The distances involved aren’t any greater then those faced by Soviet amphibious operations in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Seas. The Soviets can’t do operations over thousands of kilometers like the US and British can, but the few hundred from Vladivostok to the West Coast of Hokkaido is eminently possible. Similarly, the conditions they’d experience are that to Soviet amphibious operation in the Arctic in the northern parts of Finland and Norway during the autumn-winter of ‘44. Vasilevsky, whose in charge of Soviet forces in the Far East, commanded these operations and he’d likely draw upon them for experience.
*ssssssiiiiigh*
It's not the distance. It's the
quality of lift, boyo, and how much of it is
there for the first waves. Note: I
stated they could cobble together total first wave lift of 5 divisions (roughly 50-100,000 men) That isn't the
only problem. It's quality, how much of it is quick deploy, and do they have a
viable doctrine.
Patently untrue. The Soviets have notable air and sea assets that, while still minuscule next to those of the Anglo-Americans, they could redeploy to enhance their capabilities. Small and mid-sized transport vessels could be brought in over the Trans-Siberian and transport aircraft flown in from elsewhere. If they need it. The Soviets already demonstrated they have the assets in the Far East to move about three divisions.
And did I not
give them that? 5 divisions, I do believe.
Again, untrue. Soviet logistical capabilities after the war actually increased as they restored their civilian industry and continued to modernize their military. Lend-lease was no longer the essential centerpiece of the Soviet economy it had been in 1943.
Why did it do that? What would be
different? Gee, I don't know, y'think a million+ soliders demobilizing had
anything to do with that. Naaaaw.
Soviets go ”Okay” and carry on. They survived the loss of American food shipments in September 1945 OTL. Their agricultural sector has been recovering since 1944 and there’s nothing about invading Hokkaido that’d put undue stress on their recovering civilian economy.
See above. They
could go okay in OTL, because they
demobilized to harvest and plant, starting in Sept 1945. This situation means they
wouldn't. Not as many, not as fast.
meaning, you didn't answer the question.
Mainly because the Soviets manpower problem is a non-issue in this context. Invading Hokkaido would hardly be costly enough that they’d have to suspend demobilization in Europe or even dip into the ~three million available men from the class of 1927 who came of age in 1945 but that the Soviets didn’t bother to recruit. They have enough manpower in their standing armyto do the job. The rest of your post is similarly flawed in this vein.
... No it isn't, but apparently you're not getting it. "It's not that they didn't have manpower, that they had
limited amount on the scales of the jobs they had to do." Fact. You did not answer this: "What does
not get done."
the Soviets took
massive losses, and
massive damage, in their most 'productive' areas, have an ongoing low level insurgency in the Ukraine, issues in Eastern Europe, etc, etc.
If they keep a
million active, past Sept 1945, what is
not getting done. Period, dot. You seem to buy into the German myth of 'unlimited bodies' No, the Soviets did
not have unlimited bodies, they were at the
bottom of the bodies they did have, and
most (and this is key) weren't the ones they needed on both the civilian repairs, maintaining and building more farming vehicles, etc, etc. That simple. X bodies, where Y are the critical specialists they needed. They had to demobilize them. They did in OTL. In your suggestion, they won't.
So, again.
what doesn't get done.
This is
not counting the bodies they'd need to hold Korea, much less take it.
Anyone who's actually read the Soviet Records recognizes this: Stalin rode a pair of threes in diplomacy harder, faster, longer than a Thai Bar Girl during fleet week gets ridden.
Man was batshit insane, but he also was crazy like a fox.
The Trans-Siberian was single tracked? I’m sure that’d be news to the Soviets, who double tracked it in the 30s and added all sorts of sidings and offshoots that massively expanded its capacity.
The Soviets would be quite stunned to learn they don’t have appreciable transport capability in the Far East. I guess they’d have to wonder how they managed to move the equivalent of three divisions in successful amphibious landings against Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles without even dipping into their merchant marine assets.
Did I not say they could do 5 divisions? And note: Quality of lift, wasn't the best, and the Kurile invasions was suboptimal by review of professionals who made that their living, shall we say.
I'm not touching on the logistics to Vlad. Busan's is going to be a bit more difficult, and to other areas worse.
Same way they did OTL, when they moved large air assets there to support the Manchuria Operation. And then continued to maintain large air assets to this day.
On call naval bombardment is vastly different than on call air support. I suggest you discuss with the Isrealis exactly the difference between tube and air arty.
You'd be surprised.
Or Marines.
The Soviets (and later Russians) were able to maintain powerful forces in the Far East without lend-lease for the past 72 years. I don’t see why that would suddenly change just because they are hitting Hokkaido.
Combat != peacetime. If you can't see that, we have nothing more to discuss. And while they were fairly powerful,
for peacetime, the serious levels of force you're referring to, didn't start until the 60's. Before that, the ground forces were far lower. Here's a point to consider. If what you are saying is true; Why didn't Stalin go ahead and aid the NK?
The only amphibious lift the Soviets had in the far east were a small number of amphibs they had received recently from LL. Not enough to transport the number of troops and supplies as well as vehicles needed for a Hokkaido assault. Even assuming that the US gives more amphibious lift the the Soviets in the August-November timeframe, training crews and troops takes time. If the USA is doing Olympic and planning for Coronet, the last thing they will be sending to the USSR is amphibious lift or other amphibious specific gear. While I won't rule out a November assault, it is almost ASB and they will need to wait until March/April 1946 to let the weather become acceptable. Given the deficiencies in amphibious lift, the Soviets have to take some ports in good shape, and it is highly likely the Japanese will be able to do a fair amount of demolitions making supply difficult. Yes, the trans-Siberian is mostly double track but... The Russians do not have the capacity to support their campaigns in Manchuria and Korea and simultaneously support an amphibious assault on Hokkaido. Manchuria and Korea are much more important to Stalin - they are land areas connected to the USSR that can either be occupied or a friendly regime, so they need to get priority.
