How feasible is a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan?

Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan feasible

  • Yes

    Votes: 62 52.5%
  • No

    Votes: 40 33.9%
  • Unsure

    Votes: 16 13.6%

  • Total voters
    118
The only amphibious lift the Soviets had in the far east were a small number of amphibs they had received recently from LL. Not enough to transport the number of troops and supplies as well as vehicles needed for a Hokkaido assault. Even assuming that the US gives more amphibious lift the the Soviets in the August-November timeframe, training crews and troops takes time. If the USA is doing Olympic and planning for Coronet, the last thing they will be sending to the USSR is amphibious lift or other amphibious specific gear. While I won't rule out a November assault, it is almost ASB and they will need to wait until March/April 1946 to let the weather become acceptable. Given the deficiencies in amphibious lift, the Soviets have to take some ports in good shape, and it is highly likely the Japanese will be able to do a fair amount of demolitions making supply difficult. Yes, the trans-Siberian is mostly double track but... The Russians do not have the capacity to support their campaigns in Manchuria and Korea and simultaneously support an amphibious assault on Hokkaido. Manchuria and Korea are much more important to Stalin - they are land areas connected to the USSR that can either be occupied or a friendly regime, so they need to get priority.

During WWII Soviet amphibious operations were short range, and in all cases were support for land campaigns much like airborne operations - they were to connect with land based campaigns. None of them, other than the "postwar" Kurile campaign were self supporting. An attack on Hokkaido will require continuous support from the Soviet mainland via the sea, any air supply will be limited. This is something the Soviets have not done at all during WWII, every bit of supply will need to come from a Soviet port as Hokkaido has very little they can steal to support the troops. Every truck, every bulldozer, etc has to come from Russia and unloaded at a working port. Sakhalin is close to Hokkaido, Vladivostok roughly 400nm air distance. Air support from Sakhalin means getting supplies to Sakhalin first.

Bottom line - a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido in Spring, 1946 is not ASB. Having said that, it would be very risky, require significant pre-invasion support by the USA via LL (unlikely), have the potential for a major diplomatic dust up if the Soviets try to stay. If Olympic has failed and the USA is struggling in spring 1946 to invade Japan or has gone to a starvation plan, then invading Hokkaido may make sense to snap up something but...
 

Manman

Banned
People are underestimating the soviets and overestimating the Japanese. The Japanese care more for the Americans who are to the south and are constantly fighting them and bombing the area. Also most of japans industry and populace lies in the south not the north. Also the Japanese will be unable and unwilling to send anything north considering their logistic networked is ruined and bombed and they would rather send their forces south. The Japanese in the north and mainland Asia will be the bottom of the barrel without logistic support and facing a better prepared and better armed adversaries.
 
The only amphibious lift the Soviets had in the far east were a small number of amphibs they had received recently from LL. Not enough to transport the number of troops and supplies as well as vehicles needed for a Hokkaido assault.

They have enough assuming they are able to successfully apply their methodology against Hokkaido of landing where the enemy is not. They couldn't in the Kuriles, although part of that was geography and part of that was they were just expecting the Japanese to not actually try to fight them, but they did in Sakhalin and North Korea. Japanese numbers and dispositions in August 1945 suggest the Soviets probably could do it once the assets are freed up by the conclusion of the other ground and amphibious campaigns, but both of Japanese dispositions and number are subject to change in the subsequent months and may be unrecognizable by the time the Soviets are able to actually execute an assault. The Soviets do, in fact, have more then what they got from LL: various gunboats and other small craft from before the war with a range of several hundred kilometers. Their strictly inferior to the LL craft in capability, but their available, the Soviets are already trained on them, and they were successfully used alongside the LLcraft in the Kurile, North Korean, and Sakhalin landings as well as in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Sea's.

Given the deficiencies in amphibious lift, the Soviets have to take some ports in good shape, and it is highly likely the Japanese will be able to do a fair amount of demolitions making supply difficult.

I've never seen any evidence that the Japanese judged any threat to Hokkaido and prepared the port facilities in the region for demolition. Plus, the Soviet amphibious landings in North Korea successfully took ports intact. There are a number of ports along Hokkaido's coast that were grossly underdefended in August of '45 although that could be subject to change in a TL where Japan fights on.

Yes, the trans-Siberian is mostly double track but... The Russians do not have the capacity to support their campaigns in Manchuria and Korea and simultaneously support an amphibious assault on Hokkaido. Manchuria and Korea are much more important to Stalin - they are land areas connected to the USSR that can either be occupied or a friendly regime, so they need to get priority.

Obviously. Which is why I expect any amphibious assault to only follow the securing of Manchuria and Korea. Korea will probably fall swiftly after Manchuria: Soviet troops were already on the ground there by the time the surrender came down and there's a grand total of a single Japanese division once the remains of the Kwangtung army are sealed up in the Tuanga region. There is nothing preventing to start planning ahead of time, though, as well as moving the assets which are less relevant to the ground campaign (like the amphibious assault and transport stuff) into place.

