How feasible is a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan?

Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan feasible

  • Yes

    Votes: 62 52.5%
  • No

    Votes: 40 33.9%
  • Unsure

    Votes: 16 13.6%

  • Total voters
    118
So in a typical scenario regarding Operation Downfall, the atomic bomb is either not invented or is not ready in time to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, the Allies (the US, the UK and it's Commonwealth and France) launch a land invasion of Japan.

One element that's always been debated about Operation Downfall is the Soviets. It is always hypothesized that after the Soviets were finished conquering China and the Korean Peninsula, their next target would be the island of Hokkaido, the northernmost island in the Japanese archipelago, from which they would work their way down and race the Western Allies to Tokyo, similar to how in Europe, they had a race to Berlin.

But, here's my question. Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan even feasible? From what I have heard, the Soviets had a substantially weak navy and would've been unable to pull off the invasion, but some alternate historians have suggested otherwise.
 
Answer is: Maybe.
What you need:
1. Staging areas. Sovs would have had Sakhalin, and Korea to stage from, though Pusan(Busan) is better suited for South Honshu.
2. Lift capability with the range. THAT would be... interesting. As I pointed out Busan is better suited to hit South Honshu, not Hokkaido, and Vladastock and Sakhalin is ... more complex. Figure they could cobble together maybe a division of sealift in first wave from each staging area, and poor lift quality at that. (the ramp et al landing craft would not be in great numbers). Now, airborne assaults, are more possible, but that'd be an issue in itself.

3. Control of the Sea and Air. Yep. that they had.
4: Weather: This is NOVEMBER. Hokkaido is much closer to New ENGLAND in weather, than it is to what we think. Maybe even the Canadian Maritimes. Not fun.
5: Manpower. This is a question that I don't think a lot of alt historians are considering. The Sovs by this point, with the need to garrison Manchuria, and Korea, plus the losses they'd take in taking Korea (much worse terrain) were already scraping some barrels, this would scrape them harder.
6: Doctrine practiced: This the Sovs were weak on at the time. They had ideas, but while, oh, say ahead of the Germans in 1940, they were still far behind the UK, much less the US.

To be honest, I could see the Soviets attempting an invasion. Assuming they crushed the Manchukuo and Korean forces in 3 months (I'm not sure that's possible, once they hit the Yalu, but for the sake of discussion, let's say so) at the same time, staging everything they had for a joint land/air invasion of Hokkaido. Even though, considering all factors, it's actually the worst place for them to invade. Southern Honshu from Korea is about 45-50 km, much faster, much easier, faster turnaround. Downside, is that the Japanese had more preparing (not much) as well as people there.

I think the invasion would fail, since to their credit, the Japanese did figure out the key to stopping an invasion. And the Soviets would be in perfect position to have it shown to them. I don't see more than a 2 division airborne assault, with at most, 3 divisions landing, and this would be mostly infantry, very little armor, very little offshore gunnery, distance from airfields and concept of on call air support still somewhat weak (though the Sovs were far better than the US Army, admittedly, but not up to the level of the Marines, for example), weak NCO leadership...

This is of course, assuming they have moved what sea and air lift they DO have, and have crushed all resistance in Korea. Either not present, and they do a throw and hope? it would fail.
 

Japhy

Banned
Looking over the naval assets that were sent over during Project Hula for just this purpose, and considering the deployment of Japanese forces, I don't see how they fail to make at least some landings in Northern Japan.

Sure the Japanese know how to fight landings but there just weren't the troops in Hokkaido to stop a landing.
 
So in a typical scenario regarding Operation Downfall, the atomic bomb is either not invented or is not ready in time to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, the Allies (the US, the UK and it's Commonwealth and France) launch a land invasion of Japan.

One element that's always been debated about Operation Downfall is the Soviets. It is always hypothesized that after the Soviets were finished conquering China and the Korean Peninsula, their next target would be the island of Hokkaido, the northernmost island in the Japanese archipelago, from which they would work their way down and race the Western Allies to Tokyo, similar to how in Europe, they had a race to Berlin.

But, here's my question. Was a Soviet invasion of Northern Japan even feasible? From what I have heard, the Soviets had a substantially weak navy and would've been unable to pull off the invasion, but some alternate historians have suggested otherwise.

It is possible. But judging by the mess the Russians made of their opportunistic Kuriles operations and Truman's temperament, the question really is, can they stay without being massacred? Probably not. It would not be smart to ruffle the eagle's tail feathers in the Middle of Downfall.
 
Answer is: Maybe.
What you need:
1. Staging areas. Sovs would have had Sakhalin, and Korea to stage from, though Pusan(Busan) is better suited for South Honshu.
2. Lift capability with the range. THAT would be... interesting. As I pointed out Busan is better suited to hit South Honshu, not Hokkaido, and Vladastock and Sakhalin is ... more complex. Figure they could cobble together maybe a division of sealift in first wave from each staging area, and poor lift quality at that. (the ramp et al landing craft would not be in great numbers). Now, airborne assaults, are more possible, but that'd be an issue in itself.

