It's increasingly clear that's you. You act as if the Soviets couldn't afford to lose even a single man when anyone whose actually bothered to study their manpower and industrial situation in 1945 would acknowledge they'd be quite capable of carrying on fare more intense combat then anything they experienced against the Japanese for a number of years further, depending on the casualty rates.
I've seen other studies, talked to people who actually looked at the records in the 90's: I'll see if I can get their papers, but I repeat: "Stalin rode..." Remember, the Soviets took massive losses. One of the reasons FOR not calling up the class in 1946, was so they could use them elsewhere. Fact. Like it or not. However, I put that aside, since it's immaterial, and Stalin is quite willing to starve people. He might consider that a bonus, in fact...
Great! That probably means you could rather easily access material that's come out on Soviet amphib operations during WW2 after the Cold War. I'd recommend you catch up on it.
I also have access to the Japanese actual warplanes and deployments. Which Bob Pointed out to you. As well as
first hand knowledge of the terrain.
And on that your wrong. In fact, a failed invasion would probably cost the Soviets less then a successful one, as the Soviets wouldn't have to deal with a more extended inland campaign. Given how the Soviets approached amphibious landings, a total wipe of the first echelon of the landing force would cost the Soviets 3,000 men. The Soviets wouldn't make any follow up in that case and would abort. A successful invasion would likely more run into the tens of thousands. Given Stalin's ruthless amorality and the perceived political leverage of holding Hokkaido, that'd probably be worth the cost to him.
Oh, not saying he'd consider it. Not saying he'd not pay the price. But I'm saying that price is
far higher than you assume.
It's not a case of optimism vs pessimism. It's a case of Soviet reconnaissance, intelligence, and planning on the one hand versus Japanese force levels, dispositions, and intelligence on the other.
Soviet lift capability was not ideal, a point you miss. I recommend you study how the USMC and like
hit Japanese hard points, and they would be hard. Nor was their sea bombardment capability anywhere near the US or UK's capability. Again, I refer you to Israeli studies on CAS vs. Tube. And which they picked after trying the first...
Obviously not a statement based on actual analysis of Japanese forces on Hokkaido.
Bzzt. See Bob. Here's a fact, my view is based
more on Terrain, what I know of the weather in March, et al, than it's on actual Japanese numbers. Frankly, I'm not sure they'd be anywhere NEAR effective as anything more than speed bumps maybe literally, if the Soviets were doing what the Americans would do.
And if you have been paying attention you'll see where I say the conditions are nothing that Soviet amphibious ops have faced before... and succeeded in spite of.
Also Bzzt. Rumoi port, when I went though in
MARCH OF 1993, had 142 cm of snow on their breakwater. That isn't something the Soviets ever dealt with.
You, sir, are mistaken. Hokkaido in 1946, would be a nightmare to invade.
The beach I was referring to is Boro, that had a meter (March 25th) of snow on it. And given the terrain, it's a good place for a company of infantry even without snow to slaughter.
Not really much of a factor. Bamboo spears with the odd hunting rifle isn't going to impress the veterans of the biggest and bloodiest theatre of war in human history who, even in a amphibious landing, would be much more heavily equipped with semi-automatic and automatic small arms along with some crew-served weapons. They'd need to be jacketed within Japanese regular forces to present much of a threat.
10,000 spears (not to mention that supposedly they'd be issued one grenade each... *snort*) OTOH... You don't quite seem to grasp that. Note: You also don't answer my points about the sea states. I've
talked to fishermen who operated out of Rumoi, Otaru and Oniwaki.
Generally,
even today, an average of 1 ship from each of those ports
does not come back per month. From the period of Oct-May.
Today. (in April of 1993, I attended a ceremony for another lost fishing ship. Lucky the crew got picked up, but the ship was lost)
I'm not seeing why the Soviets would necessarily need Sapporo and couldn't settle for a lesser port. As I noted up with my Oranienbaum bridgehead example, the Soviets supplied much larger forces then what they would need for Hokkaido through much worse port facilities. In particular, the early tentative plans the Soviets were drawing up before the war ended seemed to focus on the Rumoi area, which in August 1945 was a modest port town with no serious IJA or IJN garrison, the closest force of any sort was a single coastal defense outpost 50 kilometers (around a two days march) to the north, and a pretty ideal coastline for landing.