During WWII Soviet amphibious operations were short range

Yes, they were short-range. However, you need to keep in mind that short range in this context also means that so too is an assault on Hokkaido.

This is something the Soviets have not done at all during WWII, every bit of supply will need to come from a Soviet port as Hokkaido has very little they can steal to support the troops. Every truck, every bulldozer, etc has to come from Russia and unloaded at a working port

Assuming they successfully secure a port, the Soviets do have the merchant marine, both domestic and Liberty Ships recieved under LL, to do that.

Also, the Soviets have done something like this before... sorta. The Oranienbaum Bridgehead was successfully supplied entirely by sea for two-and-a-half years. And from what I recall they did it possibly without any proper port facilities on the receiving end, although I'm working off of memory there so don't quote me on it.

Sakhalin is close to Hokkaido, Vladivostok roughly 400nm air distance. Air support from Sakhalin means getting supplies to Sakhalin first.

If you ignore the Amur air bases north of Vladivostok that is about the same distance from western Hokkaido as South Sakhalin is, sure.
 
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Interesting. A ramshackle railroad and no trucks. The Soviets in 39 are not the American equipped red army of 45. Lend Lease made the advance deep into Manchuria possible, just as it did the advance on Berlin. Logistics is not a Russian strong point. Never has been.
 

gaijin

Banned
Interesting. A ramshackle railroad and no trucks. The Soviets in 39 are not the American equipped red army of 45. Lend Lease made the advance deep into Manchuria possible, just as it did the advance on Berlin. Logistics is not a Russian strong point. Never has been.

That would be news to the Wehrmacht. One of the reasons the Soviets eventually won the war was because they were able to move and concentrate forces much faster quicker than the Germans. The Soviets weren't able to do cross ocean logistical operations like the US, but studying Soviet operations in WW2 shows that the Soviets both understood the importance of and the proper handling of logistics in modern war.
 
Interesting. A ramshackle railroad and no trucks.

Describing the Trans-Siberian Railway of the 30's and 40s as a "ramshackle railroad" is the same as describing the modern American Highway System or German Autobahn as goat tracks. It bears no relation to reality. Not really sure where the "no trucks" claim is coming from either, as the Soviets in the Far East had enough trucks in both '39 and '45. In fact, to look at the former case, the number of trucks the Soviets used at Khalkin Ghol stunned the Japanese.

The Soviets in 39 are not the American equipped red army of 45.

Holy non-sequitors batman! Leaving aside the accuracy of this statement, we're talking about the Red Army of 1945 so I don't know where this is coming from.

Logistics is not a Russian strong point. Never has been.

The Soviets proved quite adept at logistics during the latter part of the Second World War, which is a function of sound planning and handling as much as it is of resources. Had that not been the case, lend-lease would have never mattered. Even before the Soviets started consistently demonstrating logistical aptitude in mid-'43 (they did alright logistically in the winter of '42/'43 at first, but then messed up at the end and overreached, leading to Manstein's backhand blow), there were instances where they demonstrated good logistical ability. Khalkin Ghol was one of them.
 
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Noted but you should read this:

^ Martin, Bernd (1969), Deutschland und Japan Im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Musterschmidt Verlag, p. 155

That would be the double crossing Stalin trying to ship Japanese supplied rubber to Hitler's Germany, taking his middleman's cut. What is interesting is how difficult it was for the Russians to move a mere 10,000 tonnes of rubber via railroad..

Another interesting source about how the Russians were utterly dependent on Lend Lease and just what America gave them in assistance comes from a source called Major Jordan's diaries.

You can find an extract here.

The Russians are not what they are cracked up to be.

You can also try

'Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945' Hubert P. van Tuyll
Greenwood ISBN 0-313-26688-3
 