3. Control of the Sea and Air. Yep. that they had.
4: Weather: This is NOVEMBER. Hokkaido is much closer to New ENGLAND in weather, than it is to what we think. Maybe even the Canadian Maritimes. Not fun.
5: Manpower. This is a question that I don't think a lot of alt historians are considering. The Sovs by this point, with the need to garrison Manchuria, and Korea, plus the losses they'd take in taking Korea (much worse terrain) were already scraping some barrels, this would scrape them harder.
6: Doctrine practiced: This the Sovs were weak on at the time. They had ideas, but while, oh, say ahead of the Germans in 1940, they were still far behind the UK, much less the US.

To be honest, I could see the Soviets attempting an invasion. Assuming they crushed the Manchukuo and Korean forces in 3 months (I'm not sure that's possible, once they hit the Yalu, but for the sake of discussion, let's say so) at the same time, staging everything they had for a joint land/air invasion of Hokkaido. Even though, considering all factors, it's actually the worst place for them to invade. Southern Honshu from Korea is about 45-50 km, much faster, much easier, faster turnaround. Downside, is that the Japanese had more preparing (not much) as well as people there.

I think the invasion would fail, since to their credit, the Japanese did figure out the key to stopping an invasion. And the Soviets would be in perfect position to have it shown to them. I don't see more than a 2 division airborne assault, with at most, 3 divisions landing, and this would be mostly infantry, very little armor, very little offshore gunnery, distance from airfields and concept of on call air support still somewhat weak (though the Sovs were far better than the US Army, admittedly, but not up to the level of the Marines, for example), weak NCO leadership...

This is of course, assuming they have moved what sea and air lift they DO have, and have crushed all resistance in Korea. Either not present, and they do a throw and hope? it would fail.

Typhoon Season... Yeah, they hit that far north.

Trying for Honshu brings them into direct collision with US forces. That has interesting implications. Maybe Austria Czech deconfliction is possible, as in Europe, (Eisenhower the Diplomat) but with navies and air forces fighting (MacArthur?) Not a good plan, there, Joe.

Hokkaido is not a good place to fight the kind of infantry brawl the Japanese excel at, either. Hokkaido will be interesting.
 
If the war continues, the Soviets are liable to make an attempt at Hokkaido. Success of a landing is... possible, but not guaranteed. Japanese forces on Hokkaido are mostly oriented north and east whereas the Soviets very early planning for an invasion were mainly looking at the west coast. However, since the Soviets probably won't make any serious look at it until the Kuriles, South Sakhalin, and Manchuria-Korea are secure then the earliest the Soviets could even try for is October, if their lucky, and if they can't manage it then their next window of opportunity would be in early-'46 so there would possibly be time for the Japanese to adjust their force dispositions on Hokkaido if they think of it.

The Soviets would never even think of going after Honshu. That's nonsensical. As is the idea that the US would try to oppose a Soviet landing on Hokkaido. Truman isn't interested in political suicide.
 
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Truman fought in Korea. Nonsense. He would fight. Maybe not win in Europe. (That is very iffy, the Russians really needed American logistics to get as far as they did, but by that time the western allies are in no shape to stop a lunge to the Rhine, either.) He would probably win in the Pacific and I'm not sure that the Chinese (and the Japanese) would not help him. (MacArthur).

All it would take (political) is a Soviet "betrayal" of the Yalta accords. Stalin, the fool, will provide that excuse.
 
Truman fought in Korea.

Five years later in a completely different geopolitical context and with a radically altered political outlook. In 1945, the American public would lynch him for attacking what is still viewed as a trusted ally to protect what is at the time viewed as a hated enemy.

All it would take (political) is a Soviet "betrayal" of the Yalta accords. Stalin, the fool, will provide that excuse.

The Soviets betrayed the Yalta Accord pretty much the moment they were signed. It still took several years of both real and percieved slights and a relentless PR campaign to turn American public opinion against them.
 
Truman at Potsdam had already decided on anti CCCP policy.

Which is why he was so happy when Stalin told him that the Soviets intended to fulfill his plan that his reaction was to write in his diary "Finis to the Japs when that happens!"

Asserting a viewpoint (different political context) is not only counter to the facts, it is counter-historical to an absurd degree,

To assert that the American public would have tolerated war with the Soviet Union, whom they still admired, in mid-1945 for the purpose of saving the Japanese, whom they hated, is not only counter to the facts or history, but simply absurd on the face of it.
 
Two years? Potsdam actually set the tone of strained relations. If Uncle Joe has already angered the western allies about Poland, going out of bounds of the Yalta accords in the Pacific means war defacto. (Korea is the defacto case. Why do you think that happened?)