Rumoi actually had a full up company bunker, (Bob pointed out), plus several other assets. You are also forgetting 10 or so thousand people given spears, grenades, and told that the Russians were devils. Rumoi's terrain out of it was
not ideal (As in, from what I asked a friend to send me), the road that is now 232, to Obira was impassable on foot, or even most vehicles without a heavy plow til May of 1946 233 past Horonuka station, didn't reopen til June of that year, and moving down to Mashike is just begging to be destroyed. That is pretty much Route 1 US, along Monterey. Not the best idea. And from what I was told, in 93, by some old fishermen, after the war, those two years were horrendously bad weather for sea states.
That might be a sea story(in fact, I assume it was), but the weather reports I've pulled and seen seem to indicate it wasn't good. And the Soviets do not have experience with this, either. Not when their only viable main assault port is 400 kilometers away.
So study completely different situations then. Because unlike on much of Hokkaido, Iwo Jima and the Ryukyu's were heavily fortified and garrisoned, with much smaller land areas that rendered it impossible to avoid enemy positions. None of this applies to Hokkaido's west coast.
Hokkaido's west coast didn't NEED it. That's what you're missing. it's Italy on steroids. I've visited that area
personally. Had
a MARINE OFFICER with me. He flat out stated the same thing. If you won't listen to
me, listen to him. Look, that's the simple fact, I've
been though Hokkaido, and visited the west coast PERSONALLY during that time of year.
Anywhere where the Japanese weren't, it's
not a viable place to land. Period, dot. Unless you think the 3000 people (assuming all made it to the offloading) can climb cliffs averaging 20-30
meters tall, with all their gear. I'm
not giving the Japanese any credit, I'm giving the terrain which I've BEEN over, and the
weather,
full marks here.
And on that you're wrong. They do have the capability to make it successful. What they don't have is the capability to make it a guaranteed success.
Disagree fully. So does a Marine Officer, and another marine. I'll listen to the outright experts, tyvm. And considering said Marine who walked with me, wrote his War College paper on Soviet capabilities in the Stalin era for naval operations, He knows what he's talking about. And his response when I sent your belief to him (still talk to him today): "No, not only no, but
hell no. That's a good way to piss away 50,000 men."
You give too much credit (and to be fair, this is a
common failing, I assumed the same til
I did War college) to CAS capability to replace Naval heavy gunfire
which would be needed. That... is not so true.
Well, the weather does represent some capacity to screw the Soviets over but it isn't anything that is insurmountable in the absence of enemy resistance at the water's edge. Otherwise, you're spot on.
Some... yah, no. Try a LOT. And there's even a simple solution to the Russians taking any port but the three in Sapporo: "Burn it or blow the breakwater."
Almost
every port outside Sapporo's main, except for Hakodate either had a wooden/loose stone breakwater, wooden docks, wooden et al. I repeat: Every western port of any capability over a few fishing vessels, outside Ishikariwanshin Port (Sapporo's main) has a breakwater. That should tell you a lot. Destroy those...
The most realistic option for the USSR to attack Hokkaido would have been in the Spring of 1946. The forces and base of support they had on-hand in the summer of 1945 were staggeringly inadequate to guarantee success and the Far East General command would have been too busy with higher priorities on the Asian mainland. Then there's the defenders of Hokkaido itself - over 100,000 Army personnel centered on two divisions (one Type A), a brigade, a separate armored regiment, 450 aircraft, and a good number of naval troops manning coastal and interior positions.
Even for 1946, assuming the first landing point is still the port of Rumoi and the composition of the defending 5th Area Army is unchanged, the attacker still has to fight to fight through a small fortified region flanked on all sides by forested, hilly terrain, while the Japanese per their OPLAN (Ketsu-Go No. 1) are in a position to quickly dispatch reinforcements from the east, the south, and if necessary the north along three railways funneling directly to the region; within a short period something like 30,000+ troops with armored support could be brought in to confront a Soviet beachhead. Practically the only way to avoid another Anzio-type situation would be to make risky landings on other, more fortified parts of the island in order to relieve pressure on their initial beachhead, which would come with their own set of logistical and manpower strains. This would all have to be accomplished in the face of aerial attacks at sea and the Soviets' own limited amphibious warfare experience.
Pretty much. And I discounted kamikaze, and several other factors in my analysis. In this case, it boils down to this:
"General Winter is on the other side."