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The distances involved aren’t any greater then those faced by Soviet amphibious operations in the Baltic, Black, and Arctic Seas. The Soviets can’t do operations over thousands of kilometers like the US and British can, but the few hundred from Vladivostok to the West Coast of Hokkaido is eminently possible. Similarly, the conditions they’d experience are that to Soviet amphibious operation in the Arctic in the northern parts of Finland and Norway during the autumn-winter of ‘44. Vasilevsky, whose in charge of Soviet forces in the Far East, commanded these operations and he’d likely draw upon them for experience.
*ssssssiiiiigh*
It's not the distance. It's the quality of lift, boyo, and how much of it is there for the first waves. Note: I stated they could cobble together total first wave lift of 5 divisions (roughly 50-100,000 men) That isn't the only problem. It's quality, how much of it is quick deploy, and do they have a viable doctrine.
Patently untrue. The Soviets have notable air and sea assets that, while still minuscule next to those of the Anglo-Americans, they could redeploy to enhance their capabilities. Small and mid-sized transport vessels could be brought in over the Trans-Siberian and transport aircraft flown in from elsewhere. If they need it. The Soviets already demonstrated they have the assets in the Far East to move about three divisions.
And did I not give them that? 5 divisions, I do believe.
Again, untrue. Soviet logistical capabilities after the war actually increased as they restored their civilian industry and continued to modernize their military. Lend-lease was no longer the essential centerpiece of the Soviet economy it had been in 1943.
Why did it do that? What would be different? Gee, I don't know, y'think a million+ soliders demobilizing had anything to do with that. Naaaaw.
Soviets go ”Okay” and carry on. They survived the loss of American food shipments in September 1945 OTL. Their agricultural sector has been recovering since 1944 and there’s nothing about invading Hokkaido that’d put undue stress on their recovering civilian economy.
See above. They could go okay in OTL, because they demobilized to harvest and plant, starting in Sept 1945. This situation means they wouldn't. Not as many, not as fast.
meaning, you didn't answer the question.
Mainly because the Soviets manpower problem is a non-issue in this context. Invading Hokkaido would hardly be costly enough that they’d have to suspend demobilization in Europe or even dip into the ~three million available men from the class of 1927 who came of age in 1945 but that the Soviets didn’t bother to recruit. They have enough manpower in their standing armyto do the job. The rest of your post is similarly flawed in this vein.

... No it isn't, but apparently you're not getting it. "It's not that they didn't have manpower, that they had limited amount on the scales of the jobs they had to do." Fact. You did not answer this: "What does not get done."
the Soviets took massive losses, and massive damage, in their most 'productive' areas, have an ongoing low level insurgency in the Ukraine, issues in Eastern Europe, etc, etc.
If they keep a million active, past Sept 1945, what is not getting done. Period, dot. You seem to buy into the German myth of 'unlimited bodies' No, the Soviets did not have unlimited bodies, they were at the bottom of the bodies they did have, and most (and this is key) weren't the ones they needed on both the civilian repairs, maintaining and building more farming vehicles, etc, etc. That simple. X bodies, where Y are the critical specialists they needed. They had to demobilize them. They did in OTL. In your suggestion, they won't.

So, again. what doesn't get done.

This is not counting the bodies they'd need to hold Korea, much less take it.

Anyone who's actually read the Soviet Records recognizes this: Stalin rode a pair of threes in diplomacy harder, faster, longer than a Thai Bar Girl during fleet week gets ridden.
Man was batshit insane, but he also was crazy like a fox.


The Trans-Siberian was single tracked? I’m sure that’d be news to the Soviets, who double tracked it in the 30s and added all sorts of sidings and offshoots that massively expanded its capacity.



The Soviets would be quite stunned to learn they don’t have appreciable transport capability in the Far East. I guess they’d have to wonder how they managed to move the equivalent of three divisions in successful amphibious landings against Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles without even dipping into their merchant marine assets.
Did I not say they could do 5 divisions? And note: Quality of lift, wasn't the best, and the Kurile invasions was suboptimal by review of professionals who made that their living, shall we say.
I'm not touching on the logistics to Vlad. Busan's is going to be a bit more difficult, and to other areas worse.

Same way they did OTL, when they moved large air assets there to support the Manchuria Operation. And then continued to maintain large air assets to this day.
On call naval bombardment is vastly different than on call air support. I suggest you discuss with the Isrealis exactly the difference between tube and air arty.
You'd be surprised.
Or Marines.
The Soviets (and later Russians) were able to maintain powerful forces in the Far East without lend-lease for the past 72 years. I don’t see why that would suddenly change just because they are hitting Hokkaido.

Combat != peacetime. If you can't see that, we have nothing more to discuss. And while they were fairly powerful, for peacetime, the serious levels of force you're referring to, didn't start until the 60's. Before that, the ground forces were far lower. Here's a point to consider. If what you are saying is true; Why didn't Stalin go ahead and aid the NK?


The only amphibious lift the Soviets had in the far east were a small number of amphibs they had received recently from LL. Not enough to transport the number of troops and supplies as well as vehicles needed for a Hokkaido assault. Even assuming that the US gives more amphibious lift the the Soviets in the August-November timeframe, training crews and troops takes time. If the USA is doing Olympic and planning for Coronet, the last thing they will be sending to the USSR is amphibious lift or other amphibious specific gear. While I won't rule out a November assault, it is almost ASB and they will need to wait until March/April 1946 to let the weather become acceptable. Given the deficiencies in amphibious lift, the Soviets have to take some ports in good shape, and it is highly likely the Japanese will be able to do a fair amount of demolitions making supply difficult. Yes, the trans-Siberian is mostly double track but... The Russians do not have the capacity to support their campaigns in Manchuria and Korea and simultaneously support an amphibious assault on Hokkaido. Manchuria and Korea are much more important to Stalin - they are land areas connected to the USSR that can either be occupied or a friendly regime, so they need to get priority.
Sapporo (largest city on the West Coast of Hokkaido) Lat: 43+ degrees. Climate type Dfa
Boston: Lat: 42.5 degrees
March? Are you kidding?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapporo#Geography
98 cm of snow, average in march. Look before that, too... Also, that's the average over the last 50 or so years, not before. I'd remind people (putting aside whatever reason it is for) snowfall averages over time (100+ years) have been edging down in most areas, Hokkaido is not an exception. I did say meter thick on the beaches, did I not.
That was May I saw that. (about 50 km north of Sapporo, too)

