and assault capability was not anywhere near the USMC, or even the UK's, as you point out yourself: "Land where the other guy isn't." That is HIGHLY optimistic.

It's not a case of optimism vs pessimism. It's a case of Soviet reconnaissance, intelligence, and planning on the one hand versus Japanese force levels, dispositions, and intelligence on the other.

And not bloody likely in this case.

Obviously not a statement based on actual analysis of Japanese forces on Hokkaido.

2: Weather: Again, what part of this are you missing. I pointed out I've been there, in both months.

And if you have been paying attention you'll see where I say the conditions are nothing that Soviet amphibious ops have faced before... and succeeded in spite of.

4: You have a very hostile civilian population who've been repeatedly told, taking one invader is glory and worth your life. Even with starvation, et al...

Not really much of a factor. Bamboo spears with the odd hunting rifle isn't going to impress the veterans of the biggest and bloodiest theatre of war in human history who, even in a amphibious landing, would be much more heavily equipped with semi-automatic and automatic small arms along with some crew-served weapons. They'd need to be jacketed within Japanese regular forces to present much of a threat.

(contrary to your implications, there's actually NOT a lot of good ports on Hokkaido, or even passable to supply more than very small forces. You need Sapporo, period, dot.)

I'm not seeing why the Soviets would necessarily need Sapporo and couldn't settle for a lesser port. As I noted up with my Oranienbaum bridgehead example, the Soviets supplied much larger forces then what they would need for Hokkaido through much worse port facilities. In particular, the early tentative plans the Soviets were drawing up before the war ended seemed to focus on the Rumoi area, which in August 1945 was a modest port town with no serious IJA or IJN garrison, the closest force of any sort was a single coastal defense outpost 50 kilometers (around a two days march) to the north, and a pretty ideal coastline for landing.

While Japanese military capability was smashed, I suggest anyone who thinks Hokkaido would be just land, and take stuff, study Iwo Jima or the Ryukyus.

So study completely different situations then. Because unlike on much of Hokkaido, Iwo Jima and the Ryukyu's were heavily fortified and garrisoned, with much smaller land areas that rendered it impossible to avoid enemy positions. None of this applies to Hokkaido's west coast.

We're going: "They don't have the capability to make it successful"

And on that you're wrong. They do have the capability to make it successful. What they don't have is the capability to make it a guaranteed success.

The key issues seem to be the defences at the landing points and the ease of Japanese reinforcement. Weather, terrain etc. are less important here, as they would benefit the Soviets is forced on to the defensive. Unfortunately, the Japanese defences and reaction are pretty much unknowable.

Well, the weather does represent some capacity to screw the Soviets over but it isn't anything that is insurmountable in the absence of enemy resistance at the water's edge. Otherwise, you're spot on.
 
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The most realistic option for the USSR to attack Hokkaido would have been in the Spring of 1946. The forces and base of support they had on-hand in the summer of 1945 were staggeringly inadequate to guarantee success and the Far East General command would have been too busy with higher priorities on the Asian mainland. Then there's the defenders of Hokkaido itself - over 100,000 Army personnel centered on two divisions (one Type A), a brigade, a separate armored regiment, 450 aircraft, and a good number of naval troops manning coastal and interior positions.

Even for 1946, assuming the first landing point is still the port of Rumoi and the composition of the defending 5th Area Army is unchanged, the attacker still has to fight to fight through a small fortified region flanked on all sides by forested, hilly terrain, while the Japanese per their OPLAN (Ketsu-Go No. 1) are in a position to quickly dispatch reinforcements from the east, the south, and if necessary the north along three railways funneling directly to the region; within a short period something like 30,000+ troops with armored support could be brought in to confront a Soviet beachhead. Practically the only way to avoid another Anzio-type situation would be to make risky landings on other, more fortified parts of the island in order to relieve pressure on their initial beachhead, which would come with their own set of logistical and manpower strains. This would all have to be accomplished in the face of aerial attacks at sea and the Soviets' own limited amphibious warfare experience.
 
The forces and base of support they had on-hand in the summer of 1945 were staggeringly inadequate to guarantee success and

The forces and base of support they had on-hand was already capable of conducting more-or-less simultaneous amphibious operations, all of which succeeded, in mid-August of 1945 consisting of a total of 3 divisions in widely-diverse regions and location. While the Kuriles might have continued to suck things in for a longer while absent a surrender, those assets would still be available.

the Far East General command would have been too busy with higher priorities on the Asian mainland.

Possibly, possibly not. While the Soviets won't continue onto Hokkaido until things on the mainland wrap-up, it's conceivable that could be the case before 1946.

Then there's the defenders of Hokkaido itself - over 100,000 Army personnel centered on two divisions (one Type A), a brigade, a separate armored regiment, 450 aircraft, and a good number of naval troops manning coastal and interior positions.

