How fast could Japan have lost?

not so impossible if you think about it

regarding phx1138 comments.

1. The IJN does not have to broadcast their whole plan for the USN to guess that they are about to have a Taranto pulled on them. Given a few bits of intel, and given that we are still at peace, they could gather enough information to figure out the IJN plan. That would have give tham the time to gather strengh in the pacific, and they had seven carriers in comission (not counting Langley). And they only needed 3 (and a bit of luck)at Midway
2. If the IJN is not aware they are sailing into an ambush, you don't need to weight the dice too much for the USN to win that alternative battle. If the IJN looses part of their carriers, and lots of airman on round one, they are going to have to go on the defensive.
3. The Brits had recently performed a very succeful attack on taranto. All they needed to give the USN was advice (if needed), and the reverse Pearl Harbour could happen.
4. With no Fleet capable of winning, and with the Germans having failed in their bid to finish the USSR in 41, the US might force Japan into a peace deal. If Japan fought on, they could resist years, but the war would be lost from the end of the first month...
5. Would Germany declare war on the USA in those circunstances? Would that change much?

But this could be made even simpler.
Give the US a spy in Japan. The US learns about the Pearl Plan, issues a declaration of war, both fleets sail, the big sea battle everybody has been planning since the 20's happens in early December 41 and the USN wins.
 
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If Japan did not lose their nerve, assuming an initial Malayan failure, but a capture of the Philippines, surely they could go back in greater numbers to Malaya?

But even if that is correct, a longer Imperial presence in Malaya and Byrma, even if only a few months, would be a huge morale boost as well as material, relating to India, Burma and Australia.
 

HMS Erin

Banned
If the Japanese fail to make their stunning advances early, they might be cured of their victory disease and not make the decision for fight to the death. Early in the war, and after a less-bad Pearl Harbor, the Allies might be okay with cutting Japan some slack.
 
regarding phx1138 comments.

1. The IJN does not have to broadcast their whole plan for the USN to guess that they are about to have a Taranto pulled on them. Given a few bits of intel, and given that we are still at peace, they could gather enough information to figure out the IJN plan. That would have give tham the time to gather strengh in the pacific, and they had seven carriers in comission (not counting Langley). And they only needed 3 (and a bit of luck)at Midway
2. If the IJN is not aware they are sailing into an ambush, you don't need to weight the dice too much for the USN to win that alternative battle. If the IJN looses part of their carriers, and lots of airman on round one, they are going to have to go on the defensive.
3. The Brits had recently performed a very succeful attack on taranto. All they needed to give the USN was advice (if needed), and the reverse Pearl Harbour could happen.
4. With no Fleet capable of winning, and with the Germans having failed in their bid to finish the USSR in 41, the US might force Japan into a peace deal. If Japan fought on, they could resist years, but the war would be lost from the end of the first month...
5. Would Germany declare war on the USA in those circunstances? Would that change much?

But this could be made even simpler.
Give the US a spy in Japan. The US learns about the Pearl Plan, issues a declaration of war, both fleets sail, the big sea battle everybody has been planning since the 20's happens in early December 41 and the USN wins.

I wouldn't assume the US would win a fleet engagement in December 1941, even if most of the Atlantic Fleet is pulled west (a move the Japanese couldn't fail to notice). USN doctrine, equipment, and in many categories personnel were markedly inferior to the IJN.

The USN operated its carriers in pairs at best, making large-scale strike coordination all but impossible. The IJN operated all six of their true fleet carriers as a single force.

The USN still had F2As in its carrier wings (a minority, but still), not to mention large numbers of SB2Us and the infamous TBD. The IJN has Long Lances against the miserable US torpedoes.

The pilots in the IJN air groups were a cut above the USNs (a temporary advantage as the USN's pilot corps was already growing faster, but a significant edge in 1941).

In the long run Japan is doomed, but there's a reason they were able to run wild across the Pacific in the first months of the war.

The US PacFlt in 12/41 had eight old BBs (plus one in refit) and three CVs. The Atlantic Fleet had both the new BBs (still teething), the other six old BBs, four CVs (one of them also shaking down), and the lone CVE (designated an AVG at the time).

The IJN had ten assorted carriers and ten BB/BC in the Pacific, with another BB ready by the end of the year. They outnumbered PacFlt in every class, and overall weren't far behind the ENTIRE USN.

If Japan did not lose their nerve, assuming an initial Malayan failure, but a capture of the Philippines, surely they could go back in greater numbers to Malaya?

Certainly. Of course the Allies can bring in reinforcements as well.
 
odds

If the USN wants to win, they will bring a large part of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific.
The IJN has an edge on pilot quality and fighters, but not enough to garantee "reverse turkey shoot" hapenning. If Ranger stays on the atlantic, Hornet and Wasp will make it 6vs6 in CV
If the New Mexico/Mississipi/Idaho and the North Carolina/Washington join the PacFleeet the USN has an edge on BB.
The IJN cruisers had a edge on night actions, and on torpedo actions. Not so much on a gun action.

Leaving the RN out will increase the IJN chances, but the British would probably join in.

Let's say that in a PacFleet Vs IJN the IJN has a 2/1 Chance of winning the first battle, and that if the USN brings most of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific the odds are even.
iow, anything could happen...
 
When Churchill lost Singapore, he also lost most of he world's rubber supply. We spent more on synthetic rubber plants than we did on the whole Manhattan project.
Singapore would have made a good air and sea base to interdict Japanese oil supplies, too. Mines work, even if torpedos don't.
 
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