How feasible is a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan?

Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan feasible

  • Yes

    Votes: 62 52.5%
  • No

    Votes: 40 33.9%
  • Unsure

    Votes: 16 13.6%

  • Total voters
    118

nbcman

Donor
Three point shot.





Much more at the link. Refutation in effect.

An ad hominem is an attack the man, not the man's argument. (Point raised to derail from the actual point which was that ON was wrong about evolving US policy in 1945. Claiming that someone does not know the history as it was is not proving that the counter-claim is valid.

On the contrary, it seems the data does not support ON in his "point". Of course this is not a debate. It is a correction of errors, assertionsz and wrong impressions trotted out as "facts".

My opinions can be wrong, but the historical record is not my opinion. The American people were not thrilled by Korea. Yet they went to war. If they wouldn't in 45, why would they in 1950? 2 years or 5 years or 4 days. It does not matter. A nation goes to war when its leadership decides. Truman decided when the politics was worse in 50 than in 45. QED.

Your 'Three point shot' text is not hyperlinked. I believe you took the two quotes from this Truman Library web page:

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/BERLIN_A/BOC.HTM
 

And a miss!

Much more at the link. Refutation in effect.

I'm still not seeing anything that says that Truman would violently oppose a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido while the US is at war with Japan, which is what you are claiming. I'm not sure why it is so difficult for you to grasp that "Potsdam began a change in US policy towards the Soviet Union in mid-1945" is not the same thing as "the US is willing to fight the Soviets in response to invading Hokkaido while the US is still at war with Japan in mid-1945". Hell, I even did a quick search: the word Japan doesn't even appear.

An ad hominem is an attack the man, not the man's argument. (Point raised to derail from the actual point which was that ON was wrong about evolving US policy in 1945. Claiming that someone does not know the history as it was is not proving that the counter-claim is valid.

So you admit raising the ad hominem stuff was you trying out a red herring then? I don't know what to make of someone being honest about dishonest debating practices.

On the contrary, it seems the data does not support ON in his "point". Of course this is not a debate. It is a correction of errors, assertionsz and wrong impressions trotted out as "facts".

What data? Nothing you've provided supports the claim the US in 1945 would fight the USSR over the USSR invading Japan.

My opinions can be wrong, but the historical record is not my opinion.

That is true. Unfortunately, you are flatly ignoring those parts of the historical record that contradict the neat and extraordinarily simplistic little narrative you are clinging too. The development of containment was a much more prolonged and complex program that did not suddenly spring into being in mid-'45 and there is absolutely zero evidence that Truman would go so far to fight the Soviets had they invaded one of the Japanese Home Islands pre-surrender. Indeed, the actual evidence in terms of actions taken and words spoken (or written) rather suggests the opposite: landing craft sent to the Soviets, amphibious assault training provided, carrier air strikes with the explicit intention of aiding future Soviet actions, and an explicit expression of great relief at news the USSR was coming into the war. Against this weight of evidence the most you can muster up is "US policy towards the Soviet Union was starting to change in mid-1945!". Well yeah. Unfortunately, there's a big fucking leap between "starting to change the policy towards" and "willing to go to war with".

If they wouldn't in 45, why would they in 1950?

Gee, maybe because a situation in which they had spent 5 years steadily coming to perceive the Soviet Union as an enemy and then one of the Soviets client states is not at all the same as a situation when they perceive the Soviet Union as an ally coming in to help them fight a hated enemy which has been killing Americans for the last four years. :pensive:

The American people were not thrilled by Korea.

Actually they were at first. After the previous five years of increasing anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda, fueled by both real and perceived Soviet slights, steadily changing their opinion*, the US public supported Truman's initial decision to fight in Korea enthusiastically. It was only later, following Chinese intervention, when the fighting bogged down. Fact is, the American people were already primed to fight the Korean War before it started. Such was not the case five year earlier against the Soviet Union. Maybe you don't grasp that five years is actually quite a bit of time and a lot can change in that, so let me try to help you: if some random stranger in 2011 walked up to you and told you that Donald Trump would be elected President of the United States, what would you have thought then?

*The big breaking point seems to have been the Berlin Blockade.


A nation goes to war when its leadership decides.

Which is why the US entered World War 2 right in 1940 when France fell, I suppose? Or why George W Bush was able to move straight to invading Iraq at the start of 2002 instead of taking a year marshalling public support and making his case for the invasion of Iraq? In reality, a democratic state first has to spend considerable amount of time convincing it's people to go to war before it can, indeed, go to war. And while even in democracies the leadership can eventually bring the people around to it's way view, the key word there is eventually.
 