Best I can tell, they constituted poorly trained reservists, conscripted students and conscripted home guard militia. Even the Type-A Division was only a Type-A on paper, with it's quality troops having been funneled south. The 100,000 figure also includes Japanese troops on the Kuriles and Sakhalin, which by this point would have already been eliminated. Available fuel and spare parts would undoubtedly have radically decreased the number of operational vehicles. The poor quality of the crews would likely further reduce the number which actually make it. Some aircraft would undoubtedly slip through in spite of Soviet CAPs and their own pilots incompetence but whether it's enough to make a difference is very much in doubt. It wasn't in the Kuriles.

Even for 1946, assuming the first landing point is still the port of Rumoi and the composition of the defending 5th Area Army is unchanged, the attacker still has to fight to fight through a small fortified region flanked on all sides by forested, hilly terrain,

Well, once the Soviet beachhead is established and Rumoi is captured, it's pretty much a done deal. Dispositions of the 5th Army, assuming their the same whenever the Soviets show up, shows that any fortifications in the region would be unmanned at first. And even a rank amateur could tell you fortifications only matter when manned.

while the Japanese per their OPLAN (Ketsu-Go No. 1)

Do you have a link or a translation to Kestu-Go No. 1? The most I can find relating to Japanese Ketsu-Go planning in relation to an attack on Hokkaido is this lonesome line which obviously doesn't provide much in the way of information:

"(1) Upon completion of his operational objectives in southern Japan and assembly of the necessary strength, the enemy will invade Kanto. This operation may be covered by a diversionary feint at Hokkaido. "

are in a position to quickly dispatch reinforcements from the east, the south, and if necessary the north along three railways funneling directly to the region;

Assuming those railways are still functional by whenever the Soviets land following the execution of the American transport plan. And assuming they even identify the Soviet invasion as an actual invasion and not a raid, which is what it might appear to the Japanese at first. Marine raiders earlier in the year had managed to come ashore with zero resistance after all, and this was on the eastern shore where the Japanese actually had some of their forces.
 
The forces and base of support they had on-hand was already capable of conducting more-or-less simultaneous amphibious operations, all of which succeeded, in mid-August of 1945 consisting of a total of 3 divisions in widely-diverse regions and location. While the Kuriles might have continued to suck things in for a longer while absent a surrender, those assets would still be available.

They would need far more than the 87th Rifle Corps to take Hokkaido; the former just didn't have the numbers and would have been busy with its assignment in the Kurils for months - as a matter of fact, given that Japanese strength on the Kuril Islands consisted of 2 divisions (the 91st and 89th), a brigade (the 129th), and 2 regiments (the 41st and 11th Tank), if the Soviets wanted to completely clear the chain the 87th would have been grossly inadequate for even that.

Meanwhile the 16th Army on Sakhalin had a miscellany of brigades and a Rifle Division (equivalent to around 3 divisions total) available, but its advance was immediately stopped at the border with Japanese Karafuto.

Best I can tell, they constituted poorly trained reservists, conscripted students and conscripted home guard militia. Even the Type-A Division was only a Type-A on paper, with it's quality troops having been funneled south.

tl;dr the troops on Hokkaido were probably pretty decent.

Of the major units there, the 42nd Division (Type B) was formed in 1943 on Honshu, getting temporarily transferred to the Kurils with the 27th Army before moving to Hokkaido. The only major detachment this division experienced was the loss of its field artillery regiment (the 42nd) to the 24th Division on Okinawa, but this was replaced by the 12th Field Artillery Regiment which remained under its command until the end of the war. When it was demobilized, it had a personnel strength of 14,599 officers and men.

The 7th Division (Type A), meanwhile, originally consisted of 4 regiments (the 25th through the 28th) and was based in Manchuria with the Kwantung Army. Together with the 23rd Division, elements of the 7th Division were heavily engaged on the northern flank of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol where they incurred a total of 3,479 casualties broken down as 1,453 killed/missing, 1,699 wounded, and 327 sick. Out of all the Japanese units that participated in that battle, the 7th's 26th Regiment was considered to be the best. In 1940 the 7th was transferred to Hokkaido and triangularized, losing the 25th Regiment to the Sakhalin Mixed Brigade. (Later in 1945 the aforementioned SMB was expanded into the 88th Division where it briefly fought with the Soviets again.) Of the remaining regiments, the 28th was almost completely annihilated in the Aleutian and Guadalcanal Campaigns (something like a couple hundred survivors made it back to Japan) and had to be reconstituted in Hokkaido; the 26th and 27th remained in place for the remainder of the war. Equipment-wise the division was probably near full strength and had two independent tank companies (the 5th and 6th, about 44 tanks between them) stationed with it at Obihiro. The only further comment I can make about this division is that when it was demobilized by the Americans it had an unusually low roster of combat personnel for a unit of that type, only 10,800. Also in contrast to the typical Type A TO&E, it was equipped with a mountain artillery regiment instead of the traditional artillery group, probably bearing in mind the terrain of the region.