During WWII Soviet amphibious operations were short range, and in all cases were support for land campaigns much like airborne operations - they were to connect with land based campaigns. None of them, other than the "postwar" Kurile campaign were self supporting. An attack on Hokkaido will require continuous support from the Soviet mainland via the sea, any air supply will be limited. This is something the Soviets have not done at all during WWII, every bit of supply will need to come from a Soviet port as Hokkaido has very little they can steal to support the troops. Every truck, every bulldozer, etc has to come from Russia and unloaded at a working port. Sakhalin is close to Hokkaido, Vladivostok roughly 400nm air distance. Air support from Sakhalin means getting supplies to Sakhalin first.
I'm assuming that the Sovs use every possible spot, so...
Bottom line - a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido in Spring, 1946 is not ASB. Having said that, it would be very risky, require significant pre-invasion support by the USA via LL (unlikely), have the potential for a major diplomatic dust up if the Soviets try to stay. If Olympic has failed and the USA is struggling in spring 1946 to invade Japan or has gone to a starvation plan, then invading Hokkaido may make sense to snap up something but...
It's unlikely to be successful, quite. In Nov would be the better odds. March? I quote a Marine who knows the area: "Bwahahaha, that's a good way to piss away 5 divisions."
And he actually went: "75% of the work would be done by the area, not the Japanese, Drew, that's outside a few areas, hitting Maine or gods forbid, the actual Canadian Maritimes. Any officer who seriously suggested that, would be fragged by me, skip the enlisted doing it." (He's an officer too.)

People are underestimating the soviets and overestimating the Japanese. The Japanese care more for the Americans who are to the south and are constantly fighting them and bombing the area. Also most of japans industry and populace lies in the south not the north. Also the Japanese will be unable and unwilling to send anything north considering their logistic networked is ruined and bombed and they would rather send their forces south. The Japanese in the north and mainland Asia will be the bottom of the barrel without logistic support and facing a better prepared and better armed adversaries.
See above quote from a MARINE OFFICER. We're not overestimating the Japanese, we're looking coldly at land that at best starts where BOSTON is, in a very similar weather pattern.
Worse, actually, for the West Coast.
I did mention: meter thick snow on the beaches That's MARCH.
and that's not very much north of Sapporo.

How hard is that to understand?

Weather is not ideal. I suggest, for education: EXCATLY when the US and UK planned invasions for the French Coast, and think long and hard about the winds/waters and conditions of New England and Canadian Maritimes.

Contrary to popular belief, Invasions aren't easy, aren't cheap, and often boil down to how much firepower you can throw, when everything is ideal. Would Hokkaido be as defended, than Kysuhu or Honshu? Nope. No question. But there's actually less suited terrain, and the weather isn't ideal, as well. (When I backpacked across Hokkaido's coast for 30 days on a leave from the Army, I counted maybe 8 beaches that I thought could support a regimental assault, according to the Marine officer who was with me) The Japanese are quite aware of that.

Think of ANIZO's Terrain.


Interesting. *snip*

'Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945' Hubert P. van Tuyll
Greenwood ISBN 0-313-26688-3

I drew from those sources.

The Soviet Problems:
In order.
Major marshaling ports: Busan(possible), Vladstock, and that's about it. Major airbases: See there.
Weather: Again, think about Boston and north, and the sea states, and from my personal knowledge, having talked to fishermen and coasters in that region, it's often worse in that area, than better than the Open ocean.
Doctrine not ideal. This isn't saying they don't have one.
Sea and Air lift, not ideal (not non existent).
Terrain also not very ideal. A population in Nov that would be ... interesting, and even in March, still able to resist.

Limited manpower (now, to be fair, it's a question: "What isn't getting done")

Look
is an invasion possible
Yes. Either Nov or March, no question. Stalin just might order it.

Would it be successful?
Odds: Nov: 15-20%, depending on factors I'd have to look up.
March: 5%. If that.

And that's not answering the damage it would do:
How many troops would the Red army NOT demobilize.
How many of the 1927 class, they'd call up.
WHAT WERE THEY DOING? What doesn't get done?

What is the cost of it?

No one who's talking about this, and going "This is a really bad idea" disagrees the basics: 5 Division force, mostly, if not all light leaving the ports/airbases, and going for it.

We're going: "it's going to be a disaster, either immediately, or very shortly after."