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iVC

Donor
"the US is willing to fight the Soviets in response to invading Hokkaido while the US is still at war with Japan

In the case of the Soviet landing in Hokkaido, Truman could probably admit to himself that after the victory over Japan it will be necessary to tackle the Soviets out from the Japanese islands. He could even notify his generals and those involved in military planning to prepare for the next years.

But surely Truman would not order to immediately attack the Soviet forces, who, 'in fulfillment of their allied duty', are helping to finish off Japan. Not even the next year. I think that Truman understood very well that at first he needed to end the war in the Pacific. And only then he can prepare for delivering demands and conditions to the Soviet Union.

1986.004.504.jpg


And Truman still needs to convince all of his advisers and supporters that this poster is no longer relevant.
 
In the case of the Soviet landing in Hokkaido, Truman could probably admit to himself that after the victory over Japan it will be necessary to tackle the Soviets out from the Japanese islands. He could even notify his generals and those involved in military planning to prepare for the next years.

But surely Truman would not order to immediately attack the Soviet forces, who, 'in fulfillment of their allied duty', are helping to finish off Japan. Not even the next year. I think that Truman understood very well that at first he needed to end the war in the Pacific. And only then he can prepare for delivering demands and conditions to the Soviet Union.

I can see it, yes. If nothing else, using US naval supremacy to blockade a Soviet occupied Hokkaido would make for a very nice response to the Berlin Blockade.
 
1. A hit.
2. The Russian moves in the Kuriles were after the war, but not of sufficient magnitude to violate the Yalta agreements. They were going to get those islands anyway as a post war settlement the Americans imposed.
3. YOU raised the ad hominem. See above where you were quoted. STAY on point and do not stray from the topic.
4. I'll let others judge the data. Your opinion is already known and rejected.
5. Contradict the historical record? Containment took 3 months and was already defacto policy a full year before the Berlin Airlift. (Wedemeyer China).
6. Assumption about Public opinion refuted. Korea came as a shock to the American people. They were not prepared for it at all.
7. Roosevelt was running a propaganda campaign. Still could not budge them until Pearl Harbor, which kind of proves my point about Korea, doesn't it?
8. Iraq was born of Vietnam and is in this context a RED HERRING.
 
In the case of the Soviet landing in Hokkaido, Truman could probably admit to himself that after the victory over Japan it will be necessary to tackle the Soviets out from the Japanese islands. He could even notify his generals and those involved in military planning to prepare for the next years.

But surely Truman would not order to immediately attack the Soviet forces, who, 'in fulfillment of their allied duty', are helping to finish off Japan. Not even the next year. I think that Truman understood very well that at first he needed to end the war in the Pacific. And only then he can prepare for delivering demands and conditions to the Soviet Union.

1986.004.504.jpg


And Truman still needs to convince all of his advisers and supporters that this poster is no longer relevant.

Hence George Kennan's anonymous article explaining the already in place active US policy shifts in Europe the Middle East and Asia.
 

iVC

Donor
I can see it, yes.

I think it's obvious that in 1945-1946 none of the European nations (including non-European United States) posessed the willingness to fight anymore, even for the sake of honor, money or love. They DO NOT WANTED. They were FED UP ENOUGH. Victory was at hand, Hitler bite the dust already, Hirohito was the next one -- and then, finally there would be peace. Stalin, Attlee or Truman would have to carry soldiers manually on the front lines and poke them with stick if they announced to their troops that since now, for some reason, these troops should fight against yesterday's official ally.

Three or four years were enough to reinvigorate both the WAllies and the Soviets, but at least they had these three years of peace.
 

Manman

Banned
Russia would probably be able to take over most of the north considering the US will be to busy dealing with the main Japanese force and that at a certain point the Japanese might welcome them in if they say they bring food and security to the area which is probably field with refuges, imperial army which is mostly feeding itself, and bandits. Also the area will be easier to hold with a larger amount of the area not hit as hard by the americans and not as populated as the south.
 
2. The Russian moves in the Kuriles were after the war, but not of sufficient magnitude to violate the Yalta agreements. They were going to get those islands anyway as a post war settlement the Americans imposed.