Can't really say much about the 101st Independent Mixed Brigade, except that it was formed in 1945 and had a strength of 5,484 - because of its late start it was probably the least capable Army unit on Hokkaido. Since there's basically nothing in print about this brigade the quality could have ranged from acceptable to absolute trash; my gut feeling is that given IGHQ's priorities at the time they were probably borderline 1945-Kwantung Army tier.

The 22th Tank Regiment, also at Obihiro with the 7th Division and the two tank companies, would have had around 91 tanks in its organization.

The 100,000 figure also includes Japanese troops on the Kuriles and Sakhalin, which by this point would have already been eliminated.

This was a mistake on my part - the way the personnel list is given in the demobilization records (pp. 21-22, http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/pagefli...dobject/show/348/cpdtype/monograph/pftype/pdf) it makes it seem as if the total for Hokkaido is 101,029 and Hokkaido + Soviet areas is 125,300. The total army personnel on Hokkaido at the end of the war in fact numbered about 69,500 from this source, though the 'Reports of General MacArthur' gives a somewhat higher number, 150,700, for the 5th Area Army as a whole. With the addition of Naval manpower (air units, coast defenses, misc duties) the total for the island was probably around 100,000 or thereabouts.

Available fuel and spare parts would undoubtedly have radically decreased the number of operational vehicles. The poor quality of the crews would likely further reduce the number which actually make it. Some aircraft would undoubtedly slip through in spite of Soviet CAPs and their own pilots incompetence but whether it's enough to make a difference is very much in doubt. It wasn't in the Kuriles.

For the sake of time:

Maintenance and reliability given the deteriorating resource situation was an increasing problem for the Japanese late-war and many would-be suiciders had to turn back on their Kikusui missions at Okinawa because of engine trouble. Though the distances around the Japanese archipelago weren't nearly as great as those from Kyushu to Okinawa, that problem certainly wasn't going away. I can say, however, that in Hokkaido there were three airbases considered to be of high-quality by the US (Bihoro, Obishiro, and Chitose 1) that possessed permanent installations including dedicated maintenance and repair facilities. The complete map of Hokkaido airfields is as follows:

1535rb9.jpg

Additionally, Japanese air presence during the one day battle of Shumshu was so minimal that it can hardly be compared to the situation on Hokkaido; during the former action the primary danger was from Japanese shore-based artillery, which destroyed 7 landing ships (DS-1, DS-3, DS-5, DS-8, DS-9, DS-43, DS-47), a patrol boat (P-8), and two small boats plus inflicted damage on 7 other landing ships and a transport.

Well, once the Soviet beachhead is established and Rumoi is captured, it's pretty much a done deal. Dispositions of the 5th Army, assuming their the same whenever the Soviets show up, shows that any fortifications in the region would be unmanned at first.

They were not: the Rumoi area was covered by a small fortified point manned by infantry.

Do you have a link or a translation to Kestu-Go No. 1? The most I can find relating to Japanese Ketsu-Go planning in relation to an attack on Hokkaido is this lonesome line which obviously doesn't provide much in the way of information:

"(1) Upon completion of his operational objectives in southern Japan and assembly of the necessary strength, the enemy will invade Kanto. This operation may be covered by a diversionary feint at Hokkaido. "

"Homeland Operations Record" p. 63, "Ketsu-Go, No. 1, which involved the defense of Hokkaido by the Fifth Area Amy would be directly under the control of IGHQ. This portion of the operational plan contemplated the containment and destruction of any invasion force which might seek to establish bases on Hokkaido or nearby islands from which to support an invasion of Honshu."

Basically SOP of containment and counterattack as laid by the General Defense Plan for 1945.

Assuming those railways are still functional by whenever the Soviets land following the execution of the American transport plan. And assuming they even identify the Soviet invasion as an actual invasion and not a raid, which is what it might appear to the Japanese at first. Marine raiders earlier in the year had managed to come ashore with zero resistance after all, and this was on the eastern shore where the Japanese actually had some of their forces.

I would imagine that any landing on one of the Home Islands would probably trigger an immediate response from the local commander - this isn't some fringe outpost like Guadalcanal or Tulagi.
 
They would need far more than the 87th Rifle Corps to take Hokkaido;

The 87th (more specifically, one division of the 87th) was just the assault echelon. Once the port was secure, they’d probably have to wind up bringing in the rest of an army or two. The Soviets have demonstrated the ability to land and support that amount through much thinner facilities then what was available at Rumoi and they had the merchant marine to do it. Build up would be pretty slow though. To judge by similar instance against the Germans, it’d be one-two months before the Soviets could bring in enough to breakout.

tl;dr the troops on Hokkaido were probably pretty decent.

*snip*

The history of these divisions are nice and all but they don’t change the fact that there was a concerted Japanese policy of funneling quality personnel south so the “Type” designations could very much just be paper.

Though the distances around the Japanese archipelago weren't nearly as great as those from Kyushu to Okinawa, that problem certainly wasn't going away.