So is the invasion feasible?
Yes.
Is it a good idea, does it have high success odds? Nope, nope.
Would it cost the Sovs far more than they'd ever gain? Oh, hades yes.

I point out again:
3% of the Class of 1920 survived to 1945.
Think about that.
Just think.

(Edited to remove quotebox issues)
 

gaijin

Banned
Noted but you should read this:

^ Martin, Bernd (1969), Deutschland und Japan Im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Musterschmidt Verlag, p. 155

That would be the double crossing Stalin trying to ship Japanese supplied rubber to Hitler's Germany, taking his middleman's cut. What is interesting is how difficult it was for the Russians to move a mere 10,000 tonnes of rubber via railroad..

Another interesting source about how the Russians were utterly dependent on Lend Lease and just what America gave them in assistance comes from a source called Major Jordan's diaries.

You can find an extract here.

The Russians are not what they are cracked up to be.

You can also try

'Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945' Hubert P. van Tuyll
Greenwood ISBN 0-313-26688-3

Considering how both before and after the Soviets had little to no problem transporting quantities greatly in excess of 10.000 tons over that same railroad I see two options.

There was a temporary issue at stake limiting the capacity of the Trans Siberia express.

Orrrrrrr.

There was no issue but the Soviets were unwilling to give the Germans the idea that they could help them get significant amounts of strategic materials from the Japanese.

My bet is on option two.
 
*ssssssiiiiigh*
It's not the distance. It's the quality of lift, boyo, and how much of it is there for the first waves. Note: I stated they could cobble together total first wave lift of 5 divisions (roughly 50-100,000 men) That isn't the only problem. It's quality, how much of it is quick deploy, and do they have a viable doctrine.

They do actually, given the size of Hokkaido, the paucity of it's defenses, and the poor disposition of said defenses to meet an amphibious landing from the west. The Japanese forces on Hokkaido in August 1945 consisted of two divisions and two brigades, oriented on the north and east coast. The west coast didn't have anything more then the odd defense station and village militias and hence was chock full of holes, at least at the time of surrender. Soviet doctrine preferred to land where the enemy was not, which was perfectly viable given the above. Even against the existing defenses on the eastern coast, US Marine Raiders in June were able to conduct surprise shore raids against several locations and met zero enemy resistance in the process.

The thing that could fuck the Soviets up is if the Japanese shift their dispositions IATL or reinforce in the intervening months. If the Soviets begin landing only to find the Japanese had reoriented their forces to guard the west coast and run into Japanese resistance at the waters edge, then the Soviet assault force are in for a Bad Time. Whether this would happen is dependent on how cognizant the Japanese would be to a Soviet threat to Hokkaido and the direction it would come from. This is, put bluntly, a total unknown.

Why did it do that? What would be different? Gee, I don't know, y'think a million+ soliders demobilizing had anything to do with that. Naaaaw.

That's cause it wouldn't be different. Millions+ of soldiers would still be demobilizing. Invading Hokkaido would hardly require the full 1.5 million deployed in the Far East, much less the 11+ million men that constituted the Soviet armed forces overall standing manpower at the time.

See above. They could go okay in OTL, because they demobilized to harvest and plant, starting in Sept 1945. This situation means they wouldn't. Not as many, not as fast.

No, they could. Hokkaido would hardly be any sort of strain on that.

"What does not get done."

Nothing. Because the Soviets can still afford to demobilize everything they demobbed IOTL and still have gross in excess of enough standing manpower to invade Hokkaido. The post-mobilization Red Army stabilized at around 5 million men in 1948. Taking Hokkaido would require a few hundred thousand, at the maximum.

Did I not say they could do 5 divisions? And note: Quality of lift, wasn't the best, and the Kurile invasions was suboptimal by review of professionals who made that their living, shall we say.

The Kuriles was an aberration in terms of Soviet doctrine. Soviet preference was to land where the enemy was not, which as I observed earlier wasn't possible in the Kuriles. Their operations in North Korea and Sakhalin were much more in line with Soviet doctrine and went much more smoothly.

On call naval bombardment is vastly different than on call air support.

Soviet amphibious doctrine didn't rely on naval gunfire support, as it rejected opposed assaults against enemy forces. It preferred to land where the enemy wasn't, under which conditions NGF becomes much more optional. The movement of forces from sea to land in such circumstances becomes much more of an administrative-logistical task then instead of a combat one.

Combat != peacetime. If you can't see that, we have nothing more to discuss. And while they were fairly powerful, for peacetime, the serious levels of force you're referring to, didn't start until the 60's. Before that, the ground forces were far lower.

Not really. In 1946 Soviet Far East forces were a half-million heavily mechanized forces. They'd maintain that strength throughout the Cold War.

Here's a point to consider. If what you are saying is true; Why didn't Stalin go ahead and aid the NK?