I don't know where, at any point, the Kuriles entered into this conversation so I'll just happily note that this is a red-herring. I'll note that there was no agreement made at any point that forbid the Soviet Union from invading Hokkaido.

3. YOU raised the ad hominem. See above where you were quoted. STAY on point and do not stray from the topic.

You didn't quote me on anything (there might be some kinda coding issue here? Apparently your quoting me at parts and I'm not seeing the quotes?) and at no point did I make an ad-hominem. For me to have made an ad-hominem would have required me to go something like "your argument is bad because you suck". The closest you can get to this is where I go something like "your argument is bad, here is the evidence. Oh, and by the way you suck." That's insulting, but it's not a red herring.

4. I'll let others judge the data. Your opinion is already known and rejected.

Only by you. To judge by the records at the bottom, the others disagree.

5. Contradict the historical record? Containment took 3 months and was already defacto policy a full year before the Berlin Airlift. (Wedemeyer China).

Containment was something that steadily evolved over the course of four years from 1945 to 1949, when it was finally officially declared public policy. It certainly was not yet policy in mid-1945. It did not spring into being in the course of three months.

6. Assumption about Public opinion refuted. Korea came as a shock to the American people. They were not prepared for it at all.

You claim a refutation when you provide nothing to refute it with. How interesting and how typical. It is not relevant whether the American people were shocked by Korea, only if they opposed it or not. And the historical record bears it out that they did not. I, in quite contrast to you, can happily point to a source supporting this assertion. I'll even drag out my copy and provide the multiple paragraphs and page number if you like.

7. Roosevelt was running a propaganda campaign. Still could not budge them until Pearl Harbor, which kind of proves my point about Korea, doesn't it?

Actually it does the opposite: Roosevelt needed a clear casus belli to get the US public to agree to go to war and that was even after the US public was steadily souring on the Germans from the aforementioned propaganda campaign (so they were budging after all). Similarly, with Korea Truman had a clear casus belli: the North Koreans unprovokedly attacked the South Koreans whom the US already had established a commitment to defend. What's the casus belli here? That the Soviet Union, in the process of prosecuting a war it had joined in with the full agreement and support of the United States, was invading people with whom the United States was at war with? What the fuck kinda casus belli is that?

8. Iraq was born of Vietnam and is in this context a RED HERRING.

Nope. It's a example, although I'm growing increasingly unsurprised at your inability to grasp it and it's significance. It demonstrates that Democratic states still need to convince their populace in order to go to war and if they can't do that, then the war ain't happening.

Hence George Kennan's anonymous article explaining the already in place active US policy shifts in Europe the Middle East and Asia.

And now you don't even understand what Kennan was trying to do with his long telegram. He wasn't making an explanation, he was making a proposal. Do you even know the difference?
 
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Two years? Potsdam actually set the tone of strained relations. If Uncle Joe has already angered the western allies about Poland, going out of bounds of the Yalta accords in the Pacific means war defacto. (Korea is the defacto case. Why do you think that happened?)

And at Yalta Stalin promised to respect the sovereignty of Korea, just like he promised to install democratic governments in many future Eastern-bloc states. Did we go to war with him then when he broke those promises? It was only postwar, when the threat of Axis aggression was dead, buried and replaced by the new bi-polar ideological dynamic, did the United States ever take direct action against a Communist state and even then only in response to overt military aggression against its allies or itself. Neither side had any interest whatsoever in backstabbing the other during the World War era, especially when there was still a common enemy to finish.

Furthermore, the provisions of the Yalta Conference never established a clear US-Soviet line of demarcation in Asia, only places that would be returned to the USSR or various economic benefits the Soviets would receive such as oversight of the South Manchurian railroad. Legally a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, or even an attempt at one, would have crossed no boundaries established in that accord.

Lastly, it must be reiterated that almost from the day of Pearl Harbor the Americans begged Stalin to intervene and open up another front against Japan. At Yalta and Potsdam the Soviets repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to do so on behalf of their Allies, including the United States, and that this would be realized within three months of Germany's defeat. The planners for Operation Downfall, including and especially General MacArthur, regarded it as essential for the success of the invasion that the Red Army commence operations in China to prevent any more Japanese troops from reinforcing the Home Islands. This was approved by both the JWPC and President Truman.