I severely doubt the Japanese would use any of the aircraft allocated for the Decisive Battle against the Americans in Kyushu and Honshu against Soviet “raiders” in Hokkaido. That goes double if Soviet landings occur after American operations had begun. I strongly suspect that what the Japanese have in Hokkaido will be it.

Additionally, Japanese air presence during the one day battle of Shumshu was so minimal that it can hardly be compared to the situation on Hokkaido; during the former action the primary danger was from Japanese shore-based artillery, which destroyed 7 landing ships (DS-1, DS-3, DS-5, DS-8, DS-9, DS-43, DS-47), a patrol boat (P-8), and two small boats plus inflicted damage on 7 other landing ships and a transport.

No indication of (manned) shore batteries at Rumoi, best I can tell.

They were not: the Rumoi area was covered by a small fortified point manned by infantry.

That’d be the Coastal Defense Post. I recall it wasn’t inside Rumoi proper though so it won’t be of much use immediately in opposing a Soviet landing. It’s about 50 kilometers to the north. Do we have any indication about how large it is?

"Homeland Operations Record" p. 63, "Ketsu-Go, No. 1, which involved the defense of Hokkaido by the Fifth Area Amy would be directly under the control of IGHQ. This portion of the operational plan contemplated the containment and destruction of any invasion force which might seek to establish bases on Hokkaido or nearby islands from which to support an invasion of Honshu."

Basically SOP of containment and counterattack as laid by the General Defense Plan for 1945.

Gotcha, I’ll look into it.

I would imagine that any landing on one of the Home Islands would probably trigger an immediate response from the local commander - this isn't some fringe outpost like Guadalcanal or Tulagi.

The American Marine Raider landings in June didn’t, although that could be chalked up to lack of detection. A initial Soviet landing would probably occur in the dead of night, so it might also remain undetected until Morning... depending on the propensity of the town’s citizens to hang around the coast at one AM.
 
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The 87th (more specifically, one division of the 87th) was just the assault echelon. Once the port was secure, they’d probably have to wind up bringing in the rest of an army or two. The Soviets have demonstrated the ability to land and support that amount through much thinner facilities then what was available at Rumoi and they had the merchant marine to do it. Build up would be pretty slow though. To judge by similar instance against the Germans, it’d be one-two months before the Soviets could bring in enough to breakout.

Assuming we're still talking 1945, according to Glantz's description on pp. 300-301 of "August Storm" Vasilevsky's proposal (for what would effectively have been an administrative landing) envisioned using the 87th and 56th Rifle Corps, which would have finished their disarming duties in late August. Of these two the 87th would first be inserted piecemeal, one division at a time, after which the assault shipping would have to trundle along a several hundred kilometer round trip back to Sakhalin.

If the war actually continued, this plan would have been completely invalid as both of these forces would still have been heavily engaged in the Kurils (in the case of the 87th) and Sakhalin (in the case of the 56th under the 16th Army). Frankly, I don't see how the 87th Rifle Corps could alone have been sufficient to clear out the Kurils given Japanese strength there, and likely would have been pulled to Sakhalin to assist the 16th Army, perhaps with amphibious landings on the coast similar to what was actually conducted. Both of these units would have taken heavy losses and would have needed to take on replacements.

In the event of a prepared landing in 1946 I can see the Soviets concentrating all their assault shipping for a simultaneous multi-division effort (i.e, an entire Rifle Corps) against one point, which probably would have been sufficient to hold its positions against a determined counterattack long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Actually breaking out would have been a matter of how quickly they could shift the force ratio on the perimeter of the beachhead in their favor, like Pusan writ small.

The history of these divisions are nice and all but they don’t change the fact that there was a concerted Japanese policy of funneling quality personnel south so the “Type” designations could very much just be paper.

As far as those divisions were concerned they still possessed all their component units from earlier aside from the redeployments already mentioned; I can find no mention of any other withdrawals. While the Japanese did have a history of transferring both divisional and sub-divisional level units (notably at the Kwantung Army's expense), they were almost always taken en masse (i.e, an entire regiment) as opposed to individuals or arbitrary groups of soldiers.

I severely doubt the Japanese would use any of the aircraft allocated for the Decisive Battle against the Americans in Kyushu and Honshu against Soviet “raiders” in Hokkaido. That goes double if Soviet landings occur after American operations had begun. I strongly suspect that what the Japanese have in Hokkaido will be it.

The Japanese aircraft in Hokkaido were not a part of the Kyushu operations, those would have come from both Kyushu itself, Shikoku, and southern Honshu.

No indication of (manned) shore batteries at Rumoi, best I can tell. That’d be the Coastal Defense Post. I recall it wasn’t inside Rumoi proper though so it won’t be of much use immediately in opposing a Soviet landing. It’s about 50 kilometers to the north. Do we have any indication about how large it is?