He did aid North Korea. The entire invasion was bankrolled by Stalin. The North Korean army was heavily outfitted with Soviet weapons. Soviet pilots even fought for North Korea. Throughout the Korean War, there was a half-million man fully mechanized army standing by in the far east that gave American commanders endless nightmares about what would happen if it intervened.

he actually went: "75% of the work would be done by the area, not the Japanese, Drew, that's outside a few areas, hitting Maine or gods forbid, the actual Canadian Maritimes. Any officer who seriously suggested that, would be fragged by me, skip the enlisted doing it." (He's an officer too.)

He should read up on Soviet amphibious operations in northern Finland and Norway in October of 1944. The Soviets executed five separate amphibious landings in support of the campaign there. Conditions there were far worse then found in Maine or Hokkaido and used no dedicated amphibious landing craft, instead using a mix of patrol torpedo boats, minesweepers, submarine chasers, and other small craft. All landings were executed during darkness, either at night or early-morning so as to minimize detection. All landing forces successfully occupied beachheads, captured nearby ports, and accomplished their tactical missions on land. The key behind their success was that the landing sites were carefully selected so that opposition to the landing force would be minimal to non-existant.

Noted but you should read this:

^ Martin, Bernd (1969), Deutschland und Japan Im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Musterschmidt Verlag, p. 155

That would be the double crossing Stalin trying to ship Japanese supplied rubber to Hitler's Germany, taking his middleman's cut. What is interesting is how difficult it was for the Russians to move a mere 10,000 tonnes of rubber via railroad.

Are you done with this red-herring? None of the conversation on this thread was talking about 1939 until you brought it up out of the blue. Oh, and the movement of 10,000 tonnes of rubber on the Trans-Siberian was hardly difficult for the Soviets. That only represents roughly a little over a 1/3rd of it's daily capacity at the time and the movement took place over the course of a month along with many other supplies moving both west and east along the railroads.

Another interesting source about how the Russians were utterly dependent on Lend Lease and just what America gave them in assistance comes from a source called Major Jordan's diaries.

You can find an extract here.

The Russians are not what they are cracked up to be.

You can also try

'Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941-1945' Hubert P. van Tuyll
Greenwood ISBN 0-313-26688-3

None of which remotely contradicts what I observed about the necessity of having the skill to apply resources for those resources to mean anything. You are failing to understand the argument. Again.
 
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Manman

Banned
Considering such a scenario would be only possible if the soviets did better in the east or no surrender or a delayed surrender happens, most of the forces would be moved south to stop any American invasion of mainland Japan. The Japanese by this point don't care about the north or China or Korea, they are fighting in their own home and would try anything to stop the American advance.
 
he Japanese by this point don't care about the north or China or Korea, they are fighting in their own home and would try anything to stop the American advance.

I don't know, the Japanese probably would care about Hokkaido to some degree. Did they think there was a threat to Hokkaido? Well, the fact they had forces on the island positioned to defend from an attack that would come from the north out of Sakhalin and the Kuriles suggests that they did have a degree of awareness. Were they aware fully of Soviet capabilities and their intention to possibly bypass those defenses by landing on the west coast after securing the Northeast Asia mainland? It is here that we have no real indication, that we just don't know. It may have been that the time between the Soviet entry and the OTL surrender was too short for any assessment on the Japanese part to occur, events did unfold faster then any strategic military planning in that time could have occurred. Or it may not have occurred to them too even reassess, given the military's continued fixation on fighting a "decisive battle" with an American invasion in the south. We just don't know.
 
sigh...
Small scale landings with no mechanized elements against little to no opposition immediately relieved by a land assault (like an air assault) DO NOT mean you can now scale up to a 5 division assault with some mech and all supply/reinforcement/evacuations coming by sea. Can you pack troops aboard coastal craft, gunboats etc - sure and given the distances and the seas expect them to all be puking nonstop when they get to the beach. Oh wait, none of these transports are able to carry landing craft other than ships' boats or similar so getting those troops ashore will be a real mess. Look at the results of all the USN/USMC exercises in the 30s that lead to the adoption of the Higgins boat. Saying that the Soviets will find undefended beaches to assault and that solves the problem is naive at best. The ONLY way the Soviets could hope to pull this off would be to capture a fair size port (not a fishing village) almost immediately and with little to no damage, they simply do not have the equipment, doctrine, or skills to provide for reinforcement and resupply of a multidivision invasion over an exposed beach. If the port they take does not have significant working equipment, like cranes, they have basically no way to get even trucks ashore to support them. Assuming 200 tons/day for a division, this means roughly 1,000 tons/day need to move from the beach to the front - that is a lot of trucks, even before mechanical losses, road accidents, or combat loss.