Sapporo (largest city on the West Coast of Hokkaido) Lat: 43+ degrees. Climate type Dfa
Boston: Lat: 42.5 degrees
March? Are you kidding?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapporo#Geography
98 cm of snow, average in march. Look before that, too... Also, that's the average over the last 50 or so years, not before. I'd remind people (putting aside whatever reason it is for) snowfall averages over time (100+ years) have been edging down in most areas, Hokkaido is not an exception. I did say
meter thick on the beaches, did I not.
That was
May I saw that. (about 50 km north of Sapporo, too)
During WWII Soviet amphibious operations were short range, and in all cases were support for land campaigns much like airborne operations - they were to connect with land based campaigns. None of them, other than the "postwar" Kurile campaign were self supporting. An attack on Hokkaido will require continuous support from the Soviet mainland via the sea, any air supply will be limited. This is something the Soviets have not done at all during WWII, every bit of supply will need to come from a Soviet port as Hokkaido has very little they can steal to support the troops. Every truck, every bulldozer, etc has to come from Russia and unloaded at a working port. Sakhalin is close to Hokkaido, Vladivostok roughly 400nm air distance. Air support from Sakhalin means getting supplies to Sakhalin first.
I'm assuming that the Sovs use every possible spot, so...
Bottom line - a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido in Spring, 1946 is not ASB. Having said that, it would be very risky, require significant pre-invasion support by the USA via LL (unlikely), have the potential for a major diplomatic dust up if the Soviets try to stay. If Olympic has failed and the USA is struggling in spring 1946 to invade Japan or has gone to a starvation plan, then invading Hokkaido may make sense to snap up something but...
It's unlikely to be successful, quite. In Nov would be the better odds. March? I quote a Marine who knows the area: "Bwahahaha, that's a good way to piss away 5 divisions."
And he actually went: "75% of the work would be done by the area, not the Japanese, Drew, that's outside a few areas, hitting Maine or gods forbid, the actual Canadian Maritimes. Any officer who seriously suggested that, would be
fragged by me, skip the enlisted doing it." (He's an officer too.)
People are underestimating the soviets and overestimating the Japanese. The Japanese care more for the Americans who are to the south and are constantly fighting them and bombing the area. Also most of japans industry and populace lies in the south not the north. Also the Japanese will be unable and unwilling to send anything north considering their logistic networked is ruined and bombed and they would rather send their forces south. The Japanese in the north and mainland Asia will be the bottom of the barrel without logistic support and facing a better prepared and better armed adversaries.
See above quote from a
MARINE OFFICER. We're not overestimating the Japanese, we're looking coldly at land that at
best starts where BOSTON is, in a
very similar weather pattern.
Worse, actually, for the West Coast.
I did mention:
meter thick snow on the beaches That's MARCH.
and that's not very much north of Sapporo.
How hard is that to understand?
Weather is
not ideal. I suggest, for education: EXCATLY when the US and UK planned invasions for the French Coast, and think long and hard about the winds/waters and conditions of New England and Canadian Maritimes.
Contrary to popular belief, Invasions aren't easy, aren't cheap, and often boil down to how much
firepower you can throw, when everything is
ideal. Would Hokkaido be as defended, than Kysuhu or Honshu? Nope. No question. But there's actually
less suited terrain, and the weather isn't ideal, as well. (When I backpacked across Hokkaido's coast for 30 days on a leave from the Army, I counted maybe 8 beaches that I thought could support a regimental assault, according to the Marine officer who was with me) The Japanese are quite aware of that.
Think of ANIZO's Terrain.
Interesting. *snip*
'Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945' Hubert P. van Tuyll
Greenwood ISBN 0-313-26688-3
I drew from those sources.
The Soviet Problems:
In order.
Major marshaling ports: Busan(possible), Vladstock, and that's about it. Major airbases: See there.
Weather: Again, think about Boston and
north, and the sea states, and from my
personal knowledge, having talked to fishermen and coasters in that region, it's often
worse in that area, than better than the Open ocean.
Doctrine not ideal. This isn't saying they don't have one.
Sea and Air lift, not ideal (not non existent).
Terrain also not very ideal. A population in Nov that would be ... interesting, and even in March, still able to resist.
Limited manpower (now, to be fair, it's a question: "What isn't getting done")
Look
is an invasion
possible
Yes. Either Nov
or March, no question. Stalin just might order it.
Would it be successful?
Odds: Nov: 15-20%, depending on factors I'd have to look up.
March: 5%. If that.
And that's
not answering the
damage it would do:
How many troops would the Red army NOT demobilize.
How many of the 1927 class, they'd call up.
WHAT WERE THEY DOING? What doesn't get done?
What is the
cost of it?
No one who's talking about this, and going "This is a
really bad idea" disagrees the basics: 5 Division force, mostly, if not all light leaving the ports/airbases, and going for it.
We're going: "it's going to be a disaster, either immediately, or very shortly after."
So is the invasion feasible?
Yes.
Is it a good idea, does it have high success odds? Nope, nope.
Would it cost the Sovs far more than they'd ever gain? Oh, hades yes.
I point out again:
3% of the Class of 1920 survived to 1945.
Think about that.
Just think.
(Edited to remove quotebox issues)