The IJA possessed the following strongpoints on Hokkaido at the end of the war (the IJN's artillery positions can be seen on the third to last page of this PDF: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/Monos/pdfs/JM-85/JM-85.pdf, but they had not yet received ammunition)

4g3imp.jpg

The infantry unit covering the Rumoi area had only its fixed defenses to rely on and did not appear to possess any heavy artillery. Its strength was probably about a couple hundred (the demobilization document does not list this unit by name, so it must be lumped in with the "minor units demobilized" category.

The American Marine Raider landings in June didn’t, although that could be chalked up to lack of detection. A initial Soviet landing would probably occur in the dead of night, so it might also remain undetected until Morning... depending on the propensity of the town’s citizens to hang around the coast at one AM.

Marine Raider landings where? American troops never set foot on the Japanese mainland until after the surrender.
 

Lusitania

Donor
I would counter that the soviets would not get an opportunity to invade the Japanese islands. The conquest of Manchuria and Korea would more than anything make the Japanese surrender to the Western Allies.

I have read that it was the Russian invasion of Manchuria that finally made the Japanese accept Americans surrender demands and not the nuclear bombing of Japanese cities. So I would counter the same phylosophy would apply here. But I could be wrong and all of them wanted to dies.
 
I would counter that the soviets would not get an opportunity to invade the Japanese islands. The conquest of Manchuria and Korea would more than anything make the Japanese surrender to the Western Allies.

If the Japanese didn't surrender to the atomic bombs and Soviet declaration war, the Red Army taking over Manchuria and Korea wouldn't make them surrender either since they would be intent on fighting to the end.

I have read that it was the Russian invasion of Manchuria that finally made the Japanese accept Americans surrender demands and not the nuclear bombing of Japanese cities. So I would counter the same phylosophy would apply here. But I could be wrong and all of them wanted to dies.

It wasn't.
 

Lusitania

Donor
If the Japanese didn't surrender to the atomic bombs and Soviet declaration war, the Red Army taking over Manchuria and Korea wouldn't make them surrender either since they would be intent on fighting to the end.



It wasn't.
It depends on the source. Some have suggested that they were more worried of Soviets than Americans. Since history in some was is subjective and open to the authors interpretation I will state that both versions exist.
 
It depends on the source. Some have suggested that they were more worried of Soviets than Americans. Since history in some was is subjective and open to the authors interpretation I will state that both versions exist.

"Some" = hacks, revisionists. The main impact the USSR had on Japan's decision to surrender was that by declaring war it was no longer available as a potential mediator in the US-Japanese conflict (which was seen as a far-fetched prospect by many in the Japanese cabinet anyway). The Soviet military threat to the Japanese mainland, in comparison to that of the US, was virtually nil.

"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers."

--Hirohito​
 
It's increasingly clear that's you. You act as if the Soviets couldn't afford to lose even a single man when anyone whose actually bothered to study their manpower and industrial situation in 1945 would acknowledge they'd be quite capable of carrying on fare more intense combat then anything they experienced against the Japanese for a number of years further, depending on the casualty rates.
I've seen other studies, talked to people who actually looked at the records in the 90's: I'll see if I can get their papers, but I repeat: "Stalin rode..." Remember, the Soviets took massive losses. One of the reasons FOR not calling up the class in 1946, was so they could use them elsewhere. Fact. Like it or not. However, I put that aside, since it's immaterial, and Stalin is quite willing to starve people. He might consider that a bonus, in fact...

Great! That probably means you could rather easily access material that's come out on Soviet amphib operations during WW2 after the Cold War. I'd recommend you catch up on it.
I also have access to the Japanese actual warplanes and deployments. Which Bob Pointed out to you. As well as first hand knowledge of the terrain.
And on that your wrong. In fact, a failed invasion would probably cost the Soviets less then a successful one, as the Soviets wouldn't have to deal with a more extended inland campaign. Given how the Soviets approached amphibious landings, a total wipe of the first echelon of the landing force would cost the Soviets 3,000 men. The Soviets wouldn't make any follow up in that case and would abort. A successful invasion would likely more run into the tens of thousands. Given Stalin's ruthless amorality and the perceived political leverage of holding Hokkaido, that'd probably be worth the cost to him.
Oh, not saying he'd consider it. Not saying he'd not pay the price. But I'm saying that price is far higher than you assume.

It's not a case of optimism vs pessimism. It's a case of Soviet reconnaissance, intelligence, and planning on the one hand versus Japanese force levels, dispositions, and intelligence on the other.
Soviet lift capability was not ideal, a point you miss. I recommend you study how the USMC and like hit Japanese hard points, and they would be hard. Nor was their sea bombardment capability anywhere near the US or UK's capability. Again, I refer you to Israeli studies on CAS vs. Tube. And which they picked after trying the first...
Obviously not a statement based on actual analysis of Japanese forces on Hokkaido.
Bzzt. See Bob. Here's a fact, my view is based more on Terrain, what I know of the weather in March, et al, than it's on actual Japanese numbers. Frankly, I'm not sure they'd be anywhere NEAR effective as anything more than speed bumps maybe literally, if the Soviets were doing what the Americans would do.