I admit I was optimistic on how early in the spring sea conditions as well as beach conditions might be "acceptable" for a landing .BTW I took the USMC amphibious warfare course and the details of such a landing are huge. Did the Soviets have trained personnel able to do beach recon - our folks would swim ashore at night, take measurements and sand samples to see what the beach could support on Pacific Islands much the same was done in the ETO as well as using known data and data from the French resistance. If you don't have this info the most inviting beach can be a disaster (see beach issues for armor at Dieppe). You need to know tidal data for each beach, and it differs from beach to beach, day of the month etc. I could go on and on - these are all areas that take doctrine, experience, and trained personnel. Just the factors I have listed were NOT all that significant in Soviet amphibious operations in WWII for various reasons (no tides in the Black Sea, "home field" knowledge for Baltic ops, relatively small force NOT self sustaining).

Even if you have the supplies and men in Busan/Vladivostok ready to go your sea lift is marginal at best. Air support is problematic, and naval gunfire (the most effective support) minimal. Your troops have minimal amphibious training at best. You are basically talking about a manpower lift of 5 divisions across very difficult seas to very bad beaches as the FIRST major amphibious assault the USSR has ever done. BTW I do not agree that supplying this force would be easy, nor do I agree you could adequately transport them and ongoing supplies to Hokkaido unless and until a major port is up and running.

Finally - the Japanese. If the war is still going on they are fighting on home islands. Troops will fight to the death, civilians may very well be involved in large numbers. Destruction of vital infrastructure WILL be planned and ready to go - there is no way the Japanese would be completely surprised by a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido. You can't hide that sort of thing, and unlike D-Day, not much chance for a deception plan.
 
sigh...
Small scale landings with no mechanized elements against little to no opposition immediately relieved by a land assault (like an air assault) DO NOT mean you can now scale up to a 5 division assault with some mech and all supply/reinforcement/evacuations coming by sea.

I actually expect it more to be three divisions then five, with six more coming in once a significant port is secure. Five strikes me as an overestimate of Soviet sealift capability. And given Japanese defenses as they were in August 1945, there would indeed be little to no opposition. Assuming the Japanese don't redeploy or reinforce, of course.

Also, again: the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The Soviets supplied and reinforced a field army of 3 divisions and 3 brigades, plus artillery support units, 2 self-propelled anti-tank battalions, and even a tank regiment, for two-and-a-half years through what, best I can tell, nothing more then a fishing wharf. They even then reinforced that near the end of 1943 with the 2nd Shock Army, which amounts to five divisions, 600 artillery pieces, a tank brigade, another tank regiment, another two SPG regiments, and all the supplies and ammunition needed to launch an offensive out of the bridgehead and hook up with Soviet forces inland.

Saying that the Soviets will find undefended beaches to assault and that solves the problem is naive at best.

No. It's actually quite probable. Japanese defenses on the west coast were that paltry.

The ONLY way the Soviets could hope to pull this off would be to capture a fair size port (not a fishing village) almost immediately and with little to no damage,

Also quite probable. There were a number of those. There's a reason the Soviets initially focused on Rumoi, for example, in their early planning. Normandy in 1944, Kyushu in '45, or even southern Britain in '40 this is not.

- there is no way the Japanese would be completely surprised by a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.

Well, the Japanese OTL were completely surprised by the historical Soviet multi-divisional amphibious landings, despite the fact that some of these landing forces sailed right past known Japanese garrisons. Given that record, I can confidently predict that even if the Japanese anticipate a landing (something for which there is no evidence either way, so pure speculation), the first they'll find out about it is when the first Soviet landings begin.
 
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Manman

Banned
What people don't understand is that Japan is finished as a fighting force. The Japanese forces in mainland Asia would have been massacred by the soviet war machine which didn't really need to go to its reserves to take them out. The forces in Japan would also be killed off as constant bombing both conventional and nuclear took out japans forces leaving them with no way to retreat or get reinforcement other than militia armed with spears and bombs. By the time the soviets land in the north most of Japans forces would be dead, scattered, and willing to surrender or die in a mass suicide attack.
 
What people don't understand is that Japan is finished as a fighting force. The Japanese forces in mainland Asia would have been massacred by the soviet war machine which didn't really need to go to its reserves to take them out. The forces in Japan would also be killed off as constant bombing both conventional and nuclear took out japans forces leaving them with no way to retreat or get reinforcement other than militia armed with spears and bombs. By the time the soviets land in the north most of Japans forces would be dead, scattered, and willing to surrender or die in a mass suicide attack.

That's... optimistic. While famine was oncoming and in particular the imminent execution of the American plan to bomb Japan's rail lines would have paralyzed the country*, rendering large-scale movement impossible, there's no guarantee that these would collapse the fighting capacity of the Japanese army. I mean, it's certainly possible. But even a starving man can pull a trigger.

*One question that's been rattling around in my head is if that plan would have extended to the rail net in Hokkaido. If so, that could compromise Japan's ability to reinforce and/or redeploy in anticipation and/or response to a Soviet attack.
 
IMHO I doiubt the US would waste much effort on trying to trash rail lines on Hokkaido. If the US is involved in Olympic and the prep for Coronet, tactical aircraft are going to busy further south, and Hokkaido is a haul for B-29s out of the Marianas and B-29s really not the best tool for busting rail lines.
 