Your understanding of ground truths is not accurate. Never has been.
 
Two years?

Yes, two years. The linked article states that Kennan's document, and I quote, "first came to public attention in 1947". Anyone capable of basic arithmetic can figure out that 1947 is two years after 1945.

Potsdam actually set the tone of strained relations. If Uncle Joe has already angered the western allies about Poland, going out of bounds of the Yalta accords in the Pacific means war defacto. (Korea is the defacto case. Why do you think that happened?)

Again, I see nothing about US public opinion towards the Soviet Union as opposed to Japan that indicates they would have tolerated war with the USSR for the sake of saving Japan. You keep talking about things that were either not in the public eye (And even much of this is disputable as we have ample evidence that Truman welcomed Soviet entry into the Pacific War in the form of his diary entry, primary source evidence that far outstrips anything you have provided) or talking about things that happened five years after the fact while ignoring the attendent changes and intervening events that happened between then and there.

Your understanding of ground truths is not accurate. Never has been.

More like your understanding of how debates work remains totally inept. For example, I can cite a 1945 poll by Fortune which asked respondents "Thinking back for a moment to our relations with Russia a few years before the war, do you think that we shall get along better with Russia in the future than we did in the past, not so well, or about the same?" 20.1% thought it would remain the same as it had been during the war and a remarkable 48.3% believed it would actually get better. The remaining 9.4% either didn't know or deferred from answering. ("Uncle Joe", What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II) This is quite a bit of evidence of a overwhelmingly positive view of the Soviet Union. Can you give anything similar that supports your assertion the inverse was true?
 
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Yes, two years. The linked article states that Kennan's document, and I quote, "first came to public attention in 1947". Anyone capable of basic arithmetic can figure out that 1947 is two years after 1945.

I did figure it (thanks for the unnecessary math lesson), but I also pointed out that Truman and his advisors had set the tone at Potsdam (1945), so apparently you cannot understand why Kennan wrote out what he did in 47?

Again, I see nothing about US public opinion towards the Soviet Union as opposed to Japan that indicates they would have tolerated war with the USSR for the sake of saving Japan. You keep talking about things that were either not in the public eye (And even much of this is disputable as we have ample evidence that Truman welcomed Soviet entry into the Pacific War in the form of his diary entry, primary source evidence that far outstrips anything you have provided) or talking about things that happened five years after the fact while ignoring the attendent changes and intervening events that happened between then and there.

Not my problem, yours. You have to prove that US policy did not abruptly shift with Truman. You can't.

More like your understanding of how debates work remains totally inept. For example, I can cite a 1945 poll by Fortune which asked respondents "Thinking back for a moment to our relations with Russia a few years before the war, do you think that we shall get along better with Russia in the future than we did in the past, not so well, or about the same?" 20.1% thought it would remain the same as it had been during the war and a remarkable 48.3% believed it would actually get better. The remaining 9.4% either didn't know or deferred from answering. ("Uncle Joe", What Americans Thought of Joseph Stalin Before and After World War II) This is quite a bit of evidence in favor of a overwhelmingly positive view of the Soviet Union. Can you give anything similar that supports your assertion the inverse was true?

This is not a debate. It is a refutation of your errors.
 
I did figure it (thanks for the unnecessary math lesson), but I also pointed out that Truman and his advisors had set the tone at Potsdam (1945),

Except nothing you've provided really states that Truman "set the tone", as you put it. Yeah, there were tensions at Potsdam that would later explode into the Cold War. The closest you've managed is to post articles showing that there were at Potsdam that the US was deeply uneasy about and would come to base it's further policy options on. You have posted nothing that indicates that the US had decided to violently oppose a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido should such an event come about.

so apparently you cannot understand why Kennan wrote out what he did in 47?

I'm pretty sure that would be you. Kennan wrote his memo in February of 1946 (1947 was merely when it became public knowledge) and it didn't actually contain anything new for him. He had long believed what he wrote in that document, long before Potsdam, before Yalta... even before the war. That he had a chance to write it then (his superior was on sick leave, which gave him the opportunity) and that it happened to occur at a time when it would be best received by a administration looking for new policies to address a mounting issue was a happy accident. Even then, it's adoption was not instantaneous: there is no single moment you can point too and go "this is when the US government adopted containment". Like most policy, it's adoption was a gradual thing.

Of course, even in 1946 the US public still believed that the ongoing tensions weren't worth fighting over.

Not my problem, yours. You have to prove that US policy did not abruptly shift with Truman. You can't.