And if you have been paying attention you'll see where I say the conditions are nothing that Soviet amphibious ops have faced before... and succeeded in spite of.
Also Bzzt. Rumoi port, when I went though in MARCH OF 1993, had 142 cm of snow on their breakwater. That isn't something the Soviets ever dealt with.
You, sir, are mistaken. Hokkaido in 1946, would be a nightmare to invade.

The beach I was referring to is Boro, that had a meter (March 25th) of snow on it. And given the terrain, it's a good place for a company of infantry even without snow to slaughter.
Not really much of a factor. Bamboo spears with the odd hunting rifle isn't going to impress the veterans of the biggest and bloodiest theatre of war in human history who, even in a amphibious landing, would be much more heavily equipped with semi-automatic and automatic small arms along with some crew-served weapons. They'd need to be jacketed within Japanese regular forces to present much of a threat.
10,000 spears (not to mention that supposedly they'd be issued one grenade each... *snort*) OTOH... You don't quite seem to grasp that. Note: You also don't answer my points about the sea states. I've talked to fishermen who operated out of Rumoi, Otaru and Oniwaki.

Generally, even today, an average of 1 ship from each of those ports does not come back per month. From the period of Oct-May.
Today. (in April of 1993, I attended a ceremony for another lost fishing ship. Lucky the crew got picked up, but the ship was lost)





I'm not seeing why the Soviets would necessarily need Sapporo and couldn't settle for a lesser port. As I noted up with my Oranienbaum bridgehead example, the Soviets supplied much larger forces then what they would need for Hokkaido through much worse port facilities. In particular, the early tentative plans the Soviets were drawing up before the war ended seemed to focus on the Rumoi area, which in August 1945 was a modest port town with no serious IJA or IJN garrison, the closest force of any sort was a single coastal defense outpost 50 kilometers (around a two days march) to the north, and a pretty ideal coastline for landing.
Rumoi actually had a full up company bunker, (Bob pointed out), plus several other assets. You are also forgetting 10 or so thousand people given spears, grenades, and told that the Russians were devils. Rumoi's terrain out of it was not ideal (As in, from what I asked a friend to send me), the road that is now 232, to Obira was impassable on foot, or even most vehicles without a heavy plow til May of 1946 233 past Horonuka station, didn't reopen til June of that year, and moving down to Mashike is just begging to be destroyed. That is pretty much Route 1 US, along Monterey. Not the best idea. And from what I was told, in 93, by some old fishermen, after the war, those two years were horrendously bad weather for sea states.
That might be a sea story(in fact, I assume it was), but the weather reports I've pulled and seen seem to indicate it wasn't good. And the Soviets do not have experience with this, either. Not when their only viable main assault port is 400 kilometers away.

So study completely different situations then. Because unlike on much of Hokkaido, Iwo Jima and the Ryukyu's were heavily fortified and garrisoned, with much smaller land areas that rendered it impossible to avoid enemy positions. None of this applies to Hokkaido's west coast.
Hokkaido's west coast didn't NEED it. That's what you're missing. it's Italy on steroids. I've visited that area personally. Had a MARINE OFFICER with me. He flat out stated the same thing. If you won't listen to me, listen to him. Look, that's the simple fact, I've been though Hokkaido, and visited the west coast PERSONALLY during that time of year.

Anywhere where the Japanese weren't, it's not a viable place to land. Period, dot. Unless you think the 3000 people (assuming all made it to the offloading) can climb cliffs averaging 20-30 meters tall, with all their gear. I'm not giving the Japanese any credit, I'm giving the terrain which I've BEEN over, and the weather, full marks here.

And on that you're wrong. They do have the capability to make it successful. What they don't have is the capability to make it a guaranteed success.
Disagree fully. So does a Marine Officer, and another marine. I'll listen to the outright experts, tyvm. And considering said Marine who walked with me, wrote his War College paper on Soviet capabilities in the Stalin era for naval operations, He knows what he's talking about. And his response when I sent your belief to him (still talk to him today): "No, not only no, but hell no. That's a good way to piss away 50,000 men."

You give too much credit (and to be fair, this is a common failing, I assumed the same til I did War college) to CAS capability to replace Naval heavy gunfire which would be needed. That... is not so true.


Well, the weather does represent some capacity to screw the Soviets over but it isn't anything that is insurmountable in the absence of enemy resistance at the water's edge. Otherwise, you're spot on.
Some... yah, no. Try a LOT. And there's even a simple solution to the Russians taking any port but the three in Sapporo: "Burn it or blow the breakwater."
Almost every port outside Sapporo's main, except for Hakodate either had a wooden/loose stone breakwater, wooden docks, wooden et al. I repeat: Every western port of any capability over a few fishing vessels, outside Ishikariwanshin Port (Sapporo's main) has a breakwater. That should tell you a lot. Destroy those...