The Americans, while loathe to accept any foreign support at all during the actual invasion itself, were ultimately forced to do so in the form of the British Commonwealth Corps when it became apparent that the defenses of Japan were vastly stronger than initially expected. Although both MacArthur and Truman balked postwar at the prospect of a Soviet landing in Hokkaido or a joint administration of the Home Islands (when it was no longer a military necessity), the evisceration of the Sixth Army on and around Kyushu might have changed their tune. Certainly in the face of massive losses during a landing on the Japanese mainland the Americans would never have started another war over a Red landing on what might as well have been the far side of the moon, even if they had not consented to it. Such a move would have been irrational in the extreme (duh) and would have ranked as one of the greatest blunders of all time, right up there with Hitler's declaration of war on the US post-Barbarossa. Only in this case, Truman would be fighting his own ally, that he himself previously made concessions to in order to bring into the fight!
 

iVC

Donor
George Kennan's anonymous article
Kennan's note was just a proposal to be approved. It needed approval first. If the war in the Pacific is still ongoing in 1946 and Japan is still alive and kicking, then the note would have been put on hold for the time being. First finish off Japan (and soviet help would be much appreciated). Post-war arm-wrestling can be shifted to, you know, post-war world.
 

Manman

Banned
The americans have no reason to want the soviets out at this time. They are an ally that is helping them defeat the Japanese and is bringing forces that would help take over the island leaving the americans with more troops to use elsewhere. Also even post war America will not be able to do much with soviet forces in the island. They now have to take care off a massive amount of people that lack food, water, and basic shelter. They have to get soviet help unless they want to occupy the island for the next two decades.

Also the soviets will not have to worry about the whole resistance movement in their bit of japan compered to eastern Europe. The Japanese don't see the americans as better considering what they did and would see themselves as better of with out having to provide to the people of southern japan. They have more to lose if they go at it alone, and they simply lack the weapons and the will to fight on.
 
IMHO the Soviets can invade Hokkaido in the spring of 1946 - after the weather gets "decent" and they take the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin, Manchuria, and most/all of Korea. In order to do this successfully they will need significant Lend-Lease aid, as the Soviet Pacific Fleet was completely inadequate to provide amphibious lift and gunfire support. Any air support would have to come from land based air. I don't see the Soviets invading any of the main Japanese islands before they have the Kuriles, Manchuria, Sakhalin, and Korea (or most of it) in their pockets. I don't see any way they can accomplish that before the really nasty weather sets in. Furthermore there is no way Stalin is going to invade before Olympic or even Coronet. If he waits until Olympic, then weather and sea conditions for Hokkaido have become untenable.

By spring 1946 the actions of the USSR in the occupied portions of Europe are already violating any and all of the Yalta agreements left right and center. It was in March 1946 that Churchill delivered his famous "iron curtain" speech. It is entirely possible that between starting Olympic and spring, 1946 when the USSR might reasonably attempt Hokkaido, relations between the western allies and the USA specifically and the USSR may very well be bad enough that the USA neither sends the USSR what in needs to attack Hokkaido nor gives them a green light to do so. Even if the USSR lands on Hokkaido, if the USA subsequently says "thanks, now leave" Stalin really has no way to prevent the USA making good the implied "or else".
 
By spring 1946 the actions of the USSR in the occupied portions of Europe are already violating any and all of the Yalta agreements left right and center. It was in March 1946 that Churchill delivered his famous "iron curtain" speech. It is entirely possible that between starting Olympic and spring, 1946 when the USSR might reasonably attempt Hokkaido, relations between the western allies and the USA specifically and the USSR may very well be bad enough that the USA neither sends the USSR what in needs to attack Hokkaido nor gives them a green light to do so. Even if the USSR lands on Hokkaido, if the USA subsequently says "thanks, now leave" Stalin really has no way to prevent the USA making good the implied "or else".

I flatly disagree. Even if a hypothetical Soviet landing was successful (and I maintain there was a significant chance of debacle or outright failure) US military action against the USSR must be regarded as impossible for reasons mentioned above. There was no way America or its allies was going to raise a finger against Soviet Russia as long as Japan remained a factor. Additionally, presuming the Downfall campaign is prosecuted to its completion, the US having incurred enormous losses would have made the public very wary of the possibility of wading into another conflict, especially one against an erstwhile ally. American willingness to resort to the military option for the rest of the Cold War, in fact, would almost certainly be greatly reduced, and we might not have seen an equivalent to Korea or Vietnam anywhere.
 