No, it is your problem. Because for US policy to have any meaning it must have public support. Furthermore, I have already demonstrated that US policy was actively eager for Soviet participation in the Pacific War by citing a direct quote by a one Harry S. Truman made at the exact time you claim he had decided to fervently oppose Soviet involvement. I can further point to how the US furnished the USSR with active material support for an invasion of Japan in Operation Hulu or how American carrier air strikes against Hokkaido ports were done with the intention of assisting a future Soviet invasion, at least according to the carrier commander who carried out the strikes. You haven't provided anything more solid, because you can't.

. It is a refutation of your errors.

Your right, it isn't a debate. A debate would imply you have some sort of competence at this. It's more like you embarassing yourself. Nor do I see what citing a faff piece attempting a analogy between the UK trying to influence the US election in 1940 and Russia today influencing the US election in 2016 has to do with US public opinion in 1945 about the Soviet Union. Again, your ability to try and cite total non-sequitors, if not stuff that outright contradicts your own assertions, without even an attempt to show how it supports your point is uncanny.
 
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Not on topic.

Your right, it isn't a debate. A debate would imply you have some sort of competence at this. It's more like you embarassing yourself

On topic...

1. See Potsdam citation.
2. Still have not proved that Truman's policy was not an abrupt change.
3. US WW II propaganda about "Uncle Joe" is another refutation of your assertion about how the public opinion was a big deal. It had to be shaped to accept Stalin as an ally in the first place. It evaporated as your assertions do.

4. If you were debating, you would not resort to ad hominems, insults and red herrings to deflect attention from your gross misrepresentations of actual history and events. Stick to the topic. Prove your point if you can and move on. Or simply move on.
 
Not on topic.

What wasn't? You don't quote anything clear here.

1. See Potsdam citation.

Makes no claim that the US would attempt to violently stop a Soviet invasion of Japan nor presents that such was policy yet.

2. Still have not proved that Truman's policy was not an abrupt change.

Still haven't proved that there was a policy yet.

3. US WW II propaganda about "Uncle Joe" is another refutation of your assertion about how the public opinion was a big deal. It had to be shaped to accept Stalin as an ally in the first place. It evaporated as your assertions do.

Public opinion polls are not propaganda. They are much closer to data. Propaganda can and does shape public opinion, but it does not do so quickly. As I observed, it took years to turn the public against the USSR... just as it took years to build up support for it. None of this even begins to refute my central point that the US public would not tolerate a war against the USSR for the sake of Japan in mid-1945. Without that, what policy Truman did or did not have is irrellevant.

4. If you were debating, you would not resort to ad hominems, insults and red herrings to deflect attention from your gross misrepresentations of actual history and events. Stick to the topic. Prove your point if you can and move on. Or simply move on.

Geeze, pot, why do you feel the need to project onto kettle so much? No where have I resorted to ad-hominems or red herrings (you've done a lot more of the latter). Insults, yes, but inoffensive ones (as these things go) and their more tacked on at the end or beginning, with the meat of my posts being points and demonstration of evidence, whereas all you can do is claim misrepresentation of history and events in order to disguise your own inability to back up your points.
 
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CalBear

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Not on topic.



On topic...

1. See Potsdam citation.
2. Still have not proved that Truman's policy was not an abrupt change.
3. US WW II propaganda about "Uncle Joe" is another refutation of your assertion about how the public opinion was a big deal. It had to be shaped to accept Stalin as an ally in the first place. It evaporated as your assertions do.

4. If you were debating, you would not resort to ad hominems, insults and red herrings to deflect attention from your gross misrepresentations of actual history and events. Stick to the topic. Prove your point if you can and move on. Or simply move on.
Play the ball.
 
Three point shot.

The first of these American policies was established soon after Pearl Harbor, when Roosevelt agreed with General Marshall that international political considerations should defer to military requirements as long as the war lasted. The second policy, emerging in 1943, was that everything possible must be done to win the confidence of Stalin and his associates. (38)

These policies continued throughout the war although there is some evidence Roosevelt began to have some apprehensions at Yalta over Soviet policy in Poland and the other eastern European countries, but Roosevelt maintained he "could handle Stalin." With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Truman attempted to maintain Roosevelt's policy in getting along with the Soviet Union. However, at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945, Truman was exposed to the high-handed demands and intransigence of Stalin.

Much more at the link. Refutation in effect.

An ad hominem is an attack the man, not the man's argument. (Point raised to derail from the actual point which was that ON was wrong about evolving US policy in 1945. Claiming that someone does not know the history as it was is not proving that the counter-claim is valid.

On the contrary, it seems the data does not support ON in his "point". Of course this is not a debate. It is a correction of errors, assertionsz and wrong impressions trotted out as "facts".

My opinions can be wrong, but the historical record is not my opinion. The American people were not thrilled by Korea. Yet they went to war. If they wouldn't in 45, why would they in 1950? 2 years or 5 years or 4 days. It does not matter. A nation goes to war when its leadership decides. Truman decided when the politics was worse in 50 than in 45. QED.
 
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