The most realistic option for the USSR to attack Hokkaido would have been in the Spring of 1946. The forces and base of support they had on-hand in the summer of 1945 were staggeringly inadequate to guarantee success and the Far East General command would have been too busy with higher priorities on the Asian mainland. Then there's the defenders of Hokkaido itself - over 100,000 Army personnel centered on two divisions (one Type A), a brigade, a separate armored regiment, 450 aircraft, and a good number of naval troops manning coastal and interior positions.

Even for 1946, assuming the first landing point is still the port of Rumoi and the composition of the defending 5th Area Army is unchanged, the attacker still has to fight to fight through a small fortified region flanked on all sides by forested, hilly terrain, while the Japanese per their OPLAN (Ketsu-Go No. 1) are in a position to quickly dispatch reinforcements from the east, the south, and if necessary the north along three railways funneling directly to the region; within a short period something like 30,000+ troops with armored support could be brought in to confront a Soviet beachhead. Practically the only way to avoid another Anzio-type situation would be to make risky landings on other, more fortified parts of the island in order to relieve pressure on their initial beachhead, which would come with their own set of logistical and manpower strains. This would all have to be accomplished in the face of aerial attacks at sea and the Soviets' own limited amphibious warfare experience.

Pretty much. And I discounted kamikaze, and several other factors in my analysis. In this case, it boils down to this:
"General Winter is on the other side."
 
I thought this thread was supposed to be about the feasibility of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, not about what the American response, or the lack thereof, would be to such an invasion. Nevermind, it seems that boat has long since sailed.

That said i believe there are a few points to keep in mind here -

1) Stalin was not interested in the East Asia, but in Europe. The USSR's then most valuable lands were not in Siberia, Central Asia or along the Amur. They were in European Russia. And Stalin wanted as much of a buffer he could get between the USSR and the capitalists as he could, in case the capitalists decided to pull a Barbarossa 2.0 later.

Was it a smart move strategically? Perhaps, but it also sounds an awful lot like preparing to fight the previous war and not the next one.

Another indication of the lack of Soviet interest in securing East Asia for themselves was with how readily they agreed to the division of Korea, even when they had troops in Northern Korea and the WAllies had rolled snake eyes. It was almost as if the Soviets were in a hurry to resolve matters in the East Asia and leave it as a bone to the WAllies so that they could go back to focusing on the part of the world that strategically mattered to them most, Eastern Europe.

2) Whether the Soviets had the rail capacity/road network or not is a nonsensical question. If they did not have the logistical capability how did they end up deploying 1.5 Million troops, some 27,000 artillery pieces, 5,000 tanks and over 3,000 aircraft in the Manchurian offensive launched on August 9th, 1945? You can't just dump them troops in the middle of nowhere and expect them to accomplish their objectives. These must have needed enormous quantities of food, fuel and supplies to keep them moving into Manchuria, even if they did not face serious opposition. And the Soviets did move deep into Manchuria, with some units pushing over a hundred kilometers inside in just 5 days. That would mean that soviets had some serious logistical capabilities in place to make sure their troops didn't out run their supply by T+2 or T+3 days.

Let us not forget the Japanese hadn't even officially indicated their intent to surrender until August 15th, and confusion created by the Emperor's broadcast not clearly saying that the Japanese had surrendered resulted in Kwantung Army units fighting the Soviets until August 20th in some cases.

3) Hokkaido was like the last part of Japan which was defended against a naval invasion. Until the soviets invaded Manchuria, the entire Japanese focus had been on defending Kyushu and making the WAllies weep blood for every step they took on that island during Olympic. The Japanese had deployed all of their Kamikaze units in the south, none were anywhere near Hokkaido, let alone be in position to react to a Soviet invasion. Even if the Japanese do recognize the threat belatedly, they would be unable to move the necessary troops and wire up the docks in time for a September-October 1945 or even November 1945 invasion of Hokkaido. Let us not forget that at this point the Japanese were pretty much out of weapons, ammo and equipment, and most importantly, the fuel to move all of that up north from Kyushu and Honshu. That said a March invasion would mean a significantly larger amount of resources could've been deployed North if the threat of a Soviet invasion was clear and present.

Also to be noted September-October 1945 was pretty calm, typhoon wise that is, over the Home Islands, if i remember correctly. Even November '45 only had a couple of tropical storms in and around Japan. All of those storms could've been easily avoided for a naval invasion.

4) General Winter is Russian. The Soviets took part in offensive operation in the middle of the winter of 1941-42 on the Eastern Front, which was one of the worst winters on record and they did so despite having lost some of the most strategically valuable parts of their country. And the Red Army in 1945-46 was far ahead in capability than what the Red Army was in 1941-42. The only serious issue they would face would be in securing a landing in Western Hokkaido and capturing a handful of airfields. After that the Japanese had no chance of winning against the Soviets in a battle for Hokkaido. Don't forget Hokkaido is no tropical jungle, and the strategically valuable parts of the island are the kind of terrain (Manchuria, Kurils, Korea) the Soviets would've had been fighting in for a while by winter 1945. That said the soviets will suffer horrible losses, but they would they be as affected by those losses as Americans would be? Perhaps not, as on one hand they would make lighter losses in the inland battles than the Americans would and on the other there was the Soviet ability to shrug off the losses when they really wanted to, even if they were scraping the barrel by this point. Also population of Hokkaido is just like 5 million today, and was probably not more than 2 million back then, compared to 12 million for Kyushu today and perhaps as much as 3-4 million back then. Hokkaido is also bigger and has a longer coastline than Kyushu so the defenders would be stretched thinner than they would be in Kyushu even if the Japanese had similar numbers of extra troops to send North in 1945, which they did not.