@BobTheBarbarian The USA does not have to go to war with the USSR to "evict" them from Hokkaido, if the Russians should manage to land there (and I agree it would be a huge stretch). Stalin knows that he cannot have a war with the USA which would threaten his gains in Europe, and the USA could wipe the floor with the USSR in the Pacific. The Soviet Union was scraping the bottom of the barrel for manpower in 1945, and when LL stopped they were in the hurt locker for food and their agricultural and industrial capacities were going to take years to rebuild.
 
Kennan's note was just a proposal to be approved. It needed approval first. If the war in the Pacific is still ongoing in 1946 and Japan is still alive and kicking, then the note would have been put on hold for the time being. First finish off Japan (and soviet help would be much appreciated). Post-war arm-wrestling can be shifted to, you know, post-war world.

Incorrect.

You are confused.

The note was 1946.

The article was 1947.
 
And at Yalta Stalin promised to respect the sovereignty of Korea, just like he promised to install democratic governments in many future Eastern-bloc states. Did we go to war with him then when he broke those promises? It was only postwar, when the threat of Axis aggression was dead, buried and replaced by the new bi-polar ideological dynamic, did the United States ever take direct action against a Communist state and even then only in response to overt military aggression against its allies or itself. Neither side had any interest whatsoever in backstabbing the other during the World War era, especially when there was still a common enemy to finish.

[Laughter.] Stalin's promises were lies. Proxy wars in Greece, Korea, fighting in ME, IRAN, etc. 1946-1950 Plenty of wars while Stalin lived.

Furthermore, the provisions of the Yalta Conference never established a clear US-Soviet line of demarcation in Asia, only places that would be returned to the USSR or various economic benefits the Soviets would receive such as oversight of the South Manchurian railroad. Legally a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, or even an attempt at one, would have crossed no boundaries established in that accord.

38th Parallel Korea.

Lastly, it must be reiterated that almost from the day of Pearl Harbor the Americans begged Stalin to intervene and open up another front against Japan. At Yalta and Potsdam the Soviets repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to do so on behalf of their Allies, including the United States, and that this would be realized within three months of Germany's defeat. The planners for Operation Downfall, including and especially General MacArthur, regarded it as essential for the success of the invasion that the Red Army commence operations in China to prevent any more Japanese troops from reinforcing the Home Islands. This was approved by both the JWPC and President Truman.

Ahem

1. Truman did not know what FDR and Stalin cooked up at Yalta. Like the bomb he was not briefed. After the Turkey Shoot the desire was for a Russian army to bemuse the Japanese in Manchuria, and after Okinawa, even that was seen as unnecessary as the US had three ways to end the war without Russian (or British) help. Submarine blockade, aerial bombardment or amphibious assault.; All three horrendous, but certain by March *46 at the latest. The only calculation was in the total numbers of Japanese and American dead. It was likely MacArthur would get Olympic and not need Coronet, if Lemay's city-killing was not enough. But in any event 5-10 million civilian deaths would have been the result.

The Americans, while loathe to accept any foreign support at all during the actual invasion itself, were ultimately forced to do so in the form of the British Commonwealth Corps when it became apparent that the defenses of Japan were vastly stronger than initially expected. Although both MacArthur and Truman balked postwar at the prospect of a Soviet landing in Hokkaido or a joint administration of the Home Islands (when it was no longer a military necessity), the evisceration of the Sixth Army on and around Kyushu might have changed their tune. Certainly in the face of massive losses during a landing on the Japanese mainland the Americans would never have started another war over a Red landing on what might as well have been the far side of the moon, even if they had not consented to it. Such a move would have been irrational in the extreme (duh) and would have ranked as one of the greatest blunders of all time, right up there with Hitler's declaration of war on the US post-Barbarossa. Only in this case, Truman would be fighting his own ally, that he himself previously made concessions to in order to bring into the fight!

Nonsense.
 

iVC

Donor
[Laughter.] Stalin's promises were lies. Proxy wars in Greece, Korea, fighting in ME, IRAN, etc. 1946-1950 Plenty of wars while Stalin lived.

Odd enough, @McPherson . You've been told that 'Neither side could afford a war against former ally if there still are common enemies alive.'

You're ignoring this statement and continue to declare that Stalin was treacherous. Yes, he was. But any showdown between US and USSR was still not possible until Japan became finished, occupied and buried.

Could USA wish the war with Soviets and Japan simultaneously? No, even if Japanese were in their dying breath.
Could USSR wish the war with Reich and WAllies simultaneously? No, even if Germans were in their dying breath.
 
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