B-29s really not the best tool for busting rail lines.

Well, the '29s and other aircraft wouldn't necessarily have been focusing on the whole of the lines per-say. Attacking open track is both extremely difficult and only of transitory effect. The plan instead was to blow the network of rail tunnels and bridges that were practically mandatory for Japan's rail network given the terrain of the Home Islands, as to repair those required heavy industry that by this point was in a state of total collapse within Japan. Now as you noted it would be quite a haul for any USAAC aircraft from any conceivable base but the plan was coordinated with the Navy so if Hokkaido's net was among the target package then the task would likely fall to them and their carrier aircraft.
 
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Obsessed?
Let me spell this out one more time. (Putting aside your fantasies about actual soviet manpower, and how 'few' this would take, it's clear you haven't read all the records, and all the details.)
Full disclosure : USA, Retired, Lt. Col, have graduated Long Course, and War College.
1: I even flat out stated they could invade. You keep missing that. However, as well, you seem to miss: Invasion != successful invasion.
What I have been saying: There is a high chance, in Nov (at least 80%) of failure, and in March, virtually assured. I also have been stating: That it would cost the Soviets far more than they'd ever gain, thanks to the lessened manpower.

Why?
1: Soviet full on seaborne assault doctrine and assault capability was not anywhere near the USMC, or even the UK's, as you point out yourself: "Land where the other guy isn't." That is HIGHLY optimistic.
And not bloody likely in this case.
2: Weather: Again, what part of this are you missing. I pointed out I've been there, in both months.
3: Terrain. Sure, you can have a kilometer wide beach, (as there are at least a dozen of on Hokkaido) but if you're looking at 50+ meter cliffs and no way to get vehicles up... There is a reason why the Marine officer who backpacked with me lo, 25 years ago now, said there's only 8 beaches on the west and north sides fit for assault.
4: You have a very hostile civilian population who've been repeatedly told, taking one invader is glory and worth your life. Even with starvation, et al...

For the Nov assault, the beaches around Sapporo (contrary to your implications, there's actually NOT a lot of good ports on Hokkaido, or even passable to supply more than very small forces. You need Sapporo, period, dot.) will be either not defended or defended lightly, so you have a shot, 'spc if you drop troops behind the beaches. But all things considered... iffy, very iffy, and I'll agree that at this point, 3 divisions of 10,000 combat troops is likely the max sea/airlift you can do, and very few 'heavy' weapons or equipment. But, taking them at a run, might work. So, call it 20% of a successful invasion.

March? I stated, flat out, that a beach (and it's one of the ones that my Marine bro marked as 'needed' for an assault to capture Sapporo) has a meter. METER, 3 feet, half a human in Height, of snow on it. There are places in Hokkaido with nearly 7 meter high snow piles. This isn't a joke. ONLY reason I gave the invasion a 5% chance of success, is simply because enough starvation might have broken the will of the people. MIGHT. Beyond that? Not a chance in hell of success.

What I'm getting the impression is, you're discounting the real serious issues, that we keep pointing out, and you're ignoring them. Soviet Doctrine wouldn't work. How hard is that to understand? "Oh, land where the other guy isn't." "Why isn't he here? Oh... we have to climb up that 20 meter cliff..." etc, etc. This is NOT easy terrain, this is something that the Americans already KNEW would suck and suck badly. And Kyushu was much easier from a terrain and weather view than Hokkaido would ever be.

While Japanese military capability was smashed, I suggest anyone who thinks Hokkaido would be just land, and take stuff, study Iwo Jima or the Ryukyus.


No one is arguing that the Soviets do not have the lift. Don't have the drive.

We're going: "They don't have the capability to make it successful"
 
2: Weather: Again, what part of this are you missing. I pointed out I've been there, in both months.
3: Terrain. Sure, you can have a kilometer wide beach, (as there are at least a dozen of on Hokkaido) but if you're looking at 50+ meter cliffs and no way to get vehicles up... There is a reason why the Marine officer who backpacked with me lo, 25 years ago now, said there's only 8 beaches on the west and north sides fit for assault.
4: You have a very hostile civilian population who've been repeatedly told, taking one invader is glory and worth your life. Even with starvation, et al...

And, there were very few Japanese troops in Hokkaido with much less capability than during the Cold War. You have to also take into account that Soviets succesfully fought a campaign in Kola Peninsula and northernmost Norway against Germans, ie. in more hostile environment and much more capable enemy. Soviet logistic requirements were also much lower than those of German or US militaries (which naturally lowered Soviet effectiveness in long term). Soviets also had ample amounts of air transports in 1944 within distance which should be taken into account for issues of supply.

With uncertainties due to civilian population etc. I would agree. But with Soviet determination to fight in unhospitable surroundings I would not, witness the Winter War or the campaign against Finns and Germans 1941-1944 north of Lake Ladoga.
 
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