So will a soviet invasion of Hokkaido be possible? Yes, but only if the Soviet's really desired it. And they never once hinted they were serious about invading Hokkaido. Would the initial landing be successful? In late autumn/early winter 1945, maybe yes. In late spring 1946, perhaps not wildly successful. Will the ground campaign following the landing be successful? In late autumn/early winter 1945, quite possibly. In late spring 1946, still yes, but it will be bloodier. In either case it will be less costlier for the Soviets than Olympic will be for the WAllies.

In summary, does all this indicate an invasion of Hokkaido was feasible? Perhaps it was, sure seems so. That said, i believe the feasibility of this endeavor was not predicated upon the strategic capability of the Soviets as much as it on the strategic need of the Soviets to invade the island. That is if the the Soviets really wanted to invade Hokkaido they would've gone all out and made it happen. And by all indications at that time invading the Japanese Home Islands was pretty low on the Communists' Christmas list of '45.

These points i have stated are of course my personal opinion, but i have based them upon evident facts of the time. If these are proven to be wrong then i will gladly change my views, provided they are proven wrong in the first place. I would welcome you to try so that we can all get to closer to the truth. Feel free to comment.

That said I do hope these points are not unnecessarily contentious and are agreeable to most and help this debate move towards resolution. Thank you for your time.
 

nbcman

Donor
Ultimately it comes down to sustained sea lift and logistics.

YMMV. The Russians do not have enough. The best evidence is that the lift is American sourced (126-150 ships). How is that supposed to supply 10 divisions? (Estimated force needed to secure Hokkaido.)

LOGISTICS matters.
Plus 5 of the 30 LCIs were lost IOTL in the IJ opposed landing at Shumshu. If all of the Kuriles landings were opposed by IJ, the Soviets would have very few LCIs left to invade Hokkaido.

EDIT: Link added. Note that almost 20% of the invading force was lost as well as the numerous issues that the Soviets had during the invasion.
 
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Here are some of the issues that need to be addressed by Soviet intelligence and pre-invasion recon. Please note I was involved with navy intel for 5 years, subsequently surgeon with marines for long time including MAGTF surgeon, service on a general staff with war planning (medical) and attendance amphibious warfare course.
1. Details on any potential invasion beaches which includes checking the composition of the beach and how firm it is, slope of the beach, high/low tide beach exposure difference, slope of the bottom on approach (is it shallow far out or deep close inshore), beach exits, also average and min/max surf.
2. Since the number of ships the Soviets have that can unload vehicles and heavy cargo over the beach is VERY limited, you need ports to supply the invasion force so: how many ships can tie up at the pier(s) of any given port at one time, what is the minimum depth at low tide alongside the piers, what cranes and other unloading gear is available both fixed and mobile, what sort of loads can a given pier take (a pier that can take a Japanese tuck loaded with fish may not support a Soviet tank), what sort of roads/rails exit the port to allow onward movement.
3. Detailed information of offshore/inshore water conditions such as prevailing currents and do they change with tides, and water temperature. Note Russians may be hardened to the cold but they are human, troops soaked in near freezing water even if they are quickly on land are going to be at severe risk for hypothermia and if they spend much time in even waist deep water are in trouble.

As I said this is only a partial list, and it took the US and UK some unfortunate experience before they developed the proper "needs" list and techniques involving both photo recon techniques and physical beach recon by trained personnel before they got it right. While the Soviet intelligence resources on Hokkaido may exist, although how many and how they get information back to the USSR I wonder about, none of their assets will have received the training needed to get key facts even should they have the opportunity. In terms of the port facilities, between incoming fire and Japanese efforts to destroy facilities there will inevitably whatever the capacity of the port was the day before the invasion, it will be less upon the invasion which will cause limitations in supply for some time, and also require assets to be used to repair the support (leaving less opportunity to land supplies for the troops at the front).

A final point, since a significant number of the troops will be transported in smaller craft, and the distance is not short and the seas rough, a HUGE percentage of the troops will be in bad shape when they arrive. It takes time to acclimate to motion sickness, and tightly crammed in a poorly ventilated space reeking of vomit is not a good start. When the troops arrive off the beach their effectiveness will be markedly reduced. Even with dramamine, which the Soviets did not have, this was an issue for D-Day troops crossing only a relatively short distance in the rough channel.
 
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C_Plan_13.png


Map based on the immediate post above. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The Russians are in worse shape than I thought.
 
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